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This study is concerned with examining, investigating and assessing
the nature and significance of the protest and resistance of both urban
and rural Africans in Southern Ghana, or what used to be called the Gold
Coast Colony, to the British colonial policy of Indirect Rule during the
second quarter of this century.
It has been argued that there were various factors which frustrated
and made it impossible to establish a successful system of Indirect Rule
in the Gold Coast Colony, One such factor was that the Akan political
system was characteristically democratic in theory and practice. By
contrast, Indirect Rule was by nature authoritarian and autocratic. In
short, the democratic Akan political system and the autocratic Indirect
Rule system were contradictory and could not possibly co-exist.
Furthermore, in their opposition to the Indirect Rule system, the
African leadership maintained that the chiefs* rights of jurisdiction
were inherent in them by virtue of the position to which they had been
elected by their people and they denied that they were derived from or
exercisable at the will of the Crown. They argued that the Gold Coast
was not conquered or ceded and thus the British Crown could not claim
sovereignty over the chiefs. The result was that British legislation in
the Gold Coast avoided, until 19hh, any explicit commitment to the
absolute sovereignty of the Crown.
In addition, Western education, Christianity, economic growth and
the activities of the press, all tended to weaken the authority of the
chiefs and consequently contributed to the failure of Indirect Rule.
The educated Africans - used here loosely to refer to both the intelli¬
gentsia and the semi-educated "youngraen" - came out strongly against the
Indirect Rule system because, in their opinion, it tended to turn the
(ii)
balance of political power in favour of the chiefa. The educated
Africans could not accept this as they considered themselves, and not
the chiefs, destined to the political leadership of the country.
It must be stressed, however, that the educated Africans were not
against chieftaincy; their respect for the position of the chiefs as
a representative of the stool was never in question. It was in fact
very misleading in the Gold Coast to speak of "detribalised" or "de¬
nationalised* Africans. Indeed one reason why chieftaincy survived in
Ghana was apparently due to the fact that even the educated elements
showed a great respect for it.
A second reason why chieftaincy survived was that under the customary
constitution the people possessed the power to destool their chiefs. If
the people felt that their chief had defied their wishes and supported
unpopular colonial policies, they would simply destool him. Thus,
fearing destoolment, the chiefs avoided close identification with or
integration into the colonial system.
Finally, some credit must also be given to the chiefs themselves in
preserving the dignity and prestige of chieftaincy. First, some of the
chiefs tried to accommodate themselves with educational and social changes
by seeking to educate themselves and their heir-apparents. Secondly,
some of the chiefs were very prominent in the leadership of the nationalist
movement.
Besides investigating the role of the educated Africans, an attempt
has been made in this study to throw new light on the role of the rural
people in the development of Ghanaian nationalism. It has been argued
that the rural people had a long and impressive record of anti-colonial
protest. What Nkrumah did was to exploit this discontent and dissatis¬
faction among the rural people and use it for his cause.
(lit)
Finally, the study has explained and demonstrated that Africans*
anti-colonial protest, which took different forms, ranging from passive
resistance to "disturbances" and "riots", was organised, forceful and
above all successful. As a result, Indirect Rule policies such as the
Provincial Councils system, the Native Administration Ordinance, direct
taxation, the stool treasuries system, etc., were seriously challenged
and frustrated. In short, as a result of this African anti-colonial
protest, the classic application of Indirect Rule of the type developed
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CHAPTER ONE
THE MEANING OF INDIRECT RULE
"Indirect rule", in the wider sense of the term, as a general
expedient or policy by which a conquering people preserve and utilise
the institutions of the conquered, was as old as man's migrations and
conquests, * Rome was the most famous empire to adopt such an expedient.
Several factors also made this expedient acceptable to the
British. "Among these," wrote Kiss Margery Perham,
was the tradition of colonial self-government in the earlier
•white' colonies; the extensiveness of the new 'coloured*
empire; its distant and scattered distribution; and the cost
and difficulty of extending sufficient British staff to
establish 'direct' relations with tens of millions of new ^
subjects.
Examples of Britain's adoption of this general expedient of ruling
"indirectly" could be found in the Indian states, Malaya,Fiji, or in
3
Buganda and Basutoland.
In West Africa, Mary Kingsley aired this indirect principle in
her West African Studies. With her characterisitc foresight, she
warned that "ruling on European principles through Natives, is very
different from ruling on African principles through Natives". ^
^"M. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, London 1962 (first edition,
1937), 3^5.
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M. Kingsley, West African Studies, London 1899, particularly chapter XVII.
5Ibid.
(2)
Sir George Goldie, the founder of the Royal Niger Conpany, held
ideas which appeared to run closely upon these lines. He maintained
that, Hif the welfare of the native races is to be considered, if
dangerous revolts are to be obviated, the general policy of ruling on
African principles through native rulers must be followed...." * J. £,
Flint, Goldie's definitive biographer, was of the opinion that
Perhaps Goldie's most significant historical contribution was
in the sphere of administration; through the administrative
system of the Royal Niger Company he laid down the theoretical
basis for what was later to become known as indirect rule - the
system of administration based on using the existing legitimate
African rulers.
However, it must be stressed, as Flint himself admitted, that Goldie1s
work was in the main theoretical. The great practical task of estab¬
lishing a really effective system fell, as we shall soon explain, to
.Lord Lugard.
In the Gold Coast, in particular, with which we are here concerned,
the British rule was from the start, as we shall describe in detail in
chapter two, "indirect".
»
Our primary concern in this study, however, is with the narrow
3
and not the wide meaning of "Indirect Rule"; with the practical imple¬
mentation and not the theoretical idea. This was generally connected
with the methods by which Lord Lugard and his immediate successors in
Northern Nigeria developed, during the early years of this century, a
rather widespread expedient into a carefully elaborated administrative
system of colonial government having its known characteristics and its
comprehensive code of laws and regulations.
^-Quoted in J. £. Flint, Sir George Goldie and the Making of Nigeria,
London I960, 262.
2Ibid., 9^»
% <Lo distinguish indirect rule in its wide sense or as a
general expedient from indirect rule in its narrow mea-
I shall soon exniain t v j.-u
dy,designated the latterUndirectaRule^r°U this stu~
(3)
It must be quickly added that Lugard did not introduce the
principles of Indirect Rule into West Africa. Governor F. Cardew had
already established an explicitly formulated Indirect Rule system in
Sierra Leone during the period between 189^ and 1900. * So why did
the Indirect Rule system come to be generally connected with Lugard?
First, as I. F. Nicolson explained, Lugard succeeded in a propaganda
campaign directed towards the creation of his own fame as an adminis¬
trator, and of the "myth" of the superiority of his territory, and his
p
methods, over all others. In this, he was helped by briefing of
The Times through that august journal's colonial department head, Flora
Shaw. Lugard's marriage to Flora Shaw in 1902 gave him a formidable
ally, a whole diplomatic intelligence, and publicity service in one
person. 3
"Lugard's myth" as "a great and humane administrator", and "a
great public servant" prevailed throughout his life and continued well
after his death. It was strongly upheld and confirmed by his definitive
biographer, M. Perham. ^ In fact, the first time it was seriously
challenged was in 1969 by I. F. Nicolson.
Secondly, Lugard was a very thorough man and his lavish document¬
ation in laws and instructions, and later his classic, The Dual Mandate,
helped to diffuse his model of administration. ^ Finally, his own
school of administrators were promoted to important posts in Africa and
beyond and carried his principles with them.
*C. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, Oxford University Press, 1962,
522-523 and 541-551.
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M. Perham, Lugard; The Years of Adventure, I858-I898; and Lugard: The
Years of Authority, 1898-19^5, London, I960.
3For example, M. Perham, The Colonial Reckoning, London, 1961, 58*
( <0
In any case, Lugard's model, as first applied in Northern Nigeria,
became the transcendent example of the working of the Indirect Rule
system at its best. It was applied, with a bewildering variety of
modifications, in other of Briton's possessions in Africa. In the
Gold Coast, during the period covered by this study, 1925-1951t when
the Government talked of introducing Indirect Rule, what they meant
was that they were remodelling chieftaincies or states on the Northern
Nigerian pattern. Hence, to understand what was meant by Indirect Rule
and te examine and assess its failures and successes in the Gold Coast,
it becomes important to define and describe the essential principles and
attributes of the Northern Nigerian model.
So what was this Northern Nigerian model of Indirect Rule?
Lugard, its architect, referred to it as the
Rule through the Native Chiefs, who are regarded as an integral
part of the machinery of Government, with well defined powers
and functions recognised by Government, and by law, and not
dependent on the caprice of an executive officer.
To Sir Charles Tenqale, for many years Resident and then Lieu¬
tenant-Governor of Northern Nigeria from 191^ to 1917 and a supporter
of the Indirect Rule system, though not an uncritical one, Indirect
Rule meant a:
Xugard, The Political Memoranda. These were the instructions origin¬
ally issued by Lugard when he was High Commissioner of Northern
Nigeria and were, after revision, published in a book form in 1906
for the guidance of his political officers. Later after the amalga¬
mation of Nigeria these instructions were further altered so as to be
applicable to the whole of Nigeria and were published in 1919. For
lengthy extracts from these instructions see A. H. M. Kirk-Greene
(ed.), The Principles of Native Administration in Nigeria: Selected
Documents, 1900-19^7> London 1965> 68-1^8. I have myself dependedon
Kirk-Greene's extracts.
(5)
system of administration which leaves in existence the adminis¬
trative machinery which had been created by the natives them¬
selves; which recognises the existence of Emirs, Chiefs and
Native Councils, Native Courts of Justice, Muhammadan Courts,
Pagan Courts, Native Police controlled by a native executive,
as real living forces, and not as curious and interesting pageantry;
by which European influence is brought to bear on the native in¬
directly through his chiefs, and not directly through European
officers - political, police, etc., and by which the European keeps
himself a good deal in the background, and leaves the mass of
native individuals to understand that the orders which come to
them emanate from their own chief rather than from the all-per- ^
vading white man.
In short, Charles Temple epitomised that rigid school of Indirect Rule
with its insistence on the rationale of Indirect Rule as the protection
of the "native" against the disintegration that would, in its view,
2
* result from too rapid a contiguity with western civilisation.
Donald Cameron, Governor of Nigeria from 1931 to 1935f advocated
Indirect Rule with a difference, a new look, modified and revived. To
him, the cardinal principle of Indirect Rule (or Indirect Administration
as he preferred to call it) was that the authority which the Government
3
legally recognised must be the one desired by the people. The
"Native Authority", he asserted, "that is not acceptable to the people
and is maintained only because we impose it on them is ... almost
4
certainly bound to fail". He envisaged three separate stages in the
formation of an Administration: the investigation, of an intense
anthropological nature, to discover who held authority; the voluntary
acceptance by the people of that authority; and finally, the Govern¬
ment's legal recognition of authority. ^ He viewed the fundamental
C. L. Temple, Native Races and Their Rulers: Sketches and Studies of
Official Life and Administrative Problems in Nigeria, London 1968
(first edition 1918), 30.
2
A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, op.clt., 11.
3
Donald Cameron,, Nigeria: The Principles of Native Administration and
Their Application, Lagos 1934, 6.
4
Ibid.
"'m. Perham, Native Administration in Nigeria, 334.
(6)
objective of such a policy to be the need to
Adapt for the purpose of Local government the tribal institutions
which the native peoples have evolved for themselves, so that the
latter may develop in a constitutional manner from their own past,
guided and restrained by the traditions and sanctions which they
have inherited, moulded or modified as they may be on the advice
of British officers and by the general control of those officers.
In short, Cameron represented that "progressive" school of Indirect
Rule which was more concerned with directing the evolution of indigenous
institutions towards representative forms similar to those of western
2
democracy, and less with stereotyping and preserving indigenous forms.
There were many other definitions of Indirect Rule by different
administrators and scholars. ^ They all add to the view, which is
clear from the evidence given above, that even in its original home,
Northern Nigeria, Indirect Rule came to have different meanings even
to those administrators who were responsible for its application.
Indirect Rule, in Northern Nigeria, passed through different stages
and its principles were restated and redefined from time to time.
Indirect Rule in fact became the label for a whole tradition of colonial
philosophy and administration» which comprised widely differing schools
of thought. ^
1
Donald Cameron, op.cit., 1.
2
R. E. Robinson, "Why Indirect Rule has been Replaced by Local Govern¬
ment in the Nomenclature of British Native Administration", in Journal
of African Administration, vol.11, July 195°» 13-
3
Indirect Rule was variously defined by scholars. For example, to Lucy
Kair: "The element in the Indirect Rule policy fromwhich it takes its
name is the maintenance in their position of the authorities recognised
by the native population, as the basis of development of a native
administration fitted to perform the functions of a modern government".
Native Policies in Africa, London 193&, 14.
M. Perham defined Indirect Rule as "a system by which the tutelary
power recognises existing African societies and assists them to adapt
themselves to the functions of local government". Native Administra¬
tion in Nigeria, 346.
4
R. E. Robinson, op.cit.
(7)
In spite of the continuous disagreement as to how Indirect Rule
was to be interpreted, there were still characteristic principles common
to the whole tradition of Indirect Rule. In my view, Indirect Rule
was to be judged Ly the existence of three institutions: "Native
Authority", "Native Revenue" and "Native Courts". I shall thus attempt
here to describe, illustrate and explain these institutions or prin¬
ciples, depending largely on the writings of Lugard himself, the archi¬
tect of Indirect Rule; his Political Memoranda and The Dual Kandate,
which are generally accepted as the supreme sources for the study of
Indirect Rule.
The essence upon which Indirect Rule was based was the recognition
of the indigenous institutions which the people had evolved for them¬
selves. Lugard asserted that,
I have ... continually emphasised the necessity of recognising,
as a cardinal principle of British policy in dealing with native
races, that institutions and methods, in order to command success_
and promote the happiness and welfare of the people, must be deep-
rooted in their traditions and prejudices.
Lugard urged upon his officers that the "Native" etiquette and
ceremonial must be carefully studied and observed; "native" titles of
rank must be adopted; and that succession to chieftaincy should be
o
governed by "native" law and. custom.
The exponents of Indirect Rule, or at least most of them, insisted
that recognition of indigenous institutions did not necessarily imply
, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London 1922, 211.
2Ibld.t 212-213.
(8)
an intention to preserve them intact. * They maintained that modifi¬
cations and change in the form of these institutions was feasible and
o
indeed inevitable. In the terms which became familiar, Indirect Rule
was conceived as Ma means of endeavouring to graft our higher civili¬
sation upon the soundly rooted native stock ... moulding it and esta¬
blishing it into lines consistent with modern ideas and higher stan¬
dards". ^
In the words of P. E. Mitchell, at one time Governor of Uganda,
The administrative system called 'Indirect Rule' endeavours in
each place where it is to be applied to ascertain what are the
persons or institutions which the people concerned look upon as
the natural authority. It looks, in doing this, to tradition,
but it is not traditionalist, and its regard for old things is
based not on their oldness but on their soundness; and after
all, if things are both ancient and alive, it is a reasonable
presumption that they are sound.
The indigenous agencies, or more precisely, the chiefs, thus
recognised were regarded by the Government as the de facto rulers of
their people. The Government supported them in every way and upheld
their authority. ^ The Chief, together with his council, was desig¬
nated a "Native Authority" or "Native Administration" organised through-
*Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories,





Sir P. E. Mitchell, "Indirect Rule", in The Uganda Journal, vol.IV,
No.2, 1936.
^Lugard, The Political Memoranda.
(9)
out as a unit of local government. * The functions of a "Native
Authority" were to maintain law and order in the area of its juris¬
diction, which included controlling local police functions and prisons,
according to customary legal principles. In addition, a "Native
Authority" was supposed to collect taxes, initiate local development
programmes, such as schools and markets, and to maintain roads. ^
Lugard's policy aimed at insuring that the "Native Authorities"
thus constituted should be an integral part of the machinery of the
administration. He wrote,
There are not two sets of rulers - British and native - working
either separately or in co-operation, but a single Government
in which the Native Chiefs have well defined duties and an acknow¬
ledged status equally with the British officials. Their duties
should never conflict, and should overlap as little as possible;
they should be complementary to each other ...
^"Lugard, The Dual Mandate. 200.
The terms "Native Authority" and "Native Administration", both
with upper case letters, are used in this study in the technical
meaning which they acquired under Indirect Rule. In other words a
"Native Authority" or a "Native Administration" is used here to refer
to that local government unit with definite executive, judicial and
financial functions. Lord Hailey defined "Native Administration"
in its technical sense as "the procedure by which a Colonial Govern¬
ment, whose European establishment is necessarily restricted in num¬
bers, has provided itself with the administrative machinery required
for certain definite purposes of which the most important are the
supervision of the tribal or other institutions which regulate the
domestic affairs of most African communities, the maintenance of law
and order, the assessment and collection of a native tax, the pro¬
vision of local government services, and the establishment of tribunals
for the adjudication of a wide range of issues to which natives are
parties." Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African
Territories, part IV, 1.
In short, a "Native Administration" or a "Native Authority" system
was, as L. Gray Cowan pointed out, "the practical application of
indirect rule." L. G. Cowan, Local Government in West Africa, New
York 1958, 12-3^.
2
Lugard, The Dual Mandate.
3
Lugard, The Political Memoranda.
k
Ibid., also The Dual Mandate, 203.
(10)
It is important to point out that the chiefs thus constituted
as "Native Authorities" were not to be independent rulers. They were
the delegates of the Governor. * Undisputed sovereignty was one of
Lugard's essential principles and he was determined from the start
2
that there should be no uncertainty whatever about this question.
He declared that the Fulani had lost by defeat the powers that they
had won by conquest. Now, by grace and not by right, some of these
powers would be returned to them by delegation, to be retained by good
3
behaviour. He asserted that "the chief himself must understand that
he has no right to his place and power unless he renders his proper
4
services to the state.
Under the Indirect Rule system, in addition to the question of
sovereignty, there were other limitations to the independence of the
chiefs which could be summarised as follows;
1. The chiefs were not allowed to raise and control armed
forces, or to grant permission to carry arms;
2. The sole right to impose taxation in any form was reserved
to the colonial power;
3. The right to legislate was reserved to the colonial power.
However, the chiefs were given limited legislative power.
They were empowered to enforce native law and custom, pro¬
vided it was not repugnant to humanity,-or in opposition to
any oidinance. They might also make rules on any subject,
provided they were approved by the Governor;
4. The right to appropriate land for public purposes and for
commercial requirements was vested in the Governor;
5. The right of confirming or denying the choice of the people
for the successor to a chiefship, and of deposing any ruler
for misrule or other "adequate cause" was reserved to the ^
Governor.
^Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 204.
2




3Ibid., 205-207. Aslo The Political Memoranda.
(11)
Subject to these limitations, the "Native Authority" as a unit of
local government was an authority on its own. It controlled the
appointment and dismissal of its officials. The relationship of the
political officer with his "Native Authority" was that of an "adviser"
or a "supervisor". Lugard held that a political officer should inter¬
fere with the affairs of the "Native Authority" only in extreme circum¬
stances. He wrote:
Government should be called upon as rarely as possible to inter¬
vene between the chiefs and people, for if a Native chief has
lost prestige and influence to such a degree that he has to appeal
to Government to enforce his order, he becomes not merely useless ^
but a source of weakness to the Administration.
The second principle or institution by which Indirect Rule was
to be judged was the existence of a "Native Revenue". The imposition
of a direct tax - usually an income or property tax - was in a sense
the cornerstone of the whole system of Indirect Rule.
The fundamental objective of such a tax, in theory at least, was
to assign to the "Native Authorities" a definite revenue with which to
pay the salaries of their officials, to inaugurate schemes of develop-
2
ment and to maintain their own livelihood and position. Apart from
the maintenance of the affairs of the "Native Authorities", Lugard
viewed the imposition of a direct tax as necessary for the following
reasons:
1. The direct tax was an acknowledgement of British suzerainty;
2. The direct tax was a corollary to the abolition of forced
labour and domestic slavery;
3. The direct tax was a universal necessity of civilisation^
4. Only by personally assessing the direct tax in the villages
did a political officer really get to know the people and
the country.
1
Lugard, The Political Memoranda.
2




Where direct taxes existed as in Northern Nigeria, Lugard's
system provided for two main innovations: the consolidation of these
direct taxes into a single "general" annual tax, and the assessment of
villages by British officials. * Although the tax was imposed, assessed,
and it rate fixed by the Government, it was collected in the name of
2
the "Native Authority" and by its own officials. Of the tax collected,
the "Native Authority" would usually retain one half and the other half
3would be taken by the Government. J
Closely associated with the question of taxation was the system of
"Native Treasuries". Although not an introduction of Lugard's, the
development and institutionalisation of "Native Treasuries" became funda¬
mental to the idea of Indirect Rule as expounded by him in The Dual Han-
/l
date. This system provided for the establishment of a regulated,
official treasury or treasuries for each "Native Authority". Into such
a treasury or treasuries was paid the "Native Authority's" share of direct
taxes and all its other sources of revenue such as market dues or the court
fines and fees. $ A simple budget was drawn up annually to cover the
salaries of the chief and other members and officials of the "Native
Authority" and to distinguish them from other expenses of the administra¬
tion such as public works and education. ^ Finally, the "Native Treasuries"
were required to keep accounts of receipts and expenditures and have them
available for the inspection of the political officers.
*
; also Nary Bull, "Indirect Rule in Northern Nigeria, 1906-1911",
in K. Robinson and F. Madden (eds.). Essays in Imperial Government,
Oxford 1963.
^
Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 242.
3
Ibid. Also M. Perhara, Native Administration in Nigeria, 72.
4
The system of "Native Treasuries" was first introduced in about 1910
by Richard Palmer, the Resident of Katsina (later Lieutenant-Governor
of Northern Nigeria, 1925-1930). The system was then gradually spread
to the other emirates of Northern Nigeria. M. Perham, Lugard: The Years
of Authority, 472; and Native Administration in Nigeria, 70-72.




The third attribute of Indirect Rule was the system of "Native
Courts". Indirect Rule recognised the existing indigenous judicial
system and the courts administering it. *
The jurisdiction of these courts was limited to "Native" law and
custom where Africans alone were involved, providing that"no punishment
2
involving mutilation, torture, or grievous bodily harm may be inflicted".
These courts were set up by warrants in which the powers they might
exercise and the limits of their jurisdiction were defined and the judges
3
and members were named. They were graded according to the power con¬
ferred upon them in the warrant establishing them. The "Native Court"
was to be open at all times to the political officer who could revise the
sentence or judgement or who could order a rehearing or even a retrial
h
of the case in his court. Finally, it is important to note that lawyers
were not allowed to appear before the "Native Courts". In short these
were the essential principles of Indirect Rule. But what were its objec¬
tives? The advocates of Indirect Rule agreed that its short term objec¬
tive was the development of the "Native Authorities" into units of local
government. But what was the long term objective? Was the aim of In¬
direct Rule to provide for the creation of completely independent African
states? Was it to make African countries a constituent part of a British
Commonwealth? If not, what were these countries to be?
If we turn to The Dual Mandate, we fail, as M. Perham correctly
noted, to fined a definite answer to this question. ^ Nonetheless, it
^Lugard, The Political Memoranda; The Dual Mandate, 5^8.
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~*K. Perham, Lugard: The Years of Authority, ^87.
(1*0
is clear from The Dual Mandate that Lugard believed that the ultimate
development of the African territories into complete independence "is
not as yet visible on the horizon of time". ^ Hence, there seemed no
need for him to deal in final goals.
In the period after Lugard, it became vaguely held by the
exponents of Indirect Rule that its ultimate aim was to provide for
2
self-government through the chiefs. But, it must be emphasised that
the attainment of self-government was not viewed by either the Colonial
Office or the administrators responsible for the implementation of
Indirect Rule as possible in any foreseeable future. For example,
Francis Agbodeka is right in pointing out, in the case of the Gold
Coast, that
no colonial administration before the fifties, not even Guggisbergfs,
felt that African independence could be a reality in the foreseeable
future, and the oft-repeated platitude that the British were, since
the twenties, engaged on preparing the African for self-governments
must, to say the least, be taken with a pinch of salt.
Having briefly outlined the system of Indirect Rule, it is impor¬
tant next to examine and explain why such a system which in theory
seemed coherent and sound was subjected to voluminous criticism and
became the bete noire of both the educated and rural Africans.
*Lugard, op.cit., 198.
2
For example. Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems arising
in Africa South of the Sahara, Oxford, 134. M. Perham maintained that
"the ultimate test [of Indirect Rule]will be the ability with which the
African territories take their place in the World as self-governing
nations". M. Perham, "A Re-Statement of Indirect Rule", in Africa,
vol.VII, No.3. July 193^.
3
F. Agbodeka, "Sir Gordon Guggisberg's Contribution to the Development
of the Gold Coast, 1919-1927", in T.H.S.G., vol.XIII, No.l, June 1972.
(15)
Perhaps the great weakness of Indirect Rule was that instead of
absorbing the educated Africans, it considered them as troublesome, a
nuisance, "denationalised" or "detribalised" class. As Professor E. U.
Essien-Udom noted, among British colonial administrators and officials
of the Colonial Office the "educated natives", the "Coast barristers",
were the most maligned group in Colonial West Africa and were generally
thought of as "the curse of the West Coast". ^ British officials
thought of the educated Africans as upstarts who exercised an unhealthy
influence on the chiefs and people alike. Essien-Udom added that
the officials complained that the educated Africans were usurping
the leadership of the chiefs and village headmen. They were
irritated by the pretensions of the educated Africans to leader¬
ship of their communities. They hated the spirit of independence
and self-reliance shown by this group, and their demand for the
right to manage their own affairs. The officials believed that as
a group the educated Africans were unprincipled, selfish, and un¬
representative of the "real native" - a variant of the "noble
savage".... As a group the educated native had become the scape¬
goat of British Colonial West Africa.
Naturally the educated Africans refused the officials' view of
them and saw it as a deliberate attempt to divide them from their un¬
educated country fellows. As early as 1906, John Kensah Sarbah com¬
plained that
it has been fashionable to disparage the educated African, and
no opportunity is missed by his unfriends to degrade, ridicule,
or point the finger of scorn at him. 3
Casely-Hayford had frequently protested against the "false, in¬
sidious policy" of keeping the educated and the uneducated African
*E. U. Essien-Udom's introduction of J. E. Casely-Hayford, The Truth
About the West African Land Question, second edition, London 1971.
2Ibid.
3
J. M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, London I968 (first edition
1906).
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apart. For example, in a speech in 1920 he maintained that
sometimes it is supposed that the educated African is a kind of
impediment in the way of successful administration. I do not
think that this view is held by all, but there are some who hold
that view. Some even would like to see direct dealing with the
untutored native, without the medium of his educated brother.
That view is a wrong one. From the earliest times of barter, when
the European wanted to speak with the black man, it was through
the black man who could speak English with some intelligence.
As the African advances in education and intelligence, naturally
the higher grade of educated African becomes the leader of his
people and we have educated men who have been chosen by the
Government to assist them in their deliberations. The time will
never be when it will be possible to dissociate the educated
African from his uneducated brother, ^Cheers! We made this quite
deliberately, and we made it with the approval of our people.
[Loud applause] 1
Similarly, J. W. De Graft Johnson objected to labelling the
educated Africans as "denationalised" and considering them an obstacle
to good government. In 1928 he stated that
the suspicion ... that the educated African is an obstacle to
government or that he is denationalised and has lost touch with
his illiterate brethren is quite unwarranted. 2
Besides objecting to Indirect Rule as a divisive system, the
educated Africans protested that the careers opened to them under such
a system were those of subordinates, and that the only outlet for their
3
political ambitions was through the "Native Authorities". Captain
R. S. Rattray described how the educated Africans felt "the energy they
have shown and the sacrifices which they have made in acquiring a
European education do not find a sufficient outlet in any present
h
schemes of government based on Indirect Rule".
M.J. Sampson (collected), West African Leadership: Public Speeches of
J. E. Casely-Hayford, London 1969. 62.
2
J. W. De Graft Johnson, Towards Nationhood in West Africa, London 1971»
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Most of all, the educated Africans were objecting to Indirect
Rule because of its ultimate aim. The colonial exponents of Indirect
Rule envisioned the implementation of self-government through the
chiefs. But the educated Africans held that self-government implied
representative parliamentary institutions. Michael Crowder put the
argument with regard to the educated elite of West Africa as thus:
They educated elite^ were even more concerned at the way the
British conceived eventual self-government not in terms of demo¬
cratically elected representation in a central Parliament, but
through delegation by the native authorities of representative,
usually chiefs, to a central political organism. Indirect Rule
seemed designed to exclude the educated elite from an effective
national rule, and was therefore seen as an agency of reaction
against the forces of modernisation which colonial exploitation ^
had stimulated.
In other words, the significance of the attacks on the "Native
Authorities" by the educated Africans was not that they were directed
against the chiefs as such but their attacks were motivated by their
2
exclusion from a political power base. On the whole the educated
Africans were not opposed to chieftaincy but to the political, adminis¬
trative, and judicial powers given to the chiefs under the Indirect
Rule system.
Another reason why Africans objected to Indirect Rule was that
they felt it was not, in its origin, designed for their benefit but was
3rather dictated by the necessity of the moment. Lugard himself
admitted that the derisory resources of men and money would have made
impossible any attempt to rule "directly" a vast and populous country
h
like Nigeria. It is significant to note that Lugard first founded his
1
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impression), 213.
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3
N. U. Akpan, Epitaph to Indirect Rule: A Discourse on Local Govern¬
ment in Africa, London 1956, 27.
Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 215.
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system in Nigeria and it was only later that he and other administrators
and scholars bagan to rationalise and to use a philosophical explanation
to justify the system. *
The criticism of Indirect Rule was not limited to its aims and
motives but was extended to include its principles and methods. The
critics of Indirect Rule argued that although it was based on the recog¬
nition of the indigenous African institutions, no genuine effort was
made by the colonial Governments to investigate and understand the true
nature of these institutions. They maintained that it was not only
that the political officers lacked the scientific knowledge of anthro¬
pology which would enable them to investigate and understand the nature
of African institutions, but they were not themselves interested in
knowing about "primitive" institutions. When the political officer
approached African society, he looked at once for the seat of execu-
2
tive power. His principal concern was to find someone who could
carry out orders.
This lack of understanding or knowledge of the real nature of the
indigenous institutions was a serious defect of Indirect Rule. R. S.
Rattray was right in pointing out that
our inability to reach very fair below the surface in our examin¬
ation of West African forms of government of old, and the mistakes
which I think we are making at present, are largely due to our
lack of understanding as to the real position of old of these so-
called emirs, kings and paramount chiefs, and of the fundamental ~
principles underlying the old African constitutions ... ^
^
K. Perham, "A Re-Statement of Indirect Rule", in Africa, vol.VII, No.3»
July 193^.
2
M. Perham, "Some Problems of Indirect Rule in Africa", in Journal of
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3
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The critics of Indirect Rule count several mistakes which were
committed as a result of the administrators* misunderstanding of
African institutions. The most famous example was that of the
"warrant chiefs" of East Nigeria. Under the false impression that
East Nigeria communities, like some other communities elsewhere in
Africa, were ruled by "kings" and "chiefs", the British appointed a
chief to each village. ^ Such a "chief" was given a "warrant" of
recognition making him the sole executive head of his local community.
But in fact, as G. I. Jones and A. E. Afigbo have recently explained,
East Nigerian communities had no "chiefs", in so far as that term referred
2
to persons holding executive powers. They only had ritual heads. In
other words, the "warrant chiefs" had no traditional basis; they were
completely British creations. It was not surprising that these "warrant
chiefs", who owed their position entirely to the British, abused their
power. It was even less surprising that the people protested against
such a system which was alien to their institutions. The people*s
protest in fact culminated in the famous Aba or, as it is also known,
the Women Riot of 1929» which resulted in the collapse of the "warrant
chiefs" system. ^
Another example was that of the Northern Territories of the Gold
Coast. R. S. Rattray showed that the people of the Northern Terri¬
tories were originally ruled by priest-kings, Ten'dama, who relied
upon moral and spiritual sanctions and were assisted by the elders or
4the heads of kindred groups. The Northern Territories were then
*For example, A. E. Afigbo, "Revolution and Reaction in Eastern
Nigeria, 1900-1929: The Background to the Women Riot of 1929". in
Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, vol.Ill, no.3« Dec.
1966, 539-558; G. I. Jones, "Chieftaincy in the Former Region of
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invaded by small warrior bands who introduced the idea of territoral
and secular leadership. The new warrior bands, however, ruled the
country •'indirectly" and interfered very little in the life and
affairs of the indigenous population. * In the majority of cases,
the Ten'dama continued to function exactly as before. When the British
came, the Ten'dama>who had seen the fate of those who appeared before
other officials of other colonial powers, kept aloof and remained in
p
the background.
Instead of the Ten'dama,
some wholly unimportant, and often worthless individual from
the local standpoint was thrust forward to confront the strangers.
Often he was a slave or descent of a slave, sometimes he was the
village bastard, sometimes the only man in the village with a
loin-cloth. Each and all of the above have actually figured from
time to time among our European-made African aristocracy in these
parts. 3
These Government-made chiefs were merely figureheads while the Ten'dama
who were in the background, remained for the people as their respected
and true rulers. However, until Rattray published his book, The Tribes
of the Ashanti Hinterland, in 1932, the British were unaware of this
fact and made no effort to investigate what the position of the Ten'
dama was. Similar mistakes vrere made in Uganda and Tanganyika. ^
Furthermore, to Africans, especially educated Africans, Indirect
Rule meant a policy of mere preservation of the past in order to pro¬
long colonial rule. To them, the claim made by the protagonists of
Indirect Rule that they were protecting African society from the
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cover to keep African institutions intact and to hinder African develop¬
ment as long as possible. * They argued that African institutions were
dynamic and not static; that there had always been considerable
flexibility and variation in African life; that this Indirect Rule's
craze for uniformity was fundamentally wrong and harmful.
In any case, Africans refused to accept the paternalistic atti¬
tude of the administrators in telling them how to develop and adapt
their institutions to social and economic changes. One African told
Miss Perham:
We do not wish for any special treatment. We do not wish to be
protected; we want to be allowed to make our own mistakes, and
to work out our own salvation, as you did. ^
Another criticism made by its African critics, and this time
perhaps more by the rural people than by the educated, was that In¬
direct Rule was an authoritarian and oppressive system.
In 1934, R. S. Rattray warned that the "masses of the people"
were likely to be estranged owing to "the undoubted tendency of
Indirect Rule, as now applied, to build up centralised African auto¬
cracies disregarding the bases of former African constitutions and
4
states, which were essentially decentralised and democratic".
Indirect Rule, its critics complained, undermined the democratic nature
of the indigenous African political systems.
During the pre-colonial period, the chiefs* source of authority
was an indigenous African one. Under colonial rule, their right to
U. Akpan, op.cit., 26.
2
Z. K. Matthews, "An African View of Indirect Rule", in Journal of
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rule depended on the colonial authorities. But although the chiefs
were no longer independent, the colonial regime had removed from them
many of the limitations to their authority which emanated from below. *
Thus, as Crowder and Ikime rightly assessed it, we have the paradox,
under Indirect Rule, of chiefs losing their sovereignty but at the same
time increasing their powers over their subjects because the traditional
checks and balances to the exercise of their authority were neutralised
2
by the same colonial authorities. Under Indirect Rule, almost all
the methods which were available to the people for the exercise of some
3check on their chiefs became "repugnant to natural justice".
The claims of the chiefs to tribute and service with the irresistible
force of the Government behind them became oppressive. The authoritar¬
ianism of the chiefs was assisted a step further by the fact that the
colonial administration, for fear of undermining the "prestige" of the
l±
chiefs, tended to ignore or to refrain from correcting their errors.
In Nigeria, when Donald Cameron came back as Governor in 1931»
he was astonished that the "Native Authorities" were developing into
autocratic and repressive feudal monarchies. ^ The situation in
Nigeria was also accurately described by W. R. Crocker who pointed out,
in 1936, that one regrettable feature of Indirect Rule was
the manner in which the system worked to bolster up effete and
corrupt chiefs at the expense of their people. Continuous and
heavy exactions of both goods and money from the commoners,
embezzlement of tax, arbitrary imprisonment, forced labour were ^the order in some chiefdoms.
*M. Crowder and 0. Ikime, op.cit. (the introduction).
2Ibid.
3
Z. K. Matthews, op.cit.
^Donald Cameron, op.cit.
5Ibid.
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The critics of Indirect Rule, particularly the educated Africans,
also objected to the "supervisory" or "advisory" relationship between
the political officer and the "Native Authority". As we explained, in
theory the political officer was supposed to interfere as little as
possible in the affairs of the "Native Authority". However, in practice
the situation was that in so far as the political officer had to effect
decisions made by the Central Government such as the building of a road,
railway or telegraph line, etc., through his "Native Author ity"f he
was an absolute ruler instructing his "Native Authority" to carry out
his orders. * It was for this reason that the chiefs were often
described by the educated nationalists as "bureaucrats", "mouthpieces",
"stooges", and "puppets" of the colonial regime. They were even branded
p
as "collaborators" and "traitors".
Another aspect of Indirect Rule which was strongly attacked by
Africans was that of direct taxation. This was objected to on several
grounds:
1. It was taxation without representation. For example, Casely-
Hayford argued that:
we claim, in common with the rest of mankind, that taxation without
representation is a bad thing, and we are pledged, as all free
peoples have had to do, that in our several communities the African
shall have that common weapon for the protection and safe-guarding
of his rights and interests, namely the franchise. It is desirable,
we hold, that by our vote we shall determine by what laws we shall
be governed and how the revenues - which we help to put together -
shall be utilised.
*M. Crovrcler and 0. Ikime, op. cit.
2
For example, Casely-Hayford's speech at the Legislative Council in
1921, Leg.Co.Debates, 1920-21.
3
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2. The primary reason for imposition of taxation was to provide
a source of revenue for the colonial administration. It was a
mere means of exploiting the people;
3. "Native Authorities" were in fact conceived by the colonial
administration as essentially agents for maintenance of law and
order rather than as instruments for raising the social and econo¬
mic standards of their people. In other words, the people did not
derive the corresponding benefits from paying tax;
4. The people were poor and thus could not pay the tax which
was itself very excessive;
5. The people were paying enough money through indirect taxes. *
Finally, although the working of the "Native Courts" was regarded
on the whole as the most successful aspect of the Indirect Rule system,
it still did not escape criticism. The administration of justice in
these courts was described as inadequate and corrupt and their fines
O
excessive. The African lawyers were in particular hostile to these
courts because the colonial administration banned them from appearing
before them and they were thus denied a profitable source of income.
In general, these were the objections and criticisms raised against
the Indirect Rule system. It is the purpose of this study to explore,
examine and focus new light on the way the urban and rural Africans
responded to the Indirect Rule system and expressed their objections
^"For such objections raised by Africans against direct taxation, see
for example, The Gold Coast Times, 4.10.1932; The Gold Coast Spectator,
9.7.1938.
2
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and levelled their protests against it in one particular area, namely-
Southern Ghana, or what was formerly called the Gold Coast Colony,
during the period 1925-1951* The year 1925 marked the creation of the
Provincial Councils of the Paramount Chiefs, through which the colonial
administration planned to rule the country. And the year 1951 witnessed
the achievement of self-government.
It is argued that African reaction and response to the Indirect
Rule system in Southern Ghana took different shapes and forms ranging
from passive resistance to violent demonstrations. Hence it is our
intention in this study, firstly, to describe and analyse the Africans*
protest and opposition to specific Indirect Rule policies such as the
Provincial Councils of the Paramount Chiefs, the Native Administration
Ordinance (N.A.O.) of 1927, direct taxation, the stool treasuries
system, etc. Secondly, it is our intention to examine and investigate
the Africans* protest and attack against the agents of Indirect Rule,
the chiefs. And finally, an attempt is made to assess the extent of
the success of this African protest and resistance to the Indirect
Rule system. This means attempting to unravel such questions as:
What was the background or basis of the rise of the post-war nationalist
I
movement? Why was self-government not achieved through the chiefs as




THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIRECT RULE, 1830-1924
Using indirect rule in its wider sense as meaning a general policy
of "utilizing, regulating and controlling" the indigenous institutions,
it could be said that the British rule in the Gold Coast was "indirect"
from the beginning. The tradition of British officials working with
the chiefs dates largely from the time of George Maclean in the 1830s,
even before there was any formal British rule. Up to 1821 the British
Forts had been administered by the "Company of Merchants Trading to
Africa", and their officers on the Coast had had no jurisdiction,
either civil or criminal, nor any power of trial. * In 1821, the
British Government took over from the Company but seven years later
it decided to abandon the Forts and only under pressure from the
merchants was it persuaded to retain them as nominal dependencies of
Sierra Leone. The responsibilities of the Crown were transferred to a
Committee of Merchants in London and the local administration was
2
entrusted to a Council of Merchants at Cape Coast. The members of
the Council were also appointed justices of the peace within the
limits of the Forts. The agreement between the British Government
and the merchants made it very clear that the Council "will only
*D. Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, Oxford, 1963» 193-
2P.R.0.,C.0.96.268/27, despatch of 30.10.1828 from R. W. Hay to G.
Barnes, R. Erown and M. Foster.
(21)
exercise authority and jurisdiction in the forts and roadsteads or
harbours thereunto adjoining, as well as over the persons who reside
there." * In other words, the Council was to have no jurisdiction
whatsoever over the people outside the two forts at Cape Coast and
Accra.
Goerge Maclean assumed office in I83O as the second President of
the Council of Merchants. However, from the start he completely
disregarded the agreement of 1828 and began to interfere in the in-
2
ternal politics of the states and to encroach on the powers of the chiefs.
During his period, a kind of "irregular jurisdiction" grew up, extending
itself far beyond the limits of the Forts. He established a court of
which he was judge, sitting usually with chiefs in Cape Coast Castle,
and assumed the right to hear all capital cases. J This court applied
•i Akan law except where Maclean regarded it as inhuman. Apart from
Cape Coast, there were three stations at which there were magistrates;
h
Anomabu, Accra and Dixcove. In order to preserve law and order and
suppress human sacrifices, he also employed members of the local
militia as police.
Naturally Maclean's extension of his judicial control and his
encroachment on the powers of the chiefs, did not go without a challenge
^P.R.O. ,g.0.96.267/97, despatch of 1^.11.1828 from R. W. Hay to Barnes,
Brown and Foster.
2
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from the chiefs and their people. For example, King Joseph Aggrey
of Cape Coast told Maclean:
We would wish to have nothing to do here with English laws. We
like to have the English here, but not to make laws for us.
The Country is ours, and we are the allies of England: but we
do not want to be made its subjects. The forts belong to you ^
but the Country belongs to us.
Again in 1834 when Maclean fined Kojo Tsibu, the Head Chief of
Denkyera, £200 for human sacrifices, the latter petitioned the Colonial
Office maintaining that he was not a British subject and therefore not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the British authorities or British
2
notions of laws.
A final example of the chiefs* protest against the authority of
Maclean was the case of the King of Appolonia (Nzima), Kweku Aka. He
persistently refused to allow Maclean to have any control over the
affairs of his state. Maclean reacted by leading an expedition in
1835 against the King and Nzima towns were bombarded.
In 1843 the Crown took over from the merchunts. Captain H. W.
Hill was appointed Lieutenant-Governor and Maclean a Judicial Assessor.
Maclean*s duties as Judicial Assessor were to sit in court with the
chiefs and try cases where Africans alone were concerned, in accordance
with customary Akan law and the principles of British equity. ^
^■Quoted in G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana
History, 1807-1957. London, 1964, Document 132, 165-170.
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When Hill arrived at Cape Coast, several of the chiefs came to
pay their respects and to enquire whether rumours that domestic slavery
was to be abolished were true or false. * Having assured the chiefs
that no interference with domestic slavery was contemplated, Hill
considered it a good opportunity to establish an agreement to their
being under the British jurisdiction. Accordingly Hill drew up the
document which subsequently became known as the "Bond of 1844".
The Bond provided that:
(1) the chiefs, in the southern areas where Maclean had exercised
jurisdiction, formally acknowledged British power and jurisdiction
for the protection of individuals and property;
(2) human sacrifices and other "barbarous customs" such as panyarring
were abolished;
(3) murders, robberies and other crimes were to be tried by the Queen's
judicial officers and local chiefs "moulding the customs of the Country
to the general principles of British law. 3
The original document was signed by eight chiefs and during the same
year twelve others joined.
The Bond did not grant the Crown any sovereignty or suzerainty,
nor did the Africans give exclusive jurisdiction to the British in
judicial matters. Under the Bond the chiefs gave the British only
^P.R.O,,C.0.96.4, despatch No.738 of 6.3.1844' from Hill to Lord Stanley.
2Ibid.
3
Ibid. The Bond was sent to the Colonial Office under the cover of
despatch No.788 of 6.3.1844 from Hill to Lord Stanley. The Bond was
reproduced by several scholars and writers, e.g. J. M. Sarbah, Fanti
Customary Laws, London, 1968 (first edition 1897), 281-282; G. E.
Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, 196.
(^0)
"limited criminal" jurisdiction which was to be exercised only with
the concurrence of the chiefs. The Bond implied that only by con¬
sent of the chiefs and their people could the British acquire apy
further jurisdiction. The Bond was silent as to the Crown's right
to collect customs, to administer civil justice, to legislate for the
public health, to erect municipalities, to provide for education to
construct roads, and to regulate the industrial and social economy
of the country. ^ In short, the Bond did no more than acknowledge
and legalise the jurisdiction which had grown under Maclean's in¬
fluence; it did not introduce much that was new from the point of
view of the signatories.
The importance of the Bond in the history of Ghana seemed,
however, to have been, as y\du Boahen rightly noted, "grossly exagger-
2
ated". Many of the Gold Coast nationalists saw it as the "Magna
Carta" of Ghanaians and considered that it constituted the only legal
3
basis for British rule in Ghana. Indeed, it was the date of this
Bond that gave Ghana the date for Independence (6th March). But in
fact, it is difficult to see how the Bond could in any way be regarded
as the Magna Carta of Ghanaians:
Jldu Boahen, "Politics in Ghana, 1800-1874", in J.F./k. Ajayi and
M. Crowder (eds.), History of West Africa, Vol.2, London, 197^» 167-
261.
Adu Boahen, "/isante, Fante and the British, 1800-1880", in J.F.A.
Ajayi and I. Espie (eds.), A Thousand Years of West Africa History,
Ibadan, 1965, 3^1-358. ~ '
^For example, J. B. Danquah, "The Historical Significance of the Bond
of 1844", in T.H.S.G.,III, Part I, 1957.
(31)
It ended no despotism and conferred no rights on the Fante, on the
contrary, it deprived the Fante chiefs of their sole right to exer¬
cise criminal jurisdiction and should therefore be regarded as the
very opposite of a Magna Carta, 1
In any case, the Bond was a dead letter after 1847 and the exercise of
British jurisdiction took a different course from that envisaged when
it was drawn up and signed.
After the death of Maclean, the British encroached even more on
the powers of the chiefs. The result was the strengthening and con¬
solidation of British authority and the corresponding erosion of the
authority and prestige of the chiefs. In I85O - when the Gold Coast
was separated from Sierra Leone and given her own Governor - J.
Bannerman and B. Cruickshank (the latter at one time an Acting Governor)
drew the attention of the Governor to the danger of this loss in author-
2
ity of the chiefs. They maintained that "it would be impossible to
govern the immense population of the Gold Coast without the instru¬
mentality of the chiefs", and for this purpose they suggested the appoint¬
ment of a "legally constituted deliberative assembly" to be called "The
Assembly of Native Chiefs" to frame laws with the assistance of the
3Judicial Assessor. It was for this reason, and also to raise revenue,
that "The Legislative Assembly of Native Chiefs upon the Gold Coast"
which passed the famous Poll Tax in I852 was convened. The I852
Assembly never, however, reconvened and the chiefs' authority continued
to be eroded.
*A. Adu Boahen, "Politics in Ghana, 1800-1874", op.cit.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.19. letter of 22.8.1850, Cape Coast, from J. Bannerman
and B. Cruickshank to W. Winniett.
-'Ibid.
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In 1853 the Government passed the "Supreme Court Ordinance" which
provided for the establishment of regular courts within the "Forts
and Settlements" to deal with civil and criminal cases. The Ordinance
also provided for appeal from decisions of the Judicial Assessor to
the Governor. A further extension of British jurisdiction took place
in I856 when an Order in Council authorised the Supreme Court to hear
cases arising in the "Protected Territories" "without the cooperation
of any native chief or authority". The native tribunals were left to
administer customary law but in practice their authority was weakened
by the existence of the British courts. * British law and courts were
in many cases replacing customary lax^r and the courts of the chiefs.
Naturally the chiefs resented this growth of British power and
jurisdiction. In 1864, for example, the chiefs submitted a memorandum
entitled "Grievances of the Gold Coast Chiefs" in which they put for¬
ward the following complaints:
(1) that they had been deprived of the practice of holding slaves and
this had "greatly reduced their power and dignity as kings and chiefs,
their influence destroyed and then rendered them helpless";
(2) that they were for "very trifling cause" occasionally put into
2
prison by the officials, which for them meant a "great disgrace".
The next year, I865, the British authority was resisted even more
strongly and openly by King John Aggrey of Cape Coast. He objected to
appeals against the decisions of his court being sent to the British
courts, and even went on to question the whole basis of British
authority. He described the British Law as "an extraneous growth"
^D. Kimble, A Political History, 196.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.64, memorandum of 9«8.l864 entitled "Grievances of the
Gold Coast Chiefs".
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and informed Governor Richard Pine that "Cape Coast in the eye of the
law is not British territory". ^ He explained to the Governor that,
The King's court is not of yesterday. From time immemorial it
has existed, and even existed before Cape Coast Castle was
erected, and the ground on which the Castle stands was originally
taken from my ancestor at an annual rate.
King Aggrey* s aim was self-government and the preservation of the
indigenous judicial rights. Significantly he worked in close cooper¬
ation with the educated elite who advised and wholeheartedly supported
him.
Governor Pine refused to accept the argument of King Aggrey and
informed him that he
could not permit irresponsible tribunals, exercising the powers,
at all events, of imprisonment, that the demand of the King of
Cape Coast, the only one in the Protectorate, who refused appeal,
was in fact a severance from such protection rendering the
British tribunals all but useless and depriving the inhabitants
of the council aid and assistance which Great Britain accorded
them. 3
King Aggrey stood his ground and continued to defy the British
authorities and became the spokesman of the widespread movement in
Fanteland against the growth of British jurisdiction. Finally, in
1866, the Government reacted by deposing and deporting King Aggrey to
Sierra Leone. He was not allowed to return to Cape Coast until 1869
and then only as a private citizen. He died in the same year.
The challenge to British authority continued, however, after
King Aggrey's exile and death. This, as Agbodeka elaborately showed,
was clear in Cape Coast, Anomabu, Abora, Gomoa, Agona and Wasswe. ^
P.R.O.,C.0.96.67, letter of I6.3.I865 from King Aggrey to Pine,
enclosure No.9 in despatch No.38. Cape Coast, of 7.4.1865 from Pine
to E. Cardwell.
2Ibid.
3p.R,Q.,C.0.96.67, despatch No.38, Cape Coast, of 7-4.1865 from Pine
to Cardwell.
4
F. Agbodeka, African Politics and British Policy in the Gold Coast,
1868-1900. London, 1971, 18-20.
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This widespread movement in Fanteland against British authority even
inspired similar protests among the chiefs and people of the Eastern
Districts. ^ By and large at the end of the 1860s there was a growing
disatisfaction with the gradual extension of the British authority and
jurisdiction.
This resistance to British authority reached its climax with the
formation of the Fante Confederation between 1868 and 1873* Primarily,
the Confederation movement was the culmination of years of resistance
to the extension of British power and jurisdiction dating from the
1830s. ^ Several contributing factors helped in the formation of the
movement. One important factor was the recommendations made on future
British policy in West Africa by the famous Committee of the House of
Commons in I865. The often-quoted recommendation of the Committee was:
That all further extension of territory or assumption of Govern¬
ment or new treaties offering any protection to native tribes would
be inexpedient and that the object of our policy should be to en- .
courage in the natives the exercise of those qualities which may
render it possible for us more and more to transfer to them the
administration of all the Government, with a view to our ultimate
withdrawal from all axcept, probably, Sierra Leone. ^
With regard to the Gold Coast in particular, the Committee added that
they were of the opinion that:
1Ibid., 21.
O
^For example, A. Adu Boahen, op.cit.; F. Agbodeka, "The Fanti Con¬
federacy, I865-I869", in T.H.S.G.,Vol.VII. 1964, 82-123.
^Quoted in G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, document 248,
311-312.
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The Protectorate should only be retained while the chiefs may be
as speedily as possible made to do without it. Nothing should be
done to encourage them to lean on British help, or trust to
British administration of their affairs, whether military or
judicial. *
As a result of these recommendations, the Africans of the southern
states of the Gold Coast took it that the British were about to abandon
the Gold Coast and that in future they had to defend themselves against
the Asante. Thus, the chiefs and the people began to organise themselves
in preparation for the withdrawal of the British.
The chiefs themselves had an additional reason for dissatisfaction
with the British authority. In the 1860s, as an economy measure, the
British declined to pay the chiefs the stipends which had been paid
regularly in the past. ^ The chiefs therefore decided to withdraw from
the British the privileges of jurisdiction which they had so illegally
acquired.
The Confederation movement was, moreover, helped by the agreement
reached by the British and the Dutch in 1867 to exchange some of their
3
forts in order to divide the coast into Dutch and British sectors.
The chiefs and the people, particularly in the western and Fante states,
opposed the transference of forts to the Dutch, who were the allies of
the Asante. The desire to expel the Dutch helped in the establishment
of the Confederation.
^•Ibid., document 2^7, 310-3H- The Committee noted, inter alia, that
the Judicial Assessor did not fulfil his role in assisting the chiefs
in administering justice. He instead superseded their authority by
decisions made according to his own judgement. The Committee recomm¬
ended that the chiefs should be left to exercise their own juris¬
diction, with only an appeal, when necessary, to the English Magis¬
tracy.
2F. Agbodeka, African Politics, 25.
3d. Coombs, The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands, 1850-I87^t
London, 19&3.
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The aim of the Fante Confederation was to provide security and
protection and internal self-government to the land, and to promote
education and social improvements. To achieve this, the Confederation
adopted a constitution and established a machinery of Government.
The constitution provided for a king at the top, supported by councillors
(chiefs, elders, etc.) and then by a National Assembly made up of
representatives of the states. ^ The establishment of a machinery of
government included the establishment of an army, a court and a system
for the collection of taxes. The Fante Confederation also inspired a
similar movement in the eastern states. The educated citizens of Accra,
supported by the kings and chiefs there, formed in I869 the "Accra
Native Confederation" to protect their country against British encroach¬
ment.
An important feature of the Confederation movement was the close
cooperation and collaboration between the chiefs and the educated
elite. The most influential of the latter on the movement was James
Africanus Horton. Christopher Fyfe has elaborately explained the
influence of Horton's ideas on the movement. Horton's ideas in his
book, V/est African Countries and Peoples, were, as Fyfe correctly noted,
closely followed by the sponsors of the Confederation. ^ In this book,
*F. Agbodeka, African Politics, 25.
2C. Fyfe, Africanus Horton, 183 5—1883i West African Scientist and
Patriot, 1972; G. Shepperson, "An Early African Graduate: James
Africanus Beale Horton", in University of Edinburgh Gazette, No.32,
January, 1962.
3
C. Fyfe, op.cit., chapter V.
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which he wrote in 1868, Horton proposed that the Gold Coast be grouped
into two large states, each governed separately, corresponding roughly
with the distinction of Fante and Ga. He suggested that in the west
the various Fante kings were to be united under one head king. ^ This
head Icing would be assisted by Councillors, i.e., lower kings and
educated members. With regard to the states of the east, he suggested
that an "educated gentleman" be selected as the President of the
"Republic of Accra" and that he be assisted by counsellors chosen by
the people. ^ These ideas were fulfilled by the formation of the
Fante Confederation and the Accra. Native Confederation. Horton saw
the Fante Confederation as the agent which would guide the development
of Fante society toward a modern state. 3 He asked the Secretary of
State to recognise the Confederation officially and even made a sketch
of a formal constitution for the Confederation. ^ Horton's ideas on
education and economic development were also closely followed by the
sponsors of the Confederation.
The British officials were positively hostile to the Fante Con¬
federation. They considered it a "dangerous conspiracy",' 5 and arrested
its leaders. They attributed its formation to the educated elite.
^"J. Africanus Horton, West .African Countries and Peoples, Edinburgh,
1969 (first published 1868) with an introduction by G.Shepperson, 114.
2Ibid., 115.
3c. Fyfe, op.cit., 100.
Vbid., 101.
•5c. S. Salmon, C.S. and Acting Administrator, to Sir A. E. Kennedy,
quoted in G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, document 280, 338*
(38)
H. T. Ussher, the Administrator, was convinced that the educated elite
were the real power behind the Confederation. He maintained that,
A small class of discontented and -unprincipled natives, princip¬
ally mulattos and semi-educated blacks (who appear to be an evil
inseparable from all negro communities) is active in its endeavours
to persuade the ignorant, impressionable and childlike Fantees,
that the time has come to govern themselves, and to throw off our ^
rule, retaining us as advisors only.
The British succeeded in fact in discouraging and eventually destroying
the Confederation movement.
Although the Confederation movement was killed, the ideals it
stood for such as self-government, education and economic development
survived and continued to inspire future generations. The movement
also had some important immediate results. Following the Confeder¬
ation movement, there was "considerable heart searching" both in the
Colonial Office and among the Gold Coast administrators, concerning
2
the proper relationship between the chiefs and the Government. In
1871, for example, the Administrator-in-Chief at Freetown advocated
giving stipends to the chiefs as the cheapest and most effective way
3
of maintaining peace and keeping roads open for commerce. He pointed
out that the existing system of giving the chiefs presents or "dashes"
1 4
was really expensive and not at all effective.
^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.94, "Memo on the Educated Natives'.', enclosed in despatch
No.98 ofzy.10.1o72 from Pope-Hennessy to the Earl of Kimberley.
^D. Kimble, A Political History, 458.





In the next year, 1872, Sir David Chalmers, the then Judicial
Assessor, addressed a letter to the Administrator in which he submitted
proposals to:
(1) "utilize, regulate and control" the power of the chiefs;
(2) utilise the gradation of authority which existed from the headman
of the village through the chief up to the king of a large district as
a foundation on which to build up a jurisdiction regulated by the
Government. ^
Chalmers advised that those chiefs who were "intelligent, humane, and
were affected towards Governemnt" should be selected and that they
should be required "to abstain from all excessive exactions and charges
and to conform their conduct generally to the instructions which should
p
be given to them from time to time". Apart from recognising the
courts of such chiefs, he also proposed that the Government should
give them stipends or salaries.
This letter by Chalmers was perhaps the first clearly worded
recognition by a Government official of the need to base local rule
on the chiefs. However, no action was taken to implement these pro-
poslas. It seems that during the 1870s and 1880s, the Government was
primarily concerned with economic and internal developments rather
than political matters.
By 187^, the British finally abandoned the policy of gradual with¬
drawal and by Letters Patent the Gold Coast forts and settlements were
separated from the Government of Sierra Leone and were "erected into"
^P.R.O.^.0.98.697/8903/3, quoted in a memorandum entitled "History
of Legislation in connection with Native Jurisdiction in the Gold
Coast and suggested Amendments to the N.A.O. of 1927", by W. J. A.
Jones, the S.N.A., enclosed in confidential despatch of 13.10.1931
from Slater to J. H. Thomas.
2Ibid.
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a colony, without consulting the chiefs and their people. * The terms
of the Order, as Lord Hailey rightly emphasised, reflected the "air
of hesitation" which characterised the policy of the Government. ^
It avoided the formula of annexation; it made no specific mention of
the Protectorate; and it did not define the areas to which the Order
applied. 3
This hesitant manner in which the Gold Coast was acquired encouraged
the African nationalists, both the chiefs and the intelligentsia, to
entertain their contention that the Gold Coast occupied a unique
position in the British Empire in that it had never been conquered or
ceded; its relations with Britain were those of friendship, mutual
trust and commercial alliance. ^ Sarbah substantiated this argument
by quoting a statement made by Cruickshanlc, at one time the Acting
Governor, in 1853* Cruickshank said,
Indeed we had no legal jurisdiction in the country whatever. It
had never been conquered or purchased by us, or ceded to us. The
chiefs, it is ture, had, on several occasions, sworn allegiance
to the Crown of Great Britain; but, by this act, they only meant
the military service of vassals to a superior. Native laws and
customs were never understood to be abrogated or affected by it. -5
The African rulers in their dealing with the Europeans, thought of no
allegiance as that word was understood by the English.
^"D. Kimble, A Political History, 302.
^Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories,
Part III, London, 1951. 197.
3lbid.
For example, J. E. Casely-Hayford, The Gold Coast Native Institutions,
London, 1970 (first edition 1903) chapter IV.
M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, London, 1968 (first pub¬
lished 1906), 83.
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Having put forward the foregoing contention, the African nation¬
alists accordingly argued that the chiefs* rights of jurisdiction were
inherent by virtue of the positions to which they had been elected by
their people and denied that they were derived from and exercisable at
the will of the Crown, This constitutional issue, as we shall see
later, constituted the basis of the Africans* opposition to several
peices of colonial legislation and became a serious obstacle to the
Government when it attempted to introduce an orthodox or a Lugardian
type of Indirect Rule, This was because, as we have explained in the
previous chapter, under a Lugardian type of Indirect Rule, the judicial
and executive powers of the chiefs must have a statutory basis, that
is to say, they must be derived from or delegated by the Central
Government.
The situation at the time of the creation of the Colony could be
briefly summarised as thus: at the coastal towns the British ruled
directly, closely supervising the chiefs where they did not supersede
them altogether. In the interior, however, they had no choice, due to
the shortage of administrative officers, but to work with the help of
the chiefs, or rather the chiefs were left alone to run the day-to¬
day affairs of their states, ^ In short, the British Government had
no clearly defined policy towards the chiefs,. Moreover the constant
changes of Governor(which, in the x/ords of Mary Kingsley, made the
British policy in West Africa "a coma accompanied by fits") made it
difficult for the Government to develop a stable relationship x^th the
chiefs. Africanus Horton noted that betxreen 1862 and I867 there were
''"For example, R. L. Stone, "Colonial Administration and Rural Politics
in South-Central Ghana, 1919-1951"t a Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge
University, 197^» chapter four.
*
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seven Governors in the Gold Coast. He concluded that
the British relations with the chiefs had been unstable; the
rapid and successive change of governors leave no room for
any fixed plan to be entered into for the good of the peace.
Following the creation of the Colony, however, there was a debate
on the role of the chiefs and their relationship with the Government.
In 1877, Governor S. Freeling pointed out that, with regard to the
relationship of the Government with the chiefs, a '•well considered and
comprehensive plan should now be decided upon and brought into operation11.3
He suggested that to get roads constructed, which in his opinion was
most necessary, at a comparatively small cost, it would be necessary
to "strengthen the power of the Kings and chiefs or to speak perhaps
more correctly to restore to them a portion of the authority over their
people which various courses have gradually tended to diminish." ^
For this purpose he proposed that the powers of the Kings and chiefs
should be "clearly defined and then that they should be informed that
they would be supported by Government in upholding this authority as
long as it was not abused". -5 He also proposed that the chiefs should
be given stipends. Finally he suggested that the services of an officer
with experience in "native affairs" be appointed solely for the purpose
of travelling within the "Protectorate" and explaining to the chiefs
the policy of the Government. ^ Some of the Government officials did
not quite agree, however, with the Governor's proposals, particularly
that of giving stipends to the chiefs. Hence the Governor did not
feel encouraged to implement his proposals.
^J. y\fricanus Horton, op.cit., 220.
2Ibid.







The'next year, I878, the Government went a step further by
passing the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance (N.J.O.), "an Ordinance
to facilitate and regulate the exercise in the Protected Territories
of certain powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities". ^ In other
words, it must be emphasised, the Ordinance made no claim to confer any
jurisdiction but only to facilitate and regulate it.
The Ordinance empowered the Head Chiefs (this term being subs¬
tituted for Kings) to make by-laws for promoting "the peace, good order
2and welfare" of their people. The Ordinance also empowered the Head
Chiefs and chiefs to establish tribunals to try breaches of the by-laws
and to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction in a number of minor
offences. ^ Civil jurisdiction was limited to:
(a) all personal suits in which the subject matter did not exceed the
value of £25; and
/ \ 4
(b; all suits relating to the ownership or possession of lands.
Criminal jurisdiction was limited to criminal charges in which a person
was accused of having committed any offence which might from time to
time be described by the Governor. ^ Finally, the Ordinance authorised
the Governor to suspend for a period or depose any chief who appeared
to him "to have abused his power, or be unworthy, or incapable of
exercising the same justly, or for other sufficient reason." ^
^"P.R.O. ,C.0.96.124, the Ordinance was forwarded to the C.O. under cover
of despatch No.133» Accra, of 3»7^l8?8 from Lees to Hicks-Beach. It
was passed on 24.6.1878. ,
2
Clause 5 of the N.J.P., No,8 of 1878, later No.5 of I883.
-^Clause 10 of the N.J.O.
4
Clause 11 of the N.J.O.
■^Clause 12 of the N.J.O.
^Clause 29 of the N.J.O. This clause, as we shall later explain, was
most objected to by the Africans. For instance, as late as 1928, J.
W. De-Graft Johnson maintained that the Government's assumption of
the right to suspend or dismiss a chief on "sufficient cause" was
(44)
The I8780rdinance was not, however, put into force till I883,
when it was repealed and re-enacted, with one important modification
by which decisions of the native tribunals were made subject to appeal
to the British courts. ^ There were several reasons for the delay in
applying the Ordinance. In I878, the .Acting Governor stated that he
could not proclaim the Ordinance as he had no officer of sufficient
"native experience" who could explain to the chiefs of the interior
2
states the purpose of the Ordinance. H. T. Ussher, who assumed
office in 1879 as Governor, had different reasons for not applying
the Ordinance. He maintained that
practically, the interior Kings and chiefs have made little
or no progress towards civilisation. Their courts are as venal,
their decisions as unjust and they themselves as superstitious
and ignorant as they were twenty, or for that matter, one
hundred years ago.
As an alternative to proclaiming the Ordinance, he suggested the
appointment of District Commissioners in the interior who could explain
the Ordinance to the chiefs. ^
"morally wrong in as much as the people and their chiefs had not
given exclusive jurisdiction to the British Government at any time.
Nor was the 'sufficient cause* as interpreted by the Government
quite in keeping with the traditions of Native Polity". J. W.
De-Graft Johnson, Towards Nationhood in West Africa, London, 1971
(first published 1928), 38*
*D. Kimble, A Political History, 462.
^P.R.O.,0.0.96.125, despatch No.230, Accra, of 18.11.I878 from Lees
to Hicks-Beach.
3
P.R.O.,0.0.96.130» despatch of 21.1.1880 from Ussher to Hicks-Beach.
4Ibid.
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It seemed, however, that the most important reason for the delay
in applying the Ordinance was that, as Sarbah correctly noted, because
of section 29 (which empowered the Governor to suspend or dismiss a
chief) many of the chiefs, under pressure form their people, declined
to come Tinder the provisions of the Ordinance. ^ The people saw in
section 29 an encroachment on their customary constitution which
vested in them^and not the Crown, the right to dismiss or destool a
chief. As a result of this the Ordinance was originally applied in
1883 to only six Head Chiefs and even twenty years later, only eighteen
2
Head Chiefs came under its provisions.
The Native Jurisidction Ordinance was in any case a limited
measure. It was mainly concerned with the worIcing of the native
tribunals and little effort was made to regulate the executive and fiscal
powers of the chiefs. The Ordinance, for instance, omitted any ref¬
erence to stipends or direct taxation. But even with regard to its
primary objective, namely regulating the working of the native tribunals,
the Ordinance had several defects and shortcomings. For example (and
apparently fearing that the Africans would raise the question of the
inherent right of jurisdiction of the chiefs), the Ordinance made no
provisions for any procedure for the appointment of chiefs by the
Government nor for any procedure for declaring which chiefs should be
3entitled to exercise jurisdiction. Again though provision was made
for an appeal to administrative officers, the latter had no power of
^"J. M. Sarbah, op.cit. 13^.
^Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1903*
3
Lord Hailey, An African Survey, London, 1933i ^68.
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supervision or revision of the working of the native tribunals. As
a result, and because the court fees and fines were appropriated by
the members of the tribunal, tribunals were established in the smallest
villages which the administrative officers were powerless to close. *
Another serious defect of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was
that although it empowered the chiefs to make by-laws, it described no
procedure to compel them to enforce such by-laws. In practice, the
chiefs proved unwilling or unable to make by-laws which would meet with
any opposition from their people, for if they attempted to enforce them
this might result, and did result in some cases, in their destool-
ments. ^
Considering the shortcomings of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance,
it was not surprising that the "heart-searching" concerning the relation¬
ship of the chiefs with the Government continued even after that
Ordinance came into operation. Early in April 1888, Governor W. B.
Griffith pointed out that the power of the chiefs was decreasing and
would continue to decrease with the spread of civilization and accordingly
the appointment of administrative officers would become more and more
necessary. ^ He concluded that "it will be well to preserve the
influence of native law as far as possible but its extinction can, I
think, only be regarded as a matter of time, which is tending rapidly
to that end". ^
1
Ibid.
^R. L. Buell was of the opinion that the system of by-laws failed
because "the Government has attempted to persuade the chiefs to en¬
force by this moans obligations which are largely misunderstood and
therefore unpopular with the natives, and which concern subjects that
are really European in nature....", R. L. Buell, The Native Problem
in Africa, London, 19&5 (first edition 1928), 803.
3





A few days later, when two prisoners escaped from King Tackie's
prison and asked for British protection, the Governor ordered an enquiry
into the working of native prisons and native courts. W. B. Griffith,
Jr., the Acting Queen's Advocate, who made the enquiry, was of the
opinion that
the judges composing these courts fthe native courts^ are
illiterate natives who have their decisions as much on fetish as
on facts and who it is universally believed are prepared to give
any decision provided that they receive a consideration before¬
hand ... the fees required by these native courts are excessive
and both plaintiff and defendant are often heavily mulcted.
He contended that the time had arrived when the question of native
courts and native prisons possessing powers by virtue of custom should
2be grappled with and placed on a sound and definite basis. He pro¬
posed - by means of enacting an Ordinance - the gradual extinction of
the chiefs* prisons, and in consequence of the native courts and, as
an alternative, advocated that the country should in the future be
ruled directly through District Commissioners. ^ Understandably,
Governor Griffith concurred with these views.
The Acting Colonial Secretary, P. Hughes, disagreed with the
Acting Queen's Advocate's proposal to allow the power of the chiefs
to die out. He maintained: "How then are we to keep touch with the
people of the interior. The Colony cannot afford the number of
District Commissioners which would be required." ^ In conclusion,
*P.R.O.,C.O.96.191» memorandum on Native Prisons, by W. B. Griffith,
Jr., the Acting Queen's Advocate, enclosed in despatch No.116 of





P.R.O. ,C.0.96.191, letter of 22.1.1888 from P. Hughes, Acting C.S.
to Governor W. B. Griffith, enclosure 4 in despatch No.116 of 10.4.
1888 from Governor W. B. Griffith to Lord Knutsford.
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he recommended that native prisons should be supervised as far as
practicable, and that the chiefs should be warned that if abuses were
detected their prisons would be closed, * He hoped that "the mere
fact of the knowledge that the Government has power by law to close
p
their prisons will have good effect". In the end, what was intended
as compromise legislation between the views of the Acting Queen's
Advocate and the Acting Colonial Secretary was passed; the "Native
Prisons Ordinance of 1888" empowered the Governor to regulate and, if
necessary, to close the prisons of the chiefs and it prohibited imprison¬
ment in them for longer than one month. ^
By the early 1890s, the Government became convinced that the
failure of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance was due mainly to
the fact that it did not provide the Government with substantial power
of control over the chiefs and their tribunals. As a result, the
Government enacted in 1894 a bill amending the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance and providing that every native tribunal must be recognised
by the Governor as a condition of exercising jurisdiction and that no
native tribunal or chief besides those recognised by the Governor could
exercise jurisdiction. ^ A Commission appointed in the same year under
the chairmanship of the Chief Justice, Sir. J. F. Hutchinson, to
enquire into the constitution, jurisdiction and procedure of native
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
■^D. Kimble, A Political History, 646.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.697/6903/B, op.cit.
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tribunals, agreed with the amendments made by the 189^ bill. *
However, the new Governor, Sir William Maxwell, who assumed office in
1895» withdrew the bill as he thought that it dealt too exclusively
with native tribunals and not sufficiently with the powers, duties
and responsibilities of chiefs. 2 He contended that it should be laid
down by law that the elections of chiefs by their people should require
the sanction of the Government before becoming operative. 3 It is
interesting to note that this latter view was not shared by Mr. Vroom,
a citizen of ELmina and an assistant of the Secretary for Native
Affairs at the time. Vroom argued that the Governor should not have
the power to withhold confirmation of an election if satisfied that
4
it had been carried out in accordance with customary law.
In I896, Sir William Maxwell drafted a new bill which provided
for the recognition and appointment of chiefs and for rules to be made
regulating: (a) the classes of chiefs and the assignment to each class
of particular powers; (b) the payment of stipends to the chiefs of
the several classes; (c) the delineation of districts within which
chiefs were to exercise power; and (d) the election, appointment,
duties, supervision, suspension and dismissal of the chiefs. ^ By and
large, the bill gave the Government considerable control over the
chiefs, a measure to which the chiefs and their people were opposed.
The bill coincided, however, with the African's strong agitation against
the Lands Bill of 1897 and as a result of this, the Government "con¬





^P.R.O.,0.0.96.272, Governor's despatch No.131 of 15.^.1896.
(50)
The question of the land had in fact been a cause of great
tension and misunderstanding between the people and the Government.
In the Gold Coast there were three types of land: stool, family, and
private land, all of which had owners. * It was true that long term
leases occurred but this did not involve a transfer of ownership.
By the 1880s, however, the Government was anxious to secure control
over the land so as to be able to exploit its wealth in the form of
p
timber, minerals, etc. The reasons given by the Government were of
course different, namely, to protect land owners fbom unscrupulous
speculators, and to check ruthless exploitation of minerals, forests,
etc. In 189^, the Government enacted a bill "to vest waste lands,
forest lands, and minerals in the Queen". 3 The bill also provided
that future grants of land, minerals, timber, etc., were to be made
only with the concurrence of the Governor. The bill implied that
there was "Crown land" on the Gold Coast and it was this idea to which
the people strongly objected. ^ They argued, and rightly too, that
there was no such thing as "waste" lands in the Gold Coast. As a
result of the Africans* opposition to the bill, the Government
decided not to proceed with it.
For example, J. E. Casely-Hayford, The Truth About the West African
Land Question, London, 1971 (first edition 19137-
2
F. Agbodeka, African Politics, 138.
^D. Kimble, A Political History, 33^-338.
4
Several petitions were made against the Bill, e.g., (1) the petition
of Himan, dated 29-3-1895J (2) the petition of Cape Coast, dated
9.^.1895; (3) the petition of Elmina, dated 29.^.1895» These
petitions were sent to the C.O. under the cover of despatch N0.I87,
Accra, of 9«5*l895 from Maxwell to Rippon, P.R.O.,C.O.96.257»
(51)
The Governemnt tried again in 1897. The Lands Bill of that
year, although making no claim to land ownership, held that what might
properly be called "public land" had to be administered by the
Government. * It provided that the Government could declare that any
piece of land had no owner, and then authorise its occupation. The
bill also provided that Africans could make no concessions to Europeans
without the consent of the Governor. This bill was met with even stronger
opposition from the Africans. They objected to the Government's claim
of exercising paramount power in the country. This, they argued,
belonged to the chiefs and their people. The protest against the bill
culminated in the formation of the Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights
Protection Society (A.R.P.S.), an alliance of the chiefs and the
intelligentsia. The Society was formed with the immediate objective
of organising the protest against the 1897 bill. For this purpose the
Society convened meetings, wrote petitions and finally in 1898 sent a
delegation to London. The delegation succeeded in its mission. The
Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, agreed that customary law
o
should apply with regard to the devolution of land. The Gold Coast
Government contented itself with passing in 1900 the Concessions
Ordinance which provided only that proposed concessions were to be
reviewed by the Supreme Court. The A.R.P.S., building on its
successes of I898, widened its objectives and became the most important
nationalist movement and means of communication between the Government
and the chiefs and their people, until it was superseded by the
Provincial Councils.
^D. Kimble, A Political History,
^Ibid., 354.
(52)
Matthew Nathan, who assumed office in 1900, aimed ut strengthen¬
ing the authority of the chiefs "by whom a very large part of the colony
is necessarily governed" and encouraged them to make by-laws. * In
particular, he supported the dignity and prestige of the Head Chiefs;
"recognition is given to their position; communications to their
p
subordinates are sent through them ..." In 1902, he created the
Department of Native .Affairs with the intention "to secure greater
continuity in the administration of Native Affairs, and to collect
more complete records with regard to them than has previously been
3
possible".
Two years later, in 1904, Nathan passed the Chiefs Ordinance
which empowered the Governor to confirm the election and instalation
4
of a chief. This provision, however, as Lord Hailey later noted,
did not enable the Government to maintain that a chief could exercise
no legal powers till formally recognised as a "Native Authority". ^
In other words, under the Ordinance application for confirmation was
permissive and failure to apply for, or obtain, confirmation did not
prevent a chief from exercising jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Ordinance, even on a limited scale, aimed at giving the Government
more control over the chiefs. Naturally the Africans opposed it. The
two African members on the Legislative Council, J. M. Sarbah and J. P.
Brown, came out strongly against it. The latter, who was also the
President of the A.R.P.S., denounced it as unwarranted interference
with the right of the people to choose and depose a chief. ^ The
Gold Coast Leader called it "the most iniquitous, insidious and inter-
7
fering piece of legislation nicely worded that could be devised".
^-Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1903*
2Ibid.
3ibid.
^Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1904.
^Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territor¬
ies, Part III, 202.
(53)
It is interesting to remark here that perhaps one reason why
the Government during Nathan's term of office (1900-1904) began
to concern itself in a clear and practical manner, if only on a very
limited scale, with strengthening the authority of the chiefs, was due
to the writings of Mary Kingsley. Mary Kingsley had argued and
explained in her Travels in West Africa, published in 1897. and
West .African Studies, published in 1899» that there was reason and
coherent rationale in African indigenous institutions. Her ideas
seemed to have strong impact on the European officials* outlook
towards African institutions. In introducing the third edition of
her Travels in West Africa, J. E. Flint wrote:
Mary Kingsley's insistence on the importance of traditional
values and the need for their preservation was at the time
extremely important. She did more than any other writer to
produce in Europe a willingness to try to understand African
behaviour, and it was from her views that the system of
indirect rule, directed towards preventing a wholesale break¬
up of traditional society, gained strength. 1
Significantly Mary Kingsley was much attached to Nathan. She
"admired and trusted" him and wrote him letters when he was in




Quoted in A. P. Haydon, "The Good Public Servant of the State: Sir
Matthew Nathan as Governor of the Gold Coast, 1900-1904", in T.H.S.G.,
Vol.XI,1970, 105-121.
7Ibid.
^Mary Kingsley, Travels in West Africa, London, 1965. with an intro¬
duction by J. E. Flint, XVII-XVIII.
2
For such letters, see S. Gwynn, The Life of Mary Kingsley, London,
1932, 216-221 and 225-229.
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During the same year in which the Chiefs Ordinance was passed
the Chief Justice, W. B. Griffith, and the Attorney-General, W. Osborne,
submitted memoranda on the policy to be followed with regard to the
powers and jurisdiction of the chiefs. Their views were diametric¬
ally opposed. Whereas the former objected to the extension of the
scope of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and advocated that such
improvements in it as were considered necessary could be effected by
means of regulations; the latter pressed for the introduction of a
new Ordinance to be of general application throughout the Colony. ^
The new Governor, Sir John P. Rodger, supported the views of the
Chief Justice in order "to avoid endless discussion and interminable
delay" but the Secretary of State directed that a new Ordinance should
p
be introduced. As a result, a bill was introduced in 1907 with the
aim of replacing the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and defining more
clearly the powers and duties of the chiefs. It provided for the first
time for executive control by the Government over the decisions of the
chiefs. Among the important provisions of the bill were the following:
(1) the Governor was empowered to extend, remove, or curtail any
part of jurisdiction, civil or criminal, of a native tribunal;
(2) the Governor was empowered to suspend, or to depose or dismiss
any chief who should appear to him to have abused his powers, etc.;
(3) the Governor was empowered to remit or reduce any sentence of a
native tribunal;
(4) the registrars of the native tribunals were to be appointed by





The A.R.P.S. strongly objected to the measure. Casely-Hayford
adduced in opposition to the bill the argument that since the rights
of jurisdiction were inherent in the chiefs, the Governor was not
competent to withdraw or to even vary them. ^ Hayford was joined in
his objection to the bill - though for different reasons - by some of
the Government officials. The Chief Justice, Griffith, objected to
the extension of "native jurisdiction" to towns such as Accra where
O
the the Supreme Court was established. c The Secretary for Native
.Affairs, F. G. Crowther, 3 objected to the bill on the ground that
the chiefs as a whole were incapable of exercising justly the judicial
powers or of performing adequately the executive duties which the bill
conferred and imposed upon them. ^ The Colonial Secretary, Bryan, also
regarded any scheme for ruling the country through the chiefs as im¬
practicable or at least premature. -5 As a result of this opposition
from both the A.R.P.S. and three of his important officials, Governor
Rodger, himself an unwilling supporter of the measure, convinced the




F. G. Crowther: Appointed draughtsman at the P.W.D., the Gold Coast,
in 1898; Inspector of Schools, 1901; Travelling Commissioner, 1902;
Acting Director of Education, 1903; D.C., 190^; Acting S.N.A., 1906;





Although giving up the idea of introducing a new Ordinance, in
1910 Sir John P. Rodger introduced and passed a bill amending the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. By this bill, the provisions of the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance were applied to all the states of the
Colony, and a greater degree of systemisation in the conduct of the
native tribunals was ensured. ^ The Chief Justice, Griffith, who, as
we have seen, was opposed to any proposal to extend the sphere of
"native jurisdiction", opposed the measure. The two African members
on the Legislative Council, Sarbah and T. Hutton-Mills, also objected
to several points in the bill. For instance, Sarbah suggested that
the suspension and dismissal of chiefs should be by a resolution of
the Legislative Council and not by an order of the Governor. ^ In
fact, because of objections raised by Hutton-Mills and Sarbah, the
Government made a compromise by consenting to repeal section 16 of the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance which empowered the Governor to extend,
remove, or curtail any part of the jurisdiction of a native tribunal,
and thus encouraged them in their contention that the jurisdiction of
chiefs was inherent. 3 The proceedings of the debate were not immediately
made available and Sarbah was unjustifiably criticised to the extent
that stones were thrown at his house for supporting the measure. ^
Unfortunately, he died a few months later, and was consequently unable
to rebut his critics.
Report on the Native Affairs Department, 1910.
2
Gold Coast Government Gazette, 1910.
3
P.R.O.,C.0.96.697/6903/b., op.cit.
Kimble, A Political History, 469.
(57)
The 1910 amendment did not, however, secure the satisfactory working
of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. One difficulty was that, as
we have explained, although the Ordinance had empowered the chiefs
to make by-laws, it did not empower the Government to compel them to
make or enforce such by-laws. In practice, the chiefs made by-laws
only on matters which interested them, but the Government wanted them
to make and enforce by-laws on matters which it thought necessary. For
example, almost since the passing of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance,
the Government had been urging the chiefs to pass by-laws for forest
preservation, yet none were in fact made. So in 1911 the Government
decided to take the measure in its hands and passed a Forest Law
authorising the establishment of forest reserves. * The A.R.P.S.
opposed the measure on the ground that the Government had no right to
dictate to chiefs how they were to use or refrain from using their lands.
The Society, as in I898, sent a delegation to London. In view 'Of the
objections raised against the Ordinance, the Government decided not
to apply it. The chiefs of course continued to follow their former
policy of not making by-laws for forest preservations. In fact it was
not until 1926 that the Government introduced and passed (in spite of
the opposition of the .African members on the Legislative Council) a
forestry bill authorising it to establish reserves, on the understanding
that these reserves should continue to be regarded as stool property
o
and to be administered under stool by-laws.
Another example of the chiefs* reluctance to enact by-laws with
regard to issues which were unpopular among their people was that of
*For example, R. L. Buell, op.cit., 802.
^Leg.Co.Debates, 1926.
(58)
the cocoa pods and cocoa diseases. Although the Government had con¬
tinuously urged the chiefs to enact by-laws providing for the destruc¬
tion of cocoa pods and for reporting of diseases, the chiefs refused
to enact such by-laws or even when enacted them, they refrained from
enforcing them. ^ As a result, the Government finally acted by passing
in 1923 (again in spite of the opposition of the African members on
the Legislative Council) the Pest Ordinance which dealt with the question
2
of cocoa pods and cocoa diseases.
Governor Hugh Clifford, who assumed office in 1912, was sympathetic
to the chiefs (though, like Nathan and Rodger before him, in a very
vague manner), and was keen to strengthen their authority. In 1916, for
instance, he stated that,
The effective administration of this Colony, so far as the bulk
of the population is concerned, can only be carried on by us
through the agency of the native system of tribal government....
The immediate welfare of the natives of the Gold Coast and
Ashanti, I am convinced, depends upon the judicious and sym¬
pathetic handling of native affairs, and upon establishing more
and more close and confidential relations between the tribal
authorities and the European administration. ^
Addressing the Legislative Council a few months later, he asserted that,
It is fully recognised by Government that the system of tribal
administration, which the genius of their ancestors has evolved
in the course of ages, is that best suited to the circumstances
of the bulk of the native population of this Colony and ...
every effort is made to support the native constitutions and to
abide by native custom and procedure in all natters that affectP|








Although Clifford was clearly sympathetic and convinced that
there was rationality in the indigenous institutions, he was, like his
predecessors, primarily concerned with regulating the work of the native
tribunals. Little effort, if any, was made by him to regulate the
executive and fiscal functions of the chiefs. These had to wait for
his successor. Initially, Clifford^ idea of reforming the working
of the native tribunals was to repeal the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
and replace it by an entirely recast measure. * In 1914 he met the
chiefs and discussed this question with them. The next year he appointed
a committee to consider the working of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance.
On the basis of the recommendations made by this committee, an Ordinance
was drafted during the same year.
The most important provision of this Ordinance was that only the
"principal chiefs" who had been formally confirmed in their appointment
by the Governor should exercise jurisdiction, and it defined a Head
Chief as "a person elected and installed in accordance with native
custom and confirmed by the Governor". This differed considerably
from the provisions of the 1904 Chiefs Ordinance under which confirm¬
ation by the Governor was permissive and left to the discretion of the
individual chief to apply for or not apply for as he pleased. The
draft Ordinance of 1915 retained the power of the Governor to depose
a chief. The draft Ordinance also restored the paver of the Governor
(which had been repealed by the 1910 amendment) to extend, remove or
curtain the jurisdiction of any native tribunal.





Naturally, thp provisions of the draft Ordinance, particularly
that to make confirmation by the Governor a condition precedent to the
exercise of jurisdiction, were strongly opposed by both the chiefs and
the intelligentsia. ^ As a result of this, Clifford decided not to
introduce his 1915 draft Ordinance. Instead, in 1916, he circulated
a draft bill to amend the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance to all the
Head Chiefs for their consideration and criticism. ^ This bill did
not insist that a chief should be confirmed by the Governor before he
could exercise any jurisdiction. In fact, Clifford agreed with the
African point of view when in 1917 he maintained "that by insisting
upon the confirmation of any election by the Governor before the chief
chosen is permitted to preside over a tribunal, we are in fact, making
a serious encroachment upon native rights". ^
Some of the Governor's advisers, particularly the Secretary for
Native Affairs, F. G. Crowther, were not, however, in agreement with
the proposal to abandon confirmation by the Governor as an essential
preliminary to the exercise of jurisdiction by the chiefs. These
officials or advisers even succeeded in winning Clifford to their
side, for in 1918 he decided not to proceed with the amending bill
which he had circulated to the Head Chiefs in 1916. Instead, Clifford
drafted a new Native Jurisdiction Bill on the lines of his draft Ordi¬




Quoted in P.R.O.,C.O.96.697/6903/B., op.cit.
^"Report of the Native Affairs Department, 1919•
(61)
Clifford maintained, contrary to his opinion in 1917. that
It is provided in the Bill that no Head Chief or Chief shall
exercise jurisdiction under this Bill unless he has been duly
confirmed by the Governor in the post to which his people have
elected him. This, it should be understood, does not interfere
with the right of the people to elect any person whom they may
chose to fill the post of Head Chief or Chief: but the Govern¬
ment reserves to itself the right in each instance to determine
whether judicial power under this Bill shall or shall not be
entrusted to the Head Chief or Chief so elected ... I think that
it is important it should be recognised that a Head Chief or
Chief, in his judicial capacity, is a person upon whom magisterial
powers have been conferred by Government, and that until he has
been confirmed, such powers are not legally exercisable by him. ^
This bill, which was introduced in February 1919» was strongly
objected to by the A.R.P.S. The Society raised once more the old
issue of the inherent right of jurisdiction of the chiefs. ^ As a
result of this and because his term of office was drawing to an end,
Clifford decided to postpone the second reading of the bill until the
arrival of his successor.
If he was unsuccessful in his effort to reform the "native"
justice system, Clifford was more successful in strengthening the
position of the Head Chiefs on the Legislative Council. On his arrival
he found a Legislative Council consisting of nine nominated members -
five officials, including the Governor as President, and four unofficials
consisting of two Africans and two Europeans. Of the Africans, one




represented the educated elite, and one a Head Chief. * By contrast,
Clifford's enlarged 1916 Legislative Council consisted of twenty-one
nominated members - twelve official and nine unofficial. The unofficial
members consisted of three Europeans, three Head Chiefs and three of
the educated elite. The first three Head Chiefs appointed to the new
Legislative Council of 1916 were the Omanhene of Akim Abuakua, the
p
Omanhene of Anomabu and the Fia of Awunaba. At the time, the
educated elite did not object to the Head Chiefs' sitting and speaking
at the Legislative Council. However when in 1925 the representation
of the Head Chiefs on the Legislative Council was increased, the
educated elite - as we shall explain in detail in the next chapter -
argued that under the customary constitution the Head Chiefs were not
allowed to speak at the Legislative Council.
This was Sir Emmanuel Kate Kole, the Konor of Manya Krobo, who in
1911 became the first Head Chief to be nominated to the Legislative
Council and except for a break of five years from 1916 to 1921 he
served on the Legislative Council until 19301 when he decided to
retire in favour of a younger man.
Sir Emmanuel Mate Kole was born in i860 and educated at Basel
Mission School. Between 1880 and 1891 he worked as a school-master.
In 1892 he was enstooled as the Konor of Manya Krobo, a position he
retained until his death in 1939^ In his speeches at the Legislative
Council he showed particular interest in matters concerning farming
and agricultural pursuits. Leg.Co.Debates, 1939; G.N.A.,Accra,ADM
11/1420, remarks by the S.N.A.; P.R.O.,C.0.96.761/31376, despatch




The end of Clifford's tenure as Governor witnessed the creation
of the N.C.B.W.A., the most important political development in West
Africa in the post-war era. The story of the Congress has been adequately
told by several scholars such as David Kimble, La Ray E. Denzer, and
J. Ayo Langley. * Here we shall be concerned with discussing briefly
the relationship between the Head Chiefs and the intelligentsia and we
shall try to explain why their practice of close cooperation which went
as far back as the days of the Fante Confederation had now, after the
war, suffered a serious setback. The origins of the disagreement or
the cleavage between the two groups began as early as 1919» even
before the formal creation of the Congress, when the members of the
Congress sent important resolutions to the Governor without consulting
the Head Chiefs. Ofori Atta, who was now emerging as the leader of
the chiefs, reminded them that if they expected any support from the
chiefs, they must observe traditional protocol and inform the chiefs of
their activities. The chiefs resented the action of the intelligentsia
in acting independently and viewed this move as one of undermining
their basis of authority. Ofori At+a put the argument of the chiefs
as follows:
''"D. Kimble, A Political History, Chapter X; La Ray E. Denzer, "The
Hational Congress of British West Africa; Gold Coast Section",
M.A. Thesis, University of Ghana, 1965; J. A. Langley, Pan-
Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa, 1900-19^5» Oxford, 1973^
2
D. Kimble, A Political History, 379^
(64)
There will be nothing which would bring about more rapidly the
destruction of all that makes the country what it is than the
recognition of those of our people who are educated as a
community by themselves capable of doing things independently
of the chiefs and their uneducated people. 1
The intelligentsia, for their part, because of their education
and wealth, felt that the time had come when they must establish their
position as the natural leaders of the country and that they must be
heard by the Government. In a letter to the Governor, the members of
the committee of the Congress made it clear that,
In the opinion of the committee, the educated and enlightened
community of the Gold Coast, in presenting any prayer for the
redress of grievances, for needed reforms, as subjects and
citizens of the British Empire, do not first require the man¬
date of all the chiefs; and we are to submit that they, the
educated classes themselves, form a substantial and influential
and integral part of the people of the Gold Coast. 2
4nd to demonstrate their independence, the members of the Congress
sent a delegation to London without notifying the chiefs or even the
Governor.
As a result of this move, Ofori 4tta became more hostile to the
Congress movement. He contacted many fellow Head Chiefs, particularly
in the Eastern Province, and pointed out to them that their rights and
privileges were in danger. He also received "on behalf of the Central
and Western Provinces a mandate from the Executive Council of the
4.R.P.S. to oppose the Congress movement". ^ Supported by this mandate,
Ofori yVtta argued that the Congress did not represent the chiefs and
their people. In return, Casely-Hayford, the leading politician and
theorist of the Congress, launched his attack on 4tta. He described
Ofori Etta's attitude towards the Congress as inconsistent, contra¬
dictory and even treacherous. ^ At the same time, Hayford succeeded
^Leg,Co.Debates, 1920-21.
2
Sessional Paper No.VII, 1919-1920, correspondence relating to the
N.C.B.W.4.
3




in 1920 and 1921 in winning several of the Head Chiefs -notable among
them was the Ga Mantse - to the Congress. * Thus, the split between
the two groups was not absolute.
Unfortunately, as La Ray Denzer pointed out, the Congress move¬
ment collided with opposition forces resulting from changing British
p
theories of colonial government. The policy of Indirect Rule, as
established by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria, was gradually becoming
the new accepted trend in British colonial policy. In the Gold Coast,
Guggisberg had just started the move towards a Lugardian type of
Indirect Rule. He clearly and positively favoured strengthening and
ruling through the chiefs. Consequently, he encouraged Ofori Atta in
his stand against the Congress movement and agreed with him that the
intelligentsia should limit their political activities within the frame¬
work of the indigenous institutions. He maintained that "in this country
there are such things as chiefs, elected by the people, and it
is not in my opinion a fair thing for the people of the stools to be
approached in any other way than through the chief and his councillors". 3
He seemed to have deliberately wanted to widen the split between the
Head Chiefs and the intelligentsia.
/ipart from giving his support to the chiefs in their stand against
the intelligentsia, Guggisberg was concerned with securing, through
*J. A. Langley, op.cit., 170-175.
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legislation, the power of the chiefs. As we have already seen,
Clifford decided not to proceed with the second reading of the 1919 bill
amending the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and so it was left to
Guggisberg. Before proceeding with the final stages of the bill,
Guggisberg decided to meet the unofficial members of the Legislative
Council in an informal conference. ^ This conference took place on
the 24th February, 1920.
Meanwhile Guggisberg received a petition from the "chiefs, sub-
chiefs, elders, councillors and prominent citizens of the Eastern
2
Province" protesting against the bill. The petitioners were strongly
of the opinion that the bill tended to "subvert the native constitu¬
tions" and that it was "highly detrimental and predudicial to the wel-
3
fare and interests of the native inhabitants of the Gold Coast".
They objected in particular to the clauses which empowered the
Governor to confirm the election and instalation of a chief, that
which empowered the Governor to extend, remove or curtail any part of
jurisdiction of a native tribunal, and that which proposed to create
the Court of the Provincial Commissioner as the final court of Appeal
4
in suits relating to land.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.614/38098, despatch No.596 of 7-7.1920 from the Acting
Governor to Viscount Nilner.
2
P.R.O.,C.O.,96.614/38098, "Petition by Chiefs, sub-chiefs, Elders,
Councillors and Paramount citizens resident in the Eastern Province",





As a result of his conference with the African members of the
Legislative Council and the objections raised by Africans in the
aforementioned petition, Guggisberg decided to amend some of the
provisions of the 1919 bill. The result was a new bill which was
introduced into the Legislative Council in 1922. This bill, like
that of 1919» attempted to distinguish between "Head Chiefs" and
"Chiefs" and to define their jurisdiction, and it also made the
Provincial Commissioner's decision final on appeal in land cases. *
Additionally, the bill empowered the Governor to suspend or depose a
chief and to vary the jurisdiction of native tribunals.
Both the chiefs and the intelligentsia were united in their
opposition to the bill. The A.R.P.S. asked to be represented by
counsel when the bill came up for discussion at the Legislative
Council and this request was met by the Government. But even without
counsel, Casely-Hayford had, in a lengthy speech at the Legislative
Council, adequately presented the view of the African opposition. 2
He repeated the argument which he used against the 1906 bill, namely
that the rights of jurisdiction being inherent in the chiefs, the
Governor had no power or right to withdraw or vary them. 3 jn partic¬
ular, he emphasised the objection of Africans to the clauses which
made the Provincial Commissioner's decision final in land cases, and
to those which give the Governor the power to suspend or depose a
chief.






joined the opposition to the bill. But in any case as a result of the
unanimous and strong opposition to the bill he decided to withdraw
it. He explained that "the nature of the opposition revealed by the
debate and the mass of amendments showed that further preliminary
conferences and enquiries were necessary". ^
Guggisberg contented himself by introducing in 1924 a bill making
minor amendments in the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. The most impor¬
tant of these amendments was that which provided that when a chief was
suspended or deposed, it should be lawful for the Governor to make an
order for the removal of such a chief from the division he formerly
2ruled to some other place within or outside his division. The
Government was hoping that this would lessen the steadily growing
number of destoolemnts and stool disputes.
The A.R.P.S. objected to the bill and petitioned against it.
The Society maintained that the bill"seriously invades the ancient
rights and privileges of the peoples of the Gold Coast". ^ As in
1922 the Society also asked to be represented by counsel but its plea
was this time refused. Casely-Hayford presented, however, the case of
the A.R.P.S. at the Legislative Council. He explained that under the
customary law a chief could not be sent away from his district "except
under certain circumstances", and in any case the power of removal
belonged to the people and not to the Government. ^ He strongly held
^"Leg .Co.Debates, 1923.
2Leg.Co.Debates, 1924; P.R.O.,C.0.96.648, conf.despatch of 17.7.1924
from the .Acting Governor to J. H. Thomas.
3
P.R.O.,C.O.96.648, A.R.P.S. petition, enclosed in conf.despatch of




that the bill was a threat to the democratic elements of the country's
indigenous institutions. * All the African members on the Legislative
Council, with the exception of Ofori Atta, joined Hayford in oppo-
2sition to the bill. Using its official majority, however, the
Government passed the bill. However, it was between 1925 and 1927
that Guggisberg introduced far-reaching legislation with the view
of strengthening the authority of the Head Chiefs. We shall discuss
these legislations in the next chapter.
1Ibid.




THE CHALLENGE TO THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
OF THE CHIEFS. 1925-1929; THE AFRICANS' INITIAL
RESPONSE TO THE CREATION OF THE PROVINCIAL COUNCILS
OF THE PARAMOUNT CHIEFS AND THE ENACTMENT
OF THE NATIVE ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCE.
When Guggisberg assumed the Governorship of the Gold Coast, the
chiefs, particularly the Head Chiefs, were under strong pressure and
attack from both the Asafo organisations and the educated elite, *
This, coupled with the rapid social and economic change made the posi¬
tion of the chiefs even more insecure. Furthermore, with the advent
of the pax-Britannica the authority and dignity of the chiefs had
generally suffered a serious diminution. The Head Chiefs no longer
had the power of life and death; they could no longer quell rebellion;
they could no longer make wars.
The decline of the power of the chiefs was clear from the increas¬
ing number of destoolments. The destoolments, which were very rare
during the pre-colonial period, became very common during the colonial
period. During the period 1910-192*+ there were ninety-four destool-
ments; for the year 192*+ alone the number was twelve. Guggisberg
repeatedly drew attention to this substantial increase in destoolraents
and contained that this was seriously affecting the stability of the
indigenous customary institutions. J
The successive Governors, particularly Nathan, Rodger and Clifford,
had taken, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the line (though
*See chapter two above,
.Co.Debates, 192*1. The speech of the Ag.S.N.A. on 7»3«192*+.
^For example, Leg.Co.Debates, 1923-2*+. Guggisberg's speech on 21.3.1923*
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in vague terms) that African indigenous institutions should be strength¬
ened and that it was natural for the Government to rule the people
through them. More than any of his predecessors, however, Guggisberg
took a more active and practical role in strengthening and supporting
the position of the chiefs.
As F. Agbodelca noted, Guggisberg seemed to have genuinely accepted
the principle of gradual evolution of indigenous institutions as the
best, if not the only, course open to those working for African ad¬
vancement and progress. ^ This principle of gradual evolution implied
that African chiefs should be allowed some powers at local government
level under the general supervision of European political officers.
Hence Guggisberg constantly declared that it was his intention to streng¬
then the power of the chiefs, to save them from the "disturbing influence"
of Western Civilisation, to stop their destoolments by their people, and
to insure that relations between them and the Government became "ever
3
closer and better".
Apart from genuinely accepting the principle of gradual evolution
of indigenous institutions, Guggisberg's apparent enthusiasm and
determination to strengthen the authority of the chiefs was, however,
motivated by other factors. Guggisberg, unlike Clifford for instance,
had failed to appeal to or to win the confidence of the intelligentsia.
His 'personal touch*, which, in Wight's words, was his "greatest strength
and charm" had seemingly appealed to the people in the street, but not
to the intelligentsia. ^
Agbodeka, "Sir Gordon Guggisberg's contribution to the development
of the Gold Coast, 1919-27", in T.H.S.G..vol.XIII,No.l,June 1972.
2Ibld.
^Sir F. G. Guggisberg, The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events of
1920-1926 and the prospects of 1927-28, Accra. 1927. P«238.
h
M. Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, London 19^7. p.62;
R. E. Wraith described Guggisberg as "a people's Governor", while
Clifford was, by contrast, "a Governor for the elite"; Wraith,
Guggisberg. London 1967* p.96.
(72)
The intelligentsia of the N.C.B.W.A. did not tell him of their
plans and even sent their petitions directly to London. Having failed
to win the confidence of the intelligentsia, Guggisberg decided to
ally himself with the Head Chiefs against them. Hence his desire
was to give a more prominent role in the political leadership of the
country to the Head Chiefs, his allies, rather than to the intelligentsia.
The Head Chiefs themselves needed Guggisberg's help to restore their
declining power and prestige.
To achieve the strengthening of the political position of his
allies, the Head Chiefs, and to divorce them from the intelligentsia,
his opponents, Guggisberg seemed to have deliberately tried to widen
the cleavage which occurred between the Head Chiefs and the intelli¬
gentsia over the "storm" of the N.C.B.W.A. ^ He constantly blamed the
intelligentsia for the deterioration of the power of the chiefs and
the troubles in the stools. In 1923, for instance, he maintained,
"I cannot help feeling from time to time that the power of the Oman
[state Council^ of this Country is very seriously threatened by the
thoughtless selfish acts of the so-called intelligentsia." ^
Guggisberg continuously emphasised that the two groups, the
Head Chiefs and the intelligentsia, were antagonistic and completely
divided from each other. This was not true. Although the cleavage
over the question of the N.C.B.W.A. was serious, the Head Chiefs and
the intelligentsia were not really strictly divided. Of course
there had been certain incidents of impatience on the part of the
intelligentsia with the personnel of the chiefs and their councils
but there was hardly such a thing as a "detribalised" or"denationalised"
*The split over the N.C.B.W.A. has been adequately described by Kimble
in his A Political History of Ghanai. 1850-1928, London 1963, chapter
X; see also chapter two above.
2Le£.Co.Debates, 1923-24.
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African. Even the most highly educated doctors, barristers and others
would rally round their stool when it was in trouble. In surport of
this contention it should be mentioned that even in the midst of the
controversy over the creation of the Provincial Councils, the leader
of the intelligentsia, Casely-Hayford, argued that:
The division sometimes between educated and uneducated is
a false one, because if education is good for the country
we must not at any time seek to divide the educated from
the uneducated. We go together. 1
Thus, it could be argued that in emphasising the split between the
intelligentsia and the Head Chiefs, the Guggisberg's administration
was in fact deliberately pursuing a policy of "divide and rule".
Paradoxically one of the major achievements for which Guggisberg
was remembered in the Gold Coast was his establishment of Achimota
and his policy of expansion in education as a whole. It must be
emphasised, however, that although Guggisberg had from the start
adopted education as the "chief plank" of his policy, he always refused
to admit that the intelligentsia, who were steadily increasing in
number, should have any political role outside the framework of the
indigenous customary institutions. To him education and politics
were completely different things.
Furthermore, it should be remembered that a primary reason why
Guggisberg adopted a policy of expansion in education was because he
wanted to obtain more educated Africans for the clerical and other
junior jobs in the Government service. This, he hoped, would save
much of the revenue which would otherwise go in "overseas allowances",
housing, etc., for the European officials; and accordingly, he hoped
^Leg.Co.Debates, 1926-27. p.321; Hayford's speech on the 1925 Constit¬
ution.
2
Sir F. G. Guggisberg, op.cit.; Wraith, op.cit., p.173*
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he would thus be able to obtain the much needed money for his policy
of development to which he was sincerely committed. *
Guggisberg's two principal measures to save the declining
position of the Head Chiefs and to support them in the exercise of
their powers was the creation in 1925 of the Provincial Councils of the
Head Chiefs and the passing two years later of the Native Administration
Ordinance (N.A.O.). The essential purpose of these measures was to
integrate the Head Chiefs into the Governmental structure both at the
central and local levels in order to consolidate colonial administra¬
tion by isolating the intelligentsia from political power.
In this chapter, we shall attempt to describe and examine the
initial reaction and opposition of the Africans, both the intelligent¬
sia and the rural masses, to these measures. The assessment of the
success and failure of these measures will be discussed in subsequent
chapters.
The creation of the Provincial Councils of the Head Chiefs was
the most outstanding feature of the 1925 Constitution. The Constitution
provided for these Councils to consist entirely of Head Chiefs who
2
were to elect six of their members to the Legislative Council.
The number of the provincial members to the Legislative Council was
based on the respective populations of the three provinces that con¬
stituted the Colony. In other words, three members were to be elected
by the Council of the Eastern Province; two members by the Council of
3
the Central Province, and one member by the Council of the Western Province.
*For example, West Africa, 20.3.1926; Agbodeka, op.cit.
^Article 16 of the Legislative Council Order in Council, 1925«
^With regard to the Eastern Province its members to the Legislative
Council were elected on "language representation", i.e. one member
elected by the Akan, one elected by the Ewe and one by the Ga-Adangme
speaking people. In practice this led to injustice. The Ewe section
was comprised of the Awuna and Peki divisions. Their populations in
1921 were 119i302 and 19,608 respectively. As a result of this the
representative of the Ewe to the Legislative Council was always elected
(75)
At the same time, the Constitution provided for the three coastal
towns, Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi, the home of the intelligentsia,
to elect one member each to the Legislative Council, * So while the
Head Chiefs doubled their seats on the Legislative Council, the
intelligentsia continued to have the same number of seats that they
had on the 1916 Legislative Council.
Guggisberg justified giving the Head Chiefs more representation
on the Legislative Council than the intelligentsia by saying that the
former were the "time" representatives and the "natural" rulers of the
people and it was thus logical that they should be given more represent-
2
ation. To him, this was the only method to preserve the power,
3
authority, and prestige of the Head Chiefs. His prejudice in favour
of the Head Chiefs was clear.
The creation of the Provincial Councils was thus to be seen in
the light of Guggisberg's policy of strengthening the authority of
the Head Chiefs at the expense of the Intelligentsia. Guggisberg saw
the functions of the Provincial Councils as follows:
from the Awuna division. But in spite of protests and petitions by
the people of Peki and the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province
this situation continued until 1940. In 1940, however, the Government
agreed to amend the Constitution to the effect that the whole of a
Provincial Council would take a part in the election of its represent¬
atives to the Legislative Council (i.e. election on language represent¬
ation abolished); P.R.O.,C.0.96,645, conf.despatch of 4.3.1924 from
Guggisberg to J. H. Thomas; P.R.O.,C.0.96,763.31013/5. "The Electoral
Law (Amendment) Ordinance, No.10 of 1940".
^The Legislative Council Order in Council, 1925*




... these Councils would, in my opinion, serve to strengthen
the ties of native institutions, would be educative, and would
encourage that sense of responsibility which I hope, in course
of time will lead to local Self-Government in the larger inland
towns, and possibly to local government on County Council lines.
It is, in my opinion, essential that the elective principle should
apply to the chiefs in order to maintain and preserve their
status as the natural rulers as compared with the intelligentsia,
who are, from natural causes, steadily tending to break away
from the authority of their chiefs. The establishment of the
Provincial Councils with the power of electing representatives
to the Legislative Council will undoubtedly encourage the
chiefs to take wider responsibility and will assist in the
development and advancement of their Divisions for the welfare
of their people. The mere fact of these chiefs meeting together
in a legally recognised council will disseminate knowledge and
stir up a spirit of emulation. Further, these Councils will
tend to assist the chiefs to maintain the integrity of their
Divisions against the disintegrating influence of the ignorant
and semi-literate young men who are increasing yearly in
numbers. If the powers of the chiefs were weakened, there would
be a corresponding strengthening of those influences which cause
destoolments and are so very prejudicial to the welfare of the
Division in particular and the Country in general. 1
The intelligentsia, however, considering themselves destined to
be the national or political leaders of the Country naturally came out
vigorously against the considerable representation given to the Head
Chiefs. The A.R.P.S. looking on itself as the leading national body
and the "medium of communication and understanding", between the
Government and the people, saw in the creation of the Provincial
p
Councils a serious threat to its existence.
The resentment on the part of the intelligentsia to increasing
the role of the Head Chiefs in the Country's political leadership was
in fact the principal and the real reason for their opposition to the
Provincial Councils. This reason, however, was not given much pro¬
minence by the intelligentsia in their petitions, debates, etc.
*Ibid. Before the passing of the N./i.O. in 192? the term "Division"
was often used, as it is used here, to refer to a traditional "State".
2
For example P.R.O.,C.0.666/5983; the A.R.P.S.'s petition against the
1925 Constitution.
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Instead, and apparently to win the support of the people in the rural
areas, the intelligentsia chose to appear as the defending champions
of the people's indigenous institutions and maintained that the
creation of the Provincial Councils was a violation of these institutions.*
The argument of the intelligentsia against the Provincial Councils
as put forward in their speeches and petitions and their press could
be summarised thus:
1. That the "National Federal system" of the people of the Gold
Coast found its expression in the A.R.P.S. and that the creation of
the Provincial Councils in their deliberative side must tend to the
disruption of the Society and the destruction of the national spirit
and sentiment;
2. That the creation of the Provincial Councils divorced the
Head Chiefs from their sub-chiefs and their people;
3. That it was against the indigenous customary constitution
for the Head Chiefs to sit on the Legislative Council. This was because
the Head Chiefs, according to the customary constitution, did not make
laws. It was the State Council, meeting together, which legislated;
4. That the electoral side of the Provincial Councils defeated
the principle of elective representation by creating special electoral
bodies which from among their members thereof must elect members to
the Legislative Council. Instead, the intelligentsia did not want the
people to be restricted in their power of choice, but wanted them to
be permitted to elect qualified and efficient men to the Legislative
Council as they might judge fit;
5. That there were not a sufficient number of Head Chiefs
capable of intelligently and effectively taking part in the debates and
proceedings of the Legislative Council;
LIbid.
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6. That the influence of the Provincial Commissioners over the
Head Chiefs of their provinces was likely to be so great as to minimise
the independence of the elected Head Chiefs which was so essential to
the exercise of the franchise.
In an editorial dated 15th May, 1926, and entitled "Provincial
Councils and Elective Representation", the Gold Coast Independent asked
why the meetings of the Provincial Councils took place at localities
such as Nsawam, Dunkwa and Tarkwa instead of the usual meeting places
of the people from time immemorial, Accra and Cape Coast. Was it,
the Independent added, in these places the Provincial Commissioners,
who were virtually governors of the situation, could have the necessary
atmosphere in which the Provincial Councils could thrive?
7. That according to custom, no chief was allowed to speak in
public except through his linguist (spokesman) and in the vernacular
of his stool;
8. That in those stools where custom forbade a chief to cross
certain boundaries, he would break this custom if he attended a
Provincial Council in another part of the Country. *
Although the A.R.P.S. did not prepare its petition or send its
delegation against the 1925 Constitution until long after the first
meeting of these Councils took place, it had in fact been very active
in the campaign against these Councils since the terms of the new
Constitution were made public in April 1925. For example, in March
1926, the Society held at Cape Coast a conference which was attended
by several of the Head Chiefs of the Central Province. The conference,
after "mature consideration" of the Provincial Councils system,
petition
^Mainly computed form P.R.0..C.0.96 666/5983, The A.R.P.S.*s/against
the 1925 Constitution; Leg.Co.Debates, 1926-27. Hayford's speech




1. No Head Chief should attend any of the Provincial Councils*
meetings or accept nomination to the Legislative Council since the
presence of any Head Chief at the Provincial Council or the Legis¬
lative Council would involve a breach of the customary constitution;
2. The legal members of the Society were expected to assist in
the defence of any chief who might get into difficulties with the
Government by reason of his refusal to attend any of the Provincial
Councils* meetings or accept nomination to the Legislative Council. *
The Axira section of the Society also held a conference with the Head
o
Chiefs of the Western Province and a similar resolution was passed.
Apart from these conferences, resolutions and petitions, the
Government complained that the A.R.P.S. used "misinterpretation and
baseless rumour" to discredit the Provincial Councils system. As
an example of this, the Commissioner of the Central Province stated
that in August, 1926, E.O. Ababio, the Head Chief of Goraoa Ajumaku,
at the instigation of the A.R.P.S., sent messengers round his state
to collect money saying that:
1. The Government was endeavouring to bring a measure to take
the people's land and that before the people would be allowed to farm
they would have to obtain licences from the Agriculture Department;
2. If a man had four children, the Government was going to take
two to work for it;
3. All cocoa produce would be divided into three parts of which
*G.N.A.,Cape Coast, ACC.No.7/64, "Resolution passed at the Conference
of Natural Rulers with Executive Committee of the A.R.P.S. at Cape
Coast in March 1926".
2G.N.A.,Accra. ADM.11/921.No.24,1325. Minutes of 15.5.1929 by S.N.A.
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the Government would take two and the producer one. *
The message was that the money was to be collected for the pur¬
pose of sending a deputation to London to protest against the new
2
Constitution in general and the Provincial Councils in particular.
The Government made maximum exploitation of this "message" in its
counter-attack against the A.R.P.S. The Acting Governor, J. C.
Maxwell, quoted it in his opening address to the new Legislative
Council and the Acting Secretary of Native Affairs, H. S. Newlands,
also quoted it in his comments on the A.R.P.S. petition against the
new Constitution. ^ It is true that in this "message" the A.R.P.S.
took advantage of the illiteracy of the people in the rural areas and
misinterpreted the purpose of the Provincial Councils. However, it is
equally true that the Government, following its policy of "divide and
rule", deliberately overexaggerated the A.R.P.S.'s "misrepresentation"
of the functions of the Provincial Councils. Apart from this message
in Gomoa Ajuraaku, there seemed to be no evidence, either in Cape
Coast, the headquarters of the A.R.P.S., or in the Western Province,
the stronghold of the opposition against the Provincial Councils, of
the A.R.P.S. misinterpreting the functions of the Provincial Councils
to the people.
Not surprisingly Ofori Atta, the unrivalled leader of the chiefs,
whom the Gold Coast Independent termed as the "foster father, if not
the actual originator" of the Provincial Councils, took the lead in
^G.N.A., Cape Coast, ADM.23/1/692, case No.C.P.646/27, "Notes of the
proceedings at a meeting held at Mansu on 12.8.1926 between the
Commissioner of the Central Province and the Omanhene of Asin
Apimanim and his sub-chiefs and councillors.
2Ibid.
^Leg.Co.Debates, 1926-27; P.R.O.,C.0.96,673/4305. "Notes on the
Petition of the A.R.P.S., by H. S. Newlands", Enclosure in conf.
despatch of 21.4.1927, from Guggisberg to L. S. Amery.
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refuting the argument of the intelligentsia. * But before describing
Ofori Atta's argument in defence of the Provincial Councils, it is
important to give a brief biographical account of him. Ofori Atta is
a central character in this study and we shall be referring to him
on several occasions.
Nana Ofori Atta, or Aaron Euguene Bonkye Danquah as he was known
o
before his enstoolment, was born in 1881. He started his education
at the Basel Mission Elementary School at Anura at Kibi. He subsequently
went to Begoro where he joined what was then known as the "Middle"
or Grammar School. He remained at Begoro until he passed Standard
VH whereupon he entered Akropong Theological Seminary. However, he
left the Seminary after one year and went to Accra where he first
worked as a law clerk with T. Hutton-Mills. After a year with Mills,
Me moved to the correspondence branch of the Customs Department. In
1900 he served as a Sergeant of the Gold Coast Volunteer Corps in the
Ashanti Campaign. After his return from the campaign, he was appointed
to the correspondence branch of the Governor's Office.
In 1903 Ofori Atta resigned from Government employment and went
to Kibi where he joined the Secretariat of his uncle, the Omahene (Head
Chief) of Akim Abuakwa. In 1912 Atta was elected and installed as the
Oraanhene of Akim Abuakwa, one of the largest and wealthiest states in
the Colony, a position he retained until his death in 1943. During
1914-1918, he was very active in support of the War effort. For instance,
*The Gold Coast Independent, 18.9.1926.
^The following biographical account of Ofori Atta is mainly computed
fromM . Sampson, Gold Coast Men of Affairs, London 1969; P.R.O.,C.O.
96717/21750; Leg.Co.Debates,1944; The Gold Coast Independent,
28.8.1943; The Times. 26.8.1943.
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he assisted in recruiting Africans for the East African Campaign and
presented an aeroplane to the British Government for use in the War.
In recognition of this service, the Governor, Hugh Clifford, appointed
him to the Legislative Council in 1916 and awarded him a C.B.E. in
1918.
In 1925i Atta helped the Government in the creation of the
Provincial Councils. Two years later he Introduced the Native Adminis¬
tration Ordinance into the Legislative Council. In recognition of
these activities he was made a Knight Commander of the Order of the
British Empire in 1927 and in 1928 he was made a Knight of the British
Empire. During the same year, 1928, he was elected by the Provincial
Council of the Eastern Province (Akan section) as a Provincial member
to the Legislative Council, a position he was re-elected to and kept
until his death.
Apart from being a member of the Legislative Council during most
of the period between 1916 and 19^3» Atta was also a member of the
Board of Education, a member of Achimota Council, a member of the
District Agricultural Committee, and served on other innumerable
Government committees. In fact, one would be hard put to look at the
personnel roster of any Gold Coast committee during the inter war
period and not find Atta's name. Atta was also the first president of
the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province and subsequently presi¬
dent of the Joint Provincial Council.
Ofori Atta was one of the most, if not the most, prominent Gold
Coast politicians during the inter-war period. Politically he was
particularly distinguished by what the Times called his "unswerving
loyalty" to the British Crown and the British connection. His
political activities mostly consisted in collaborating with the
(83)
British colonial administration and helping to implement its Indirect
Rule policies. Being educated, able and eloquent speaker, his help to
the Government was effective and very crucial.
Having given a brief biographical account of Ofori Atta, we can
now describe his argument in defence of the Provincial Councils.
Welcoming the new Constitution as a "great and gracious gift",
Atta elaborately argued that the establishment of the Provincial
Councils was not in any way a violation of the customary constitution, *
He maintained that the suggestion that it was unconstitutional for a
chief to sit on the Legislative Council was "most extraordinary" to
come from those who professed to be progressive. He asserted that the
chiefs and not the intelligentsia were the representatives of the
people. He forcibly declared himself against the intelligentsia's
claim to be
... a class which forms a substantial and influential integral
part of the people of the Gold Coast who as subjects and citi¬
zens of the British Empire do not require mandate from the
chiefs when presenting prayers for needed reforms. 2
Ofori Atta, like Guggisberg, was not prepared to allow the intelli¬
gentsia a political role outside the framework of the indigenous
customary structure.
The Government on its side was very active in refuting the
criticisms and objections of the intelligentsia against the Provincial
Councils. Guggisberg who was now decidedly determined to replace the
A.R.P.S. with the Provincial Councils asserted that:
The Society has no justifiable claim to speak on beh<)J.f of the
chiefs and the people of the Gold Coast as a whole. It is a
private society controlled by a small number of office bearers
in the coast towns. 3
^Leg.Co.Debates,1926-27, Ofori Atta's speech on 18.3.1926.
2Ibid.
3p.R.Q.,C.0.96.673/4305,conf.despatch of 21.4.1927 from Guggisberg to
L. S. Amery.
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From the Government's point of view, the era when the A.R.P.S. acted
as a "medium of communication and understanding" between the people
and the Government was now, for all practical purposes, over. A new
era in which the Provincial Councils were gradually superceding the
Society's political role had begun.
In refuting the argument of the intelligentsia against the
Provincial Councils, the Government emphasised that the creation of
the Provincial Councils was not e new innovation. The Acting S.N.A.,
E. S. Newlands, traced the origins of these Councils as far back as
1826 when the chiefs of the Eastern Province met at the village of
Oyeadufo in order to concert measures of common defence against the
Ashanti who were then invading the Eastern Province. * The result
was the battle of Dodowa in which the Ashanti were defeated.
Newlands then made reference to the year 1852 when some of the
Head Chiefs met at Cape Coast and constituted themselves into a
Legislative Assembly and passed the famous Poll Tax Ordinance. He
further stated that in 1868 some of the Head Chiefs met at Mankessim
2and formed the famous Fanti Confederation.
Finally, Newlands made reference to the year 1918 when most of
the Head Chiefs of the Eastern Province assembled at Accra and produced
a list of proposals which included: the establishment of an Agricult¬
ural College; the establishment of a secondary school; the amendment
of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance; the advancement of Africans in
public service by merit, etc. ^ Newlands concluded that the Govern¬
ment was not in fact inventing the Provincial Councils but was rather
*P.R.O.,C.0.96.673/^305. Notes on the Petition of the A.R.P.S. against
the 1925 Constitution, by J. E. Newlands, the AG.S.N.A., Enclosure in
the Governor's despatch of 21.4.1927. Kimble (Political History, p.
450, footnote 1) referred to Newlands as being S.N.A. in 1926. In




recognising the time-honoured practice of the Head Chiefs who had in
the past often met in conferences to discuss issues. *
In a lengthy despatch in which he dealt extensively with the
A.R.P.S. petition, Guggisberg also repeated Newlands* argument that
the creation of the Provincial Councils was in no way a new innovation
or a violation of the customary constitution.^
Guggisberg added that the creation of the Provincial Councils did
not in fact enable a Head Chief to make laws. He explained that the
Provincial Councils merely provided a forum in which a Head Chief,
accompanied by eight of his councillors, could ascertain and consider
the nature of any measure proposed by the Government. 3 jt was then
his duty to discuss these measures in detail with his own State Council
and thereafter to bring the decision of the latter before the Provincial
Council. The next step was that the assembled Head Chiefs, after due
deliberation, would inform the Government of their considered proposals.
Those Head Chiefs who were members of the Legislative Council were
then in a position to represent the views of the Provincial Councils
as a whole in the Legislative Council. ^
Guggisberg concluded:
The establishment of a Provincial Council can thus in no way
cause dissention between a chief and his people; it does not
free the chief from his obligations towards his people nor does
it take away their rights to destool him should he act contrary
to the interests of the people. 5
1Ibid.






With regard to the intelligentsia's contention that the Head
Chiefs were incapable of following the proceedings of the Legislative
Council, Guggisberg reacted sharply:
In my experience the criticism made by the chiefs who have been
members of Council have been more helpful and informative than
those of the other African members, 1
The argument of the Government could be criticised on several
grounds. The essence of the Government's argument was that the
Provincial Councils were not a new innovation but had their origin in
Gold Coast history and institutions. Such an argument was in fact
typical of the exponents of Indirect Rule who usually argued that the
organs of colonial government were no more than indigenous institutions
in modern constitutional clothes. To argue against this view, one can
point out that it was true that there had been moments in Gold Coast
history when the Head Chiefs, particularly in supreme necessity of
war, met together. However, never before the creation of the Provincial
Councils in 1925 had the Head Chiefs been organised in regular assemblies
on a permanent basis to take part in the administration of the Colony.
Furthermore, it could be argued that Guggisberg was obviously
leaning too far in favour of his allies, the Head Chiefs, when he
asserted that they were capable of taking an effective part, even more
than the intelligentsia, in the proceedings of the Legislative Council.
It was true that some of the Head Chiefs, such as Ofori Atta, were just
as capable of taking an intelligent part in the proceedings of the
Legislative Council as the members of the intelligentsia but these
were very few and the majority of the Head Chiefs were illiterate and
thus incapable of taking an effective part in the debates of the Legis¬
lative Council. Finally, it could be said that the restriction on the
Provincial Councils to elect to the Legislative Council only Head
Chiefs had undoubtedly limited the expression of African views.
1Ibid.
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With regard to the intelligentsia's argument against the Provincial
Councils, it could be noted that their interpretation of the customary
constitution was rigid and conservative. In fact, it was difficult
to agree with the A.R.P.S. on how the presence of the Head Chiefs on
the Legislative Council could be a violation of the customary constit¬
ution. Even before the creation of the Provincial Councils, some Head
Chiefs had been nominated to the Legislative Council. * The customary
constitution was not static but changing and flexible and thus there
was no reason why it should not allow for the chiefs to sit on the
Legislative Council or to speak in public.
This does not suggest that the JJ.R.P.S.'s defence of the customary
constitution against the chiefs themselves was not genuine, but rather
that it was not their real or primary objection to the Provincial
Councils. The intelligentsia's real objection, which was seldom expli¬
citly expressed by them, was to the considerable representation given
to the Head Chiefs. Had the 1925 Constitution empowered the Provincial
Councils to elect non-chiefs to the Legislative Council the intelli¬
gentsia would have most probably made no objection. In fact, in March
1923t when Guggisberg interviewed Casely-Hayford, Hutton-Milis and Van-
Hein and discussed with them the creation of the Provincial Councils,
giving them the impression that such Councils would be allowed to elect
2
commoners, they made no objection to their creation.
In any case, the A.R.P.S. campaign against the Provincial Councils
seemed to have initial success. The three Councils met on the l?th
May, 1926. In the Western Province the meeting of the Council was a
IjSee chapter two above, p^2.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.666/5983. Minute by Guggisberg on the JLR.P.S. 's
petition against the 1925 Constitution.
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complete fiasco, for although eight Head Chiefs, out of a total of
twenty-two entitled to sit, met at Tarkwa and were kept in the Council
Chamber all day, they refused to elect their representative to the
Legislative Council and instead registered their protest against the
whole procedure, *
In the Central Province out of twenty-eight entitled to sit only
eleven Head Chiefs met at Dunkwa. ^ However, they succeeded in
electing their two members to the Legislative Council, These were
Otu Ababio II, Omanhene of Abura, and Ayirebi Acquah IH, Omanhene of
Winneba.
Not surprisingly in the Eastern Province where the ground for the
reception of the Provincial Council had been prepared by Ofori Atta,
the key partner of colonial administration, ten Head Chiefs, out of a
total of thirteen entitled to sit, met at Nsawam and chose their
3
three representatives to the Legislative Council. These were Mate
Kole, Honor (Head Chief) of Manya Krobo, Togbi Sri II, the Fia (Head
Chief) of Awuna, and F. W. Kwesi Akuffo, Omanhene of Akwapim. At the
end of the meeting the Council passed a resolution placing on record,
... their deep sense of gratitude to the Government for the
practical support given to the Native Administration which
has culminated in the inauguration of the Provincial Council,
for such a Council apart from its electoral functions, affords
them better opportunities of uniting with a view to discussing
matters affecting the welfare of the Country. 4
Yet, even in the Eastern Province the satisfaction of the Govern¬
ment was not complete. The Ga Mantse (Head Chief), Tackie Yaoboi, of
the Ga State declined to attend the meeting of the Provincial Council.
^•Leg.Co.Debates, 1926-27; West Africa. 23.10.1926.
2p.R,0.,C.0.96.666/5983.conf.despatch of 16.7.1926 from J. C. Maxwell
to L. S. Amery.
3
Ibid.; Report on the Eastern Province, 1926-17.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.673/^305. "Resolution passed by the Eastern Province
Council", Enclosure in the Governor's despatch of 21.^.1927.
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The Ga State was very important and large in size and population and
included Accrk Municipality. Significantly the Ga Mantse was the
president of the A.R.P.S. section of the Eastern Province and in his
letter to the Government refusing to attend the meeting of the Provincial,
he closely followed the Society's argument. He stated that:
1. It was contrary to custom for the Ga Mantse to travel from
Accra to any part of the Province to hold meetings with other Head
Chiefs;
2. It was contrary to custom for the Ga Mantse to participate
in Legislative Council debates, or to vote on behalf of the Ga people,
and it was against custom for any other Head Chief to represent them
on the Council.*
The Government officials must have felt very upset that Tackie
Yaoboi, for whom they had only a few months ago intervened to save
o
from destoolment, had boycotted the meeting of the Provincial
Council.
It was not, however, until after, and as a result of the passing
of the Native Administration Ordinance in 1927 that the campaign against
the Provincial Councils reached the peak of its success. This we shall
soon discuss.
The passing of the Native Administration Ordinance in 1927 was
Guggisberg's second major measure for strengthening the authority of
the Head Chiefs. Guggisberg had, as we have seen in the previous chapter,
introduced in 1922 an amendment to the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
of 1883 but as a result of an unanimous opposition by the African
members of the Legislative Council, he withdrew it. In his address to
*G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/925. Letter of 1^.5.1926 from Tackie Yaoboi, Ga
Mantse, to the Commissioner of the Eastern Province.
^Sessional Paper No.X of 1925-26. Report on an inquiry held by C.W.
Welman, the S.N.A. For more details see chapter eight below.
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the Legislative Council in February, 1925» Guggisberg made the following
statement:
While I feel strongly that Government will have to do something
to strengthen the power of the Chiefs and to prevent their rule
becoming a farce, I am of the opinion that we should first wait
for proposals from the Paramount Chiefs and their Oman Councils.
Whenever Government in the past have attempted to legislate to
strengthen their position, even though we may have previously
consulted many of them, we have usually met with firm opposition
from the very native rulers that we are trying to help. I there¬
fore feel strongly that the first move must be made by the Chiefs
themselves. 1
At the same session of the Provincial Council Ofori Atta asked
whether in view of the need for a new measure to supercede the Native
Jurisdiction Ordincance the Government might be prepared to grant the
necessary leave to an unofficial member to introduce a Bill to the
o
Legislative Council at an early date. To this question the Colonial
Secretary replied:
Government would not oppose the introduction of a Bill dealing
with the subject of Native Jurisdiction ... Government is in
full sympathy with the Honourable Member's view that the whole
subject of Native Jurisdiction in the Colony requires the most
careful consideration. At the same time while it will give
leave for such a Bill to be introduced, it cannot pledge itself
in advance to support it until the terms of the Bill are known
and full consideration has been given to them. 3
Encouraged by such statements, some of the Head Chiefs of the
Eastern Province met in May 1925 in a conference which took place at
Nsawam, over which Ofori Atta presided, and drafted a Native Adminis-
tration Ordinance. This was then circulated by Ofori Atta throughout
the Colony for the consideration of the different Head Chiefs. Ofori Atta




^•Report of the Native Affairs Dept., 1925-26.
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the A.R.P.S. and asked for their suggestions and criticisms. * In
reply, the Executive Committee objected to Ofori Atta sending such a
letter and asked if he was still a member of the Eastern Province
2
section of the A.R.P.S.
Meanwhile, the draft Ordinance was carefully examined, altered
where necessary and put into legal phraseology by a Government Committee
appointed especially for this purpose. ^ Therefore, although the draft
Ordinance was originally drafted by some of the Head Chiefs and intro¬
duced in the Legislative Council by Ofori Atta - and for that matter,
it was the first time in the history of the Council that a Bill was
introduced by an unofficial member - it was for all intents and pur¬
poses just as much a Government measure as if it had been introduced
by the Secretary for Native Affairs.
The Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council and read a
first time on the 4-th of March, 1927# At the time there was only one
municipal member on the Legislative, namely Kojo-Thompson who accepted
nomination as a member of Accra. The municipal seats of Cape Coast and
Sekondi remained vacant as the A.R.P.S. boycotted the new Legislative
Council.
However, Guggisberg invited Casely-Hayford and Glover Addo to
become extraordinary members of the Legislative Council for discussion
of the Bill in its second reading. Following the instruction of the
A.R.P.S., they declined the invitation. ^ A motion to introduce a
petition from the A.R.P.S. against the Bill and for counsel to appear
before the Council was rejected and an attempt to postpone the discussion
1G.N.A., Cape Coast,ACC.No.115/65.File No.28, Letter of 29.4.1926 from
Ofori Atta to President of the A.R.P.S.
2
Ibid., letter of 11.5.1926, from Secretary of the A.R.P.S. to Ofori Atta.
3G.N.A..Accra.ADM.ll/974.case No.2l/l927. Minute of 29.7.1928.
4
For example, G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/1420, Report of the Native Affairs
Dept., 1927-28.
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of the Bill was defeated.
The Bill was passed into law on the 21st April, 192?, replacing the
forty-four year old Native Jurisdiction Ordinance. It took its place
in the Statute book as the Native Administration Ordinance, No.18 of
1927, "An Ordinance to define and to regulate the exercise of certain
powers and jurisdiction by Native Authorities, and to assign certain
functions to the Provincial Councils, and for purposes connected there¬
with." * Naturally the provincial members on the Legislative Council
supported the passing of the Ordinance. Only the single voice of Kojo-
Thompson was in fact raised against it.
The Native Administration Ordinance (N.A.O.) recognised and
defined categories of chiefs, the most important of whom were
2
"Paramount Chiefs", this term being substituted for "Head Chiefs".
The procedures of electing, installing and deposing these chiefs were
3described in detail. The powers and jurisdiction of the Paramount
Chiefs as distinct from those of other chiefs were for the first time
clearly defined. Furthermore, the Ordinance tried to strengthen and
safeguard the position of the Paramount Chiefs against their sub-
chiefs. For instance, the Ordinance provided that,
No Divisional Chief or Chief shall claim independence from a
Paramount Chief Stool or from any Stool to which he or his
Stool is subordinate; and No Divisional Chief or Chief shall
transfer or withdraw, or attempt to transfer or withdraw, his
or his Stool's allegiance from the Paramount Stool or from ^
the Divisional Stool to which he or his Stool owes allegiance.
The Ordinance also empowered the Paramount Chiefs to make by-laws
for the "good government and welfare" of their States.^
iFor a copy of the Ordinance see P.R.O. ,C.0.96.673/^308, Enclosure in
Despatch No.389 of 19.5*1927 from J. C.Maxwell to L. S. Amery.
2Part I of the N.A.O..No.18 of 1927.
3Part II of the N.A.O.
**Part IV (clause 33) of the N.A.O.
•5Part VU (clause ^0) of the N.A.O.
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The Ordinance recognised and attested to provide an elaborate
scheme for the regulation and organisation of the native tribunals. *
The jurisdiction of the different grades of these tribunals was
2
defined and the procedure of appeals was described. Besides the
tribunals, the Ordinance gave jurisdiction to the State Council and the
Provincial Councils. For the first time the State Council was recog¬
nised as the highest authority in the State and empowered to deal with
stool disputes. J
A Provincial Council was given the power to entertain the following:
1. All disputes of a constitutional nature arising between
Paramount Chiefs of the same province, or between sub-chiefs of different
states but in the same Province;
2. All disputes relating to the ownership, possession or occup¬
ation of lands, or to jurisdiction arising between Paramount Chiefs of
the same province or sub-chiefs of different States but in the same
province. Disputes of chiefs of two provinces were to be tried by two
Provincial Councils sitting jointly;
3. Any question, matter, or dispute referred to it by the
Governor for hearing and determination. ^
The Native Administration Ordinance was strenuously opposed by
the intelligentsia who were resentful of any measure, even a limited
one, to strengthen the position of their political rivals, the Para¬
mount Chiefs. In addition to the competition over the Country's
political leadership, the intelligentsia had another real reason to
1Part VIII of the N.A.O.
2Part IX of the N.A.O.
^Part X of the N.A.O.
^Part XI of the N.A.O.
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oppose the Ordinance. The Ordinance had removed from the Supreme
Court to the native tribunals the jurisdiction to entertain cases
relating to political and constitutional disputes between the chiefs
such as those involving succession to stools or the custody of stools'
properties. * This had hitherto proved a regular source of income to
the members of the intelligentsia who, for the most part, were practising
barristers. To quote one example, the Tufehene of Assin Apimanim had
p
paid over £1,000 in lawyers' fees to establish his claim to a stool.
As during the 1925-26 campaign against the Provincial Councils,
the intelligentsia chose not to give prominence to their real objections
but once again the battle cry was that the Native Administration Ordinance
it,
was, like the Provincial Councils before/ violating the customary
constitution. The argument of the intelligentsia against the Native
Administration Ordinance could be briefly summarised thus:
1. That the Ordinance would lead to the introduction in the Gold
Coast of ideas of "political administration", i.e. Indirect Rule,
developed in Northern Nigeria where conditions were totally different
from those existing in the Gold Coast;
2. That the Ordinance violated the democratic nature of the
customary constitution and assigned to the Paramount Chiefs functions
and rights which never belonged to them under the customary constitution;
3. That the exercise cff these functions and rights could not but
place such Paramount Chiefs beyond the control of their sub-chiefs and
people;
4. That the Ordinance conferred judicial powers on the Adminis¬
trative officers and this was inimical to the best interests of litigants. ^
^"Part IV(clause 35) of the N.A.O.
2G.N.A.,Accra.ADM.11/974,case No.2l/l927, Minute of 25.5.1928 by the
Commissioner of the Central Province.
3
Mainly computed from G.N.A.,Accra.ADM.il/974,case No.21/1927, petition
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The majority of the press, which had always championed the polit¬
ical causes in the country and which was usually owned and edited by
members of the intelligentsia, came out strongly against the Native
Administration Ordinance and took the opportunity to renew its attack
on the Provincial Councils.
The Gold Coast Spectator, for example, maintained that there was
no legislation within recollection which had been enacted that had
caused so much trouble to the different states. * The Paramount Chiefs,
the Spectator explained, were given more power by the Ordinance and
thus supported it; on the other hand the people felt their interests
had been ignored and the clauses of the Ordinances alienated their
pchiefs from them and placed them in the category of Government officials.
Two weeks later, the Spectator added that it was clear from daily events
that the Ordinance was doing more harm than good to the Country. J It
argued that the Ordinance "imperils the peace of the Country and
greatly upsets Native custom and usage." The remedy, the Spectator
h
suggested, was to suspend the operation of the Ordinance.
The Gold Coast Independent, owned by Dr. Nanka-Bruce, a prominent
figure of the intelligentsia, also held that the Provincial Councils
and their progeny, the Native Administration Ordinance, had c<v*sed
serious differences between the people and their Paramount Chiefs. ^
of the A.R.P.S. dated 13.2.1928 against the N.A.O.; P.R.O.,C.0.96.673/
4308, proceeding of a mass meeting held at Accra on 1^.^.1927; Leg.Co.
Debates.1927-28.
*The Gold Coast Spectator, 8.10.1927.
2Ibid.
^The Gold Coast Spectator, 22.10.1927.
4Ibid.
-*The Gold Coast Independent, 7.1.1928.
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The Independent urged the Government to drop the Ordinance or gather
the collective opinion of the people by a referendum. * The Independent
was convinced that if such a referendum were conducted the people would
come out clearly against the Ordinance. ^
The Gold Coast Times took the opportunity of the publishing of the
Ordinance to stage what could probably be described as the strongest
attack on the Provincial Councils. 3 it carried the following:
The motive behind the institutions of these Councils is
revealed in the character of the Bill ^i.e., the N.A.O.H :
it is not to save native institutions in the impact with western
civilization, as the Government has been preaching to the whole
outside world, but to extend the powers of the Chiefs beyond the
limits by customary law, and having gratified this natural
craving, to influence them in turn to give their sanctions to the
class of legislation which the Government cannot introduce on
its responsibility without its authority being called in
question. In short, the Provincial Councils were designed to do
the dirty work of the Government, if we may so put it, and as
vehicles for clearing legislative garbage. 4
Surprisingly the Vox-Populi, usually considered a radical and
anti-colonial newspaper, came out clearly in favour of the Native
Administration Ordinance. 3 jn an editorial entitled "The Case for the
Chiefs", it stated that great credit was due to those chiefs who were
responsible for the birth of the Ordinance and they were to be con¬
gratulated on the fact they had thought it fit to take steps to protect
their positions, the absence of legislation in regard to which had been
a cause of eternal unrest in the country. ^ The Vox-Populi went on to
1Ibid.
2Ibid.






It is not doubted that there is inherent native jurisdiction
existent in our Natural Rulers, and if we will only remember that
the consolidation of British Authority itself in our land has
been founded on native jurisdiction originally as ameliorated by
the venerable Maclean sitting with our chiefs and judges, it should
be conceded that our chiefs have every right to legislate as they
have done from time immemorial.... To us there does not appear
to be anything new in the Bill. Nothing that does not exist
already save the augmentation of their jurisdiction in civil
cases to a higher amount which is in itself reasonable and just.
But the Vox-Populi was a single voice in an otherwise united opposition
to the Native Administration Ordinance. In any case, the Vox-Popull
itself changed its stance five years later when in 1932, as we shall
explain in the next chapter, it declared itself against the Native
O
Administration Ordinance.
Section 129 of the Native Administration Ordinance gave the
intelligentsia an opportunity to revive their attack on the Provincial
Councils. This section made it lawful, but not obligatory, for the
Governor to remove from the schedule of the States to which the
Ordinance was intended to be applied any State whose Paramount Chief
was not attending the meetings of the Provincial Council. Accordingly,
the intelligentsia spread it about that any people who wished to avoid
coming under the Ordinance had only to insure that their Paramount
Chief should cease to attend the meetings of the Councils. 3
As a result of the actions of the intelligentsia, and owing to the
abolition of various subordinate native tribunals effected by the
Ordinance, several subordinate chiefs sought to forbid their Paramount
Chiefs to attend the meetings of the Provincial Councils in the hope
that thereby section 129 of the Ordinance would automatically result
in its being withdrawn from their States. ^
llbid.
^The Vox-Populi, 27.6.1932. For more detail see chapter four below.
^For example the Leg.Co.Debates, 1928-29.
^P.R.O.,C.O.,96.677/6033.conf.despatch of 29.12.1927 from Slater to
L. S. Amery.
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In addition to the support of the subordinate chiefs, the campaign
of the intelligentsia was made successful because of the crucial
support of the rural people. The Native Administration Ordinance
enabled the colonial Government to interfere more and more in the
day-to-day affairs of the stools, particularly in enstoolments and
destoolments. Naturally the people saw this as a deliberate attempt
on the part of the colonial Government to undermine the democratic
element in their indigenous institutions.
The democratic Akan political system and the autocratic Indirect
Rule system were contradictory and could not possibly co-exist. When¬
ever the people felt that their Paramount Chiefs were collaborating or
integrating too closely with the colonial Governemnt they would simply
destool them. The weapon of destoolment was very effective in the
campaign against the Native Administration Ordinance. Several Para¬
mount Chiefs were instructed by their people not to attend the
meetings of the Provincial Councils and those who defied the instructions
of their people were in fact destooled.
Ironically the rural people's revolt against the Ordinance first
manifested itself in the Eastern Province, the stronghold of the
Provincial Councils and whose Paramount Chiefs were the original
sponsors of the Native Administration Ordinance. Here in May 1927,
the State Council of Akwapim, under pressure from its people, dis¬
associated itself from the activities of its Omanhene, F. W. Kwesi
Akuffo, and instructed him to refrain from attending the Provincial and
Legislative Councils. * It is to be recalled that Akuffo was one of
the original sponsors of the Native Administration Ordinance and had
been elected in 1926 to the Legislative Council as one of the three
Provincial members of the Eastern Province.
*G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ACC.No.115/67, File No.28, proceedings of a meeting
held on 17.^.1927 at Akwapim state; The Gold Coast Independent,
7.1.1928; West Africa, lb.7.1927.
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Because of the activities of the State Council of Akwapim, the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province met the Council members and
expressed "unsympathetic words" and showed an "unsavoury attitude"
towards their action. * This attitude of the Commissioner prompted
the State Council to pronounce immediately the formal destoolment of
their Omanhene.
Not surprisingly the Government refused to recognise the de¬
stoolment of the Qmanhene. The new Governor, Sir. R. A. Slater, went
to Akwapim and told the people that they had no power to prevent the
Qmanhene from attending the Legislative Council. 2 The Governor also
promised support and protection to the Omanhene should he decide to
attend the Council. However, the Omanhene died suddenly in November
1927, and this was taken by the people of Akwapira as an indication that
their "ancestors" were on their side. ^
In New Juaben State, also in the Eastern Province, a mass meeting
was held on the 12th of September, 1927 and a resolution repudiating
k
the Native Administration Ordinance was passed. The resolution
asserted that in supporting the Ordinance, the Oraanhene, Nana Kwaku
Boateng, had acted without the permission or sanction of his State
Council and his people. ^ The resolution accused him of betraying
the trust of his council and his people and declared him destooled. ^
F. W. Kwesi Akuffo was born on 21.6.1863 and was educated in the
Basel Mission School at Akropong. He was enstooled as Omanhene of
Akwapim in I896, destooled in 1907 hut reinstated in 1919* He died
in November, 1927* Leg.Co.Debates, 1928-29.
*The Gold Coast Spectator, 19.11.1927*
2West Africa. 24.9.1927.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1420, Report on the Native Affairs Dept. 1930.
^Sessional Paper No.V. of 1929-30. Enquiry into the alleged deposition
of Nana Kwaku, Omanhene of New Juaben; The Gold Coast Independent,8.10.27*
^Sessional Paper No.V of 1929-30. ibid.
6Ibid.
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The Government refused to acknowledge the Omanhene*s destoolment.
A mass meeting was also held in October 1927, in Awuna State, in
the Eastern Province, and it resolved to protest against the Ordinance. *
The Awuna Fia (Paramount Chief) Togbi Sri H, who had been elected in
1926 as a Provincial member to the Legislative Council, was instructed
to cease attending the meetings of the Provincial and Legislative
p
Councils. Sri H obeyed these instructions.
Still in the Eastern Province, in October 1927, the State Council
of Akmamu sent a letter to the Government protesting against the
Native Administration Ordinance on the grounds that:
1. The Omanhene, Nana E. A. Ababio IV, who was one of the
original sponsors of the Native Administration Ordinance, did not
consult his State Council and his people until after the Ordinance
was passed in the Legislative Council;
2. The Native Administration Ordinance degraded most of the
important chiefs in the States and sought only the interests of the
Paramount Chiefs. ^ xhe State Council then instructed the Ctaanhene to
cease attending the meetings of the Provincial Councils.
Our last example of the revolt of the people of the Eastern
Province against the Native Administration Ordinance was that of the
PekL State. Here a resolution was passed against the Ordinance and
the Omanhene was instructed by his State Council to cease attending
the meetings of the Provincial Council. ^
*The Gold Coast Independent, 22.10.1927.
2Ibld.
3G.N.A..Accra,ADM.ll/974.case No.21/1927, letter of 10.10.1927 from
Omanhene of Akwarau to the D.C.
4
Report on the Eastern Province, 1927-28.
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By and large, the majority of the Paramount Chiefs of the
Eastern Province who in 1925 and 1926 strongly supported the Provincial
Councils system, were now in 1927 instructed by their State Councils,
which were themselves under pressure from their people, to cease
attending the meetings of the Provincial Councils,
In the Central Province, the most outstanding example of oppo¬
sition to the Native Administration Ordinance was that of the Oguaa
State (Cape Coast). * Here the Omanhene himself, his State Council,
the majority of the Asafo organisations and the A.R.P.S. all joined in
opposing the Provincial Councils system and the Native Administration
Ordinance. In fact, the opposition of the Oguaa State to these
measures continued until 19^3» just one year before the Native
Administration Ordinance itself was repealed. The opposition of the
State
Oguaa/will be explained in more detail in chapter seven.
In Winneba State, also in the Central Province, the Qnanhene
Ayeribi Acquah III, who was elected in 1926 as a Provincial member to
the Legislative Council, was instructed to attend no more meetings of
2
the Provincial Council or the Legislative Council. The Omanhene
refused to obey the instructions of his State Council. As a result,
his State Council and his people destooled him in spite of the effort
of the political officers to explain the Ordinance to them in a "sugar-
coated fashion". ^
Another example of the revolt of the people in the Central Province
was that of the Abura State. Here the Omanhene, Otu Ababio II, was
elected in 1926 as a Provincial member to the Legislative Council and
when the Native Administration Ordinance was enacted he consented to
*For more detail on the Oguaa State*s opposition to the Provincial
Councils system and the N.A.O. see chapter seven below.
2
The Gold Coast Spectator, 8.10.1927.
-^The Gold Coast Leader, 2.7.1927*
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its application in his State. * However, early in November 1927, his
State Council, his sub-chiefs and his people declared their disapproval
of the Ordinance and their unwillingness to be governed by its provi¬
sions. ^ A few days later, the Omanhene suddenly died and this was
taken as another example that the "ancestors" were on the side of the
people. ^
Our final example of the Central Province's revolt against the
Native Administration Ordinance was that of Ekumfi State. Here the
State Council held a meeting with the Omanhene and formally restrained
him from further attending or associating himself with the Provincial
4
Council. For his previous association with the Provincial Council,
the Omanhene was fined £21. ^
By and large there was ample evidence to demonstrate that by the
end of 1927, the campaign against the Provincial Councils and the
Native Administration Ordinance was very successful and the whole
system seemed to be collapsing. The S.N.A. complained annoyedly
that the Native Administration Ordinance was becoming "unpopular
among the masses". ^ The Provincial Commissioner of the Central
Province admitted that the opponents of the Provincial Council gained
much success in their campaign and that by January 1928, there appeared
7
to be little prospect of the Council surviving the onslaught. In
^■Otu Ababio was enstooled as Omanhene in 1900, destooled in 1904 and
reinstated in 1909. In 1926 he was elected President of the Provincial
Council of the Central Province and also elected to the Legislative
Council. But he only took his seat on the Legislative Council once.
He died in November 1927. Leg.Co.Debates, l?2c-29«
^G.N.A.,CapeCoast,ADM.23/l/507. letter of 10.11.1927 from Omanhene of
Abura to the Commissioner of the Central Province.
•^G.N.A..Accra,ADM. 11/1420, Report on the Native Affairs Dept. 1930.
^The Gold Coast Independent. 9.1.1927.
^Ibid.
^Report of the Native Affairs Dept. 1927-28.
TReport on the Central Province, 1927-28.
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fact the majority of the Paramount Chiefs in the Eastern and Central
Provinces were instructed by their State Councils and their people not
to attend the meetings of the Provincial Councils. Moreover, all the
Paramount Chiefs, with the exception only of Kate Hole, the Konor of
Manga Krobo, who were elected in 1926 to the Legislative Council were
now in 1927 told by their people to cease attending it. In the
Western Province the Paramount Chiefs, as we have described, had from
the start opposed and boycotted the Provincial Councils system and the
Native Administration Ordinance.
The success of the revolt against the Provincial Councils and the
Native Administration Ordinance was short-lived. Governor Slater arrived
in the country in July 19271 when the opposition to the Provincial
Councils and the Native Administration Ordinance was at its peak. To
the disappointment of the intelligentsia, who rejoiced at the departure
of Guggisberg, Slater from the start made it determinedly clear that
he saw no reason why he should depart from the general lines of policy
pursued by his predecessor. ^
Slater expressed the view that the Provincial Councils were "a
2
very natural and sound development" of the indigenous institutions.
He also asserted that he was not going to suspend the Native Admini¬
stration Ordinance but rather he was going to make it a success.^
Accordingly, he and his politocal officers began an active campaign
of meetings and personal contacts with the Paramount Chiefs and their
people. The purpose was to refute the criticisms of the intelligentsia





Ordinance were beneficial to the chiefs and their people. * The
A.R.P.S. was portrayed to the people as a private society and Slater
denied that it had the right to dictate to the chiefs on their atti¬
tude towards the Government.
Perhaps a more effective move in winning support for the Pro¬
vincial Councils and the Native Administration Ordinance was Slater's
decision to apply the Ordinance, as from January 1928, to all the
States and not only to the States listed in the third schedule of
2
the Ordinance. This reduced considerably the pressure on the
Paramount Chiefs.
It had now become clear to the people that, contrary to what
section 129 of the Ordinance made them believe, preventing their
Paramount Chiefs from attending the meetings of the Provincial Councils
would not after all automatically or necessarily mean that the Native
Administration Ordinance would not be applied to their States.
Furthermore, the Paramount Chiefs themselves seemed to be frightened
by the enormous success of the agitation against them and this made
them more accessible for an alliance with the colonial officials.
They seemed to have become decidedly convinced that if their declining
authority was to be saved then they should finally abandon the A.R.P.S.
and instead clearly integrate themselves with the colonial administra¬
tion which was offering them more power and protection. Finally the
Paramount Chiefs were encouraged in accepting the Provincial Councils
system by the "liberal scale of cash payments" for time spent at
meetings and in travelling. ^
*For example, G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/921, Memo, by the S.N.A. dated
10.8.192? and entitled "Benefits that occur to the Paramount Chief's
state when the Paramount Chief is a member of Provincial Council."
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.677/6033. conf.despatch of 29.12.1927 from Slater to
L. S. Amery.
■^Kimble, Political History, 503.
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Fortunately for both the Paramount Chiefs and the colonial
Government, the intelligentsia themselves were no longer united in
their opposition to the Provincial Councils and the Native Administra¬
tion Ordinance. Their leader, Casely-Hayford who had vigorously
opposed these measures changed his mind in 1928 and concluded that it
had been a mistake to oppose them.
Perhaps Hayford realised that the colonial administration, which
was then strongly established and was gradually committing itself
to a Lugardian type of Indirect Rule, was not going to suspend either
the 1925 constitution or the Native Administration Ordinance. Thus,
as a pragmatic politician, he sought reform from within instead of the
policy of complete non-cooperation. Furthermore, we may speculate
that Casely-Hayford•s "change of heart", to use Kimble*s phrase, was
caused by his feeling that before he died he wanted to be reconciled
with his adversaries.
Whatever the reason, Hayford declared that the Provincial
Councils system was useful and would be workable and on his return to
the Legislative Council he took the opportunity to state that:
I must say candidly that I for one was at one time opposed to
the system £the Provincial Councils system} because I thought
that it infringed the order of making the State Council the
Authority instead of the Oman, but, however, it has been made
clear to the responsible men of the Country that the time has
come for them to explain the misunderstanding so that all might
work together and co-operate. 1
This was followed by a reconciliation in 1929 with Ofori Atta, the
leader of the chiefs. Hayford's "change of heart" was a decisive




As a result of all these factors, the Paramount Chiefs gradually-
resumed their attendance at the Provincial Councils meetings and
began to apply the Native Administration Ordinance to their States.
The Provincial Council of the Central Province met on the 27th
February, 1928, and passed a resolution against the A.R.P.S. oppo¬
sition to the Provincial Councils and the Native Administration
Ordinance.* The Council took the opportunity to offer the Government
its "high appreciation of the unremitting efforts made by Government
to protect our persons from molestation, and our authority from being
trodden upon." 2
By April 1928, only three of the twenty-eight States comprising
the Provincial Council of the Central Province were unrepresented,
Oguaa, Ajumako and Abeadzi. 3 The Commissioner who had a year ago
%
given up every hope of the Provincial Council surviving the onslaught
now happily reported that the opposition to the Provincial Council
k
and the Native Administration Ordinance was fading. Equally, the
opposition in the Eastern Province was fading.
§
In the Western Province, where the Paramount Cheifs had origin¬
ally refused to establish a Provincial Council, they now at last met
In April 1928, inaugurated the Provincial Council and elected Nana
Annor Adjaye, Omanhene of Western Nzima, as their representative to
the Legislative Council. ^
*G.N.A. .Accra, ADM. 11/921,case No.2Vl925, "Resolution passed by the 8th
session of Provincial Council of Central Province, on 27.2.1928."
2Ibid.
^Report on the Central Province, 1928-29.
Sbid.
^Report on the Western Province, 1927-28.
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On the whole, throughout 1928 and 1929» the three Provincial
Councils continued to be held regularly and were well attended, *
By 1930 only four out of the country's sixty-three States were still
refusing to join the deliberations of the Provincial Councils. 2 But
though the Provincial Councils were firmly established and the Native
Administration Ordinance was accepted as the measure regulating the
affairs of the stools, they both, as we shall explain later, fell far
short of fulfilling the functions the colonial administration intended.




THE CHALLENGE TO THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
OF THE CHIEFS. 1930-1951: THE CHIEFS AND
POLITICAL. EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL CHANGES
The period from 1925 to 1950 could perhaps best be called the era
of the Provincial Councils of the Paramount Chiefs. These Councils,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, were essentially designed to
accord prominence to the Paramount Chiefs while at the same time reducing
to a minimum the influence of the educated elite on the political
leadership of the Country. The Paramount Chiefs were regarded by the
colonial administration as the "natural rulers" and "true representatives"
of the people. They were given new powers, they were "honoured" and
"knighted" and were expected to inherit the British colonial power
when self-government was achieved. The Paramount Chiefs of the
Provincial Councils did not, however, play the role the colonial admin¬
istration wanted of them.
In the last chapter we discussed the Africans1 initial response
to the introduction of the Provincial Councils system and the Govern¬
ment's attempt to strengthen the authority of the chiefs. In this
chapter the continuing challenge for the political leadership of the
Paramount Chiefs during the 1930s and the 19*t0s by different social
forces will be examined.
As during the 1920s so during the 1930s, the first challenge to
the chiefs' political authority came from the educated elite or the
intelligentsia. * Because of their education and economic resources,
*For the general characteristics of the educated elite see K. E. de
Graft Johnson, "The Evolution of Elites in Ghana", in P. C. Lloyd
(ed.), The New Elites of Tropical Africa, Oxford, 1966.
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the educated elite considered themselves destined to the political
leadership of the Country. They maintained that the majority of the
chiefs were illiterate and thus, not only were they incompetent to
manage the affairs of the people in modern times, but most importantly,
they were also easy tools in the hands of the colonial administration,
and so they retarded the political development of the Country. * The
educated elite did not want the chiefs to take any part in politics.
As we have described in the previous chapter, naturally the educated
elite strongly opposed the introduction of the Provincial Councils
system. A reconciliation was made between the two groups in 1929 but,
as Kimble correctly noted, this did not mean abrogation of the claim
2
made by the educated elite to national leadership. In fact, the
Cape Coast parent section of the A.R.P.S. disapproved of the recon¬
ciliation. In short, the nationalist movement remained disunited in
spite of the 1929 reconciliation. In 1930» Or. J. B. Danquah attempted
to remedy this by forming the Gold Coast Youth Conference.
Joseph Kwame Kyeretwi Boakye Danquah was born in 1895* ^ At the
age of seventeen he completed his primary education at the Basel
Mission Grammar School at Begoro. After leaving school he was employed
in 1913 at the office of V. J. Buckle, a barrister-at-law in Accra.
The next year he was appointed a clerk in the Chief Registrar's office
of the Supreme Court. Between 1915 and 1921 he acted as Secretary and
Registrar of the tribunal of his elder brother, Ofori Atta, the
Omanhene of Akira Abualcwa. His first involvement in the national move¬
ment was in 1921 when he represented Akim Abuakwa State at the Cape
*For example, J. B. Christensen, "African Political Systems: Indirect
Rule and Democratic Process", in Phylon,XV, 1,195**» 69-83.
2Kimble, A Political History of Ghana, Oxford 1963. 505*
^The following brief biographical account of J. B. Danquah comes mainly
from: J. B. Danquah, Historic Speeches and Writings on Ghana, Accra
(N.D.), compiled by H. K. Akyeampongl West Africa, 2^.9.1926 and
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Coast conference of the A.R.P.S.
Towards the end of 1921 he left for England and in January 1923»
he entered University College, London. In July 1923» he passed the
Intermediate Examination in Arts, At the sessional examination 1923-24,
he was awarded a first class certificate in general introduction to
philosophy and in Greek philosophy and a first class certificate with
the prize in Modem Philosophy and Ethics. In June 1925» he passed
his B.A. examination with second class honours in philosophy. In
July 1926, he was elected by the Assembly of Faculties, at University
College, as a John Stuart Mill Scholar in Philosophy of Mind and Logic.
The annual value of the scholarship was £35 and the holder might be
called upon to assist in teaching. This enabled him to proceed with
his studies and in 1927, he obtained his Ph.D. degree. The title of
his thesis was MThe Moral End as Moral Excellence".
While he was studying for his B.A. he took up the study of law as
an external student. He passed the LL.B. degree examination in 1926
m*
and was called to the Bar during the same year. At the same time
Danquah was very active in the political and social life of the West
African students in Britain. He was, for example a founder of the West
African Students Union of Great Britain and Ireland, generally called
"WASU".
In 1927 he returned home after a successful academic career in
London. The next year he published his first two books, Akan Laws and
Customs (his best known book), and Cases in Akan Law. In 1930. he
founded the Youth Conference and the next year he founded and edited
the Times of West Africa, a daily newspaper which became increasingly
outspoken against the colonial administration. In 1934 an official
of the Colonial Office described it as "notorious for its venomous
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and scurrilous attitude twards Government and the European race
generally." *
In 1934 Danquah was back in London as the Secretary of the
Gold Coast and Ashanti Delegation which came to London to protest
against the Sedition Bill and the Waterworks Ordinance. He stayed
in London until 1936 researching at the British Museum and writing
about the Gold Coast's history and institutions.
Back in the Gold Coast he tried to revive the Youth Conference.
In 1946 he was elected to the Legislative Council. In 1947 he founded
the U.G.C.C. The story of his life after 1951 is outside the scope of
this study and it is sufficient to say only that he became the out¬
standing opponent of Nkrumah. He died in 19&5 one °*" Nkruraah's
detention camps.
Politically Danquah was distinguished from the majority, if not
all, of the intelligentsia by advocating giving the chiefs a prominent
role in the political leadership of the Country. Perhaps a somewhat
accurate description of Danquah the politician was that given by West
Africa in a profile of him in 1949. West Africa stated:
Danquah is no radical, barely, indeed, a liberal. For Danquah
is a conservative, conservative almost to the point of reaction.
True he believes in democracy, but a democracy guided and led by
the chiefs.
He is for the old order. Of course, he believes in Africa for
the Africans - what good African in the Gold Coast does not? -
but you feel that if Danquah has his way it will be an Africa
ruled by its aristocrats and its great families. 2
Although Danquah generally supported the chiefs, he did not completely
see eye-to-eye with them. His years in London as a student and as
leader in WASU endowed him, as Holmes noted, with a certain, though
limited, degree of anti-colonialism. ^ He maintained a consistently
1.1.1949; and A. B. Holmes IV, "Economic and Political Organisations
in the Gold Coast, 1920-45", a Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1972.
1P.R.0..C.0.96.717/21750, Minute of 23.6.1934.
2West Africa. 1.1.1949.
3a.B. Holmes IV, op.cit.
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critical but not radical or anti-imperialist attitude.* In spite of this
stance, he was widely disliked by the colonial administration. In
1934, for example, an official of the Colonial Office described him
2
as "pronouncedly anti-white and anti-Government".
Having given a brief biographical sketch of Danquah, we can now
describe his efforts to effect a reconciliation between the Paramount
Chiefs and the intelligentsia of the A.R.P.S.
When Danquah returned from London in 1927, the struggle for
"dominance and survival", 3 to use Jones-Quartey's phrase, between
the Paramount Chiefs and the intelligentsia was at its height.
Danquah made it his prime political objective to resolve this cleavage
between the two groups. He stated:
I believed in chiefdomship and democracy. The intelligentsia
believed in democracy. I thought the chiefs and intelligentsia
could come together. I did not think we could get anywhere by
destroying the chiefdoms. 4
Accordingly, Danquah founded in 1930 the Gold Coast Youth Conference
with the aim of uniting the chiefs with the intelligentsia and foster¬
ing development by bringing all the various groups together to a
round table Conference to discuss matters affecting the welfare of the
Country. ^ The Conference counted several Paramount Chiefs, including
Premph I and Ofori Atta, as its patrons. Apart from being addressed
by some Paramount Chiefs and members of the intelligentsia, the
Conference did not achieve anything. In fact, the Conference did not
reconvene until 1938.
1Ibid.
2P.R.0.,C.0.96.717/21750. Notes on the members of the Gold Coast and
Ashanti Delegation of 1934, dated 28.6.1934.
•^K. A. B. Jones-Quartey, A Summary History of the Ghana Press, 1822-
1960. Accra, 1974. 19.
\fest Africa. 1.1.1949.
^The Gold Coast Independent, 1.2.1930.
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Danquah attributed the decline of the Conference to the fact that
the Continuation Committee set upt to carry the Conference from year
to year had no adequate machinery for disseminating the policy for
which the Conference stood. * This could only partly explain the
decline of the Conference. Danquah himself was not, in fact, the suit¬
able person to reconcile the chiefs with the intelligentsia. Not only
was he closely associated with his elder brother, Ofori Atta, the
leader of the chiefs, but unlike the majority of the intelligentsia,
even since his London days, he had clearly come out in defence of the
2
Provincial Councils system and the N.A.O. Perhaps his views on the N.A.O.
were best expressed in a letter he wrote to the two-members delegation
of the A.R.P.S. in London in 193^ In this letter he stated:
I had often wondered when I heard people criticising the N.A.O.
as a great evil, and condemning the revival ( for it was no less
than that) of the State Councils, whether they knew what they
were talking about, or that they were merely echoing, like
parrots, the cry of the lawyers who felt that by strengthening
the State Councils, their practice had thereby been diminished....
I consider the N.A.O. as the Magna Carta of the Akan people, and
I am sure history will prove me right. 3
Whatever the reason, Danquah's first attempt to reconcile the
Paramount Chiefs with the intelligentsia failed. The Cape Coast
section of the A.R.P.S., now under the leadership of Kobina Sekyi,
continued to oppose the Provincial Councils system.
William Esume-Gwira Sekyi was born in 1892 at Cape Coast where he
a
attended the Kfantsipim Boys* School. In 1910 he entered the Univer¬
sity College, London, and took his B.A. in Philosophy in 1913* He
^J. B. Danquah, Historic Speeches, 66.
2For example, West Africa, 2.1.1926.
•^G.N.A.,Cape Coast, ACC.,No. 75/&+ (A.R.P.S.'s papers), letter of 7.6.1935
from J. B. Danquah to G. Moore and S. R. Wood.
^The following biographical account of Kobina Sekyi is mainly compiled
from: J. A. Langley, "Modernisation and its >|alcontents: Kobina Sekyi
of Ghana and the Re-Statement of African Pollt<o>L Theory, 1892-1956",
in Political Theory and Ideology in African Society, proceedings of a
seminar held in the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh,
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returned to Cape Coast and between 1913 and 1915 he worked there as a
teacher. In 1915 he left again for London where he took his Masters
degree in Philosophy and at the same time qualified for the Bar at
the Inner Temple. Soon after his return to Cape Coast in 1918, he
became the secretary of the Gold Coast section of the N.C.B.W.A.
4s J. A. Langley noted, although Kobina Sekyi was not a revolutionary
socialist but a traditionalist functioning within the legalistic-
constitutional politics of the A.R.P.S., perhaps of all the Gold Coast
nationalists during the inter-war period, he was the most uncompromising
with the colonial administration. * He was distinguished for his
p
"extreme Africanism" and he strongly believed in the value and
3
necessity of strengthening the indigenous customary institutions.
He believed this could best be achieved if the chiefs disassociated
themselves from the colonial Government and its alien political insti¬
tutions. It was because he felt that the Provincial Councils and the
Native Administration Ordinance were calculated to undermine the in¬
digenous institutions and to introduce undesirable western political
27th and 28th Feb., 1970; K. A. B. Jones-Quartey, "Kobina Sekyi:
A Fragment of Biography", in Research Review, vol.4,No.1, 1967.
*J. A. Langley, ibid.
^K. A. B. Jones-Quartey, op.cit.
3■'For example, Magnus Sampson said of him: "Mr. Sekyi was a keen expon¬
ent of native institutions and as a conservative he had strong belief
in chiefship as an institution to be cherished and preserved as the
background and culture of this Country." M. Sampson, "Kobina Sekyi
As I Knew Him", in G.N.A.,Cape Coast, Seky's Papers.
(115)
institutions, that he vigorously opposed them, * True to his uncom¬
promising nature, he refused to join Casely-Hayford in his recon¬
ciliation with the Paramount Chiefs. Instead, Sekyi led the Cape
Coast section of the A.R.P.S. in its fight against the Provincial
Councils system and the colonial Government.
Although by the early 1930s the A.R.P.S. was deserted by most of
its chiefs, Sekyi refused to liquidate it. He was very determined to
prove to the Government that it (the A.R.P.S.) and not the Provincial
Councils, was in fact the political or national body representing the
Country. The Society assumed an attitude of complete non-cooperation
towards the Government and in particular played an active role in
irritating and disrupting the Government's Indirect Rule policies such
2
as the proposed Native Administration Revenue Bill of 1931•
Sekyi himself was very involved in the rural politics of the
Oguaa State (Cape Coast). Partly because of his influence and support,
the Oguaa State declined until 19^3 to join the Provincial Council of
the Central Province. Sekyi also championed the cause of several sub-
chiefs who wanted to become independent of their Paramount Chiefs.
For example, he was the legal adviser of the chiefs of Asaraangkese and
Akwatia in their protracted struggle to gain independence from their
Paramount Chief, Ofori Atta, the father of the Provincial Councils
3
system.
*J. A. Langley, op.cit.
^For more details see chapter six below.
^For more details see chapter eight below.
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The Society took advantage of the 1930-32 agitation against the
Governments proposed taxation scheme to renew its attack on the
Provincial Councils system. In May 19311 Sekyi began a series of
articles in the Gold Coast Times in which he critically dealt with
such issues as: (1) the 1919 protest of the African clerks in the
civil service against the then Colonial Secretary, Sir Ransford
Slater (at the time Sekyi was writing these articles Slater was the
Governor of the Gold Coast); (2) the petition of the N.C.B.W.A.;
(3) the petition of the A.R.P.S. against the 1925 constitution and
the protest of the Society against the N.A.O.; and (4) the Gold
Coast and Ashanti Cocoa Federation ban against the sale of cocoa and
the purchase of luxuries.* Sekyi's aim in writing these articles was
to expose some of the oppressive and repressive methods of the colonial
administration in neutralising or breaking up certain African nation¬
alist movements and protest actions.
In February 1932, the Society took the step of inviting Governor
Slater to a conference for the discussion of matters concerning
"peace, order and good Government of the Country", furnishing him with
2
a list of eighteen topics which it wanted to discuss with him.
This list covered such issues as the nature and extent of the British
jurisdiction, the relationship of the chiefs to the Government, the
1925 constitution, the stool treasuries system, education, etc.^
*These articles were written under the title "On Some Recent Movements
in West Africa." The first article appeared in the issue of the Gold
Coast Times of 9«5*1931*
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.704/7258. letter of 16.2.1932 from J. P. Brown to the
Commissioner of the Central Province; and letter of 22.2.1932 from
Brown to the AG, C.S., Accra.
-^Ibid.
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Governor Slater had committed himself to the Provincial Councils
system and was very annoyed by the A.R.P.S. 's persistent opposition
to such a system. Sekyi's above mentioned articles in the Gold Coast
Times, in which he attacked some of Slater's own policies must have
further convinced him that action must be taken against the A.R.P.S.
The invitation of the Society gave him the opportunity to undermine
it officially. So Slater not only declined the invitation of the
Society but told J. P. Brown, the Society's president, that,
The Government does not recognise your Society as the medium
of communication between Government and the chiefs and people,
the Provincial Councils having been established for that purpose. 1
This reply was given "wide publication" by the Government and the Governor
hoped that this
will have a marked effect in still further weakening the
Society's rapidly dwindling influence, but if its end does not
soon come about naturally early consideration will have to be
given to other means, as its disloyal tendencies are becoming
more and more marked. 2
Far from destroying the A.R.P.S. the reply of the Governor, in
fact, gained the Society the sympathy and support of most of the press.
For example, the Times of West Africa, owned and edited by Danquah who
was himself not unsympathetic to the Provincial Councils system,
strongly maintained that the Government was wrong in its decision
3
not to recognise the A.R.P.S. The Times argued that the Society
was an indigenous body, created by the people themselves, while the
Provincial Councils by contrast were "Statutory bodies set up by an
Order in Council and eventually embodied in the N.A.O. as an instru¬
ment of Government in this Country. They are, in every respect,
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.704/7258, letter of 21.3.1932 from C. E. Skene,
Commissioner of the Central Province, to J. P. Brown.
2P.R.P.,C.0.96.704/7259. despatch of 2.4.1932 from Slater to Sir P.
Cunliffe-Lister.
"^The Times of Vfest Africa, 12.4.1932, editorial entitled "The
Aborigines and the Government.
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official bodies." 1
The Gold Coast Independent, at the time the chief organ of the
intelligentsia, took the opportunity of "August Fifth" 1933. on which
the A.R.P.S. celebrated the occasion of "August Fifth" 1898 when the
Secretary of State met the Society1s successful delegation against the
o
1897 Lands Bill to pay its tribute to the Society. The Independent
held that:
Whatever sense of security is enjoyed in the right of ownership
to the lands of this Country, it is to the A.R.P.S. that we are
indebted. Of late years it has been sought chiefly through the
agency of the Government to substitute another body, that is the
Provincial Councils, for this veteran body which had urged three
sanguinary conflicts over certain rights of the people of this
Country and every time emerged victorious. 3
By and large the Society's cause was greatly boosted, even if for
a short time. In addition the Society continued to maintain its role
in disturbing and spoiling the Government's Indirect Rule policies in
the rural areas, particularly in the Central Province. Whenever there
was a suitable chance, the A.R.P.S. would hold meetings with the
people and the Asafo companies and urge them to put pressure on their
Paramount Chiefs to withdraw from the Provincial Councils.
Meanwhile, besides the A.R.P.S. opposition, the political authority
of the Paramount Chiefs was facing new threats. A very serious threat
or challenge to the political role of the Paramount Chiefs during the
1930s came from the press. The press in the Gold Coast, and elsewhere
in British West Africa for that matter, was almost exclusively in the
hands of the African educated elite: lawyers, doctors, clergymen, etc.^
1Ibid.
^The Gold Coast Independent, 5*8.1933*
3lbid.
4
For example, Martin Wight, The Gold Coast Legislative Council, London
1947, 169.
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It was the most potent instrument used in the propagation of nationalist
ideas and racial consciousness and thus performed a crucial role in
the nationalist awakening. * It was sometimes claimed that in the
absence of representative government, the newspapers were in fact the
voice of the people.
In the Gold Coast, the 1930s witnessed a new era in the history of
the press. Professor Jones-Quartey stated that "the short span between
1930 and 1937 was the most turbulent and most exciting in the history
of the Gold Coast press up to then." ^
Several new newspapers were founded during this period. The Times
of West Africa was founded (and edited) by Danquah in 1931* The Gold
Coast Observer started in 1932 and was owned by C. H. Hayfron Benjamin.
The African Morning Post, which came to be accepted as a "quite revol¬
utionary departure in local journalism", was started in 193^* 3 It
was owned by A. J. Ocansey, a wealthy businessman from Ada in the
Eastern Region, and was edited by Dr. N. Azikiwe. In short, for the
first time, the daily newspaper became an established feature in the
life of the Country. Other important newspapers which were in exist¬
ence before 1930 were the Gold Coast Independent, founded in 1918 by
Dr. F. V. Nanka-Bruce and edited by D. G. Tackie; the Gold Coast
the Vox-Populi; and
Times;/ the Gold Coast Spectator, owned by A. J. Ocansey and edited
by T. K. Orgle, an Accra lawyer. The latter two were usually con¬
sidered of a radical nature.
*S. K. B. Asante, "The West African Response to the Italo-Ethiopian
Crisis, 193^-19^2", a Ph.D. thesis, London University, 1972.
o
K. A. B. Jones-Quartey, A Summary History of the Ghana Press, 1822-
1960. Accra 197^. 21.
3Ibld, 22.
NameofNewspaper
TheGoldC astIndep ndent,(Accra,Weekly) TheGoldC astSpectator, (AccraWeekly) TheGoldC astTimes, (CapeCoast,Weekly) TheVox-Populi, (Accra,Bi-Weekly) Theim sofWe tAfrica, (Accra,Daily) TheAfricanMorningP st,(Accra,Daily) TheEcho, (Daily)
Circu¬ lation 1933 1995
Circu¬ lation 193^ 2450
Circu¬ lation 1935 2240
Circu¬ lation 1936 2100
2800900/3 00290 /3 0025 550550550
400
1000/15001 0/15 02000/2502 0/25 0 1390 750000 10001600 NewspapersandCirculation,1933-38 (Reference:Gov r m ntBluooks)
Circu-Circ ¬ lationl ti n 19371 8 10001500 2500 800/1000 2000/2500/2500 72000 10002 00
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It must be noted that the circulation figures were no real guide to
the newspapers* full influence as each copy was passed about from hand
to hand. They were not only read by the literate but were also read
alound to the illiterate. Trying to justify more control by the
Government over the press, Governor S. Thomas complained:
The local press is harmful to the Country. It is the illiterate
who are affected most, and young semi-educated men. They have
the paper read to them and lap all they hear. 1
Moreover, not only were the papers actually more widely circulated than
the circulation figures showed, the belief that anything which appeared
in print must be true was universal.
.As we have seen in the previous chapter, with the one exception of
the Vox-Populi, all the newspapers spoke strongly against the intro¬
duction of the Provincial Councils and the N.A.O. Daring 1928 and 1929,
the press attack on the Provincial Councils slowed down but in the
1930s it was strongly renewed. For example, in 1930, the Gold Coast
Times, in an editorial entitled "The Disorder in the Native States",
maintained that the Provincial Councils and the Native Administration
Ordinance had proved to be "disturbing factors in the native affairs
of the Country" and that they were responsible for the "tension and
2
violent agitation" which had prevailed in the States. It went on to
describe the N.A.O. as:
*P.R.O.tC.O.96.71^/2l630, despatch of 27.2.193^ from Shenton Thomas to
A. Fiddian.
^The Gold Coast Times, 8.2.1930.
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A measure drafted by a few self-seeking and ambitious chiefs, who
have no real love for their Country, with the support of an
Administration which was using them as factors in a political
adventure for the extension of British dominion at the expense of
the ancient rights and privileges of the people of this Country..,,
The Native Administration Ordinance is a challenge to the sovereign¬
ty of the people in that it introduces the dangerous principle that
the chiefs can on their own initiative impose what laws they like
upon their people; and our people must take up the challenge in
all seriousness. 1
In conclusion the Gold Coast Times asked for the withdrawal of the
N.A.O. and the Provincial Councils.
About two months later, the Gold Coast Times referred to the
"moral and material damage" caused by the 1925 constitution and its
2
by-products, the Provincial Councils and the N.A.O. The Times argued
that the Government was steadily removing the restraints imposed upon
the Paramount Chiefs under the indigenous democratic institutions. 3
It went on to state: v
The object of the Government in introducing these proposals
Qthe Provincial Councils and the N.A.0.3 is to secure certain
interests which will enable it to increase its hold on the
Country and to exploit it far more profitably in the interests
of the British race than is the case now.... The constitutional
proposals were designed to further the policy of divide and rule
which is the only means in these enlightened days by which the
Government can subdue this Country, which it now occupies by
virtue of the Bond of 1844, and introduce here the conditions
existing in East and South Africa. 4
The Vox-Populi, which in 1927 welcomed the introduction of the
Provincial Councils changed its stand five years later. In 1932 the
Vox-Popull described the system of Indirect Rule which the Government
was trying to introduce as "completely foreign, undesirable, and incom¬
patible with the sentiment and system of the land ..." 5
1Ibid.






Besides the general opposition to the Provincial Councils system
and the N.A.O., the press also objected to specific Indirect Rule
policies. For example, the Government proposed taxation scheme of
1931-32 was strongly attacked in the press and intense pressure was
brought to bear on the chiefs to condemn the scheme as well. * Moreover,
the stool disputes were given wide coverage in the newspapers. Almost
in every issue of every paper in the 1930s there was a story of a stool
dispute. Invariably the press blamed the Provincial Councils system
for the dramatic increase in the number of stool disputes and de-
stoolraents. Dissident subordinate chiefs were usually supported by
the press in their conflicts with their Paramount Chiefs and their cases
were sympathetically dealt with. By contrast, the Paramount Chiefs
were continually portrayed in the press as acquiring new powers over
their subordinate chiefs and their people and as increasingly becoming
mere tools in the hands of the colonial administration. Naturally the
Paramount Chiefs were alarmed. For example, in 193^» their leader,
Ofori Atta, "spoke disparagingly of how the chiefs of this Country were
2
put to ridicule by the press and the Spectator figured conspicuously."
Understandably the Government was annoyed by the hostility and the
press attacks directed towards the Paramount Chiefs and its Indirect
Rule policies in general. In January, 1933» H. S. Newlands, the retired
Chief Commissioner of Ashanti, wrote officially to the Colonial Office
putting forward his views on how to control the press in the Gold
Coast. ^ He urged that the law affecting the publication of the
newspapers in the Gold Coast should be amended with the view of giving
the Government more control "before the minds of the people are
1-See chapter six below.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ACC.802/56, Minute of the Joint Committee of J.P.C.,
dated 12.3.1932*.
-^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.707/1613. conf .despatch of 5* 1*1933 H. S. Newlands
to the Under Secretary of State.
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poisoned." * He made it clear that more Government control over the
press was needed because,
... leading articles invariably consist of unfavourable criticism
of the Government, its officers (and the manner in which they
discharge their duties), of native authorities, of the Town
Councils and of any other constituted authority. 2
On the whole the Governor agreed with Newlands* views and hurriedly
prepared a bill with the view of providing for effective control of the
press. This was the "Newspapers, Books, and Printing Press Bill of
k
193^m» which was generally referred to as the Press Bill. The law
affecting newspapers in the Gold Coast was regulated by the "Newspaper
Registration Ordinance of 189^" which purported to do no more than to
require (a) the registration of each newspaper and (b) the notification
of the names and addresses of the proprietors and printers.
The Press Bill of 193^. however, provided that besides giving the
usual particulars such as the name and address of the newspaper, the
proprietor was required to give and register in the office of the
Colonial Secretary a bond of £200. ^ This was designed to meet any
penalties imposed upon the proprietor, printer, editor or publisher.
The bond was also to be used to pay any damages which might be awarded
in any action for libel instituted against the newspaper. ^
1Ibid.
^Ibid. , my emphasis.
3p.R.O.,0.0.96.707/1613. conf.despatch of 26.5.1933 from Shenton Thomas
to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
^P.R.O.,0.0.96.72^/21630, "The Newspaper, Books and Printing Press Bill,





The Bill also gave power to conpel the proprietor of a newspaper
to publish free of charge, corrections or statements, with no omission,
when required to do so by the Government. * Finally, the Bill made
provisions for a reserve power exercisable by the Court to suspend a
newspaper when any person had been convicted of publishing a seditious
2
or other libelous article. By and large the Bill, even in the opinion
of the Colonial Office, was of a "special and rather drastic" kind. 3
Before publishing the Press Bill the Government decided to deal
first with another matter which was closely connected with the control
of the press; namely, that of the control of imported books, newspapers,
and other documents which the Government considered of a subversive
nature and "from which local editors are in the habit of quoting." ^
The Government decided to deal with this issue by amending the
Criminal Code. The Criminal Code (Amendment) Ordinance of 193^.
better known as the Sedition Bill, empowered the Government to prohibit
the importation of newspapers, books, pamphlets, etc., which it con¬
sidered seditious. 5 The Sedition Bill also made it an offence to re¬
produce seditious or prohibited documents, and an offence for any
person to be in possession of seditious material. ^
1Ibid.
^Ibid.
3P.R.O.,C.0.96.714/21630. Minute of 26.2.193^ by A. Fiddian.
^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.7ljj;/2l630, conf.despatch of 20.1.193^» from Deputy
Governor to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
•^P.R.O.,C.0.96.716/21729, "The Criminal Code Amendment Ordinance, No.
21 of 193^". enclosure in conf .despatch of ^-.^.193^ from Shenton Thomas
to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
^Ibid.
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The Sedition Bill, which was originally seen as "auxiliary" to the
Press Bill, was published in February 193^, and passed the next month.
The Press Bill on the other hand was never published. This was because
the publication of the Sedition Bill, which in fact was at first mistaken
by the press forjthe Press Bill (the news of its drafting had leaked out)
together with the publication of another unpopular Ordinance, namely,
the Waterworks Ordinance of 193^+, which imposed direct taxation on the
inhabitants of Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi, sparked a strong and
united opposition to the Government. 1- As a result of this opposition,
2
the Government decided to postpone the introduction of the Press Bill.
The Governor explained:
The local papers are already sufficiently excited, though without
cause, over the Criminal Code Amendment Bill, and it would be a
pity to give them ground for complaining that legislation which
affects them had been produced at the last moment. 3
Although one of the main reasons for drafting the Press Bill was
because of the criticism and attack of the press on the chiefs, and
although neither the Waterworks Ordinance nor the Sedition Bill directly
affected the chiefs, the chiefs still took an active and positive role
in the agitation against the 193^ Ordinances. One reason was that
since the press, the Asafo companies, the "youngmen" and the intelli¬
gentsia all unitedly opposed the 193^ measures, the chiefs found them¬
selves under strong popular pressure and had no choice but to join in
the agitation. The chiefs knew if they defied the united opinion of
their people, they would run the risk of being destooled.
%or the protest against the Sedition Bill see, for example, P.R.O.,C.O.
716/21729; and for the protest against the Waterworks Ordinance see
P.R.O.,0.0.96.71^/21656.
^P.R.O. ,C.O.96.71V21630, conf .despatch of 9»3.193^ from Shenton Thomas
to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister. In fact it was not until 1951 that the law
regulating the press was amended.
^Ibid.
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As an example of the pressure put on the chiefs to join in the
opposition to the 193^ measures, the Vox-Populi, in an editorial
entitled "Friendly and Unfriendly Chiefs", warned the chiefs about the
Government's distinction between chiefs; those supporting it were friendly
and those who were thinking with their people and nation were unfriendly. *
The Vox-Populi urged the chiefs to act in the "existing crisis" as real
o
nationalists and patriots. Equally the Gold Coast Independent and
the Times of West Africa appealed to the chiefs to join the people in
the agitation against "the most oppressive legislation since the Lands
Bills." 3
Perhaps another reason why the chiefs took an active role in the
1934 agitation was that the Government made the mistake of publishing
at the time of the Sedition Bill, the "Forced or Compulsory Labour
Bill". This Bill was intended to give statutory effect to the Con¬
vention concerning the abolishment of forced or compulsory labour
which was adopted by the International Labour Conference at Geneva in
June 1930» and was approved by the U.K. Government in May 1931* ^ In
the main the Bill deprived the chiefs of their former practice of
mobilising the people to work without paying them.
Naturally the chiefs objected to the Bill. The Provincial Council
of the Eastern Province, for example, unanimously agreed that the
provisions of the Bill were "so onerous and in parts so strange" to the
Gold Coast conditions. 3 Ofori Atta strongly argued against the Bill
^The Vox-Populi, 24.2.1932*.
^Ibid.
^The Gold Coast Independent, 10.2.193^. editorial entitled "Muzzling
the press of the Gold Coast"; The Times of West Africa, 13.2.1934.
4
Leg.Co.Debates, 1934.
3fhe Times of Vest Africa, 6.3.193^.
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when it came up for discussion in the Legislative Council and main¬
tained that the "customary services" given by the people to their chiefs
were not really forced labour. *
A final reason why the chiefs took an active role in the 193**
agitation was perhaps that the Paramount Chiefs, considering themselves,
and not the intelligentsia, the leaders of the people, did not want the
intelligentsia to take all the credit in leading the Country against
what were obviously unpopular ordinances.
Mass meetings, petitions, articles in the press, etc., having all
failed to convince the Government to withdraw the 193** measures (except
of course the postponement of the Press Bill) the Gold Coast national¬
ists, true to their tradition, thought that the next logical step was
to send a deputation to London. However the A.R.P.S. still considering
the Provincial Councils as unconstitutional and illegal and claiming
to be itself the sole representative body for the Country would not agree
to join the Paramount Chiefs in one deputation. A Committee of
Reconciliation, with Danquah as its most active member, was constituted
to reconcile the Society with the chiefs. This failed, however, and the
Paramount Chiefs allied with the intelligentsia of Accra, Sekondi and
Kumasi formed themselves into a "Central National Committee" (C.N.C.)
2
and decided to send their own deputation. Ofori Atta was chosen to
lead this deputation of "men of moderate views". Danquah was the
Secretary of the deputation.
^"Leg,Co.Debates, 193**.
^It is outside the scope of this study to discuss in detail the forma¬
tion of the C.N.C. delegation, the collection of its funds, its per¬
sonnel, its various memoranda, its meeting with the S. of S., etc.
Detailed information on such aspects of the delegation could be found
in: Sessional Paper,No.XI of 193**. "Papers relating to the Petition
of the Delegation from the Gold Colony and Ashanti"; P.R.O.,C.0.96.
717/21750(1-**): P.R.O. ,C.0.96.718/21756 to 21764; West Africa. 30.
6.1934, 28.7.1934, 11.8.193*+ and 1.9.193**; Chin-Pao, The Gold Coast
Delegations to Britain in 193**: The Political Background, Taiwan,
Republic of China, 1970.
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The Cape Coast A.R.P.S. supported by the "militant" nationalists,
Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe, both newly arrived in the Gold Coast, and
the radical press sent its own deputation, George Moore, the Tufehene
of Oguaa state and a strong opponent of the Provincial Councils system
was chosen by the A.R.P.S. to lead its deputation. *
The claims of the two deputations were not very different.
Besides asking for withdrawal of the 193^ measures, both deputations
took the opportunity to ask for constitutional reforms and drew attention
to various grievances encountered by the people. The difference was
not on the concessions to be asked for from the colonial administration
but on the question of political leadership. The deputation of the
C.N.C. claimed in its petition that it was the representative of the
2
"Paramount Chiefs, and people of the Gold Coast and Ashanti". The
A.R.P.S. also asked in its petition to be acknowledged as the "sole
political organization entitled to represent the Country on all matters
affecting interests of aboriginal inhabitants." ^ Further, the Society
claimed that the C.N.C. was in no way representative of views of
Africans generally and that most of the Paramount Chiefs who supported
the C.N.C. did not have the support of their people. ^
By and large, as a policy of "divide and rule" the Provincial
Councils system seemed to be working successfully. The division in
^Detailed information on the A.R.P.S.'s delegation could be found in
P.R.O..C.0.96.718/21752; and P.R.O.,C.0.96.723/31135. Also Sam
Rhodie, "The Gold Coast Aborigines Abroad", in J.A.H.vol.VI.No.3>1965.
389-Ml.
2
Sessional Paper, No.XI of 193^-» ibid.
3P.R.O.,C.0.96.718/21752, Telegram of 30.6.193^ to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
Ll
P.R.O.,C.0.96.718/21752, letter of 11.7.193^ from Sydney Redfren and Co.
(the A.R.P.S.'s solicitors) to the Under Secretary of State.
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the nationalist movement in fact encouraged the Colonial Office to
make no concessions to either of the deputations. Both deputations
failed in their mission and none of their major demands was met by the
Colonial Office. The leadership of both the chiefs and the intelli¬
gentsia suffered a setback. The time seemed ripe for the emergence of
a new type of leadership.
By the mid 1930s a new threat or challenge to the political leader¬
ship of both the chiefs and the intelligentsia was in fact clearly
emerging; namely that of the educated commoners, generally referred to
as the "youngmen*1. Their emergence was the result^ of the expansion of
western education. Since the early 1920s there was a great demand for
western education in the Gold Coast.
Foster pointed to three important factors explaining the increased
demand for education: (1) the establishment of effective European
overrule, which created an administrative structure within which posts
were available to educated Africans and which gave opportunities for
the latter to displace; (2) the creation of opportunities within an
occupational structure dominated by European commercial enterprises,
particularly in the coastal areas; (3) the enlargement of the exchange
sector through the development of cash-crop economies within rural areas
which introduced increasing fluidity within traditional structure them¬
selves. *
The African demand for education found an outlet in Guggisberg's
policy of expansion in education, especially the establishment of
Achimota. The result was that by the mid-1930s there were thousands
*P. Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana, London 1971 (third
impression), 128.
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of school-leavers. * These were employed as clerks, teachers, cocoa-
brokers, shopkeepers, etc.
The Indirect Rule system refused to reconcile itself to this social
change and completely excluded the Myoungmenn from a share in the exer¬
cise of power. It was one of the contradictions of the Indirect Rule
theories that while advocating a policy of educating Africans and even
employing some of them in its civil service, the colonial administration
insisted that its aim was to preserve and protect the indigenous insti¬
tutions from the "disturbing influence" of western education and western
civilization. 2
Naturally the "youngmen" resented the colonial policy of turning
the balance of power in favour of the chiefs. Like the intelligentsia
before them, the "youngraen" argued that education and economic growth
had given them a new status in the society and hence they should also
have a share in the political power. Like the intelligentsia they also
believed that the chiefs, being illiterate, were thus unfit for polit¬
ical leadership.
The discontent of the "youngmen" was expressed in their opposition
to the authority of the chiefs, particularly the Paramount Chiefs, and
to specific Indirect Rule policies. The "youngmen", for example,
1Ibld., 113 (table 3).
2For example, P.R.O. ,C.0.96.645,conf.despatch of 4.3.1923 from Guggisberg
to J. H. Thomas; P.R.O.,0.0.96.693/6599 "Native Administration in the
Gold Coast and its Dependencies", a conf. Minute of l6.12.1929 by Gover¬
nor Slater; and P.R.O.,0.0,96,730/31228/1936, conf.despatch of 31 • 8.
1936 from Arnold Hodson to W. A. Ormsby-Gore.
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frequently accused the chiefs of maladministration of the stool
revenues. During the 1930s this had become the cause of several
destoolments. They were also active in the agitation against the
Government-proposed taxation scheme of 1931-32 and against the 193^
bills. * The Governor complained that during the 193^ agitation the
O
"youngmen" exercised strong pressure against the chiefs. He added,
The discontented section of the population is, as usual, the
most clamant and includes many of the younger generation who have
some education and are prone, as elsewhere, to be critical of any
form of government not their own. It is this minority which uses
press agitation to impose its will on the chiefs and to instruct
them to vote. 3
Unlike the intelligentsia the "youngmen" had not lost their con¬
tact with the rural areas. Some of them in fact continued to live
there. Their influence in the rural politics was considerable. For
example, they read the newspapers to their illiterate fellows, wrote
their petitions, organised their meetings and demonstrations, etc.
Until 193^ the protest of the "youngmen" remained sporadic and un¬
organised. The self-seeking intelligentsia, busy enhancing their own
political and econimic position, paid no attention to the grievances
of the "youngmen". However, the arrival of Wallace-Johnson in the
Gold Coast at the end of 1933 gave the "youngmen" both leadership and
an organised political movement.
I. T. A, Wallace-Johnson was born of poor Creole parents in 1895
^■See chapter six below.
2P.R.O., C.0.96.7l6/21729»conf.despatch of k.k.193^ from Shenton Thomas
to tSir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
3Ibid..
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in Sierra Leone. * In 1913 he took his first job in the Customs Depart¬
ment as a Temporary Outdoor Officer. A year after joining the Depart¬
ment, he became involved in a strike for better pay and working con¬
ditions. Between 1915 and 1920 he worked in the Sierra Leone Carrier
Corps, which accompanied the British Infantry in its campaign in
Cameroons, East Africa and the Kiddle East. In 1920 he returned home
and took a variety of jobs. In 1926 he went to sea as a clerk on a
ship sailing between America and South Africa. In 1930 he went to
Nigeria, where he assisted in establishing the Nigerian Workers* Union.
In July 1926, he participated in the First International Trade
Union Conference of Negro Workers held in Hamburg under the auspices of
the Communist Party. He then wrote articles and became a member of the
editorial body of the Negro Worker which was launched by the Hamburg
Conference. The Worker called for a well-planned and united action by
the Black workers. Under the auspices of the International Trade Union
Committee of Negro Workers, he embarked on a tour of Europe after the
Hamburg Conference. He then attended the International Labour and
Defence Congress in Moscow, where he remained for perhaps as long as
eighteen months. In Moscow he claimed that he undertook a course of
instruction at the People's University of the East, which specialised
in training colonial students in Marxist-Leninist theory.
*The following brief biographical account of Wallace-Johnson is mainly
compiled from: Wallace-Johnson's Papers at the Institute of African
Studies, University of Ghana, Legon; James Hooker, Black Revolution¬
ary, New York 1967; J. S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism,
Berkeley, California, 1958; Leo Spitzer and La Ray Denzer, "I.T. A.
Wallace-Johnson and the West African Youth League", in The International
Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.6.No.3.1973.^13-^52, and vol.
6,No.h.1973. &&5T. —
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Wallace-Johnson returned to Freetown in 1933 and after a short time,
he left for Nigeria. However in August 1933» he was deported on account
of his trade union activities. * He went from there to the Gold Coast.
Arriving at the time of the Sedition Bill, Wallace-Johnson took advantage
of the situation to mobilise the youth against the "old leadership" of
the Paramount Chiefs and the intelligentsia. He allied himself with
the A.R.P.S. in its fight against the Provincial Councils system.
Governor Shenton Thomas was even convinced that Wallace-Johnson had
"certainly instigated and has probably directed the attack" against the
Sedition Bill.^
Radical political tendencies received a further boost when N. Azikiwe,
after a successful academic career in America, arrived in the Gold
Coast in November 1934. Although not in complete agreement with
Wallace-Johnson, they both believed in the philosophy of a "New
Africa" and were thus able to enter into a political partnership. This
philosophy of "New Africa" was explained in detail by Azikiwe in his
Renascent Africa, published in 1937* His five components of this
philosophy were: spiritual balance; social regeneration; economic
and
determinism; mental emancipation;/ national risorgimento. ^ The
objective of this philosophy was to shift political initiative out of
the hands of the conservative-minded leadership of the Paramount Chiefs
and the intelligentsia into the hands of the younger, militant and more
^"S. K. B. Asante, op.cit., claimed that Wallace-Johnson was not deported
from Nigeria because of political and trade union activities but he was
prompted to move to the Gold Coast by the Ashanti Mines Workers* strike
of 1933.
2
P.R.O.,C.0.714/21630, despatch of 27.2.1934 from Shenton Thomas to A.
Fiddian.
Azikiwe, Renascent Africa, London 1968 (first published 1937). For
a brief explanation and description of the background to Azikiwe's
philosophy of New Africa, see Michael J. C. Echeruo, "Nnamdi Azikiwe




The political activities of Wallace-Johnson and the writings of
Azikiwe in the African Morning Post resulted in the foundation of the
"West African Youth League" (W.A.Y.L.) in June 1935* Wallace-Johnson
was its organising secretary. The W.A.Y.L. was the first effective mass-
oriented political movement in the Gold Coast and was unquestionably
the most uncompromisingly anti-colonialist movement of all the political
organisations during the 1930s. Unlike the political movements of the
intelligentsia, the League was on the whole concerned with the complete
transformation of the colonial system rather than its gradual reform.
Its motto was "Liberty or Death". The League drew its membership from
the "youngmen", trade unions, literary societies, ex-servicemen and an
effort was made to engage the Muslim communities. Chief A1 Haji Alii
of the Hausa community of Accra was one of the League's patrons. 3
Wallace-Johnson and his W.A.Y.L. persistently opposed the system
of Indirect Rule and considered the Provincial Councils to be the
principal measure by which colonial officials kept their grip on the
»
Country. At its first meeting, the W.A.Y.L. passed a resolution against
the Provincial Councils system describing it as being.
In direct contravention to the native customs and usages of the
inhabitants of the Country which prohibits chiefs from making
laws for the government of the people ... 4
The resolution called on the Government to consider the advisability of
discontinuing the policy of appointing chiefs to the Legislative Council.
*Leo Spitzer and La Ray Denzer, "I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson and the West
African Youth League", in The International Journal of African
Historical Studie3,vol.6.No.3.197^.
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The most positive action of Wallace-Johnson and his League against
Indirect Rule took place during the campaign against the Levy Bill.
This was passed by the Government in 1936 to empower the chiefs to
impose levies on their people. The League held several meetings in
the rural areas and tried to obtain written statements from the
State Councils that were against the measure.* Wallace-Johnson
claimed that due to his activities, some of the states passed resol¬
utions against the measure and that some of the Paramount Chiefs were
2aestooled by their people for supporting it. He also telegrammed the
Secretary of State, J. H. Thomas, protesting against the measure ana
asked for its withdrawal.^ Governor Hodson, who was becoming im¬
patient with the political activities of Wallace-Johnson and his
League, hurriedly informed the Secretary of State not to pay any atten¬
tion to the protest of the League ana added, "as you are aware this body
j^the LeagueJ is entirely irresponsible". ^
However, Wallace-Johnson was not deterred by the ineffectiveness of
his telegram to the Secretary of State and more than once he wrote to
the Secretary of the League Against Imperialism in London asking him
to exert pressure on the Colonial Office. ^ He also won the
*p.R.0.,0.0.96.727/31696/1A, extract from a letter dated 30.5»1?36 from
Wallace-Johnson to the Secretary of the League Against Imperialism.
2Ibid.
-^P.R.O.,C.0.96.723/3113^, telegram No.53 of 11.4.1936 from the Secretary
of the League Against Imperialism to the S.of S.
4
P.R.O.,0.0.96.726/31134, despatch of 10.4.1936 from Arnold Hodson to
J. H. Thomas.
^r.R.O.,0.0.96.726/31134, Wallace-Johnson correspondence with the
Secretary of the League Against Imperialism.
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support of Miss Eleanor Rathbone, Labour M.P., who asked the Secretary
of State in the House of Commons whether the people of the Gold Coast
had been consulted on the Bill before it was passed in the Legislative
Council. *
In addition, whenever there was an agitation against any of the
big Paramount Chiefs, Wallace-Johnson allied with the opposed forces
of those Chiefs. For example, he strongly supported the subordinate
chiefs of Asaraangkese and Akwatia in their dispute with their Para-
2
mount Chief, Ofori Atta. The League even passed a resolution in
support of the two subordinate chiefs. He also supported the Fiaga
of Agbosome (Volta Region) who had been demanding independence from
3
the Awuna Stool since 1921. ^
The Paramount Chiefs, the intelligentsia and the Government were
<L
all alarmed by WaJL^ce-Johnson's and Azikiwe's activities. The Para¬
mount Chiefs were concerned that Wallace-Johnson and Aziklwe were
inciting the "youngmen" against them. Predictably Ofori Atta led the
counter attack of the chiefs against Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe.
During the Legislative Council session of 1936, Ofori Atta maintained
that:
We have heard so much of a "new Africa" coming to birth. The
protagonists of the New Africa are spreading doctrines which can
only tend to cause trouble in this Country.... But if the
youth of the Country are to be taught and educated to disrespect
and to show open contempt to their chiefs and Elders and leading
public men with whose views or whose persons those 'teachers'
(Vallace-Johnson and Asikiwe) are not in agreement, or for whom ^
they have an animosity, then it is a real danger. *
^Parliamentary Debates, 1935-36 (fifth series),vol.311, 30.
2For more details on Wallace-Johnson's involvement in the "Asaraangkese




Following this, the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province,
apparently under the influence of its President, Ofori Atta, resolved:
1. That for a considerable time now this Country had had the
misfortune to suffer great inconveniences, losses, wrongs
and other acts calculated to do physical and moral damage
to the people, from "strangers or Africans not native to
the Gold Coast";
2. That events had shown that it was most unsafe for the well-
being of the Gold Coast to continue to tolerate undesirable
conduct of "Africans not native to the Gold Coast";
3. That laws be made whereby any "non-native African of the
Gold Coast" whose conduct was noticed and proved to be
undesirable, provoking dissension or creating an attitude of
disrespect in the youth of the Country could be ordered
away from the Gold Coast. 1
Although not mentioned by name, it was clear that the undesirable
"strangers" agaisnt whom these resolutions were passed and whom the
Paramount Chiefs were anxious to see deported from the Country were
Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe.
The "conservative" and "moderate" elements of the intelligentsia
expressed their resentment of the political activities of the W.A.I.L.
in their chief newspaper, the Gold Coast Independent. For example,
in an article dated July 1935» the Independent reminded Wallace-
Johnson and his League that politics was not the right business and
2
aim of the youth. The Independent added that politics was the busi-
3
ness of the highly educated elite who had assumed the "toga virilis".
Finally, the Independent referred to Wallace-Johnson as a "jobless
4
extremist", a "foreigner", and it asked him to leave the Gold Coast.
^"G.N.A., Accra,ACC.805/56, minute of the 23rd session of the Provincial
Council of the Eastern Province, 2.4.193&.
2





Understandably the Government, like the Paramount Chiefs and the
intelligentsia, was also alarmed by Wallace-Johnson's political activ¬
ities. As early as January 1936, Governor Hodson wrote to the Colonial
Office:
I do wish you could suggest some plan whereby I could get rid of
Wallace-Johnson. He is in the employ of the Bolsheviks and is
doing a certain amount of harm by getting hold of the young men
for his 'youth League'. He just keeps within the law, but only
just. At many of his meetings he says outrageous and criminal
things but the law officers tell me it is almost impossible to get
a conviction on the spoken word. There is something wrong in our
constitution which allows these sort of people to be at large.
The French would not tolerate it for one second. 1
An opportunity presented itself in May 1936, for the Colonial
Government to act against both Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe. In its
issue of the 15th May, 1936, the African Morning Post, edited by
Azikiwe, published an article by Wallace-Johnson entitled "Has the
African a God" in which he condemned European civilisation and
2
imperialism. The article also criticised specific Ordinances passed
by the Gold Coast Government, namely the Sedition Bill, the Forced
Labour Ordinance of 1935 and the Asamanghese (Regulation) Ordinance of
1935. 3
Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe were arrested on the charge of
sedition. They were the first two Africans to be tried under the
Sedition Bill of 193^; a Bill which Wallace-Johnson had bitterly
opposed. He was convicted and fined £50. Azikiwe was also fined £50
or six months imprisonment. Later, the West African Court of Appeal
quashed the judgement against Azikiwe. In 1937 Wallace-Johnson left
the Gold Coast in order to press his case for an appeal to the Privy
^•P.R.O.,C.0.96.731/31230. extract from a letter dated lh.l.1936 from
Arnold Hodson to Sir Cecil Bottomley.
2
The African Morning Post, 15.5.1936.
3Ibld.
(140)
Council in London. Azikiwe also left the Gold Coast for his home
Country, Nigeria. After their departure the W.A.Y.L. disintegrated
rapidly and crumbled. The grievances of the "youngmen" continued
unabated until the post-war period. Nkrumah, as we shall see later in
this chapter, exploited these grievances.
Although the W.A.Y.L. failed to capture the political initiative
from the "old leadership", it still completely changed the base of
politics in the Gold Coast. No longer was the political scene domin¬
ated only by the Paramount Chiefs and the intelligentsia. The "young-
men" had come to stay as a third contender on the political scene. A
decade later, they would found and achieve their long-awaited chance
to assume political power.
Nonetheless, the activities of Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe and
the W.A.Y.L. had their immediate results too. Both the colonial
officials and the chiefs came to realise more fully than at any time
before that western education was becoming a serious threat to the
prestige and authority of the chiefs.
The Colonial Office took the initiative in offering a solution
to this problem of education versus the authority of th<» chiefs. In
May 1936, the Secretary of State, J. H. Thomas, pointed out that
unless early steps were taken to provide opportunities for the educated
classes to participate in the work of local government in association
with the chiefs, it was doubtful whether the chiefs would long be
able to command the respect and obedience of their people. ^ The
Secretary of State was also anxious that the Government should find
special meausres to raise the educational standard of the chiefs and
^P.R.O,,C.0.96.730/31228, despatch of 15.5.1936 from J. H. Thomas to
Arnold Hodson.
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other potential stool heirs. *
In July 1936, the Secretary for Native Affairs took the oppor¬
tunity of addressing the Joint Provincial Council to press the argument
2of the Secretary of State on the chiefs. The Secretary for Native
Affairs told the Paramount Chiefs assembling that:
The number of these educated young men is increasing year by
year and if the chiefs and their elders are to continue to be
representatives of their people and their recognised leaders
it is absolutely necessary that they should recognise the
importance of this educated section of the community and consider
their views and their interests. ^
The Joint Provincial Council responded quickly. The Council met
and discussed the question of "Education of Heirs-Zpparent to Stools"
and agreed that should there be peace at all in the states, the stool
h
occupants should be educated. The Council agreed to appoint a
Committee to study the subject and report back to it. It was also
resolved that each member of the Joint Provincial Councils should, to
the best of his ability, stimulate the interests of the "youngmen" in
his state by including them in the various stool councils. ^
Gradually the chiefs came to realise that education is indis¬
pensable for the functions of a chief and a tendency grew to elect
the
literate chiefs, particularly Paramount Chiefs. By 1944,/six Paramount
Chiefs on the Legislative Council had a considerable amount of educa¬
tion. Some states actually passed by-laws prohibiting any one who was
1Ibid.
^G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ACC.338/65, minute of the Joint session of the






illiterate from occupying a stool. * This was because, as Fortes
noted in the case of Ashanti, the literate chiefs were felt to be
better able to cope with the pressures and initiatives emanating from
2
government and the whole environment of modem conditions. It was
therefore as much a self-protective reaction of a society in trans¬
ition as a "progressive" move. The chiefs also offered the educated
members of their communities places oh the stools councils.
However, the effect of all this should not be exaggerated.
Although there was a growing tendency for the literate to supersede
the illiterate, the majority of the chiefs were still illiterate.
Again it should be noted that the role given to the educated forces
was very subordinate. For example, although the 1925 Constitution was
amended in 1940 to make non-chiefs eligible for membership of the
3
Provincial Councils, this provision turned out to be paperwork.
Throughout the history of the Provincial Councils, no non-Paramount
Chief ever became a member of these Councils. All the Paramount
Chiefs and the Government were ready to concede was that the educated
forces be allowed to take part in the deliberations of the stools
councils. They were given no share in the policy-making. The Govern-
^"Rhodes House Library, Mss.Brit.Emp.S. ,365.Box 80, (Fabian Colonial
Bureau Papers) conf.report dated 24.1.1944 and entitled "Education and
Native Administration on the Gold Coast", by the S.N.A., H. Thomas.
O
Rhodes House Library, Oxford, 600.18.s.vol.1, M. Fortes, Preliminary
Report on Ashanti Social Survey, 1946.
•^J. H. S. Frimpong, "The Joint Provincial Council of Paramount Chiefs
and the Politics of Independence in the Gold Coast (Ghana), 194-6-
1958", thesis, University of Ghana, 1966; also, "the Joint
Provincial Council of the Chiefs and the Politics of Independence,
1946-1958, in T.H.S.G.vol.XIV.No.l.June 1973. 79-91.
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ment and the Paramount Chiefs failed to realise that the educated
forces not only wanted a say in the local administration, but, more
importantly, they also wanted a say in the central administration.
Meanwhile Wallace-Johnson and Azikiwe having left the country,
Danquah thought the time was ripe to try once again to reconcile the
Paramount Chiefs and the "moderate" and "conservative" elements of the
intelligentsia and to bring them into closer cooperation. * For this
he revived the Youth Conference in 1938. Representatives of the
Conference were summoned to a special meeting with some of the leading
Paramount Chiefs at Winneba "in preparation for reconciliation of any
2
outstanding differences between chiefs and people".
It was resolved to establish a national fund and the chiefs were
made responsible for taking all necessary steps to make the operation
of such a fund possible. Danquah even hoped that the Paramount Chiefs
would be willing to turn the Joint Provincial Council into a "Central
National Council" to be composed of both chiefs and intelligentsia. ^
This Council, Danquah hoped, would then prepare the country for self-
government.
The contact with the chiefs continued and Ofori Atta called the
intelligentsia into several consultations with chiefs at meetings
Ll
held at his residence in Accra. The cooperation between the chiefs
and the intelligentsia was pushed a step further when in 19^2 an amend¬
ment to the 1925 Constitution made it possible for the Joint Provincial
Council to elect non-chiefs to the Legislative Council.
^"J. B. Danquah, Historic Speeches, 72.
2Ibid., 70-71.
3
J. B. Danquah, Self-Help and Expansion; A Review of the Work and Aims
of the Youth Conference, with a Statement of its Policy for 19^7. and
the Action consequent upon that Policy, Accra, 19^3\ 23.
J. B. Danquah, Historic Speeches, 71•
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The climax of the cooperation between the chiefs and the intelli¬
gentsia was the preparation, by the Youth Conference, at the invitation
of the chiefs, of a 400 page memorandum entitled "Things to change in
the Gold Coast". ^ This memorandum "touched on all aspeots of the
2
Country's life and government". Upon the basis of recommendations
made in this memorandum, the Joint Provincial Council set up a Committee
which prepared another memorandum containing the demands of both the
3
chiefs and the intelligentsia for constitutional reforms. This
memorandum which asked for an unofficial majority on the Legislative
Council was submitted to the Secretary of State, Oliver Stanley, when
he visited the Gold Coast in 19^3« By and large, during the War period,
the chiefs and the intelligentsia managed to work together in close
agreement and harmony.
The Government did not meet all the constitutional demands made
by the chiefs and the intelligentsia but nevertheless the Burns
Constitution of 19^ was seen at the time of its publication as a big
step towards self-government. For the first time the Constitution
provided for an elected majority on the Legislative Council. For the
first time too Ashanti was included with the Colony in the legislature.
Under the Burns Constitution the Legislative Council consisted of a
President; six ex-officio members; eighteen elected members of whom
nine were elected by the Joint Provincial Council and five were elected
by the Municipalities of Accra, Cape Coast, Sekondi, and Kumasi; and
1Ibid., 72.
2Ibid.
-^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.782, Memo, of the J.P.C. of the Gold Coast Colony and
the Confederacy of Ashanti together with African Unofficial members
of the Leg.Co., 19^3.
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six members were nominated by the Governor. * Thus, the Burns
Constitution, like that of Guggisberg's before it, gave the Paramount
Chiefs considerable representation in contrast to the intelligentsia.
The Constitution also gave statutory recognition to the Joint
Provincial Council.
The intelligentsia hoped, however, that, after the above-
mentioned 19^2 amendment of the 1925 Constitution, the Paramount
Chiefs would elect some of them to the Legislative Council. The
Paramount Chiefs had in fact promised to do this. But when the elec¬
tions were held to elect the representatives of the Joint Provincial
Council, only two of the intelligentsia (Danquah and Rev. C. Baeta)
were successful. The intelligentsia were disappointed whilst the
Paramount Chiefs asserted that giving two seats to non-chiefs was a
good enough gesture "to dispose the allegation that the chiefs [werej
selfish £andj unwilling to co-operate with ... the intelligentsia". ^
The traditional conflict over the question of political leadership came
to the surface once again, and once more Danquah had to try and unite
the two groups.
Danquah, in fact, lost no time and immediately after the election
of 19^6 he bag an holding meetings and consultations to bring the chiefs
and the intelligentsia into a common platform, ^ The result was the
foundation of the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) in 19^7 with
its objective of ensuring by "all legitimate and constitutional means
the direction and control of government should pass into the hands of
*For example, G. E.Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of
Ghana History, 1807-1957, London, 1964, 681-682.
2
Minute of the J.P.C., Dec., 19^6.
^J. B. Danquah, Historic Speeches, 77-78.
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the people and their chiefs in the shortest possible time." *
It was towards the end of 19^7 that the U.G.C.C. invited Kwame
Nkrumah, then in London, to be its full time General Secretary.
Nkrumah accepted after some hesitation and returned to the Gold Coast
after twelve years abroad. When he returned to the Gold Coast he was
no newcomer to politics. Wide reading, a single-minded devotion to
the idea of African independence, first-hand knowledge of left-wing
organisations and his experience at the Manchester Pan-African
Congress of 1945» had given him an insight into politics.
Apart from this, his return to the Gold Coast was at an opportune
moment; the nationalist movements in Burma, Ceylon and India were
having great successes. World War II had also brought a major re¬
orientation of the domestic politics in Britain and a fundamental change
2
in the colonial outlook. In the Gold Coast itself there was an
increasing atmosphere of discontent due to the rise in the cost of
living, exacerbated by the ex-servicemen, who, having seen better mat¬
erial standards of life abroad, felt that the post-war hardships were
a malicious colonial plan to inhibit the development of the Gold
3
Coast. Finally, the expansion of roads, transport, and communications
helped to create a climate of change and expectancy. In short, the time
was ripe for an effective leader to emerge and Nkrumah had the expertise
to use the events and situation of the post-war to aid his cause.
1Ibid.
^A. R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order, Chicago, 1966, 13.
3
For example, D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960, Oxford, 1970
(first edition 1964), chapter 1.
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In January 1948, the discontent of the people of the Gold Coast
came to a head. There was an anti-inflation campaign, led by Nii Kwabena,
an Accra sub-ehief, which culminated in a boycott of European goods,
followed by a demonstration by the ex-servicemen which resulted in
rioting and shooting. * The "Big Six" of the U.G.C.C. including
Nkrumah were arrested by the Government for being responsible for these
events,
None of them were in fact responsible, but Nkfumahwas quick to
sense the political significance of the 1948 events and to embrace the
cause of the people. Fortunately for him, following the riots and
shootings of 1948, the Paramount Chiefs and the intelligentsia of the
U.G.C.C. condemned the introduction of the "element of violence" into
the Gold Coast and asserted their loyalty to the British Government.
The Joint Provincial Council sent a telegram to "His Majesty" con¬
demning "this disorderliness as totally unconstitutional" and
reaffirmed its "unstinted support to the Gold Coast Government in its
2
... successful efforts to restore order". Nkrumah alone supported the
cause of the people and as such he was heralded as their hero.
The Government appointed a Commission under the chairmanship of
Aiken Watson, to enquire into the events of 1948 and their underlying
causes and also "to make recommendations on any matter arising from
their enquiry". 3 s0 besides enquiring into the underlying causes of
1Ibid.
^J. H. S. Frimpong,"The Joint Provincial Council of Paramount Chiefs
and the Politics of Independence in the Gold Coast (Ghana), 1946-1958,"
M.A. thesis, University of Ghana, 1966.
3
-^Colonial No.231: Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Distur¬
bances in the Gold Coast, 1948. (Hereafter referred to as Watson
Commission's Report)
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the 194-8 events, the Watson Commission made proposals which it recommended
as a basis for constitutional reform. It described the two-year old
Burns Constitution as "outmoded at birth" and called for a substantial
measure of constitutional reform. *
With regard to the Governments policy of Indirect Rule, the
Commission called for some "radical changes" and, as Metcalfe noted,
it disregarded, almost completely, the chiefs and the indigenous
2
institutions as having any part to play in self-governing Gold Coast.
It maintained:
While for ourselves we are unable to envisage the growth of
commercialisation in the Gold Coast with the retention of native
institutions, save in a form which is a pale historical reflec¬
tion of the past, we do not think we are called upon to make any
immediate recommendation for the solution of a matter upon which
Africans themselves are not in agreement. Our sole concern is
to see that in any new constitutional development there is such
modification as will prevent existing institutions standing in
the way of general political organisation. ^
Obviously, Aiken Watson and the members of his Commission, who
knew little, if anything, about Africa, were not just out of touch with
the Colonial Office's views, but they were also out of touch with
opinion in the Gold Coast where, as will be explained later, chieftaincy
was still cherished.
Understandably, the Commission's views were not welcomed by the
British Government which had always maintained that the best way of
training the people in the art of self-government was to give them the
1Ibid., 24-30.
2
G. E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, 680.
^Watson Commission's Report, 25-26.
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opportunity of learning it through the "Native Authorities" system.
Thus the British Government issued a statement in which, among other
things, it rejected the views of the Watson Commission in respect of
the 1946 Constitution and the role of the chiefs in the Country's
future political life. ^ The statement asserted that, while agreeing
with the importance of modernising the "Native Authorities", the
British Government,
... regard the chiefs as having an essential part to play. In
general, the chiefs in the Gold Coast are the traditional
leaders of the people. Their functions in regard to local admini¬
stration are based upon popular support; and the transfer or
delegation of any of their functions would require popular
sanction, since the position of the chiefs affects the whole
system of relationships on which Community life is traditionally^
based.
Although refuting the views of the Watson Commission on the 1946
Constitution and the political role of the chiefs, the Government still
agreed, in the face of the prevailing demands for constitutional
reforms, to appoint, in 19491 a Committee to consider the constitutional
proposals made by the Watson Commission and to make recommendations
3
for a new constitution. This was an all African Committee under the
chairmanship of Fir. Justice J. H. Coussey. The Committee was composed
of Paramount Chiefs and members of the intelligentsia, including the
leaders of the U.G.C.C. The Committee, in fact, had strong represent¬
ation from the Paramount Chiefs. It included the following; (1) Nana
Ofori Atta II; (2) Nana Sir Tsibu Darlcu IX; (3) Nene Azu Kate
Kole; (4) Nana Amanfi III; (5) Nana Kwame Gyebi Ababio; and (6)
4
Nana Adjay Brown.
^Statement by His Majesty's Government on the Report of the Commission
of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast.
2Ibid.
•^Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional




Nkrumah was not, however, invited and this proved to be to his
advantage. While the other leaders of the U.G.C.C. were busy in the
meetings of the Coussey Committee, Nkrumah was free to act within
the Convention and using the local youth societies he formed the
Committee .on Youth Organsiation (C.Y.O.). * The C.Y.O., although
founded and functioning within the U.G.C.C., looked to Nkrumah for
leadership and in fact formed the basis of his C.P.P. when he broke
away from the U.G.C.C.
Both chiefs and intelligentsia were concerned that Nkrumah was
gradually becoming a menace to their political leadership. Just as in
the 1930s, when they had opposed and attacked Wallace-Johnson for intro¬
ducing mass agitation into the Country*s politics and for mobilising
the youth against them, they were now, in the late 19^+Os, repeating the
same argument against Nkrumah. The Paramount Chiefs of the Indirect
Rule system brought up under the belief that they would inherit the
mantle of British rule, were determined not to allow a newcomer to
challenge them when things were just beginning to sway quickly towards
self-government.
Thus, when Nkrumah founded the C.P.P. in 19^+9. the Joint
Provincial Council, under the leadership of Ofori Atta II and Nana
Sir Tsibu Darku IX, was among its first opponents. Less than two weeks
after the inauguration of the C.P.P. the Joint Provincial Council met
and issued a statement asserting that:
(1) the Joint Provincial Council was deeply concerned with the pre¬
vailing disorderliness in the Country;
, (2) such behaviour had never been a feature of the national life of
the Gold Coast which had been one of peace and harmony;
%wame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, London 19&5 (first
published in 1957). 79.
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(3) the Country's political life in the past had been fought with
characteristic constitutional methods;
(h) the Joint Provincial Council wanted to make it clear that only
by constitutional means would it be possible for the Country to reach
the goal of her aspirations. *
Meanwhile, the Coussey Committee published its report. It pro¬
posed a form of semi-responsible Government, an executive council of
three ex-officio and eight representative ministers, and a nationally
elected assembly. The Governor retained reserve powers. With regard
to the structure of the legislature the Committee was divided almost
equally as to whether it should be a bicameral or unicameral legis-
2
lature. However the Government approved of a unicameral system, where
two thirds were elected on a popular franchise, and one third elected
by the territorial Councils of Chiefs. It should also be noted that
the Coussey Committee, unlike the Watson Commission before it, asserted
the importance of the political role of the chiefs. It held,
... contrary to the view expressed in the Watson Report, we
believe that there is still a place for the chiefs in a new
constitutional set-up.... The whole institution of chieftaincy
is so closely bound up with the life of our communities that ~
its disappearance would spell disaster....
Nlcrumah labelled the Coussey Committee's report as "bogus and
fraudulent" and began to talk of the need for "Positive Action", by
which he meant "the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional
means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in this
^G.N.A.,Accra, C.S.O.119.S.F.4., "Statement on Disorderliness in the
Gold Coast", dated 24.6.19^9t by the J.P.C.
2




in this Country. * Legitimate political agitation, newspaper and
educational campaigns were to be the main weapons, along with and only
as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts
and non-cooperation, based on the principle of absolute non-violence,
as used by Ghandi in India. 2 On 6th January, 1950, the T.U.C.,
enforcing Nkrumah's policy of positive action, declared a general
strike which nonetheless, resulted in violence.
The Government reacted by declaring a state of emergency. And
the Joint Provincial Council deplored "the grave disorders and acts of
violence ... which a political group has brought about by its so-called
weapon of "Positive Action"." ^
The Joint Provincial Council also resolved that the strike was
illegal and unjustified and declared its support for the action of the
4
Government in resotring peace and order. The Provincial members
also supported the three bills which were hurriedly introduced into
the Legislative Council, namely the Criminal Code (Amendment) Ordin¬
ance, 1950» the Curfew Ordinance, 1950, and the Newspapers Regulations
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1950.^
Although describing the Coussey Constitution as "bogus and fraudu¬
lent", Nkrumah still agreed to run for election under it. The result
of the 1951 election indicated an overwhelming victory for the C.P.P.
^•Kwame Nkrumah, Autobiography, 92.
2Ibid.t 12.





It emerged as the only party with appreciable public support.
Nkrumah accepted the Governor's offer to be the Leader of Government
Business.
But what were the factors and who were the people behind the
rise of the C.P.P.? D. E. Apter held that the "youngmen" or "standard
VII boys" played the most prominent role in the rise of the C.P.P. *
He argued that these "youngmen" had emerged after World War II as a
new grouping having common social and psychological frontiers. They
were now organised and numerous. They had a goal - self-government;
they had a devil - British Imperialism; they found a god - Kwame
2
Nkrumah; Apter concluded that the membership of the C.P.P. was
primarily drawn from these standard VII boys.
Dennis Austin also portrayed the political conflict of 19*+9 as
haivng "many characteristics of class struggle" when the term included
not only economic criteria but education and a traditionally derived
3
commoner social status. Like Apter, he argued that it was a new
class of educated commoners which enabled the C.P.P. to spread so
quickly after 19^9; the youth societies became branches and the raal-
contents party secretaries. These "educated commoners", Austin
^"D. Apter, Ghana in Transition, Princeton paperback, ed. 1972 (first
ed. 1955). 165-17^
2Ibid.




explained, cohered after World War II as a distinct social group.
They were primary school teachers, clerks, petty-traders, storekeepers,
many of them hardly employable. These educated commoners were also
persistent opponents of the "Native Authority" system which offered
them no outlet for their energies. * It was from this social group
of elementary school leavers, Austin concluded, "that the C.P.P.
emerged.
Both Apter and Austin seem to have overestimated the role of the
"youngmen" in the rise of the C.P.P. It seems rather difficult to
treat the anti-chieftaincy sentiment and behaviour among the Gold
Coast commoners as a class struggle. Against the existence of a
class struggle in the Gold Coast in the late 1940s, one can point to,
following J. Kraus, the persistence and existence of traditional
relationships in society and politics between people of widely differing
life styles and levels of wealth, education and occupation. This
could, and still can be seen in Ghana as well as in many other African
countries. The breakdown in social solidarity was not total, as Apter
and Austin have tried to show. Links of Icingship, local patriotism,
and ethnicity helped to draw commoners and chiefs into local cooperation.
And, in any case, the "youngmen" were not, asApter and Austin want us
to believe, a new group who came into prominence after World War II.
The "youngmen" had been active in the country's political life since
the 1930s.
1Ibid., 18-28.
2J. Kraus, "On the Politics of Nationalism and Social Change in Ghana",




But although the rise of the C.P.P. was not a clear-cut "class
struggle" in the Marxist sense, still the role of the primary and middle
school leavers was important and cannot be ignored. These "youngmen"
had, as we have seen, since the 1930s, political and economic grievances
which they wanted to see solved. The system of Indirect Rule, however,
failed to give them any major share in the political power and its
economic opportunities. Thus driven away by the system of Indirect
Rule into their own societies and organisations, these "youngmen"
provided an environment for a leader to emerge and solve their
girevances, Nkrumah was quick to realise the far-reaching political
consequences of the grievances of these "youngmen" airi he and his
field organisers kept reiterating that "the people want their
grievances redressed". * Besides, Nkrumah was able to give the
"youngmen" a slogan: SELF-GOVERNEMNT NOW: FREEDOM: FORWARD EVER,
BACKWARD NEVER: SEEK YE FIRST THE POLITICAL KINGDOM AND EVERYTHING
SHALL BE ADDED TO IT. Furthermore, Nkrumah was a capable organiser:
p
he was charming and he possessed the tremendous ability of oratory.
He was also a hard worker and toured nearly the whole country in his
campaigning.
All these abilities of Nkrumah's, rather than anything else, con¬
tributed to the rise of the C.P.P. Many joined, not only the "young¬
men" but also the farmers, the trade unionists, market-women, taxi-
drivers and anyone who could follow the leader shouting "FREEDOM" with
a good voice. But it must be noted that although the C.P.P. succeeded
in acquiring a large membership, it was not what one would call a mass
party in the sense of mobilising large numbers of people and bringing
them into the political arena as politically conscious participants. J
1
Quoted in Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, Princeton,
1970, 196.
2
For example, T. P. Omari, Kwame Nkrumah, London 1970.
2r. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of Illusion, New York 1970, 107.
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The C.P.P. was not a revolutionary or essentially anti-chiefs
party. The Gold Coast under Nkrumah and his C.P.P. advanced to in¬
dependence by carefully planned stages, marked by periodic constitu¬
tional revisions. There was no preaching of class warfare, no resort
to armed collective defence, no suggestion of independence outside the
Commonwealth. * The attitude of Nkruraah himself towards the chiefs
« was very ambivalent. During the early years of the C.P.P., when the
Joint Provincial Council clearly came against him, Nkruraah threatened
the chiefs "to leave their sandals". However, once in office, his
policy was to manipulate rather than to abolish chieftaincy. The
role of the chiefs was recognised in both the Independence and the
Republican Constitutions. This ambivalence towards the chiefs was
noted by David Brokensha who explained that,
The ambivalence stemmed from the C.P.P. on the one hand regarding
chieftaincy as an outmoded institution that hampered plans for
socialism and modernisation, while on the other hand there was
a sentimental regard for traditional customs. Nkrumah reflected
this attitude when he allowed himself to be enstooled as chief
of his home area in Nziraa, in I960.
By and large, instead of abolishing chieftaincy, Nkrumah, incon¬
sistent with his claims to "radicalism", "socialism", and "marxism",
presumed himself to be the "Paramount Chief" of Ghana; he acquired
chiefly titles, usually appearing in traditional dresses and the drums
3beat when he made his appearance. At his instalation as President
^"B.D.G. Folson, "The Development of Socialist Ideology in Ghana, 19^9-
1959"» in Ghana Social Science Journal,vol.1,No.1,1971.
^D. Brokensha, "The Resilient Chieftaincy at Larteh, Ghana", in M.
Crowder and 0. Ikime (eds.), West African Chiefs, University of Ife
Press, 1970, kOZ.
3
J. Mohan, "Nkrumah and Nkrumaism", in the Socialist Register, 19&7*
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of the Republic of Ghana the British symbols of the earlier parliament
were replaced by those of Ghana: the Jlkan-type throne, the traditional
sword instead of the orb and sceptre, and royal linguists as his escort. *
In fact between 1962 and 1966 it looked as if authority was going to be
"traditionalised" rather than "socialised".
^P. C. Lloyd (ed.), The New Elites of Tropical /frica, Oxford, 1966, 35.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE JUDICIAL AND EXECUTIVE
STATUS AND POWERS OF THE CHIEFS
As we have described in chapters two and three, until 1927, the
colonial Government was primarily concerned with "utilizing and
♦
regulating" the judicial powers of the chiefs and very little, if any,
was done to regulate their executive, administrative or fiscal powers.
In 1927 the Government enacted the Native Administration Ordinance.
In spite of its name, however, the Native Administration Ordinance
concerned itself very little with regulating the administrative or
executive powers of the chiefs. The only specific executive powers
given to the chiefs under the Native Administration Ordinance were those
of "a conservator of peace, and of preventing or suppressing riots,
affrays, and tumults of every description". ^ Of course, the Paramount
Chiefs could - as they used to under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance
of I883 - make by-laws. This was, however, subject to the approval
of the Governor and in any case it was, in the words of a Colonial
2Office official, "a cumbrous method of exercising executive powers".
The Native Administration Ordinance was in fact a "native juris¬
diction" Ordinance. It dealt mostly with "defining and regulating" the
judicial and constitutional powers of the chiefs. It recognised five
Section 117 of the N.A.O.,No.l8 of 1927.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.73Q/31228, memorandum of 20.1.1936 by G. Creasy.
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types of native tribunals, viz., the Odikro tribunal, the Ohene tri¬
bunal, the Omanhene tribunal, the State Council tribunal and the
Provincial Council tribunal. ^ They were empowered with limited civil
and criminal jurisdiction according to their grade.
But even with regard to regulating the judicial powers of the
chiefs, the Native Administration Ordinance was - if compared to
similar Ordinances passed in Nigeria, for example, where an orthodox
system of Indirect Rule had been adopted - a compromise and a limited
measure. First, the old question of the inherent right of jurisdiction
of the chiefs was left unresolved. The Ordinance avoided any explicit
definition or commitment to the absolute sovereignty of the Crown.
Moreover, the power to suspend or dismiss a chief, which was given
to the Governor under the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, was
omitted.
Secondly, although the Ordinance defined and somewhat enlarged
the judicial powers of the native tribunals, it aid not provide any
measure for their control. Apart from a prohibition of taking and
receiving bribes or exacting fines and fees other than those author¬
ised, the only control of the tribunals arose from the power of the
Provincial Commissioner's court to stop the hearing of cases and
transfer them to another native tribunal, a Provincial Commissioner's
court or a division of the Supreme Court. ^
1Part VIII of the N.A.O., No.18 of 192?.
2Ibid.
3
Parts vm and IX of the N.A.O., No.18 of 1927.
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As a result of all this, the defects and abuses in the working
of the native tribunals continued to prevail even after the passage
of the Native Administration Ordinance. In fact, they continued to
prevail until the Native Administration Ordinance was repealed in
1944. These defects and abuses could be briefly stated as thus:
1. The chiefs believed that they possessed judicial powers as
inherent functions of their office and were thus entitled to maintain
courts by reason of their election to chiefly office by their people.
As a result, firstly, as the number of the chiefs was very large this
led to the creation of a large number of native tribunals. Secondly,
the judicial office became limited to the chiefs and their councillors
who were both usually illiterate. The educated elements were, on the
whole, excluded from the membership of the native tribunals;
2. The members of the native tribunals were compensated by sharing
the fees and fines collected. Hence it was not surprising that maximum
fines were almost invariably imposed, that costs were inflated by
unnecessary adjournments, that frivolous litigation was encouraged and
even fomented. In short, the native tribunals were regarded by their
members as a source of revenue instead of a fount of justice;
3. Since the Native Administration Ordinance did not prescribe
the maximum number of members of a native tribunal, it was not surprising
that numerous persons sought to share court revenues; courts of fifteen
to twenty members were not uncommon.
4. The Native Administration Ordinance, which the native tribunals
were supposed to enforce, was comprised of 129 detailed and complicated
clauses.
>
5. The Native Administration Ordinance did not describe fixed
procedure for the native tribunals.
(161)
6. The standard of education and training of the registrars of
the native tribunals, upon whom the working of the tribunals depended,
was very low. The fundamental reason why qualified persons did not
seek to be registrars was the uncertainty of the remuneration of regis¬
trars of tribunals. Neither the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance nor the
Native Administration Ordinance provided for the registrars to be given
regular salaries. In most of the tribunals, the pay of the staff
depended on the fines and fees collected during the month and if these
were insufficient the registrars went without. Because of the low
standard of the registrars, which was itself a result of the uncertainty
of their remuneration, it was not surprising that allegations against
these registrars of bribe-taking, misinterpretation of the Native
Administration Ordinance, and incorrect recording of official proceedings
were very common. *
As a result of such limitations, it soon became clear to the
colonial Government that the Native Administration Ordinance was in¬
adequate for regulating the affairs of the stools. Although the
Native Administration Ordinance together with the Provincial Councils,
gave the Paramount Chiefs more voice at the centre and assured them of
the Government's protection, their authority in their states continued
to decline steadily and their relations with their people worsened.
Mainly computed from: Report of the Native Tribunals Committee of
Enquiry, 19^-3 (Blackall's Committee); Report of the Commission on
Native Courts, 1951 (Korsah's Commission); Annual Reports of the
Eastern, Central and Western Provinces; W. B. Harvey, Law and Social
Change in Ghana, Princeton, 1966; Lord Hailey, Native Administration
in the British African Territories, London, 1950» Part III.
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This decline in the authority of the Paramount Chiefs at the local
level was principally due to the fact that the Native Administration
Ordinance failed to eradicate the corruption in the native tribunals
or to adequately regulate the administrative and financial affairs of
the stools.
Prompted by the limitations and the inadequacies of the Native
Administration Ordinance, Governor Sir A. Ransford Slater decided
to re-examine and re-assess the Government's "Native Administration"
policy. Slater's ideas were contained in his Minute; Native Adminis¬
tration in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies which was printed in
December 1929. * It is important to summarise the Minute here in
detail because for the first time it committed the colonial Government
to introducing in the Gold Coast a Lugardian model of Indirect Rule
and it became until 1951 the yardstick by which both the successive
Governors and the Colonial Office measured the successes and failures
of such a system.
Slater explained that the object of his Minute was primarily to
inform the political officers that his policy was,
Definitely to maintain and support native rule, and to that end
to prepare the way for a more extensive delegation of power and
authority to native rulers under due safeguards. In other words,
the development of 'Indirect Rule' is the policy of the Gold Coast ^
Government.
Tracing the policy of his predecessors, Slater drew attention to
the lack of a clearly defined policy in regard to "Native Administrations".
He pointed out that although it had been the declared policy of his
^•P.R.O. ,C.0.96.693/6599, "Native Administration in the Gold Coast and its
Dependencies", conf.Minute of 16.12.1929 by A. R. Slater, enclosed in




predecessors "to conduct the administration of the natives through
the proper native authorities" that phrase was capable of several
interpretations and this ambiguity had always marked the "native policy"
of the Gold Coast Government. * The phrase, .Slater explained, could
mean "to use the chiefs as our mouthpieces through whom the orders
of the Government are issued to the people", or could mean "to make the
chiefs an integral part of the machinery of Government with well-defined
powers and functions recognised by Government and by law and not
p
dependent on the views of an executive officer". In so far as the
chiefs of the Gold Coast had well-defined judicial functions, the second
interpretation, Slater maintained, applied. ^ But in as much as they
had very few executive powers, they could not be looked on as substan¬
tially other than the mouthpieces of the administrative officers and
in this sense the first interpretation applied. ^ Slater summed up
the policy of his predecessors thus:
If we really face the facts, it must be admitted that our
practice is to exercise British rule with the support of the
native chiefs rather than to maintain and support native rule.









Quoting extensively from Lord Lugard's The Dual Mandate in
support of his argument, Slater asserted to his political officers
that he personally allied himself unhesitatingly on the side of those
who believed in the principle of "Indirect Rule" rather than "Direct
Rule". * The aim of the Government, he explained, should be to make
2
the "Native Authority" a "living part of the machinery of Government".
To Slater, this could not be effected by regarding the chiefs as merely
mouthpieces of the Government, nor could it be effected by giving the
chiefs only judicial functions. To effect such a policy, Slater
asserted, the chiefs must also be given executive powers and be pro-
3
vided with funds. J
Slater summarised the argument for "Indirect Rule" as against
"Direct Rule" thus:
1. It would ensure the political officers being in close con¬
tact with the chiefs and their people. This was because under such a
system, the political officer was the "adviser" of the chiefs and he
was also responsible for the assessment of direct taxation;
2. It would uphold the authority of the chiefs by giving them
threefold powers: judicial; fiscal; executive;
3. It would create a barrier against undue "westernization"
of the indigenous institutions;
4. It would provide a solution to the problem of Local Govern¬
ment in growing centres where much development was clamoured for at
4







Slater went on to emphasise the necessity of giving the "Native
Authorities" power to issue orders. He pointed out that the only
executive powers possessed by the Gold Coast Chiefs were those prescribed
in section 117 of the Native Administration Ordinance, viz., those of
a "conservator of peace". Hence, Slater declared it as his determined
intention that, like the case in Tanganyika and Northern Nigeria, the
Paramount Chiefs in the Gold Coast should be invested with complete
powers to issue orders under statutory authority apart from customary
law. ^ He added, however, that such powers could not safely be entrusted
to all the Paramount Chiefs and that the degree of delegation would
2
also vary. He also made it clear to his political officers that
under Indirect Rule, the chiefs were not independent rulers but they
were the delegates of the Governor. The Government, he explained,
would reserve for itself the right to impose taxation, to make laws,
to control the exercise by the "Native Authorities" of subsidiary
legislative powers, etc. Moreover, the disposal of the annual revenue
of a "Native Authority" and its important executive acts, though emana¬
ting from itself, were subject to the guidance and advice of the
3
political officers.
In short the Minute laid down the theoretical lines of the policy
to be adopted by the Government. Broadly speaking such a policy
closely followed that described by Lord Lugard in his Political Memo-
1+




\see chapter one above.
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immediately followed by specific proposals to extend the scope of the
Native Administration Ordinance. In spite of its limitations and short¬
comings, the Native Administration Ordinance remained the accepted
measure for regulating the affairs of the stools.
The limitations of the Native Administration Ordinance fully
came to the surface in 1930-31. The immediate reason was the cocoa
hold-up of 1930-31. Convinced that the European firms were responsible
lor the substantial decrease in the price of cocoa, the "Gold Coast
and Ashanti Cocoa Federation", the association which represented the
cocoa farmers, reacted by holding their cocoa and swore the traditional
oath to confirm this decision.
The oath occupied an important position in the fabric of the
2
Akan political system; it might correctly be described as its keystone.
If an individual violated an oath it would be the duty of his chief's
tribunal to punish him. Accordingly, the chiefs naturally took action
to see that those few farmers who, in contravention of the oath taken
by the Cocoa Federation, tried to sell their cocoa were brought to the
native tribunals and punished. ^
Understandably the Government was alarmed that the chiefs, whom
it looked upon as its agents in carrying out the administration of the
country, were challenging its right of jurisdiction and were acting as
if they were really independent of its "Native Administration" system.
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1420, case No.22/19, "Notes by the S.N.A. on the
cocoa hold-up", dated 18.12.1930.
2
For example, J. B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, London, 1928.
^G.N.A.,Accra, ADM.ll/l420, case No.22/19, op.clt.; Sam Rhodie, "The
Gold Coast Cocoa Hold-up of 1930-31", in T.H.S.G.,Vol.IX,1968.
(167)
Governor Slater reacted by warning the chiefs that they were acting
ultra vires and that they had no power to punish those farmers who
wanted to sell their cocoa. * In support of this argument, Slater
cited the judgement of his Chief Justice in the case of "Inspector-
o
General of Police versus Asare Panyin in 1931". In this case a certain
chief, Asare Panyin, issued an order forbiding his people to sell cocoa
and ordered that any person so doing would be breaking the chief's oath
and would thus be arrested. The Chief Justice ruled, that the chief
had no power to issue such an order, that any oath to that effect was
unlawful and that the persons who carried out the chief's order were
guilty of a criminal offence. Moreover, the Chief Justice ruled that
the legislative powers of the chiefs and their councillors were entirely
derived from the Ordinances of the Gold Coast, apart from which they
had no powers of legislation, inherent or otherwise, and that the
prescribed means of such legislation was by means of by-laws which
could come into effect only and when they had been approved by the
Governor.
In addition to warning and arguing against the action taken by
the chiefs during the hold-up, the Government forbade oath-taking and
gong-gong proclamations in restraint of trade. 3 chiefs were prosec¬
uted, their councillors jailed and their orders and decisions were
reversed. ^
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1420,case No.22/19, op.cit.
^This is elaborately summarised in G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/798,





On their part, both the intelligentsia and the chiefs challenged
the point of view and the action of the Government. During the
meeting of the Legislative Council, Ofori Atta, the unrivalled leader
of the chiefs, argued that,
Before the introduction of the Native Administration Ordinance,
a chief had legitimate power, no matter what one may say, to
deal with a subject who swore an oath and broke it.... The
Ordinance £"N.A.O.^J is a mere regularization of the powers of
the chiefs held before.
Similarly, K. A. Korsah, the municipal member of Cape Coast, argued
that,
Paramount Chiefs even before the Native Administration Ordinance
was passed had jurisdiction in this country. The N.A.O. merely
regulated, but did not confer jurisdiction on the Paramount
Chiefs. The right of punishing their subjects for breaking gathshad never been questioned.
By and large the chiefs* claim to legislate independently, which
Casely-Hayford, as we have stated in chapter two, made on more than
one occasion on their behalf was now, thanks to the vagueness of the
Native Administration Ordinance, strongly revived during the cocoa
hold-up of 1930-31. As a result of this, Governor Slater depending
largely, if not entirely, on a memorandum-^ written by his Secretary
for Native Affairs, W. J. A. Jones, forwarded to the Colonial Office
in October 1931» specific proposed amendments to the Native Adminis¬
tration Ordinance. ^ The main object of these amendments, Slater
^"Leg. Co,Debates ,<*. 12.1930.
2Ibid.
3
P.R.O.,C.O.96.697/6903/B, a confidential memorandum entitled "History
of Legislation in connection with Native Jurisdiction in the Gold
Coast and suggested Amendments to the N.A.O. of 1927"» by W. J. A.
Jones, the S.N.A., enclosed in conf. despatch of 13.10.1931 from
Slater to J. H. Thomas.
P.R.O.,C.0.96.697/6903/R, conf.despatch of 13.10.1931 from Slater to
J. H. Thomas.
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explained, was to secure greater control by the administrative officers
over the judicial activities of the chiefs and to set in explicit and
statutory terms a constitutional issue which was persistently raised
by the Gold Coast nationalists. ^ This was namely that the rights of
jurisdiction of the chiefs were inherent in them by virtue of the
position to which they had been elected by their people. The nation¬
alists denied that they were derived from and exercisable only at the
will of the Crown.
First Slater suggested that the Native Administration Ordinance
should be amended so that the confirmation by the Governor of the elec¬
tion and instalation of the chiefs should be made a condition prece¬
dent to the exercise of their jurisdiction. 2 This did not mean that
the Governor would have the right to veto an election of a chief, but
"that he wjould be vested by an Ordinance with the discretion to decide
whether or not the person elected should be entrusted with judicial
powers which the Governor alone could confer.
Secondly, Slater suggested that the Native Administration Ordi¬
nance should be amended to the effect that whenever an administrative
officer should decide that any order issued by a chief by means of
an oath, should not have been issued or should not be enforced, he







Finally, and in order to give the administrative officers substan¬
tial control over the native tribunals, Slater recommended that every
District Commissioner or Assistant District Commisssioner should have
access to the native tribunals and be empowered to:
1. suspend, reduce, or otherwise modify any sentence or decision
of a native tribunal;
2. order a rehearing before any tribunal having jurisdiction
in the cause or matter;
3. transfer any cause or matter either before or at any stage of
the proceedings to a District Commissioner's court, 1-
So, on the whole, Slater's proposed amendments to the Native
Administration Ordinance clearly aimed at enforcing in the Gold Coast
a fundamental principle of the Lugardian type of Indirect Rule, i.e.,
the judicial and executive powers of the chiefs must have a statutory
basis, that is to say, they must be derived from or delegated by the
Central Government. ^
However, Slater proposed amendments were never carried out.
Slater made the mistake of putting forward these amendments at the
time when he attempted to introduce a comprehensive taxation scheme.
We shall discuss in a subsequent chapter this taxation scheme and the
Africans' opposition to it. For our purpose here it would be enough
to state that owing to the strong African opposition to this taxation
scheme and the "disturbed state of public feeling" which occurred as
1Ibid.
2
For example, Lord Lugard, The Dual Mandate, chapters X,XI and XXVII.
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as a result, Slater decided to give up the idea of introducing his
proposed amendments to the Native Administration Ordinance. ^ Slater's
ideas on introducing a Lugardian type of Indirect Rule in the Gold
Coast suffered a serious setback.
The situation in 1932, when Slater's term of office came to an
end, was that although Slater formulated comprehensive proposals
on introducing in the Gold Coast a Lugardian model of Indirect Rule,
none of these proposals, thanks to the Africans' opposition, was in
fact implemented.
This failure of the Government to implement its proposals for the
introduction of Indirect Rule was partly responsible for the fact that
some of the Government officials began to lose faith in the Provincial
Councils system. The Councils were themselves partly to blame.
Although by the early 1930s the Provincial Councils were firmly established
they proved in practice to be inefficient and unsuccessful. First, the
process of consulting these Councils proved to be long and slow. It
involved: (1) despatching papers to the Provincial Commissioners for
transmission to the presidents of the Provincial Councils for consider¬
ations; (2) assembling the three Provincial Councils; (3) consider-
O
ation by the Councils members of the subjects on their agenda.
This process usually took a few weeks.
Secondly, the expenses of the Council meetings proved to be con¬
siderably costly. The Paramount Chiefs deliberately prolonged the
^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.7^9/31228, "Summary of Proposals in connection with the
Introduction of Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast Colony", a memorandum
prepared at the Secretariat, the Gold Coast, 1938.
P.R.O.,C.0.96.719/21836, Extract from despatch of 5»9»193^ from G. A. S.
Northcote to A. Fiddian.
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duration of the meetings in order to increase the sum of their payments
and allowances. For example, in its fourth session, in 1929, the
Council of the Western Province sat for nine days and its expenses,
apart from travelling, were in the neighbourhood of £1,000. * In
addition, andto encourage the Paramount Chiefs to attend the Councils
meetings, the Government adopted the practice of paying them a "bribe
2
in the form of generous transport and travelling expenses".
As a result of these defects and drawbacks in the working of the
Provincial Councils, some of the Government officials became strongly
of the opinion that these Councils had proved a fiasco, and should
thus be abolished. In 1932, the Secretary for Native Affairs distri¬
buted a circular to his Provincial Commissioners asking them if the
3Provincial Councils system had proved a success. The answer of the
Central Province Commissioner, which was "definitely in the negative",
was typical. The Commissioner stated:
I suggest that we must take it as a premise that the Native
Administration Ordinance and the Native Constitution in their
present form have failed to ensure good government and that it
is essential that more direct control by the Central Government
be established.... With every desire to establish or conserve
Indirect Rule we are being forced not only surely but quickly,
into the direction of Direct Rule by the Central Government.
Slater was succeeded in 1932 by Sir Shenton Thomas ^ whose
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/921,case No.2k, Minute of 15.5«1929 by the S.N.A.
^P.R.O.,0.0.96.725/31313/5, Memorandum of 5«1.1935» enclosed in despatch
of 3.12.1936 from Arnold Hod son to W. G. A. Ormsby-Gore.
3
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/684.
^G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/684, letter of 10.11.1932 from the Commission
of the C.P. to the S.N.A.
''sir Thomas Shenton Whitelegge Thomas: Born 1879; Colonial Service:
East Africa Protectorate, 1909-18; Uganda, 1918-21; Nigeria 1921-27;
C.S. of the Gold Coast Government, 1927-29; Governor of Nyasaland,
1929-32; Governor of the Gold Coast, 1932-3^. See M. Wight, The Gold
Coast Legislative Council, London, 19^7, 31, and G. E. Metcalfe, op.cit.,
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governorship lasted for only two years. His short tenure in office
was partly responsible for the fact that although he made some proposals
for regulating the judicial and executive functions of the chiefs, he
did not at all implement them.
At any rate, Shenton Thomas first wrote in November 193^ a memorandum
containing his ideas and proposals on the working of the native tribunals.^"
In this memorandum he traversed over the various defects and abuses of
the native tribunals. He strongly held that the dissatisfaction in
2
the stools was chiefly due to the corruption in these native tribunals.
In particular he pointed to the high cost of litigation. He cited as
an example that a very trifling case might cost:
£ s. d.
Summons to accused 5 0
summons to witness 5 0
service fee 1 0
hearing fee 5 0
judgement fee 10 0
£16 0
In a small case where the amount involved was not more than £25, the
Governor noted that the fees might be:
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/50?t Memorandum of 11.5.193^ by the






summons fee 10 0
summons fee to witness 5 0
service fee 1 0
hearing fee 2 0 0
judgement fee 12 0 0
viewing fee 4 10 0
adjournment 5 0
£19 5 0
Shenton Thomas proposed that the scale of fees under the Native
.Administration Ordinance should be revised with the view of reducing
these fees; that a special sum should be fixed in each case and that
p
some of the fees, e.g., hearing fees, might be deleted.
Following this memorandum, Shenton Thomas drafted two Ordinances
for the Gold Coast Colony: A Native Authority Ordinance and a Native
Courts Ordinance. 3 Both these Ordinances followed closely the
"Native Authority" and "Native Courts" Ordinances of Nigeria.** In
other words, Shenton Thomas's proposed Ordinances gave the Government,
more than ever before, substantial control over the appointment and
working of the "Native Authorities" and the native tribunals.
As a result of a discussion with Sir Donald Cameron, the then






with his two draft Ordinances. * Sir Donald Cameron expressed the
opinion that because of the democratic nature of the indigenous insti¬
tutions in the Gold Coast "Indirect rule was probably not possible in
the Gold Coast where authority came from below and not from above as,
2
generally speaking, in Nigeria." Shenton Thomas himself stated his
reasons for not proceeding with his two proposed Ordinances thus:
(1) he had grave doubts whether Indirect Rule as applied in
Nigeria would be really suitable for the Gold Coast Colony;
(2) he believed that to impose a system which the people did not
accept would be impossible;
(3) the ground had not been sufficiently prepared by a propa¬
ganda campaign. It would thus be inopportune to enact new legislation
with a view of developing the policy of Indirect Rule. ^
It is to be remembered that Shenton Thomas took office at a time
of economic and political unrest. As a result, he gradually became
convinced that a system of Indirect Rule like that adovcated by Slater
whereby the administrative officers would have substantial "super¬
visory" and "advisory" powers over the "Native Authorities" would raise
the opposition of the Africans and worsen the already unstable economic
and political situation. Instead, Shenton Thomas seemed to be favouring
leaving the chiefs to themselves in the administration of their states.
1Ibid.




In other words, while Slater believed in a Lugardian type of
Indirect Rule, Shenton Thomas seemed to be returning to the policy
adopted by the Government in the pre-Guggisberg era when apart from
vaguely committing itself to supporting and strengthening the authority
of the chiefs, the Government, in fact, made no genuine attempt to
create efficient "Native Authorities".^- Hence, Shenton Thomas not
only decided not to proceed with his two draft Ordinances but he took
no step to implement the far-reaching proposals put forward by his
predecessor.
p
Sir Arnold Hodson, Governor of the Gold Coast from 1934 to
1941 had, as M. Wight described, something of the personal touch that
was Guggisberg's great strength and charm. ^ His informality gained him
the name of "the Sunshine Governor" when he was Governor of Sierra
Leone, 1930-34. Also like Guggisberg before him, he failed to win
the confidence of the intelligentsia and he was very sensitive to their
criticisms. He believed that Africans could best by ruled by a "softly-
softly" policy and that their support of Government measures could
4
easily be won through broadcasting and other types of propaganda.
1-For example, R. L. Stone, "Colonial Administration and Rural Politics
in South-Central Ghana, 1919-1951". Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University,
1974, chapter 4.
2
Sir Arnold Wienholt Hodson (1881-1944); 1902-4 various posts in Trans¬
vaal; 1904-12 Bechuanaland Civil Service; 1912-14 Somalialand; 1914-
26 British Consul in Abyssinia; 1926-30 Governor of the Falkland Isles;
1930-34 Govornor of Sierra Leone; 1934-41 Governor of the Gold Coast.
M. Wight, op.cit.
"^M. Wight, op. cit.
^In 1936, the Accra Broadcasting Service was extended to Achimota and
Labadi and the broadcasting hours were increased to reach 72 hours per
day. The red iffusion service at Cape Coast was officially opened in
June of the same year. During the next two years, new rediffusion
stations were opened in Sekondi-Takoradi, Koforidua, Kumasi and Tamale.
Leg.Co.Debates, 1937 and 1938 (Hodson*s annual speeches).
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He thus tried to keep in close contact with the chiefs and their people
and he was constantly touring the country. This was in keeping with
his days of colonial service in Southern and Eastern Africa when he
had been fond of touring and lion hunting had been his favourite sport. *
Wallace-Johnson remarked critically in 1936 that,
It could hardly be appreciated how a Governor who would not make
it possible to spend even a month in continuous residence in the
Headquarters of his administrative influence, could direct the
affairs of a Colony. ^
Although keen to strengthen the authority of the Paramount Chiefs
and to secure their cooperation with the Government, which was weakened
during the regimes of Slater and Shenton Thomas, Hodson \*as not enthus¬
iastic about the idea that this should be done within an orthodox system
of Indirect Rule. In February 1936, he wrote;
It will take several years to prove whether our present native
policy is right or not. Personally I am doubtful, as I cannot
see how educated Africans can be ruled by petty chiefs of no
real importance. However this policy was instituted by Adminis¬
trators of great experience and I must naturally do my best to
carry it out and make a success out of it if possible. 3
Hodson seemed to be more anxious to establish a good reputation
for himself among the people and was thus reluctant to deal with contro¬
versial or unpopular policies such as direct taxation or explicitly
defining the sovereignty of the Crown. As a result, apart from an
amendment to the Native Administration Ordinance in 1935 authorising
the District Commissioners to review the proceedings of native tri¬
bunals in criminal cases and the costs awarded in civil cases, Hodson
1
Sir A. W. Hodson, Travel and Sport in the Kalahari Desert, London,
1912; An Account of Lion Hunting and Exploration in South West
Abyssinia, London, 1929.
^P.R.O.,0.0.96.726/31039/1. letter of 5.9.1936 from Wallace-Johnson
to the Secretary of the L.A.I.
^P.R.O.,0.0.96.730/31228, strictly conf.despatch of 26.2.1936 from
Arnold Hodson to Sir C. Bottomley.
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took no step during the first two years of his regime to develop
Indirect Rule as described by Slater in his Minute and which in theory
was the accepted policy of the Government.
The Colonial Office was not, however, impressed by Hudson's
"Softly-softly" policy and it thought that he was not giving the
question of Indirect Rule much attention. In February 1936, the
Secretary of State, J. H. Thomas, held a meeting with his officials
ofthe West .African Department with the specific aim of discussing the
working of the Indirect Rule system in the Gold Coast. ^ It was agreed
at the meeting that Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast was not working at
all satisfactorily and it was decided to ask Hodson to review the
O
situation and to urge upon him the necessity of taking action. ^
Hodson refused to share the opinion of the Colonial Office and he
held that the working of the Indirect Rule system was improving and
that he was doing his best to make the Provincial Councils a success
but this would naturally need "much patience and care". ^
The Colonial Office was not convinced by Hudson's argument and
it became impatient with his reluctance to put forward specific pro¬
posals for the development of Indirect Rule. Hence, the Colonial
Office took the initiative in 1936 by putting forward its own proposals.
In a lengthy despatch dated the 15th Kay, 1936, the Secretary of State,
J. H. Thomas, pointed out that while the development of Indirect Rule
was the accepted policy of the Government and the administrative
officers were instructed accordingly, no step had been taken to provide
^"P.R.O.,C.0.96.730/31228, Minute by I. M. R. Maclennan (n.d.).
2Ibid.
3
P.R.O.,C.O.96.730/31228, strictly conf.despatch of 26.2.1936, op,cit.
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by legislation a constitutional framework adapted to the operation of
such a system. ^ He maintained that in the absence of a clear defin¬
ition of the executive powers of the "Native Administrations" by
means of a suitable "Native Authorities Ordinance" on the lines of the
legislation in force, for instance, in Nigeria, there was no statutory
p
provision for control and supervision by the Central Government.
He gave it as his opinion that Indirect Rule should be introduced
in the Gold Coast as soon as possible and that further delay in its
introduction would only tend to increase the complexity of the problems
to be solved. 3 He made it clear that he wanted to see in the Gold
Coast a system of Indirect Rule on the lines of that adopted in
Nigeria whereby the judicial and executive powers of the "Native
Authorities" were clearly defined as being delegated from the Central
Government; that is to say, the chiefs should not retain "inherent
rights" of jurisdiction. ^ In short, the Secretary of State was, like
Slater before him, concerned with securing to the Central Government
more control over the power of the chiefs.
The Secretary of State, J. H. Thomas, then referred in his des¬
patch to the insecurity of the chiefs* tenure and asserted that there
could be little hope of development of strong "Native Administrations"
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.730/31228, conf.despatch of 15.5*1936 from J. H. Thomas
to Arnold Hodson. We shall here discuss the despatch in so far as it
dealt with the judicial and executive powers of the chiefs. The pro¬
posals made in the despatch with regard to the fiscal and financial






so long as the chiefs were liable to destoolment if they attempted to
enforce unpopular measures. ^ He invited the Governor to consider
whether it was not desirable that the administrative officers should be
granted by legislation effective powers of intervention in the settle-
ment of complaints against chiefs and disputes regarding stool successions.
He felt that Government should have the power of deposing and suspending
chiefs. 3
In reply to the Secretary of State's despatch, Hodson forwarded
on 31st August, 1936, a lengthy despatch containing his observations
h
and recommendations. Having agreed with the secretary of State that
the time had come to enforce the doctrine that judicial powers of the
chiefs were derived from the Crown, Hodson recommended that a "Native
Courts Ordinance" should be enacted at once embodying this doctrine.
Such an Ordinance, Hodson explained, should also provide for:
1. The native tribunals to be established by the Governor;
2. The Governor to have the power to disband any native tribunal;
3. The native tribunals to be graded according to their type;
4. The President and members of a tribunal to be nominated by the
Governor, and nominations were not necessarily to be confined to the





^P.R.O.,C.O.96.730/31228, conf.despatch of 31•8.1936 from Arnold Hodson
to W. G. A. Crmsby-Gore.
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5. The maximum and minimum number of members of a tribunal who
might sit at any one time were to be prescribed by the Governor;
6. The Governor to have power to terminatethe appointment of
any particular member;
7. The District Commissioners to have full control over the
native tribunals. *
In addition to the enactment of such an Ordinance, Hodson hoped
that the fees and fines collected in the native tribunals should be
paid into an account to be controlled by the District Commissioner who
would pay therefrom the salaries of the president, members and other
o
officials of such tribunals. These salaries, Hodson added, were not
be
to/fixed but were to be based on the amount of money collected each
year.
With regard to the executive and administrative aspects of the
chiefs, Hodson proposed the creation of statutory "Local Authorities".
These would be of three kinds: (1) a "Native Authority" in the
accepted sense of the term; (2) a Town Board; (3) a Rural Council. 3
With regard to (1) Hodson proposed the enactment of a "Native
Authority Ordinance" empowering the Government to appoint and control
"Native Authorities", to create and regulate stool treasuries and to
authorise the "Native Authorities" to levy a tribute for local needs. ^
The proposed "Town Boards" were meant to be established in certain







establishment of such "Town Boards" would be effected by the enact¬
ment of a "Township Ordinance" and a complementary "Public Health
Ordinance".
With regard to the establishment of "Rural Councils", Hodson ex¬
plained that this would be effected only when progress under the
proposed "Native Authroity Ordinance" was impossible. * These "Rural
Councils", Hodson explained, would be constituted on the lines of the
"Town Boards", and their function would be executive, caring for all
functions of "Native Authorities" except the keeping of law and order.
In effect, k "Rural Council" would be a "Native Authority" but without
2
judicial powers.
On the question of the insecurity of the tenure of the chiefs,
Hodson proposed to give the District Commissioners the right to sit
with a State Council and direct the enquiry into the complaints made
against a chief, the finding to be subject to the approval of the
Governor whose decision would be final. He also suggested that power
should be given to the District Commissioners to intervene at any early
stage in a constitutional dispute. Furthermore, he recommended inter
alia that the judicial powers of the Provincial Councils should be taken
away and be vested in the court of the Provincial Commissioner. 3
On the question of resuming the power of deposing or suspending
chiefs, Hodson was, however, of the opinion that Government should not






in any case have no effect in practice owing to the democratic nature
of the indigenous institutions. Undoubtedly, Hodson was influenced
here by the fact that the experience of the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance of 1883 had shown that in practice the action of a Governor
in suspending or deposing a chief achieved no purpose whatsoever.
This was because a suspension or deposition of a chief by the Govern¬
ment would not necessarily deprive him, in the eyes of his Council and
his people, of his judicial powers. Under the customary constitution,
a chief could only be deposed by the people who elected him and not
by the Government.
Finally, Hodson suggested that all his abovementioned proposals
should be undertaken by degrees. In other words, the first step, he
explained, would be the enactment of the "Township" and "Public Health"
Ordinances. At the same time, a start would be made in the judicial
reed rm. Regulations of the executive, administrative and financial
powers of the chief would wait pending a period of "sympathetic propa¬
ganda", until the principle underlying the judicial reform had been
inculcated and "Local Government" in selected townships was estab¬
lished . ^
On the whole, Hodson's proposals were not met with great favour
in the Colonial Office. The Secretary of State, now W. G. A. Ormsby-
Gore (later Lord Harlech), laid it down in no uncertain fashion that
he could see no alternative to the development of a system of Indirect
1Ibid.
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Rule based on the existing indigenous institutions. * He explained that
the alternative would appear to be either "direct rule" which, apart
from other considerations, must be excluded on financial grounds, or
the development of Indirect Rule through the chiefs.
With regard to the proposed "Native Courts Ordinance", Ormsby-
Gore was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by
Hodson. He had, however, some doubt whether in the programme suggested
by Hodson, concentration on the improvement of the native tribunals
had not overshadowed the question of re-establishing the "Native
Authorities" in their administrative aspect. ^ Ormsby-Gore maintained
that there was so close a connection between the administrative and
judicial functions of the "Native Authorities", that he was not satis¬
fied that any useful results would be achieved by proceeding with
Hodson's proposed judicial reforms while leaving for a further period
of "sympathetic propaganda" the administrative and financial aspects
of' the "Native Authorities". ^ There appears, in the opinion of
Ormsby-Gore, to be some risk that the changes proposed by Hodson with
regard to the native tribunals, desirable as they were in themselves,
might so derogate from the dignity of the chiefs as to render adminis¬
trative reforms still more difficult if they were left to a later period.5
Ormsby-Gore saw no objection to the principle of establishing
"Town Boards". He, however, observed that the functions of the "Town
Boards" as explained by Hodson, were comparatively narrow in scope,
•^P.R.O. ,0.0.96.793/31228, conf .despatch of 31.1 -1937 from W. G. A.








and appeared to be concerned almost entirely with matters of public
health. ^ He also observed that it was not clear from Hodson's
despatch who would be responsible for other matters of local govern¬
ment in "Town Boards" areas, nor what would be the relations of the
"Town Boards" with the chiefs or the "Native Authorities" in whose
2
areas they were established.
Finally, Ormsby-Gore rejected the suggestion of establishing
"Rural Councils" as "Local Authorities" as such councils, in his
opinion, had no traditional basis in the Gold Coast and their estab¬
lishment would thus violate a fundamental principle of Indirect Rule,
viz., that such a system should be founded on those institutions which
3
the people had evolved for themselves. Ormsby-Gore held strongly that
the establishment of such Councils would lead to the complete and final
suppression of the chiefs and their councillors and that this would
have serious political consequences and could only be regarded as a
4
"counsel of despair".
It was thus clear that the Governor, the man on the spot, and the
Colonial Office held different views on how to develop or promote
Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast. While Hodson, on the one hand, believed
in a "piecemeal policy" of establishing Indirect Rule, the Colonial
Office, on the other hand, wanted the reforms in all aspects of the







Under repeated pressure from the Colonial Office, Hodson reluc¬
tantly made new proposals for the establishment of Indirect Rule. In
a despatch dated 13th November, 1937» Hodson agreed with the Secretary
of State, Ormsby-Gore, that "there would appear to be no practical
alternative to the development in the Colony of a system of Indirect
Rule based on the existing chiefs". * This time Hodson appeared ready
to abandon his "piecemeal policy" and suggested a comprehensive scheme
for the reform of the judicial, administrative, and financial aspects
of the "Native Authorities" at one time. Hodson's scheme, which was
meant to repeal the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927, suggested
the introduction of:
1. A "Native Courts Ordinance";
2. A "Native Authorities Ordinance";
2
3. A "Native Treasuries Ordinance".
The proposed "Native Courts Ordinance" provided the Government
with full control over the native tribunals and clearly laid it down
3
that the jurisdiction of such tribunals was derived from the Crown. J
The Governor was empowered to establish and to cancel or suspend such
tribunals. Power was also vested in the Governor to limit the number
of persons who would form a native tribunal and to nominate the presi¬
dent and members of such a tribunal. The Ordinance also provided for
the jurisdiction enjoyed by the State Councils under the Native
Administration Ordinance to cease. ^ It proposed instead that a State








Council should be an executive body only.
Finally, the Ordinance provided for the jurisdiction conferred
upon the Provincial Councils by the Native Administration Ordinance
to disappear. ^ This was because, Hodson pointed out, the experience
of the ten years since these Councils began to function had proved
that they could not carry out their judicial functions without "in-
ordinate delay and expense" and that they were inefficient.
The proposed "Native Authorities Ordinance" was intended to
repeal the Native Administration Ordinance in so far as it dealt with
administrative as distinct from judicial functions. Broadly speaking,
it differed from the relevant parts of the Native Administration
Ordinance in that,
1. Provisions similar to those in "part two" of the Native
Administration Ordinance were excluded. This part of the Native
Administration Ordinance contained detailed provisions for the settle¬
ment of disputes that might arise as a result of enstoolment or de-
stoolment of chiefs and other matters of a constitutional nature.
Hodson recommended that such disputes should be left to the people to
settle themselves and where it was necessary for the Government to
intervene, an inquiry could instituted under the Commissions of Inquiry
Ordinance;
2. A provision was made enabling the Governor to withdraw all
authority from a "Native Authority" if it failed to carry out duties




was so worded as to admit of the chief and his councillors and persons
nominated by the Governor being appointed to that position. Hodson
hoped that such a definition would provide the opportunity for "suit¬
able members" of the educated community to take part in the local
administration;
3. A provision was made for the "Native Authorities" to issue
orders which, however, might be revoked by the administrative officers,
and for these officers to issue orders in the event of the "Native
Authorities" refusing to do so;
4. "Native Authorities" might be appointed for various areas,
the boundaries of which need not coincide with those of the existing
states;
5. A provision was made for the amalgamation of small states. *
Finally, although accepting the view that the reforms in the diff¬
erent functions of the "Native Authorities" should be introduced
simultaneously, Hodson warned that the introduction of such reforms
would be
Bitterly opposed and that serious disorders in connection there¬
with are not unlikely to occur. The success of the introduction
of a system of local government through "Native Authorities" in
the Colony depends ultimately on the development of the appro¬
priate frame of mind amongst the people.
Hodson was still hesitant and seemed to believe that a period of an
intensive propaganda campaign was necessary before he could embark on




Although, this time, not objecting to Hodson's proposals the
Secretary of State (Ormsby-Gore) pointed out that before they could be
implemented a survey of the requirements of each "Native Authority"
should be made. ^ The Secretary of State also wanted a Commission
including persons with first-hand knowledge of the working of Indirect
Rule in Africa to be appointed to advise on the working of Indirect
Rule in the Gold Coast and to recommend on the best way to give effect
2
to Hodson's proposals.
Meanwhile, however, early in November 1937» all but one of the
important European firms trading in the Gold Coast and Nigeria entered
in "Buying Agreements" fixing the price of cocoa. The Gold Coast
farmers, convinced that these "Agreements" were designed to exploit
them, reacted by staging a general hold-up of their cocoa accompanied
by a boycott of certain European goods. ^ usual the farmers
swore the traditional oath to confirm their decision. The chiefs,
particularly OfofI Atta, were very visible in the leadership of the
hold-up. They wholeheartedly supported the hold-up and as was the case
during the 1930-31 hold-up, they employed the traditional sanctions
against those few farmers who tried, contrary to the oath taken by
the farmers' organisations, to sell their cocoa or to purchase
European goods. ^ For example, in the tribunal of Nana Odanhene of
Osenase, in the Eastern Province, a farmer was fined £5 for buying six
tins of tomatoes from a U.A.C. store. ^ When the farmer refused to
1p,R.O..c.0.96.739/31228, conf.despatch of 27.1.1938 from Sir C.
Bottomley to Arnold Hodson.
2Ibid.
-^G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/798, "Notes on the cocoa hold-up of 1937-38";
Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West African Cocoa, 1938,
cmd.5845; J. Milburn, "The 1938 Gold Coast Cocoa Crisis: British
Business and the Colonial Office", in African Historical Studies,Vol.
IH, No.l, 1970, 57-7^.
4
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/798, op.cit.
^G.N.A.. Accra.ADK.29/6/13. case No.2344. letter of 23.11.1937 from
Police Superintendent to the Commissioner of E.P.
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pay the fine, the chief sentenced him to a month in prison with hard
labour, Again at Denkera, in the Central Province, the Omanhene arrested
and charged four persons for selling cocoa to a European firm. ^
The Government reacted to the action taken by the chiefs during
the hold-up by publishing a statement saying that the chiefs had no
power to forbid, threaten or imprison any farmer who wanted to sell
2
his cocoa or purchase any article. Naturally both the chiefs and the
intelligentsia objected to this statement and once again raised the
question of the "inherent right" of jurisdiction of the chiefs. The
African point of view was elaborately explained in a monograph written
by Dr. J. B. Danquah. ^ Like Casely-Hayford before him, Danquah, using
his great academic and legal skills, forcibly argued that the judicial
powers and functions of the chiefs were vested in them by customary
Ll
law and could not be abolished by a legislative enactment. In
addition, he pointed out that the "ill-timed and impolitic" statement
issued by the Government only strengthened the already prevailing
view among Africans that the Government was taking sides with the
European firms. ^
In the midst of this controversy over the "inherent right" of
jurisdiction of the chiefs and the hostile attitude prevailing among
the people against the Government, it became evident to the colonial
^"G.N.A. ,Cape Coast, ADM.23/1/798, op.cit.
^Ibid., The Gold Coast News, 26.11.1937•
3
J. B. Danquah, Liberty of the Subject: A Monograph on the Gold Coast
Cocoa Hold-up and Boycott of Foreign Goods, 1937-8» G. Boakie Publlsh-





administration that any attempt to implement the programme proposed
by Hodson would be strenuously opposed by the people. Hodson himself
stated that:
The cocoa dispute could not have happened at a more unfortunate
time, for things were beginning to move slowly but steadily in
the right direction. Now however we have not only been brought
to a standstill, but we have lost the ground we had gained.
Nothing is more certain than that there will have to be a breathing
space before any important steps in native policy can be taken for
I can say without any hesitation that the introduction in the near
future of the proposals under consideration would lead to very
grave trouble indeed.
Apart from the revival of the "inherent right" of jurisdiction of
the chiefs, the Government had an additional reason to believe that the
time was inopportune for the introduction of its radical proposals on
the establishment of Indirect Rule. In 1938 the relations between the
chiefs and the Government came under new strains. The immediate reason
for this was the enactment of the Native Administration (Amendment)
Ordinance, No.25 of 1938. This Ordinance made the decisions of the
Provincial Councils in all except land cases subject to appeal to the
Governor, whose decision would be final.
The Paramount Chiefs of the Provincial Councils saw the Ordinance
as an encroachment on their judicial powers and petitioned the Secretary
of State asking for its disallowance. ^ They also complained, inter
alia, that since 1937, the Government ceased to consult them with regard
to amendments to the Native Administration Ordinance and other bills
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.7^9/31228, letter of 11.3.1938 from Arnold Hodson to Sir
C. Bottomley.
2
P.R.O.,C.0.96.7^7/3113^. This Ordinance was forwarded to the Colonial
Office under cover of despatch No.706 of 18.10.1938 from G. London,
Acting Governor,to M. MacDonald.
3
P.R.O.,C.0.96.757/31134, Petition of 9.11.1938 by the Provincial
Councils, enclosed in conf. despatch of 14.2.1939 from Arnold Hodson
to K. MacDonald.
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affecting their people. * They concluded, "We feel that such policy
of non-co-operation is not only materially prejudicial but also not
2
beneficial, to the Country as a whole". The Secretary of State,
Malcolm MacDonald, however, (following a recommendation by Hodson)
dismissed the petition.
As a result of the change in the situation due to the cocoa
hold-up and the passing of the Ordinance No.25 of 1938# both Hodson
and the Colonial Office agreed that the time was inopportune to try
to explicitly define and regulate the judicial and executive powers of
the chiefs. Accordingly the idea of appointing a Commission to invest¬
igate the working of Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast was abandoned and
Hodson's proposals of 1937 were left to die quietly. They joined the
long series of the Government's abortive measures in connection with
establishing Indirect Rule. In short, by 1941, when Hodson's term of
office came to an end, although the Government had since 1929 officially
committed itself to establishing in the Gold Coast a Lugardian model of
Indirect Rule, very little, if any, of this system was achieved. The
Government's proposals were either frozen in the face of a strong
African opposition or they were never introduced because of an antici¬
pated opposition or because of disagreements among the officials them¬
selves.
In November 1942, a new Governor, Sir Alan Burns, ^ took office.
He was, from the start, struck by the defects and shortcomings of the
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
-%ir Alan Cuthbert Burns: Born 1887» served in West Indies, 1905-12
and 192**-28; in Nigeria, 1912-24 and 1928-34; Governor of British
Honduras, 1934-40; Governor of the Gold Coast, 1941-47; U.K.
Representative on the Trusteeship Council, 1947-58. G. E. Metcalfe,
op.cit., 666.
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Native Administration Ordinance. These defects and shortcomings were
evidenced by the large number of interminable stool disputes. From
enquiries he made personally, Alan Burns learnt that during the period
1932-42, no less than twenty-two Paramount Chiefs had been destooled. *
In the case of subordinate chiefs, the position was as bad or worse.
Alan Burns asserted:
I am confident that if one half of the energy and the time and
the money that is spent in the Gold Coast on stool disputes could
be devoted to more useful purpose the Gold Coast would be a
richer and a better place. I am anxious to do all I can to
remove this blight from the country.
The defects and shortcomings in the working of the Native
Administrations were also noticed at this time by Lord Hailey in his
confidential report, Native Administration and Political Development
in British Tropical Africa, which he submitted to the Secretary of
State in 1942. ^ In this report Lord Hailey maintained that the short¬
comings of the system of "Native Administrations" in the Gold Coast
were becoming "so obvious as to have created the doubt whether they
could be remedied without a modification of the present policy". ^
His own suggestion to remedy the situation was that the Government
must abandon its policy of gradualism or policy of step-by-step -
which characterised the regime of Hod son as we have explained - and
take immediate action. ^
Although not putting forward a specific comprehensive programme
of reform, Lord Hailey made, some general recommendations and observ¬
ations. He was of the opinion, for example that the jurisdiction of
^Leg.Co.Debates, 1942.
2Ibid.
^Lord Hailey, Native_Admdnirtration and Political Development in






the State Councils and of the Judicial Committee of the Provincial
Councils was of questionable value and should accordingly be abolished.^-
He was also of the opinion that the Government should find some means
to increase its control over the executive functions of the "Native
Authorities". 2
Encouraged by Lord Hailey's criticisms and anxious himself to
amend the obvious defects in the Government's "Native Administrations"
system, Alan Burns apointed, in 194-2, two committees to report on the
working of that system. The first committee, which included Ofori Atta
and K. A. Korsah, who represented the Africans, was asked to report on
the working of the Native Administration Ordinance as far as the execu¬
tive and administrative functions of the chiefs were concerned and to
make suggestions therewith. The second committee - the Native Tribunals
Committee of Enquiry (Blaclcall Committee) - which included two
Europeans and five Africans, was asked to report on the constitution,
jurisdiction and procedure of the native tribunals and to suggest
reforms therewith. ^
Depending largely on the reports of these two committees, the
Government passed in 1944 the two Ordinances which jointly replaced
and repealed the seventeen year old Native Administration Ordinance.
These were the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No.21 of 1944 and
the Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance No.22 of 1944. ^
In the Native Authority Ordinance which was passed in November
1944, the Government found a formula for controlling local administration
without claiming any authority over the chiefs. Clause 3 of the Ordi¬




The Blackall Committee included: (1) H. W. B. Blackall, Attorney-
General, (Chairman); (2) T. R. 0. Mangin, Acting Secretary for Native
Affairs; (3) Mr. Justice Woolhouse Bannerman; (4) Sir Ofori Atta;
(5) Nane Azu Mate Kole; (6) J. B. Danquah; (7) J. C. deGraft-Johnson.
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of the Governor and that such "Native Authorities" need not necessarily
be formed from the chiefs and their State Councils. * The Governor was
empowered, if he deemed it expedient to do so, to name any African of
2
the area concerned as a "Native Authority". The Governor was also
empowered to revoke, suspend or vary the appointment of any person as
a "Native Authority". ^
Besides being given powers and duties under the customary law,
the Native Authority Ordinance provided that the Native Authorities,
as appointed by the Governor, would also be given a wide range of
duties for the maintenance of law and order and the performance of the
functions of local government organs. They were also given complete
financial control and were enabled to raise an annual rate. The
Ordinance provided, however, that the Provincial Commissioner might
direct a "Native Authority" to: (a) make or amend an order or in
default, he might himself make or amend such an order; (b) suspend or
revoke the operation of an order or in default, he might himself suspend
or revoke such an order. J
Finally, the State Councils ceased under the Ordinance to possess
legal authority in either administrative or fiscal powers. They were
only left with the power to enquire into certain constitutional
h
For a copy of each of these Ordinances see for example, G.R.A.,Accra,
ADH.il/lflJO,Vol.2,Ko.2259.S.F.11.
^Clause 3 of the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No.21 of 19^-.
2Ibid.
3
Clause 5 of the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance.
^Part 6 (Financial Provisions) of the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance.
•^Clause 12 of the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance.
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disputes such as the election, instalation and deposition of a chief.1
In addition, they were vested with the right to submit to the
Governor declarations and modifications of the customary law. 2
The second Ordinance, the Native Courts Ordinance, provided that
native tribunals would be established by order of the Governor in
Council. 3 in other words, the Ordinance, in contrast with the Native
Administration Ordinance which recognised the native tribunals existing
under the indigenous customary law, finally rejected the traditional
claims of the chiefs to judicial powers as inherent attributes of their
offices. ^
The Ordinance provided that the native courts, as established by
the Governor, would be of four grades, A, B, C and D, and the juris¬
diction of each grade was detailed in the schedules attached to the
Ordinance. 3 Broadly speaking, the jurisdiction of these courts was,
in many respects, considerably greater than that of the corresponding
grades of tribunals provided for by the Native Administration Ordinance.
For example, a Paramount Chief's tribunal under the Native Adminis¬
tration Ordinance usually had criminal jurisdiction to fine up to £25
and the corresponding figure for a Divisional Chief's tribunal was £10.
By contrast, a grade 'A* court under the Native Courts Ordinance (corres¬
ponding to a Paramount Chief's tribunal) had a criminal jurisdiction
of £50 and grade 'B* courts (corresponding to a Divisional Chief's
tribunal) had criminal jurisdiction of £25. ^
•^Part III (Constitutional Matters) of the Native Authority (Colony)
Ordinance.
2
Part V (Native Customary Law) of the Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance.
^The Native Courts (Colony) Ordinance, No.22 of 19^4.
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Ibid.; W. B. Harvey, op.cit., 209.
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Summary of the Ordinance by the S.N.A.
6Ibid.
(197)
The Ordinance also provided for the appointment of an officer
'called the Judicial Advisor who was described as the "guide, philo¬
sopher and friend" of the native tribunals. ^ His principal functions
were:
1. to carry out inspections of the native courts and to review
their decisions^
2. to issue circulars for the guidance of native tribunals;
3. to organise training courses and supervise the examination
of native courts registrars. ^
Finally, the Ordinance put the native tribunes under the res¬
ponsibility of the "Native Authorities". The "Native Authorities"
were to provide buildings, pay members* allowances, employ and pay
staff, and in return, receive the fees and fines of the courts.
Undoubtedly, the 1944 legislation served to reduce some of the
abuses, corruption and inefficiency in the working of the "Native
Authorities". In particular, there were considerable improvements in
the working of the native tribunals. First, the number of these
tribunals decreased after the Native Courts Ordinance came into force.
V/hereas under the Native Administration Ordinance there were in the
Colony 324 native courts, there were in 1948, by contrast, only 146 native
3 4
courts. By 1950» these were reduced to 135« Secondly, the Govern¬
ment adopted the practice of appointing non-chiefs as members of the
native tribunals. By 1950-51» the non-chiefs comprised 54 per cent of
the total membership of the native courts. ^ Thirdly, the Native
1Ibid.
2
Ibid.: Report of the Commission on Native Courts, 1951 (Korsah's
Commission).
3
Lord Hailey, Native Administrations in the British African Territories,
op.cit.,213*
4
Report of the Commission on Native Courts, 1951»
5Ibid.
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Courts (Colony) Procedure Regulations, No, 10 of 19*f5 - which was issued
soon after the Native Courts Ordinance came into force - provided
settled procedure for the native courts. The Regulations also pre¬
scribed a scale of fees applicable in all courts.
But the improvements introduced by the 19^ legislation were not
enough and certainly they were not as radical as is usually thought.
For example, although the 19^ legislation provided for the appointment
of a person to the post of "Native Authority" who was fully subject
to the revocation of the Governor, in practice, the Governor generally
appointed as "Native Authority" a chief and his councillors. * Al¬
though the native courts were put under the responsibility of the
"Native Authorities" the latter proved unwilling to spend enough on the
staff and facilities of the courts to bring them to the standard desir¬
able. In 1951, the Korsah's Commission on Native Courts noted that
p
the staff of the Native Courts were generally inadequate in quality.
However, the 19^- measures were important in that they marked the
first serious move towards establishing local government organs on the
western style. In other words, they marked a new approach to Indirect
Rule. The Government was anxious to put an end to the stool disputes
and other defects in the working of the "Native Administrations", but
seemed convinced that this could not really be done as long as the
educated forces (used here loosely to mean both the intelligentsia and
the sub-elite) maintained their opposition to the "Native Administrations"
system. Hence, the Government decided to reconcile the principles
underlying the system of Indirect Rule and the wishes of these educated
1
W. B. Harvey, op.cit.,75»
2
Report of the Commission on Native Courts, 1951«
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forces. Accordingly, the Government offered these educated forces
places on both the "Native Authorities" and the "Native Courts" as
formed by the 19^- Ordinances. In other words, the Government appeared
ready to ignore a fundamental principle of the Lugardian model of
Indirect Rule, namely that such a system should be based on the
people's indigenous institutions and not on Government-created ones.
The Government failed, however, to realise that the educated forces
not only wanted a say in the local administration but also, and most
importantly, wanted a say in the central administration; they wanted
substantial constitutional reforms.
The educated elite in fact strongly objected to the 19^+ measures.
A. Sawyer, the Accra Municipal member to the Legislative Council,
argued that these measures were, first of all, based upon principles
"totally opposed to the customary laws of the Gold Coast and that,
secondly, they contained provisions that were totally at variance with
the accepted principles of English constitutional law. ^ He objected
in particular to clause three of the Native Authority Ordinance which
empowered the Governor to appoint as "Native Authority" any person or
2
persons he deemed fit. Significantly, Sawyer summed up his argument
by saying that the 19^4 measures did not contribute to the goal of
self-government. More or less the same objections were raised by Dr.
Danquah, the Gold Coast Observer and the Gold Coast Independent. ^
Following the 19^- measures, the next proposals made with regard
to the working of the "Native Administrations" were those made by the
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the Watson Commission chiefly concerned itself - apart from enquiring
into the underlying causes of the 19^-8 events - with the political
role of the chiefs. It gave little attention to the judicial and
administrative roles of the chiefs. It briefly referred to the Native
Courts and only limited itself to recommending the consideration of' the
question whether the time had not arrived when the jurisdiction of
Native Courts might be entrusted to African lawyers to act as stipend¬
iary Travelling Magistrates. ^
However, the Coussey Committee, which was appointed in 19^9 to
consider the constitutional proposals made by the Watson Commission,
made comprehensive recommendations in respect of the administrative
and judicial functions of the "Native Authorities". The Committee
recommended the establishment of three classes of "Local Authorities"
designated A, B, and C which would be separate and different from the
2
State Councils. The latter would deal only with matters of custom
and disputes connected with the stools.
Class •A' Authorities or Councils would be the highest local
government Authority comprising both municipal and what was described
as district councils. This class of Authorities or Councils was intended
for State areas large enough (approximately 100,000 persons or more)
and whose resources would enable them to maintain themselves as economic
units. Class 'B* Authorities or Councils covered: (1) urban areas
councils (towns with 10,000 persons or more) and (2) rural areas (after
providing for urban areas, the District Council would be divided into
a number of rural areas Councils). Class 'C* Authorities or Councils
3would cover the village area Councils.
1
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold
Coast, 1948, Colonial No.231, 19^8.J^~~
2




Although the functions of these "Local Authorities" were essentially
those of local government organs and were meant to be separate from
the State Councils, the Committee was nevertheless convinced that,
It is essential to maintain the link between the local authorities
and traditional authorities. The whole social framework of the
Country is based on the rule of the chiefs. This has been re¬
inforced by the policy of'Indirect Rule' of the past, so that the
traditional authorities have now an entrenched interest in the
local administration. Their complete exclusion from the new
Councils will, therefore, be inadvisable and unwise. 1
Accordingly, the Committee recommended that no less than one third of
the seats of all the "Local Authorities" should be reserved for the
p
appointees of the chiefs. It also recommended that the chiefs
should be the presidents of the "Local Authorities", but with no
executive powers. 3 In other words, this post of president was to be
purely honorary and ceremonial.
The Coussey Committee also made suggestions for the improvement
of the system of Native Courts. These suggestions included the
following:
1. That the practice of appointing a special panel of adjudi¬
cators for the Native Courts should be encouraged and that the members
should be increasingly people who were not members of the State
Councils or Local Authorities of the areas concerned;
2. That there should be fewer grades of Native Courts;
3. That the Native Courts should be subject to the control of
the Chief Justice and be supervised by Judicial Officers working under
him;






5. That a special committee should be set up to examine the
whole question of Native Courts. *
The Government welcomed the recommendations of the Coussey
Committee. And in December 19^9» a Select Committee of the Legis¬
lative Council was appointed to examine the Coussey Committee's
recommendations on "Local Authorities". In its report which was published
0
in 19511 the Select Committee agreed with the most important recommend-
ations of the Coussey Committee.
Similarity, Nkrumah's Government, which came to office in 1951»
accepted, on the whole, the Coussey Committee's recommendations.
These recommendations were effected by the Local Government Ordinance,
No.29 of 1951 • This Ordinance which came into effect on the 12th
January, 1952 > wrote the official finish to the Indirect Rule system in
the Gold Coast. It finally replaced the "Native Authorities" or
"Native Administrations" with Local Government Councils, more democrat¬
ically elected. 3 However, the Ordinance, following the Coussey
Committee's recommendations, reserved one third of the membership of
these councils to the appointees of the State Councils. ^ The chiefs
were also kept under the Ordinance as honorary presidents of the
Local Government Councils. 5
With regard to the Coussey Committee's recommendations on the
Native Courts, the Government appointed a commission in December 1950
to examine them. This was the Commission on Native Courts under the
1Ibid.
Report by the Select Committee on Local Government, Accra (Govern¬
ment Printing Department), 1951*
3




chairmanship of Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) K. A. Korsah, The
members of his commission were African. In its report which it sub¬
mitted in September 1951» the Korsah Commission made it clear that in
spite of the 19^ legislation, the working of the Native Courts was
anything but satisfactory. ^ The Commission then made its own recomm¬
endations. The most important of which were:
1. The establishment of new courts to be called "Local Courts";
2. The Chief Justice should control and be responsible for the
Local Courts;
3. Chiefs should not be appointed as ex-officio members;
4. A chief who was a hereditary, territorial ruler should not
be appointed as a member of a Local Court;
5. Membership of a Local or State Council should not be an
absolute bar to appointment, but such appointments should generally
be avoided;
6. Court staff should be members of a central service confined
to the judicial service or department. They should also be trained for
2
their positions.
The Government did not consider the report of the Korsah Commission
directly but submitted it to an interdepartmental committee. This
committee submitted its report to the Cabinet in 1953« On the whole,
3it agreed with the recommendations made by the Korsah Commission.
It was not until 1955» however, that the Government issued a statement
only to explain that the delay in implementing the Korsah Commission's
recommendations was due to the many implications of these recommend-
^"Report of Commission on Native Courts, 1951. op.cit.
2Ibid.
3
W. B. Harvey, op.cit., 211-212 and 217.
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ations. * It was not, in fact, until 1958 that the Government attempted
to implement the Korsah Commissions recommendations. This was effected
by the Local Courts Act of 1958.
The Local Courts Act empowered the Minister for the Interior to
establish Local Courts. These Courts were to be nationally uniform,
2each Court possessing the same jurisdiction. In other words; the
old practice of grading the Native Courts was abandoned. The Ordinance
empowered the Minister for the Interior to appoint Magistrates to
preside over the Local Courts. ^ The Minister was also empowered to
promote, transfer, dismiss and discipline these Magistrates. ^ The
Magistrates ' salaries were formally fixed by the Minister but paid
by the Local Government Authorities which in turn received all revenues
of the Courts. 5
The Ordinance provided for the registrars and other officers of
the Courts to be appointed only with the approval of the Minister who
was authorised to lay down standards of proficiency. Finally, powers
of review and other supervisory control over the Local Courts were
vested in District Courts which were established under the Courts
Ordinance of 1951. ^ In more important cases, appeals could be further
pursued to the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal.
To sum up, we can argue that several factors accounted for the
failure of the Government's proposals to adequately define and
regulate the judicial and executive powers of the chiefs. Two factors
hbid.








in particular could be emphasised here. The first was that the Africans,
on the one hand, and the colonial administration, on the other hand,
held diarnetYCcally opposed views with regard to the definition and
extent of the chiefs1 jurisdiction. This led to continuous friction
and confrontation between the Africans and the colonial administration.
The result was that because of the strenuous African opposition, the
colonial Government failed for a long time to enforce the notion that
the chiefs* jurisdiction and powers were derived from the Crown and in
effect, the official control over the chiefs remained, in contrast
with Nigeria, characteristically vague and limited.
The second factor was that the colonial officials themselves were
not in agreement as to the degree and form which the Government should
exercise over the chiefs. Broadly speaking, both Governor Slater and
the Colonial Office wanted to establish in the Gold Coast an orthodox
or a Lugardian model of Indirect Rule. However, none of Slater's
successors was enthusiastic about such a system. The disagreement
between the Governors and the Colonial Office was particularly notice¬
able during Governor Hodson's regime. A great deal of his seven years
as Governor was spent in exchanging despatches with the Colonial
Office, with each side displaying his proposals and observations on the
best way to establish Indirect Rule. Due to the frequent change of
the Secretaries of State during the 1930s» this process of exchanging
despatches and consultations was prolonged even further. It is inter¬
esting to note that during the Governorship of Hodson alone, the
Secretaries of State changed five times: Sir Philip Cunliffe-Listor
(November 1931 to June 1935)J Malcolm MacDonald (June 1935 ho November
1935); J. H. Thomas (November 1935 - May 1936); V/. G. A. Ormsby-Gore
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(May 1936 - May 1938); Malcolm MacDonald (May 1938 - May 1940). *
The result was that although several proposals were made with regard
to establishing Indirect Rule, very few of them were in fact implemented.
3ecause of all this, and due also to the educational and social
change, by the mid 1940s, the Government became convinced that it was,
after all, too late to introduce Indirect Rule on the lines explained
by Slater in his Minute. Thus in order to save the disintegrating
"Native Administrations", the Government tried to reconcile the
principles underlying the Indirect Rule system and the demands of the
intelligentsia and the sub-elite. This was the principle underlying the
1944 measures which started the move toward establishing local govern¬
ment bodies. The measures, however, proved to be too little and too
late to satisfy the demands of the educated forces for self-government.
During the whole period under review (1925-1951)» the changes in the
British Government were: (l) Ramsey MacDonald's second Labour Govern¬
ment formed June 1929; (2) Raraso^y MacDonald • s first National Govern¬
ment formed August 1931; (3) Rams&y McDonald's second National
Government formed November 1931; (4) Baldwin's National Government
formed June 1935; (5) Chamberlain's National Government formed May
1937; (6) Chamberlain's War Cabinet formed September 1939; (7)
Churchill's War Cabinet formed May 1940; (8) Churchill's Caretaker
Government formed Kay 1945; Attlee's Labour Government formed July
1945; (10) Churchill's Conservative Government formed October 1951•
A. J. P. Taylor, English Histbry, 1914-45, Oxford, 1965.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE AFRICANS' OPPOSITION TO DIRECT TAXATION
AND THE STOOL TREASURIES SYSTEM
As we have seen in chapter one, the advocates of the Indirect
Rule system believed that among the essential features for the success
of such a system was a properly regulated treasury and a regular annual
direct tax. This tax would be available to remunerate the chief and
the other functionaries of the "Native Administration" and to defray
the cost of local services and works of improvement. In his The Dual
Mandate, which is generally accepted to be the authoritative work on
the principles of Indirect Rule, Lugard explained that the fundamental
basis upon which the policy of IndirectRule rested was,
the assignment to the native rulers of a definite revenue with
which to pay the salaries of their officials, and to inaugurate
schemes of development. This revenue must obviously be found
by taxation . ^
He also held that,
without a tax there can be no treasury, and without a treasury
no real eventual measure of self-rule . 2
In the Gold Coast, however, the system of Indirect Rule had
been most clearly distinguished, in contrast, for example, to that
in Nigeria or Tanganyika, by the absence for a long time of any
regulated treasury system and of legal provisions for the exercise
by the Colonial Government over the finance of the stools.
In this chapter we shall attempt to examine and explain why
the colonial Government's policy of establishing properly regulated
stool or state treasuries and imposing an annual tax or tribute for
the upkeep of the "Native Administrations" or "Native Authorities",
had been delayed for a very long time and why when finally introduced




it was vigorously opposed and resisted by the Africans.
The history of direct taxation in the Gold Coast could be
traced back to the Poll Tax Agreement (or Ordinance as it is usually
referred to) of 1852. This was not primarily introduced with the
aim of regulating the financial functions of the "Native
Administrations", with which we are here concerned. Nevertheless
it is important to discuss it briefly. This because, as Kimble
rightly noted, ever since the "unhappy experience" of that tax, the
people developed an intense dislike and suspicion of any form of direct
taxation. ^ This suspicion, as we shall later see, proved to be a
great obstacle when the colonial Government finally decided to impose
a direct tax for the maintenance of the different functions of the
"Native Administrations".
The Poll Tax was introduced when, faced by a substantial
decrease-in the revenue from import duties, Governor Hill succeeded
in calling together some of the leading chiefs who constituted
themselves in a "Legislative Assembly" and passed, among other
2
measures, the Poll Tax Ordinance. The Ordinance provided that
the tax would be one shilling a head each year for every man, woman
and child under British protection. It was estimated that the tax
3
would yield £20,000 per annum. Section eleven of the Ordinance
provided that the revenue derived from this tax, after the payments
^D. Kimble, A Political History, 425.
2
C.C. Reindorf, The History of the Gold Coast and Ashantx, 525.
^P.R.O..C.0.96.700/7109. "Memo on the Introduction of Direct
Taxation in the Gold Coast Colony", dated 27.7.1931, by the S.N.A.,
W.J.A. Jones, enclosure in conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from
Slater to J.H. Thomas.
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of stipends to the chiefs and paying for the costs of collecting
the tax, would be devoted to public improvements such as education,
communication and increased medical facilities. ^
r
The first collection of the tax was given "quietly and
cheerfully", but in 1854 the people of Christianborg, Labadi and
Teshi met and resolved not to pay the tax even if this was to lead
2
to war with the colonial administration. The Government reacted
by bombarding these villages. Several houses were burnt, at
•3
least thirteen persons were killed and many others injured.
In spite of this, however, the Government failed to make the
people pay the tax and although it was estimated that the tax
would yield £20,000 per annum, during the eight years it remained
4
in force only £30,286 was collected. The collection of the tax
was abandoned in 1861 and the Ordinance was formally repealed in
1886.
Several factors could account for the failure of the Poll
Tax, the principal one, perhaps, being that none of the improvements
which the chiefs and their people had been promised such as the
5
provisions of schools, hospitals and roads had taken place.
Another factor for the failure of the Poll Tax was that its
collection was not entrusted to the chiefs but to semi-literate
officers employed by the Government. These officers worked
independently of, and were consequently obstructed by, the chiefd
whom they probably professed to despise because of their illiteracy.
^Quoted in J.M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, 101.





These officers were doubtless guilty of far greater extortion than
would have been the chiefs, if the collection had been carried out
through them. ^ The chiefs, on their side, complained that the
Government had neglected to consult them with regard to the
expenditure of the money collected and that it failed to pay them
2
the stipends they were promised.
The abandonment of the Poll Tax, as Kimble observed,
created the impression among the people that direct taxation was
3"an unjust imposition to be resisted at all costs". It also
encouraged the idea that Government would yield to continued
pressure. Thecolonial Government, on its part, fearing a potential
African opposition to direct taxation, was discouraged to formulate
new proposals. The formal assumption of sovereignty by the
British in 1874 was not marked, as was the case in most other British
4
possessions in Africa, by the imposition of a direct tax. The
hesitant manner in which the British acquired the Gold Coast Colony
itself encouraged the Gold Coast nationalists in their contention,
whenever the question of taxation was raised, that since the British
had not acquired the "Colony" by conquest then it followed that they
5had not acquired the right to impose a tax on the people.
The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, which remained
in force until 1927, was primarily concerned with the reform of the




D. Kimble, A Political History, 191.
4
Ibid. Also, Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British
African Territories,part III. 200.
5
J.E. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, London, 1970,
(first edition 1903).
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of the chiefs. ^ The Ordinance was absent of any provision for the
establishment of stool treasuries or for their control when established.
The colonial Government wanted to provide the chiefs, whom it considered
as effective tools in ruling the people, with some definite source of
revenue to meet the responsibilities of their office but was seemingly
not ready to risk another outburst of opposition as happened in
1852. Even Governor Hugh Clifford who was clearly sympathetic to
giving the chiefs more powers, expressed strong views in favour of
continuing the policy of not imposing direct taxation on the people.
As early as 1915 he stated that:
direct taxation is a system of raising revenue which in this
part of West Africa is opposed to sound policy and creates a
feeling of discontent which isjvery dearly purchased at the
cost of the insignificant financial results thereby secured .^
Three years later he held the same view and asserted that it was his
emphatic conviction that the introduction of direct taxation would
3
be "a political blunder". His words were very prophetic as we
shall later see.
Perhaps the first time the Government formulated a
comprehensive direct taxation scheme specifically designed to
provide revenue for the upkeep of the "Native Administrations"
was in 1926. In that year C.W. Welman, the Secretary for Native
Affairs presented to W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, the parliamentary Under
Secretary who was then visiting the country, a memorandum entitled
Direct Native Taxation and the share of Native Governments in the
^Lord Hailey, Native Administrations, Part III, 201-02.
p
P.R.O. .C.0.96.700/7109. quoted in conf. despatch of 31.10.1931
from Slater to J.H. Thomas.
5Ibid.
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produce of Taiation. After referring to the financial difficulties
encountered by the chiefs, the Secretary for Native Affairs stated
that the time had come when a system of direct taxation should be
devised and organised so as to provide the chiefs with some definite
source of revenue in order to
" meet the respectable maintenance of themselves and
their households and to furnish a: fund, which could be
applied to minor works of public utility in their
territories". 2
He proposed that the principle on which the establishment of such
taxation should rest was that the chiefs should be authorised to
raise revenue, within certain limits, from all persons living in their
3
jurisdiction. He suggested that the tax would be of one shilling a
4
year per head of the population.
»
The Under Secretary agreed with the Secretary for Native
Affairs on the need of providing the chiefs with a regular source
of revenue. In his report on his visit to West Africa, Ormsby Gore
referred, with regard to the Gold Coast, to the limited and irregular
source of revenue of the stools and suggested that the Government
5should enact a scheme authorising the chiefs to levy a tax. He
maintained that if the proceeds of such taxation were wholly applied
to stool revenue he saw no reason why the people should oppose it. ^
P.RO.,0.0.96.663. "Direct Native Taxation and the Share of Native
Governments in the Produce of Taxation",a memorandum of February




^Report by the Hon. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore,M.P. (Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies), on his visit to West Africa
during the year 1926. Cmd. 2744.
6Ibido
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Finally, he stressed that
"I regard the establishment of stool treasuries both in the
Colony and Ashanti as a principle of policy of cardinal
importance for the future stability and development of native
institutions". 1
Guggisberg himself was clearly enthusiastic towards
strengthening the authority of the Paramount Chiefs and thus not
unsympathetic to the proposals of both his Secretary for Native
Affairs and the Under-Secretary. He was, however, of the opinion
that it was not yet opportune to take any steps in regard to the
2establishment of stool treasuries in the Colony. He added that
it was desirable that the Provincial Councils should initiate such
3
innovation.
Apart from that, Guggisber^ appeared more interested in
major works of development than in providing minor local services
and this partly explained his apparent lack of enthusiasm for the
promotion of treasuries and taxation in local authorities.
Guggisberg's idea of strengthening the authority of the Paramount
Chiefs aimed primarily at giving them, in contrast to the
intelligentsia,a more political role in the national leadership, but
he never seemed to have realised that this could not really be
adequately achieved if their financial difficulties were not solved.
Finally, Guggisberg must have realised that any attempt to
impose a tax or establish stool treasuries, at a time when there was
^Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.675/4546. quoted in despatch No. 641 of 19.8.1927
from Slater to L.S. Amery.
3Ibid.
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what could be described as a nationwide protest against the 1925
constitution and the Provincial Councils, would certainly be a
complete fiasco. ^ Accordingly, he took no step to implement the
proposals put forward by the Secretary for Native Affairs and the
Parliamentary Under-Secretary.
Meanwhile, the financial conditions of the chiefs continued
to deteriorate. Some of the chiefs were fortunate in having a
regular and substantial income from the proceeds of the mineral and
agricultural concessions. But these were very few, and in the
majority of the states, court fees and fines comprised the only
revenue available for the maintenance of the stool. Such a source
of revenue was not only irregular and insecure but was also
insufficient to provide adequately for the public services or to
allow any real progress to be made.
What made things even worse for the chiefs was that the
2
cost of litigation had increased very considerably. The cocoa
industry was indirectly responsible for this in that with the
development of that industry, land had increased in value and as a
3result rival claims became acute and protracted. In addition, the
people, particularly the young men, were becoming increasingly
critical of the way the chiefs were administrating the finance of the
stools. In fact, the people's accusations of their> chiefs of
1
For more details on the Africans' protest against the Provincial
Councils, see chapter three above.
2
For example, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, The Gold Coast; A Review of the
Events of 1924-25, Accra, 1925, Government Printing Dept. ■> 126.
3Ibid.
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maladministrating the funds of the stools were becoming one of the
main causes of the steadily increasing number of destoolments.
Such was the financial situation of the chiefs when the
Native Administration Ordinance was passed in 1927. The Ordinance,
however, like the 1883 Ordinance before it, made no specific
provision for the establishment of stool treasuries or imposition of
a tax. The Ordinance only vaguely authorised a Paramount Chief to
make by-laws providing for the "good government and welfare" of the
people in his state. ^
Some of the Paramount Chiefs, however, mistakenly thought
that the Native Administration Ordinance would enable them to make
by -laws for the establishment of treasuries and imposition of a
tax. Accordingly, and also apparently encouraged by Guggisberg1s
opinion that it was desirable that the establishment of treasuries
should be initiated by the Paramount Chiefs, the Konor of Manya
Krobo state, in the Eastern Province, forwarded to the Government
for approval a list of by-laws which his state council had passed
2
in December 1927. This list of by-laws proposed to establish
a state treasury and to impose a land and fishing taxation scheme.
Governor Slater was very sympathetic to the Konor's
proposals but he realized that the Native Administration Ordinance
nowhere provided for such matters as establishing a stool treasury
or imposing a tax. Accordingly, the Governor informed the Konor
^Section 40 of the N.A.O., No. 18 of 1927.
G.N.A., Accra, ADM.11/928, case No.32. Minute of 13.3.1929 on
Stool Treasuries.
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that he could not approve of his proposed list of by-laws. 1 The
Governor, however, added that the Government would be preparing a
■odel state treasuries by -laws for the whole Colony which would be
2sent to the Provincial Councils for their views.
The Oaanhene of Akim Abuakwa, Nana Ofori Atta, also
mistakenly thinking that the Natrve Adninistration Ordinance would
enable Paramount Chiefs to pass by -laws establishing a treasury and
imposing a tax, forwarded in May, 1928, a set of "state treasury
by-laws" providing for the establishment of a state treasury and for
the imposition of certain cocoa taxes on farms owned by "strangers"
3
in his state.
Once again the Omanhene was informed that the Native
Administration Ordinance did not empower a Paramount Chief to impose
4
a tax. The Omanhene was displeased with this reply and claimed that
a state council had the right under custom, to tax "strangers"
cultivating land within its state even without the consent of the
5
Central Government. The Government replied that while the state
councils could not be granted that measure of financial independence
which the Omanhene claimed on their behalf, the Central Government
should not reserve to itself the right to impose a tax but should
delegate this power by an Ordinance to the "Native Authorities"







received the Governor's approval. ^ Ofori Atta must have felt upset
to realise that the Ordinance which he himself introduced in the
Legislative Council a year ago was now proving inadequate for
regulating the fiscal matters of the stools.
Meanwhile, and apparently encouraged by what Ormsby-Gore
said in his report on his visit to West Africa of the need for
establishing stool treasuries in Ashanti and the Colony, Governor
Slater passed in 1927 the "Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance, No. 10
of 1927". The Ordinance empowered the Governor to make regulations
providing for the establishment, constitution and management of stool
2
treasuries. The Ordinance gave the administrative officers full
control over the keeping, inspection and audit of the accounts of the
3
stool revenues and expenditure.
The Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance was not met by
opposition in Ashanti. Encouraged by this, the Government decided
in 1928 that an Ordinance on the lines of Ashanti Stool Treasuries
Ordinance would be the best way of establishing stool treasuries in
4
the Colony. Accordingly the Government asked the Provincial
Councils for their views on this proposal.
In its reply to the Government the Council of the Central
Province put forward the following conditions for the acceptance of
the proposal:
(l) that it should be left entirely with the different states to make
11bid.
2
Section 2 of the Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance No.10 of 1927.
This Ordinance was forwarded to the C.O. under cover of despatch




Annual Report of the Native Affairs Department 1929-50. Also Leg.Co.
Debates 1930-31.
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their own arrangements with regard to such system of taxation as they
might consider feasible;
(2) that all accounting and management of a stool treasury should be
left with the state concerned;
(3) that no state be obliged to keep a banking account in connection
with its treasury;
(4) that no state be obliged to submit its accounts to the
Government. ^
In short, what the Council of the Central Province wanted
was that apart from giving statutory effect to the establishment of
stool treasuries, the Government should not interfere in the control
and management of these treasuries.
The Council of the Western Province, while agreeing to the
principle of establishing properly regulated stool treasuries, also
made it clear that it was rejecting the amount of control which the
2
Government had on the stool treasuries in Ashanti.
The Council of the Eastern Province, apparently under the
influence of the Omanhene of Akim Jhuakwa and the Konor of Manya Krobo,
who both had already, as we have seen, expressed their wish to
establish stool treasuries, declared itself in favour of the
Government's proposal and made no objection to Government control
3
over stool treasuries.
So, as during 1925-1927 when the Paramount Chiefs of the





Eastern Province, under the leadership of Ofori Atta, wholeheartedly
welcomed the Provincial Councils system and Native Administration
Ordinance while the majority of the Paramount Chiefs of the Central
and Western Provinces strongly opposed these measures, there was now
in 1929 a similar split, although less acute, on the question of
stool treasuries. This cleavage between the Paramount Chiefs of
the Eastern Province on the one hand and those of the Western and
Central Provinces on the other continued well into the 1930's, as
we shall later explain. ^ In fact at one time the cleavage looked
like one between pro and anti Government factions respectively.
It seemed that the Government policy of "divide and rule" not only
aimed to divorce the intelligentsia from the Paramount Chiefs but
also to divide the latter among themselves.
Not surprisingly, Governor Slater refused to accept the
views of the Councils of the Central and Western Provinces to the
effect of establishing stool treasuries without giving the Government
a substantial measure of control over them. But at the same time,
and as a result of the objectionsraised by these Councils, Slater
was convinced that the time was inopportune for the establishment
2
of a stool treasuries system in the Colony.
Meanwhile, Slater wrote his Minute; Native Administration
in the Gold Coast and its Dependencies in which he explained his
3
views on the principles and application of the Indirect Rule system.
See p.229
^P.R.O.,C.0.96/679/4546. despatch of 19.8.1927 from Slater to L.S.
Amery.
•z
P.R.O.,C.0.693/6599. "Native Administration in the Gold Coast and its
Dependencies", a conf. Minute of 16.12.1929 by A.R. Slater.
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With regard to the fiscal and financial powers of the chiefs Slater
(following Lugard) held that
the foundation of any stable system of Indirect Rule
must be the duly regulated stool treasury, and the development
of the system will largely depend on the regularity and extent
to which the revenue of those treasuries can be maintained, ^
Furthermore, Slater argued that
The Government of the Gold Coast is finding it increasingly
difficult to meet the demands made upon it for the satisfaction
of local needs, and as a matter of principle it is
objectionable that purely local expenditure should be a
charge on the revenue of the Central Government. Local
needs in Nigeria and elsewhere are satisfied by the
expenditure by Native Administrations (under due guidance)
of funds collected from the localities concerned, and there
seems no reason why a similar system should not be gradually
established in the Gold Coast. Indeed, with the tendency
of the Colony's recurrent expenditure to overtake the revenue
it seems probable that in a short time no Government funds
will be available for parochial purposes, ^
Notwithstanding that direct taxation in the Gold Coast was
traditionally regarded with disfavour, Slater believed that if the
proceeds of such taxation were handed over to the "Native
Administrations" for the benefit of the. localities in which the
3tax was raised, there would presumably be fewer objections.
The Colonial Office favourably welcomed Slater's views and
agreed with him that the introduction of direct taxation was necessary
for the effective establishment of Indirect Rule. Encouraged by
this, Slater sent to Nigeria in May 1931, his Secretary for Native
Affairs, W.J.A. Jones, to study the system of Indirect Rule on the
spot and then to advise on the best way of finding ,funds for the
11bid.
2
Ibid. , "original emphasis".
3Ibid.
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"Native Administrations" in the Gold Coast. After his visit to
Nigeria, W.J.A. Jones submitted a lengthy memorandum containing his
proposals on the introduction of direct taxation in the Gold Coast.^
Depending largely, if not entirely, on this memorandum,
p
Slater forwarded in October 1951, a comprehensive taxation scheme.
Slater was very keen to emphasise that direct taxation was
indispensable to the proper foundation of Indirect Rule and that
the Government's primary objective in introducing it was to provide
3
a "legitimate and regular" form of revenue for the chiefs.
Although it was the strong belief of Slater that, as a
matter of principle, direct taxation was a necessary measure for
the development of a successful system of Indirect Rule, he was
clearly motivated by other considerations in his attempt to introduce
direct taxation. The World trade depression had halved the price of
cocoa and as a result the Government revenue, which was dependent on
custom duties which itself was largely dependent on the price of
cocoa, decreased considerably. The Government increased the
customs duties and retrenched some of its staff but this could not
make up for the deficit which occurred as the result of the
4
substantial decrease in the cocoa price. Hence the Government
sought a solution in direct taxation.
P.R.o..c.o.96.700/7109* "Memorandum on the Introduction of Direct
Taxation in the Gold Coast", 27.7.1931» by W.J.A. Jones, the S.N.A.
enclosed in conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from Slater to J.H.
Thomas.
^p.r.o..c.0.96.700/7109. conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from Slater
to J.H. Thomas.
5Ibid.
^For example, P.R.O.,C.0.96.696/6830/A.pt.2. conf. despatch of
16.8.1931 from Slater to Lord Passfield.
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Further, the Government considered the introduction of
direct taxation to be a corollary of the abolition of forced labour.
Under section Four of the Roads Ordinance, the colonial Government
and the chiefs used to call upon the people to maintain the roads
and perform other public works without paying them. But due to the
Forced Labour Convention entered into by Britain in 1930, it became
clear that the colonial Government and the chiefs could no longer
mobilise the people for work without paying them. The Secretary
for Native Affairs unashamedly argued that the people should
accordingly pay "a redemption price" £i.e. a direct taxj from
Forced labour. ^
In addition, the Government had in 1929 and 1930, and due
to a strong demand by the unofficial African Members of the
Legislative Council and other African individuals, introduced
legislation restricting the sale and increasing the cost of all
spirits, and in the case of gin, gradually decreasing its import
2
until in ten years time it would cease altogether. As a result
of these measures, the revenue derived from the import of spirits
decreased from £1,456,161 in 1928 to £625,939 in 1930, a loss of
3
£830,222. The Government argued that since this loss was made
p.r.o..0,0.96.700/7109. "Memorandum on the Introduction of Direct
Taxation in the Gold Coast", 27.7.1931, by W.J.A. Jones, the S.N.A.
enclosed in conf. despatch (b) of 31*10.1931 from Slater to J.H.Thomas.
2
These restrictions led to the increase in illicit distillation. As
a result by the mid-1950s, the Government decided to abandon the
policy of "restrictions".
There is a great deal of material on the controversy of prohibition
of imported spirits. See for example, p.r.O.,C.0.96.685/6508; p.r.o.
C.0.96/685/6337; p.r.o..C.0.96.696; The Times. 28.3.1929, 6.4.1929;
The Gold Coast Leader, 9,1.1929, The Times of West Africa. 4.11.1933;
The African World, 13.4.1929.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.700/7109. conf. despatch of 31.10.1931 from Slater to
j.h. Thomas.
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as a result of an African demand, then Africans should make up for
some of that loss by paying a direct tax. ^
Slater's proposals with regard to the introduction of
direct taxation were in two forms: (l) an Income Tax Ordinance;
and (2) a Native Administration Revenue Ordinance. The former,
though intended to be applied to the three coastal towns where a
form of local government had been instituted, was still introduced
within the framework of Indirect Rule. The Government thought that
it would be a good move politically to subject to direct taxation
first the wage earners of the towns and then after a year or so
apply the tax to the rural areas and thus divide African opposition
2
to its Direct Taxation scheme. The Government's plan to divide
the Africans' opposition, however, failed. Not only did both the
rural and urban areas join in the campaign against the proposed
Income Tax Ordinance but the effect of this campaign became
prejudicial to the principal part of the Government's Taxation
3
scheme, namely the proposed Native Administration Revenue Ordinance.
Thus it would not be out of place to outline here the Africans'
campaign against the Income Tax in some detail.
The proposed Income Tax Ordinance provided for a tax at the
4
rate of 6d. in the pound on all income over £40 a year. The
Government hoped this would yield £91,000 a year. The Bill vras
first published in September, 1931, but the Governor made it clear
5
that he did not intend to apply it until the first of April, 1932.
^In fact this loss was partly made as a result of the decrease in
the cocoa price. See for example, N.A. Cox-George, Studies in
Finance and Development: The Gold Coast (Ghana) Experience
1914-1950. London, 1973. " ~~~ ~
^P.R.O. .C.0.96.699/7O5O/A. conf. despatch of 16.8.1931 from Slater
to Lord Passfieldo
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.708/1662, Notes regarding the introduction of direct
taxation in the Gold Coast (N.D.).





The opposition to the Income Tax first disclosed itself
in Sekondi, where a meeting was held on the 26th of October, 1931,
and resolved its
vehement protest against any proposal on the part of the
Government of the Gold Coast to the levy of the Income
Tax proposed 1
The meeting was attended by the two Paramount Chiefs of the town,
"almost all" the lawyers in the town and a large gathering of the
2
people. Following the meeting, a big demonstration was arranged
and some of the Government Officials were physically attacked.
The various inscriptions displayed by the demonstrators on flags
were forcefully against the measure, such as:
Income Tax is akin to slavery^1
We shout down the Income Tax till we are hoarse ;
Awake, Gold Coast, to your sense of inherent liberty ;
We protest against the iniquitous Tax . 3
The next day, the demonstrations spread to Shama, which is
about six miles from Sekondi, and stones were thrown at the Acting
4
Provincial Commissioner.
Two days later still a similar demonstration took place
at Cape Coast and a confrontation between the people and the Police
led to "considerable stone throwing" at the police and other
Government officials as a result of which one police officer and
one constable sustained injuries and the windows of the police
5station were broken. Eleven persons were arrested in connection
with the demonstration and eight of them were sentenced to three
months imprisonment each with hard labour.
1P.R.0.,C.0.96.699/7050/B, conf. report by the Commissioner of Police,
Western Province, enclosure in conf. despatch of 3.11.1931 from
Slater to J.H. Thomas.
2Ibid.
5Ibid.
^P.R.O..C.O.96.699/7050/B. letter of 30.10.1931 from Acting Commissioner
01 western Province to U.S., Accra, enclosure 5 in conf. despatch of
3.11.1931 from Slater to J.H. Thomas.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.699/7050/B, conf. despatch of 31.10.1931 from Slater
to J.H. Thomas; Also, The Times of West Africa, 28-29.10.1931.
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The strong opposition of Cape Coast to the Income Tax was
not at all surprising. The town was the headquarters for the
A.R.P.S. which together with the Omanhene and the Asafo had been
very objectionable to the Provincial Councils and the Native
Administration Ordinance. ^ The A.R.P.S. was apparently very keen
to put on a show of strength in an attempt to demonstrate to the
Government that it, and not the Provincial Councils, still had the
support of the people and should thus still be considered the
"medium of communication" between the people and the Government.
Besides being active in the demonstration of Cape Coast, the
A.R.P.S. held a conference to discuss the Income Tax, passed a
resolution against the measure and telegrammed the Governor asking
2
for its withdrawal. The Governor himself was convinced that
"much of the trouble" at Cape Coast against the Income Tax was
due to "the attitude of obstructive and unreasoning opposition
3
to Government by the A.R.P.S."
No demonstrations took place at Accra but a meeting
attended by many of the chiefs of the Ga state and the educated
elite was held in November, 1931• The meeting expressed its
rejection of the measure and petitioned the Governor asking for
4its withdrawal.
^For more details, see chapter 8 below.
p
G.N.A..Cape Coast,ACC.No.137/65, The A.R.P.SJsj Papers, letter
of 3.12.1931 from J.P. Brown, President of the A.R.P.S. to the
C.S., Accra.
^P.R.O. .C.0.96.704-/7260. conf. despatch of 2.4.1932 from Slater to
Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.699/7050/B. "Report on the mass meeting held on
10.11.1932 at Accra in connection with Income Tax", enclosure in
Governor's despatch of 17.11.1931.
(226)
By and large the Africans' opposition to the Income Tax
was far more united and intense than the Government anticipated.
The Secretary for Native Affairs admitted that "the opposition to
the Bill has been organised more rapidly than I had anticipated
and is proving all the more effective". ^ Other senior officials
advised the Governor that the agitation against the Income Tax was
threatening to jeopardize the probability of securing concurrence
of the up-country chiefs to the propaganda which the Government was
2
proposing to carry on for the establishment of Indirect Rule.
So as a result of the Africans' strenuous opposition to
the Income Tax measure and fearing that this might be prejudicial to
the wider policy of direct taxation (i.e. the proposed Native
Administration Revenue Ordinance), Slater decided in November, 1931,
to postpone the introduction of the Income Tax and stated that it
and the Native Revenue would be promoted together later as
3
complimentary measures. In fact the question of Income Tax was
never again raised until 1943.
The other form of Slater's proposed taxation scheme was a
"Native Administration Revenue Ordinance" which was intended to be
applied simultaneously to Ashanti and the Colony (with the exception,
however, of the towns which were administered under some form of
local government). ^ This proposed Ordinance empowered the chiefs
^P.R.0.,C.0.96.699/7050A, quoted in conf. despatch (a) of 16.11.1931
from Slater to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
2Ibid.
3Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.700/7109. conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from
Slater to J.H. Thomas.
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to establish treasuries, under the close supervision of the
administrative officers, and to levy a tax.^ The tax was proposed
to be levied on all males at the rate of 2-5$ on gross annual income.
The Government hoped that this would yield about £400,000 a year to be
divided in equal amounts among the Government and the "Native
3
Administrations". Of the portion paid to the latter, the chiefs
would be paid a definite amount totalling \Qf/o while the remaining
40$ would be spent on local services. It was proposed that the
assessment of the tax, (which was to be a system of lump sum
assessment), would be carried out by the District Commissioners
4
in co-operation with the chiefs and their elders. The collection
of the tax was, however, entrusted to the "Native Administrations"
working under the supervision of the District Commissioners.
According to the Government's plan, the Native
Administration Revenue measure was to come into force at the
beginning of the financial year 1933/34, after the Government's
anticipated Income Tax had been enforced in the towns. In spite
of the opposition to the Income Tax which resulted in its
postponement, the Government nevertheless decided to continue
with introducing the Native Administration Revenue measure. The
administrative officers were accordingly instructed to embark on a
propoganda campaign among the people, explaining to them the benefits
and necessity of introducing the measure.






active and addressed several meetings of the chiefs trying to
convince them to accept the measure. In December, 1931, for
example, he met the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province and
made a lengthy speech on the benefits of the measure. He asserted
to the Paramount Chiefs convening that:
it is only in the school of local government that you
will learn self-government and there can be no local
government until a system of direct taxation is
introduced to provide the state councils with funds
to maintain and extend social services in the various
states 1
t.
The Governor also pointed out in his speech to the
Legislative Council in March, 1932, that, in his opinion, the most
important condition for the proper development of "Native
Administrations" was the delegation to them of financial
responsibility, which could only be exercised if the duty of
raising revenue locally, as well as disbursing it, was entrusted
to them. ^
The Government's propounds campaign seemed to have some
initial success. The Provincial Council of the Eastern Province,
under the influence of Ofori Atta, who clearly declared himself in
favour of the measure, passed a resolution in December, 1931,
welcoming the Government's proposal and urged it to prepare "without
any undue delay" the Bill for the consideration of the Provincial
3
Councils.
^G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.O.1573/31. "Copy of a speech made by S.N.A. at a
meeting of the Provincial Council of Eastern Province on 10.12.1931".
^Leg.Co.Debates, 1932.
^P.R.O. ,C,0.96.704-/7260, "Resolution by the Provincial Council of
the Eastern Province", 16.12.1931, enclosure in Governor's conf.
despatch of 20.9.1932.
(229)
In April, 1932, a full meeting of the three Provincial
Councils was held specially at Saltpond to discuss the Native
Administration Revenue measure. This was the first time the
members of the Provincial Councils had met jointly since the
inception of these Councils in 1925. ^ At the meeting, the members
of the Provincial Council of the Western Province and those of the
Central Province - with the exception of only the Omanhene of
Winneba - rejected unconditionally the proposed Native Administration
2
Revenue Ordinance. Nana Aduku, Omanhene of Mankessim, expressing
the opinion of the Central Province, stated that:
In the Central Province Council we do not want undue
Government interference in our local affairs. I do
not think that it is a wrong attitude. When we tax
ourselves we do not want Government to come in and say
you must give us so much of what you collect 3
The members of the Provincial Council of the Eastern
Province were, however, in favour of the measure providing that it
did not include a provision giving the Central Government a part of
4
the proceeds. The old cleavage between the Councils of the Central
and Western Provinces on the one hand and the Council of the Eastern
Province on the other came again to the surface. The colonial
administration once again succeeded in divorcing the Council of the
Eastern Province from the other two Councils.
For the proceedings of this meeting, see G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.O.
58 9/32: P.R.0.,C.0.96.704/7260, particularly conf. enclosure
"D" in conf. despatch of 20.8.1932 from Acting Governor to Sir P.
Cunliffe-Lister.
2Ibid.
^P.R.O..C.O.96»704/7260. "Notes of the Proceedings and Happenings
in connection with the united mass conference of Provincial
Councils held at Saltpond from 19th to the 23rd April 1932",
enclosure "D" in conf. despatch of 20.8.1932 from Acting Governor




The Eastern Province Council's acceptance of the Native
Administration Revenue measure was strongly resented by the people
who gathered at the place of the conference at Saltpond. ^ An
organised demonstration hooted Ofori Atta and some of the
demonstrators tried to seize some of his paraphernalia and stones
2
were thrown at his car. It was also rumoured that the people
would be attacking, during the night, the houses in which Ofori
Atta and the Omanhene of Winneba were staying, but this was averted
3
as the Government posted "all available Police" round the two houses.
In fact, the Government did not fail to come to the aid of Ofori Atta
and the other members of the Eastern Province Council and more Police
were brought from Cape Coast to protect them. The Assistant District
Commissioner met the President of the Eastern Province Council and
assured him of the "wholehearted support of the Government and of
4
every protection by the Police".
At the end of the conference, there was some confusion and
disagreement and the members of the Eastern Province Council left
without signing or even acknowledging the resolution adopted by the
rest of the members of the conference. The resolution itself, which
was signed by the Councils of the Western and Central Provinces,
emphatically declared that the Paramount Chiefs were not prepared
"under any circumstances" to accept the proposed Native Administration
5
Revenue Ordinance.
^G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.0.389/32. minutes on "Disturbances at Saltpond on
the occasion of the meeting of J.P.C., April 1932"; The Times of
West Africa. 26.4.1933.
O
G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.O.389/32, letter of 29.4-1933 from Acting
Commissioner of Central Province to C^S.,Accra.
3Ibid.
^Ibido
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.704/7260. A copy of this resolution is enclosed in
conf. despatch 20.8.1932 from Acting Governor to Sir P. Cunliffe-
Lister.
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The Native Administration Revenue measure was also
strongly attacked in the press. The Gold Coast Times, for example,
refused the Government's contention that the measure was a necessary
step for the establishment of a "local government" in the rural
areas. ^ The Times insisted that the Government was merely trying
to transfer some of its responsibilities to local administrations
so that local development would be met by taxes on the people while
the officials were enjoying the revenue of the country. The Times
was, in fact, echoing the argument often repeated by the critics of
Slater's Taxation Scheme, namely, that the amount of money which was
devoted to the salaries, allowances and other privileges of the
European officials was excessive and that instead of imposing direct
taxation on the people, the Government should first cut down these
2
salaries and allowances.
The Government had argued in its propaganda campaign that
in authorising the chiefs to impose a tax, it was not creating a new
innovation since it had long been the custom for a Paramount Chief,
with the concurrence of his people, to exact levies at irregular
intervals for specific purposes. But it can be argued that there
was a difference between irregular or ad hoc tributes which were
voluntarily paid by the people for particular aid for their state
and the imposition of an annual regular tribute for "Native
3 ^
Administrations". The latter was certainly not sanctioned by any
indigenous custom.
^The Gold Coast Times. 4.10.1932.
For example, P.R.O.,C.0.96.696/683O/C, conf. despatch of 16.11.1931
from Slater to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister; P.R.O.,0.0.96.699/7030.
Minute of 16.12.1931 by A. Fiddian.
•3
G.N.A..Accra,C.S.O., 372.S.F.29. Notes by the Deputy Governor.
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The Vox-Populi described the measure as a "veiled desire
on the part of the Government to import a system of local
Government that is completely foreign, undesirable and incompatible
with the sentiment and system of the land". ^ It urged the people
to oppose the measure vehemently and blamed those chiefs who were
accepting it. 2
As during the campaign against the Income Tax, the
A.R.P.S. was also active in the campaign against the Native
Administration Revenue measure and held several conferences
3
explaining and urging the chiefs and the people to oppose it.
At one of these conferences, held at Cape Coast in January and
February, 1932, the Society maintained that the measure proposed
to introduce in the Gold Coast a Nigerian type of Indirect Rule
4which was "contrary to the spirit of our institution". The
Society asserted that it could not consent to any legislation
which tended to create in the Gold Coast the system of Indirect
5
Rule. The Society also repeated its favourite argument that
imposition of direct taxation was a violation on the part of the
British Government of the "term of their character of settlement".
The A.R.P.S. was also very active in the demonstrations
which, as we have seen, took place during the conference of the
Joint Provincial Council which was held at Saltpond in April 1932.
1The Vox-Ponuli. 22.6.1932.
2Ibid.
^G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ACC.No. 11/64. A.R.P.S's. Papers.
^G.N.A,,Cape Coast.ACC.No.11/64. A.R.P.S's. Papers, Notes on




In fact, the Acting Commissioner of the Central Province complained
that these demonstrations were caused by "malcontents sent over from
Cape Coast by the A.R.P.S. in order to interrupt the peaceful
proceedings of the meetings, and these together with some of the
more irresponsible inhabitants of Saltpond were entirely responsible
for the trouble which took place". ^
The campaign against the Native Administration Revenue
measure was so vehement and successful that the Government decided
to withdraw it. Certainly Slater could not have chosen a worse time
to introduce his taxation scheme. The early 1930's was a period when
the world-wide economic crisis generated instability in the cocoa
market and thereby increased the economic grievances of the cocoa
farmers. The Gold Coast cocoa farmers, in fact, blamed the
European firms for the fall in the cocoa price and reacted by
organising a hold-up in 1930/31. The hold-up was not very
successful but the economic grievances, and with them the seeds of
discontent, remained. The people could not pay a tax, even if they
had been willing to, because they simply had no money.
Besides being inopportune due to the general economic
hardships encountered by the people, Slater's taxation scheme
perhaps came too late. By the early 1930's, the people of the
Gold Coast had so long enjoyed freedom from direct taxation that
this seemed to have induced in them a genuine belief that they had
some inherent right to escape from it. Lord Lugard's prediction
in 1922 that, if delayed, the imposition of direct taxation would
2
lead to trouble, was very prophetic in the case of the Gold Coast.
^G.N.A..Accra,C.S.O.389/32. letter of 22.4.1932 from Acting
Commissioner of Central Province to C.S.,Accra.
2
Lugard, The Dual Mandate. 219.
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In any case, Slater had to abandon his Taxation scheme and
this was certainly a serious drawback to the orthodox type of
Indirect Rule as outlined in his Minute. Such a system of Indirect
Rule could not be successfully established unless a tax was imposed
on the people for the upkeep of the "Native Administrations". ^
Besides being opposed by the people for providing for the
imposition of a tax, the Native Administration Revenue measure was
equally opposed for purporting to give the colonial Government control
over the stool treasuries. As we have already mentioned, the
Government had wanted in 1928/29 to introduce in the Golony an
Ordinance on the lines of the "Ashanti Stool Treasuries Ordinance"
but due to objections raised by the Provincial Councils of the
Western and Central Provinces the Government had to postpone the
introduction of such an Ordinance. Now in September, 1931, on the
same day the Income Tax was published in the gazette, the Government
passed an amendment to section 40 of the Native Administration
Ordinance making it lawful for a Paramount Chief to pass by-laws
2
for the establishment and constitution of stool treasuries.
The amendment, however, did not empower the chiefsto levy a tax
but only provided for the establishment of treasuries where an
account could be kept of the existing customary revenues of the
stools. In short, the amendment did not give the Government as
substantial an amount of control over the treasuries as in
3
Ashanti.
P.R.O.,C.0.96.693/6399. "Native Administration in the Gold Coast
and its Dependencies", A confidential Minute of 16.12.1929 by A.R.
Slater.
p
Leg.Co.Debates, 25.9.1931; also, P.R.O.,C.0.96.697/6903/b. conf.
despatch of 13.10.1931 from Slater to J.H. Thomas.
-'The S.N.A. admitted that the amendment fell short of what the
Government wanted and warned the Paramount Chiefs that it was only
a commencement and that unless there was a regular form of revenue
the state treasuries would not fulfil the objective for which they
were intended; see G.N.A..Accra,C.S.O.,1573/31. "^Ry sPeech made
by S.N.A. at a meeting of the Provincial Council of Eastern Province
on 10.12.1931".
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The next month, Slater forwarded to the Colonial Office
his Native Administration Revenue measure, and this time he ignored
the objections raised in 1929 by the Provincial Councils of the
Western and Central Provinces to any interference by thecolonial
administration in the management of their treasuries. The
proposed Native Administration Revenue Ordinance not only provided
for the establishment of stool treasuries but also gave the District
Commissioner's full control over the accounts of these treasuries. ^
Naturally the chiefs of the Western and Central Provinces strongly
objected to any control by the colonial Government over their
treasuries.
It must be emphasised, however, that the chiefs were not
objectionable to the principle of establishing stool treasuries but
to the control of the Government over such treasuries. VJhat the
chiefs, or at least the majority of them, wanted was that the
Government should provide them with the statutory legislation for
establishing treasuries and levying a tax without claiming any
control over those treasuries or asking for a share of the tax.
Neither the 1931 amendment to the Native Administration Ordinance
nor the Native Administration Revenue measure had fully met the
chiefs' demands.
On their part, the people were very suspicious of the
colonial administration's attempt to establish a stool treasuries
system. The people's mistrust of such a system was, as A.K.Korsah
explained, due to the fact that they were afraid that as soon as
stool treasuries were established and constituted, the Government
^p.r.o..c.0.96.700/7109: conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from
Slater to J.H. Thomas.
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would take the opportunity to impose taxes on them. ^ Further, they
viewed the system as a veiled attempt by the colonial Government to
appropriate part of the revenue of their stools. One District
Commissioner in the Central Provice put the attitude of the people
in the following terms:
As far as this Province is concerned the idea of stool
treasuries might be yet unborn. Mention of the sentence
is anathema. It is income tax in another form; it is a
cunning device to secure control of the states' revenue ^
This suspicion and mistrust on the part of the people of the
Government's intention was in fact a formidable obstacle to the
Government's policy of establishing stool treasuries. The result
was that in spite of a strong propaganda campaign carried out by
the Government in 1933 to encourage the chiefs to establish stool
treasuries under the provisions of the 1931 amendment, very few did
so and even where stool treasuries were established not all the
3
sources of revenue were brought into them. Besides being
discouraged by their people, the chiefs, in fact, saw no point -
the amendment of 1931 not having empowered ihem to impose a tax -
in establishing treasuries that did not add to their income and
equally saw no reason why they should disclose their financial
sources to the administrative officers.
Governor Shenton Thomas, who took office in November,
1932, made no attempt to introduce direct taxation. In fact he
did not even believe that direct taxation was essential for the
establishment of a system of Indirect Rule. He stated that:
^
Leg.Go.Debates. 1936.
Report on the Central Province. 1933/34.
3
Lord Hailey, An African Survey. London^ 1939,
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If it is the belief that Native Administration, or,
as it is commonly called, indirect rule, cannot
function without direct taxation, I should like to
dispel that belief. It is not so. 1
The exponents of the Lugardian type of Indirect Rule, like Slater,
would not of course concur with such a point of view. But then
Shenton Thomas had made it clear to the Colonial Office that he
had grave doubts about whether "Native Administration" along the
lines operating in Nigeria would be really suitable for the Gold
Coast Colony.
Meanwhile, the failure of the Government to implement
its Taxation scheme or to establish properly regulated stool
treasuries meant the continuance of the chiefs' unsatisfactory
financial situation. They continued to lack a secure regular
source of income and were still primarily dependent on the fines
and fees of the native tribunals. In spite of the fact that they
often exacted the maximum fees and fines for even minor offences,
the chiefs were still finding it difficult, mainly because of the
enormous amount of money spent on litigation, to support the
3
government of their states. In addition, and because of the
increasingly critical attitude of the people, the chiefs were even
finding it difficult to levy a tribute under customary law.




P.R.O. ,0.0.96.749/31228. "Summary of Proposals in connection with
the Introduction of Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast Colony,
19.7.1938"» a memorandum prepared at the Secretariat, Accra.
3
For example, Report on the Western Province, 1933-34.
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Considering this unenviable financial position of the
majority of the Chiefs, it was not surprising that the "Gold Coast
and Ashanti Delegation of 1934" to London took the opportunity to
submit to the Secretary of State a memorandum containing their
suggestions on the "financing of the stools". ^ Having traversed
on the failure of the Native Administration Revenue measure and the
stool treasuries system to solve the financial difficulties of the
chiefs, the delegation asked that the Government should allocate
2
to every stool an annual grant-in-aid from the general revenue.
In support of this, the delegation argued that the people still
retained the memory of the agreement or understanding reached between
the Government and chiefs whereby the Government undertook to
3
allocate to the stools a part of the revenue derivable from taxes.
The delegation complained that since the failure of the Poll Tax
Ordinance, no allocation or grant was ever made to the Chiefs. The
British Government had ceased to pay rents for the "Forts" and the
yearly grant by Parliament of £4,000 to the Colony had also come to
4
an end.
Finally, in justifying their claim for grants-in-aid from
the general revenue, the delegation maintained that the Government
had already overtaxed the people through indirect taxation and hence
any form of direct taxation would be unjustified and would of course
^ be opposed.
^Sessional Paper No.XI.1934. "Papers relating to the petition of





In his reply to the delegation, the Secretary of State, Sir Philip
Cunliffe-Lister, stated that it was not, in his opinion,
economically desirable or administratively desirable that stool
treasuries should exist on grants-in-aid from the central revenue,
but he could consider favourably proposals for the raising of local
revenue consistent with efficient financial administration. ^
The Secretary of State was actually stating the opinion of the
local administration which had under both Slater and Shenton Thomas
2
refused to give the chiefs grants-in-aid from the general revenue.
The Government based its argument for not providing for the
maintenance of the "Native Administrations" from the general revenue
on the following grounds:
(1) that providing the chiefs with grants-in-aid would deprive
them of the incentive to undertake responsibility which
they must learn or bear if any real progress in self-
determination was to be made;
(2) that it was impossible to devise any scheme whereby grants
would be allocated to the "Native Administrations" in
proportion to the amounts contributed to the general
revenue by the people within their respective areas of
control. This was because, the Government argued, the
revenue accruing from import and export duties was
proportional to the wealth but not necessarily to the
^Ibid.
S'or example, at the meeting of the Legislative Council in 1932
Slater stated that "There can be no question of grants from
general revenue: on the contrary the Native Authorities will be
expected to contribute a portion of the tax towards the heavy
cost of Central Administration of the Colony"; Leg.Co.Debates 1932.
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population of the various "Native Administrations".
The Government was not, of course, conceiving that self-
government would be achieved in any foreseeable future and thus its
argument that the ultimate aim of Indirect Rule was to provide for
self-determination or self-government through the chiefs was anything
but sincere. Furthermore, had the Government wanted, it could have
found a scheme to allocate grants to the different chiefs, as in fact
Governor Alan Burns did in the mid 1940's as we shall later see.
The real reason why the Government refused to give the
chiefs grants-in-aid from the general revenue was that the general
revenue continued to decline due to the fall in the price of cocoa
during the period from the late 1920's to 1934, and the Government,
having given priority to the salaries and allowances of its
officials, had no funds available for "purely parochial purposes".
Governor Arnold Hodson, who assumed office in November,
1934, was anxious to restore the co-operation between the Government
and the Paramount Chiefs which had been weakened during the
governorship of Slater and Shenton Thomas. With an autocratic
and paternalistic attitude similar to that of Guggisberg, he
stated that he wanted to help the Paramount Chiefs and to strengthen
their authority. Slater's Taxation scheme having failed, and little
progress having been achieved in establishing stool treasuries, it
was natural that the chiefs' priority was to be helped in finding
adecpate money for the maintenance of their stools.'
P.R.O.,C.0.96.700/7109. "Memorandum on the Introduction of Direct
Taxation in the Gold Coast", 27.7.1931, by W.J.A. Jones, the
S.N.A., enclosed in conf. despatch (b) of 31.10.1931 from Slater
to J.H. Thomas.
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Hodson's first attempt to help the Chiefs overcome their
financial difficulties was to pass, in 1936, an amendment to the
Native Administration Ordinance authorising them to impose levies
on their people. This amendment which was usually referred to as
the "Levy Bill" provided that:
(1) the introduction of such a levy would be entirely optional to a
"Native Authority";
(2) each state would decide the amount of levy to be imposed and
the method of its collection;
(3) an annual levy would only be imposed in lieu of customary tribute;
(4) it would be optional for any state to discontinue such a levy if
desired;
(5) no levy would be permitted by the Governor unless a stool
treasury was properly organised. (The amendment did not, however,
make it compulsory that where a stool treasury was established all
stool receipts should be brought to account in it.) ^
The Provincial Councils and their members on the Legislative
Council declared themselves in favour of the amendment. This was
understandable since the amendment provided the chiefs with the power
to impose levies without at the same time giving the Government any
2
substantial measure of control over their treasuries. Ofori Atta,
in particular, was very prominent in the defence of the measure.
P.R.O.,C.O.96.722/31096/1. despatch No.5 of 31.1.1936 from Deputy
Governor to J.H. Thomas; P.R.O..C.0.96.728/^11 34. despatch No.
218 of 10.4.1936 from Hodson to J.H. Thomas; Leg.Co.Debates,
26.2.1936.
For example, G.N.A., Cape Coast. ADM,23/1/970. Minutes of Emergency
session of Provincial Council of Central Province held at Saltpond
26-28.1Oo1937•
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However, the municipal members on the Legislative Council,
Arku Korsah and Kojo-Thompson, came out strongly against the Levy
Bill. The latter expressed the argument against the measure as
follows:
(1) that it had not been given sufficient publicity:
(2) that it was contrary to customary law;
(3) that the people could not afford any further taxation;
(4) that the imposition of the levy would embroil the chiefs in
disputes with their people;
(5) that the people who would pay the levy were not represented on the
Legislative Council; that the Provincial members on the Legislative
Council were not representative of the people, and in particular not
on this question of imposing a tax; and
(6) that in fact the Government was compelling the chiefs to impose
compulsory levies against the will of the people. 1
The Levy Bill was also strongly attacked in the press.
The Vox-Populi. for example, objected to the measure on the grounds
that it gave the Paramount Chiefs power to fleece their people and
2
that there was no previous consultation with the state councils.
Furthermore, the Vox-Populi argued that although it was not unusual
for a chief under customary law to call upon his people from time
to time to pay a tribute for a particular purpose, this was not,
3





The Gold Coast Times maintained that the Levy Bill was
another way on the part of the Government to raise again the question
of the Income Tax. ^ In fact the outcry against the Income Tax
seemed to have, as the Commissioner of the Eastern Province noted,
a lasting effect on the people and any suggestion in connection with
the imposition of direct taxation was at once regarded by the people
with great suspicion. ^
Moreover, thanks to the people's traditional resentment
to any Government-inspired taxation scheme, the campaign against
the Levy Bill was veiy successful in the rural areas. Several
state councils, like those of Shama and Anlo, were forced, under
pressure from their people, to pass resolutions stating that the
Provincial members on the Legislative Council did not represent the
views of their people as regards the Levy Bill and they (the people)
3
were objecting to its application in their states.
In the/Ucwamu state, in the Eastern Province, the people
even took the extreme step of destooling their Omanhene for
4
associating himself with the measure. The Government had no
choice but to recognise the destoolment of the Omanhene who had
5
been on the stool of Akwamu since 1921.
By and large, although the Levy Bill was passed into law,
the majority of the chiefs, fearing destoolment by their people, did
not ask for the exercise of the powers provided by it. The Joint
"*The Gold Coast Times, 3.8.1936.
2
For example, Report on the Eastern Province, 1936-37.
•^G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.O..372/30.SF.36. "Protest against Levy Bill:
Resolution of the State Council of Shama, passed on 8.10.1936", and
"Resolution of the State Council of Anlo, passed on 18.4.1936".
4
Report on the Eastern Province, 1936-37.
5Ibid.
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Provincial Council contented itself by putting the blame on
"deliberate misrepresentations by unscrupulous persons and others
and to a section of the press " ^
As we have seen in the previous chapter in May, 1936,
the Secretary of State, J.H. Thomas, took the initiative of putting
forward proposals for the development of the Indirect Rule system.
With regard to the finance of the chiefs, J.H. Thomas stressed that
if Indirect Rule was to be developed on a sound footing, some
measures must be taken for ensuring that in all the states, local
taxation would be levied and that properly organised treasuries
2
would be established. Although welcoming the Levy Bill as a step
in the right direction, J.H. Thomas suggested that to leave the
imposition of levies to the option of the individual states could
3
not be regarded as a final solution. He asserted that the Government,
and not the chiefs, should impose these levies.
In reply to this, Governor Hodson agreed that the
introduction of direct taxation was inevitable since the "Native
Administrations" would require money for the maintenance of essential
services and local development, but he pointed out that its
introduction would be strenuously opposed by the people and could
4
only be implemented by compulsion. The alternative, Hodson
suggested, was to continue the existing policy of "peaceful propaganda"
^G.N.A..Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/970. Minutes of the Joint Session of the
J.P.C., 27.7.1936.
P.R.O.,0.0.96.730/31228, conf. despatch of 15.5.1936 from J.H. Thomas
to Hodson.
3Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.730/31228, conf. despatch of 31.8.1936 from Hodson to
W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore.
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in the hope that the spread of education and the urge of economic
necessity would one day compel the people themselves to accept the
principle of local taxation for local needs. ^ He held very
strongly that direct taxation should not be imposed by the
Government unless it had been demonstrated beyond all doubt that
the chiefs were unable to collect such levies, tributes, etc.,
2
as sanctioned by customary law.
The Colonial office was not convinced with Hodson's
argument. The Colonial office seemed to be annoyed that the
GcQi Coast was becoming the outstanding exception to the rule that
in all their African Colonies where a system of "Native
Administrations" was adopted, the British had found a way to
make the people pay for the maintenance of such "Native
Administrations". Accordingly, the Secretary of State, W.G.A.
Ormsby-Gore, wrote back and this time stated that in order that
the Native Administrations might be assured of sufficient revenue
for their everyday requirements it was essential that:
(1) a uniform system of direct taxation should be imposed by the
Government, or that;
(2) the "Native Administrations" should be compelled to impose an
adequate local tax at a regular rate as distinct from casual levies.
In addition:




where rents and royalties in respect of stool lands, mineral
concessions, etc., were payable, the money should be paid into the
state treasury and not to the chiefs. ^
Under this pressure from the Colonial Office, Hodson
reluctantly suggested in 1937 the enactment of a "Native Treasuries
Ordinance" to deal with all the financial and fiscal functions of
2
the "Native Administrations". This Ordinance, Hodson explained,
would empower the Governor to constitute stool treasuries and to
make regulations under it in connection with the imposition of
taxation. The Ordinance would also give the administrative
3officers full control over stool treasuries.
Hodson went on to suggest that direct taxation would be
imposed by the Government since it was clear that the "Native
Administrations" themselves were unable or unwilling to impose
such taxation. The actual collection of the tax, Hodson added,
would be in the hands of the chiefs under the supervision of the
administrative officers. The tax itself would be a capitation
tax to be imposed on all males of the age of eighteen and upwards
4
at the rate of five shillings.
Furthermore, Hodson proposed that all revenue whatsoever
which was enjoyed by the chiefs would have to be paid into the stool
treasuries. He also stated that since properly organised treasuries
would relieve the Central Government of several activities, he
^P.R.O.,C.0.96,730/31228. conf. despatch of 30.1.1937 from W.G.A.
Ormsby-Gore to Hodson.






proposed to make a grant to them from the general revenue on the
basis of these transferred activities. ^ Finally, Hodson warned
the Colonial Office that the implementation of these proposals
2
would most certainly be opposed by the people.
Meanwhile, the situation was transformed by the cocoa
hold-up of 1937-1938. The months of the hold-up were a period
of grave economic grievances for the cocoa farmers. As a result,
both the Colonial Office andHodson realised that any attempt to
impose a direct tax would certainly be opposed by the farmers.
This view was strengthened by the fact that the farmers were
anything but pleased with the way the Government handled the
3
hold-up. Accordingly, both the Colonial Office and Hodson
tactfully agreed that it was practically impossible to impose a
direct tax when the farmers were holding their cocoa and hence
had no money to pay the tax. f Hodson's proposed "Native
Treasuries Ordinance" was quietly abandoned.
Thus, the situation by mid 1938 was that more than a
decade after Slater had attempted to enact legislation establishing
properly organised treasuries, little, if any, was achieved. One





For example, Report of the Commission on the Marketing of West
African Cocoa, Cmd.3845,1938.
4P.R.O.,C.0.96.758/31228. conf. despatch of 13-3.1939 from Hodson
to Malcolm MacDonald.
(248)
the states which have adopted the stool treasuries system
were very few in relation to the total number; and the
acceptance of the system of levies a rarity among them . ^
The financial difficulties of the chiefs continued to increase and
so did the number of destoolments.
In 1939, Governor Hodson, although abandoning any idea
of imposing a direct tax, thought that the number of destoolments
could still be reduced if the states were compelled to establish
treasuries where the existing revenue of each stool could be put
on a proper accounting system. This was the primary objective
of the "Native Administration Treasuries Ordinance No. 16 of
p
1939" (usually referred to as the Treasuries Ordinance).
The Treasuries Ordinance empowered the "Native
Administrations" to introduce into their states or divisions
"properly organised" treasuries which would be subject to the
3
supervision of the administrative officers. The Ordinance
also empowered the Governor to order, if a "Native Administration"
failed to establish a treasury, the establishment of a treasury in
any state or division he deemed necessary. In other words, the
establishment of stool treasuries was for the first time made
4
compulsory.
^Report on the Western Province, 1938-39.
2
This Ordinance was originally drafted and forwarded to the C.O. in
July 1938 under cover of the Acting Governor's despatch of 22.7.1938.
It was, however, redrafted in 1939, after the Provincial Councils
made points of minor importance, and was finally passed in Mg.rch,
1939;'P.R.O..C.O.96.752/31352: P.R.O..C.O.96.760/31332: G.N.A..Accra.
C.S.O.372/30.S.F.34. " ~ ~
3




The Ordinance also provided for the creation of "Finance
Boards" which would transact all the financial business of the
chiefs and the state councils. ^ The Ordinance didjnot, however,
unlike that proposed by Hodson in 1937, empower the Government to
impose taxation. The institution of a tax or levy remained
voluntary as under the Levy Bill of1936.
The Treasuries Ordinance of 1939 was not met by any
opposition in the Legislative Council and was welcomed by most
of the press. The African Morning Post, for example, whole¬
heartedly supported the Ordinance and saw in it a measure to put
2
an end to the chiefs' mismanagement of the stool funds.
The Gold Coast Spectator also accepted the Ordinance.
But it had its reservations:
A stool treasury must be used solely for works of intrinsic
value for a state the native authority should not allow
itself to be led into footing bills for works which should
come under the Central Government. If the native
administrations can insure their interests against official
encroachment, and use their funds only for works of purely
local nature, there is no reason why the stool treasury
should not be a success and be supported by the whole
Country . 3
The Vox-Populi, in accepting the Ordinance, also argued
that a stool treasury should be for the benefit of the stool and
not merely serve to relieve the Central Government of its legal
4
and moral responsibilities.
Why then did the press, which hitherto strongly opposed
the stool treasuries system, decide to give the Treasuries
1
Ibid... Section 3.
^The African Morning Post, 20.10.1938.
^The Gold Coast Spectator. 9.7.1938.
^The Vox-Populi. 16.7.1938.
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Ordinance of 1939 a chance? First, the press saw in the Ordinance
a good chance of putting an end to the pernicious system whereby a
large portion of the fines and fees paid into a chief's tribunal
passed directly into the pockets of that chief and his
councillors. ^
Secondly, the Ordinance provided for the creation of
Finance Boards and this was welcomed by the press in the hope that
it would give an opportunity for educated and non-hereditary elements
to be admitted a place on the state councils. This was
particularly welcomed by the semi-educated "youngmen" who were
steadily increasing in number.
Thirdly, the Ordinance did not, in any case, make it
compulsory that the chiefs should impose a direct tax, the thing
which the people and the press most objected to. Finally, the
Ordinance, unlike the 1931 amendment of the Native Administration
Ordinance, for example, was not mixed up with a Government-
proposed taxation scheme. And this was perhaps why the people
and the press were less suspicious of the stool treasury system
in 1939 than they had been previously.
The press's support for the Treasuries Ordinance should
not, however, be exaggerated. It is worth emphasising that
although the press decidedto give the Ordinance a chance, it still
made it very clear that it was objectionable to any control by the




^P.R.O.,C.0.96.752/31352: Notes of 22.7.1938 by the Acting Governor.
?
For example, The Gold Coast Spectator, 9.7.1939.
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The Treasuries Ordinance was not however, met with
favour by all the sections of the community. The Cape Coast
section of the A.R.P.S. came out strongly against the Ordinance.
The Society saw in the Ordinance a chance to undermine the
Provincial Councils system.
The A.R.P.S.'s campaign against the •'■reasuries Ordinance
of 1939 began by a conference held in Cape Coast and resolutions
were passed against the Ordinance. ^ The Society followed this
conference by distributing to the different states leaflets
2
attacking the Ordinance and urging them to refuse it.
The Society explained in these leaflets that the Ordinance and
the regulations made under it were tfesigned to give the Paramount
3
Chiefs power they had never had under the customary constitution.
The Government and the Provincial Councils complained
that the Society's campaign against the Treasuries Ordinance,
like its campagn against the Provincial Councils during the mid
1920's, was based on "rumour and exaggeration". Unlike the case
during the mid 1920's, the Government and the Paramount Chiefs
seemed this time to have in fact much evidence in the Society's
leaflets to prove their point. As an example of this, one of the
Society's leaflets*which appeared to have been widely distributed
in the different states, stated that the Provincial Councils would,
when the regulations under the Ordinance were made, order that:
^G.N.A.,CapeCoast,ACC.No.77/64.F.No.5« The A.R.P.S's. Papers.
p
G.N.A..Cape Coast.ACC.762/56,Case No.26. These leaflets were
signed by J.P. Allotey Hammond, Acting Secretary of the Society.
3Ibid.
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(a) a fisherman would need to take out a licence for his canoe;
(b) a fisherman's catch would be divided into three equal parts
between the fisherman himself, his Paramount Chief and the
Government;
(c) a young girl about to be married would not be allowed to do so
until she had paid to her Paramount Chief the sum of 2s.6d.
(d) all women in every state would be asked to wear identification
marks or tickets around their necks. ^
Besides the distribution of leaflets, the A.R.P.S. was
active in holding meetings in the rural areas, particularly in
the Central Province. In July, 1940, for example, a meeting
attended by fishermen from Mouri, Anomabu and Saltpond was
2
addressed by Sekyi and other leaders of the A.R.P.S. During
the meeting, the regulations made under the Treasuries Ordinance
were interpreted to make those present believe that the Provincial
Councils had "dexterously combined to bring distress upon the
3
people of the country". Finally, the fishermen were asked ton
devise ways and means of getting rid of their chiefs who were
4
supporting the Provincial Councils system.
Some people from Odumasi, the capital town of the Manya
Krobo state, in the Eastern Province, also attended a "secret
meeting" at Cape Coast held under the auspices of the Society with
^G.N.A,.Accra,ADM.11/1637« quoted in telegram of 6.1 .1940 from Nana
Amanfi III, Omanhene of Asebu, to Commissioner of Central Province.





a view to branding the chiefs of the Provincial Councils with
dissaffection for the country. ^ The standing Committee of the
Joint Provincial Councils also complained that the "linguists" of
Akwamu, Akwapim and Kwahu, all in the Eastern Province, were
2
"closely connected" with the A.R.P.S's. campaign.
Ironically, the A.R.P.S. was joined in its campaign
against the 1939 Treasuries Ordinance by Ofori Atta, the staunch
supporter and defender of the Government's Indirect Rule system;
but of course for different reasons. Ofori Atta had originally
supported the Treasuries Ordinance when passed in 1939 but when
the necessary regulations under it were made in 1940, he led some
vocal Paramount Chiefs against it on the grounds that these
regulations placed the treasuries entirely under the control of
3
the Government. As an example of one such objection, these
Paramount Chiefs wanted their estimates to be submitted for the
Governor's information and not for his approval. Ofori Atta
made a further objection directed against the regulation which
provided that the District Commissioner should countersign the
4
cheques of the stools. He wanted this regulation to be amended
to make it optional for state councils to decide whether or not the
District Commissioners should countersign their cheques.
^G.N.A..Accra,ACC.762/56. Case No.26, "Report on the work of the
Standing Committee of the J.P.C.", 14.11.1940.
2Ibid.
•^G.N.A.,Accra,Acc.762/56. Case No.26, "Minutes of the interview





The Governor interviewed these Paramount Chiefs but
firmly refused to remove the Government's supervisory control
over the treasuries. ^ Ofori Atta was very upset with the
Governor's decision and took the opportunity of the meeting
of the Joint Provincial Council to renew his attack on the control
of the District Commissioners over the treasuries as provided for
2
by the regulations made under the Treasuries Ordinance.
Ofori Atta's disagreement with the Colonial Government
over the regulations made under the Treasuries Ordinance of 1959
was the first of its kind. He had never before openly opposed
the Colonial Government on any aspect of its Indirect Rule system.
As long as that system sought to strenghten the role of the
Paramount Chiefs in the national leadership at the expense of the
intelligentsia, Ofori Atta wholeheartedly supported and defended
it. But he was not ready to accept willingly a measure that would
not only require him to disclose the great wealth of the Akim
Abuakwa state but would also subject its expenditure, over which
he had had complete control since 1912, to the supervision of a
District Commissioner.
The cleavage between Ofori Atta and the Colonial Government,
was not, however, final and should not be exaggerated. In fact,
two years later (i.e. in 1942), he was appointed together with
A.K. Korsah to the Committee which drafted the Native Authority
^Ibid.
2
Minutes of the 23rd Session of the J.P.C. held at Dodowa, 5.2.1940.
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Ordinance of 1944. He was also chosen in 1942, again with Korsah,
as one of the first two Africans to be appointed to the Executive
Council.
The A.R.P.S's. campaign, together with the opposition of
Ofori Atta, was very effective. Although the Treasuries Ordinance
compelled the states to establish treasuries, during the five years
it remained in force, only twenty five states of the country's
sixty three states established treasuries. Even where treasuries
were established, the chiefs did not bring into them all the
receipts of their stools. ^ The majority of the chiefs and their
elders continued the practice of dividing the fees and fines of the
tribunals among themselves. Imposition of an annual tax was
introduced by resolution of the state council in several states but
2
it was only in one or two that it had been properly collected.
In fact, as Commissioner Sir Sydney Philipson later noted, no real
effort was made to collect an annual tax or rate until the
3
introduction of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1944.
By and large, the Treasuries Ordinance of 1939 did little
to solve the steadily worsening financial conditions of the chiefs.
The new Governor, Sir Alan Burns, was astonished by the large sums
spent on litigation and the debts incurred by the stools on account
4
of this. On their side, the chiefs, now having a new Governor,
^Regional Administrations, Report by the Chief Commissioner (sir
Sydney Philipson), Accra, Government Printing Department 1951.
2
Leg.Co.Debtates 1943, Appendix to Governor's speech.
3
Regional Administrations, op. cit.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.775/31454, secret despatch of 5.10.1943 from Alan
Burns to Oliver Stanley.
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once again raised the question of receiving help through grants-
in-aid from the general revenue. In a memorandum submitted to
the Secretary of State, Stanley Oliver, during his visit to the
country in 1943, the Joint Provincial Council asked that;
(1) portions of the revenue of the Central Government be granted
as of right to the state councils;
(2) the grant not only be made in proportion to the population of
each state, but also in proportion to the revenue of the state, and
to the extent of its enterprise in public works, education etc. ^
Meanwhile, the Government had been engaged since 1942 in
preparing a new programme in the hope of developing its Indirect
Rule system. The outcome was the passing in 1944 of the "Native
Authority" and the "Native Courts" Ordinance. The former replaced
both the Native Administration Ordinance of 1927 and the Native
Administration Treasuries Ordinance of 1939.
With regard to the fiscal functions of the chiefs, the
Native Authority Ordinance of 1944 gave complete financial control
2
to the statutory "Native Authorities". A "Native Authority" was
given control and management of all public revenue and the sources
3from which it was derived within the area of its authority.
The financial affairs of each "Native Authority" would be managed
by a Finance Committee in accordance with regulations made by the
i
Governor. * The Ordinance also enabled a "Native Authority" to
1
For a copy of this memorandum see P.R.O.,0.0.96.776/3150/1.




raise an annual rate on residents and persons owning immovable
property within its area. 1
The principle of collection of an annual rate or tax, the
proceeds of which should go towards the maintenance of the "Native
Authorities", and to which the people had hitherto strongly
objected, was now at long last (i.e. after the passing of the
Native Authority Ordinance of 1944) generally accepted and adopted.
By May, 1945, fifty "Native Authorities" were organised and they
imposed an annual rate. The yield from these rates can be seen in
the following table:







♦Reference: Sir Sydney Philips on, Regional Administration.
The increase which the imposition of this annual rate
brought to the account of the stool treasuries can be seen from the
following table which shows the general revenue of the "Native




Revenue of the "Native Authorities" in the Gold Coast Colony
1942-1948/49








♦Reference: Sessional Paper No.VI of 1950.
Why did the people accept the principle of paying an
annual tax after they had so strongly opposed it for such a long
time? Firstly, direct taxation was accepted on the understanding
that the colonial administration would accordingly give the people
more political representation. G.E. Metcalfe noted that the
Income Tax introduced in 1943 was accepted by Africans "in the
belief that it in fact presaged a substantial measure of elective
representative government". ^
This was also clear from a memorandum submitted by the
Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council directing
attention to "certain large issues" evoked by the 1943 Income
2
Tax Bill. Although not opposed to the Bill, the Standing
Committee keenly asked that:
^G.E. Metcalfe, Great Britain and Ghana, 661; Leg.Co.Debates 1 943-
2
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ACC,No.137/63. "A memorandum on the Income Tax
by the Standing Committee of the J.P.C."
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the actual political consciousness and enlightenment
of the Gold Coast should be taken into consideration,
and that the Legislative Council should be reformed
by advancing it a stage further than was contemplated
suitable for this Country nearly twenty years ago.
The present position should therefore be reversed
and the vast majority of the people of the Country given
a majority voice in the Legislative Council We ask
also that the majority in the reformed Legislative
Council should have a corresponding majority in the
Ezecutive Council. ^
The memorandum concluded that:
A Country or a people capable of bearing the burden
of direct taxation must be deemed capable of matching
their political ability to their economic competence
and we ask therefore for reforms as outlined above. ^
Secondly, the Government had at last agreed in 1944 to
give the "Native Authorities" grants-in-aid from the general
revenue. These grants (known as Development Grants) were made in
proportion to the amount collected by the "Native Authorities" from
3
the annual rate. This encouraged the people to pay an annual rate
in order to secure a grant-in-aid for their stool. The grants
themselves were substantial and were thus worth trying to secure.
In 1947/48, for example, the grants-in-aid made to the "Native
Authorities" amounted to £63,340 compared to an annual rate of
• £99,086. 4
Thirdly, one major reason why the people had refused to
pay an annual tax or rate before 1944 was that they saw it as a
device on the part of the colonial Government to undermine and








Native Authority Ordinance of 1944, however, distinguished between
a "Native Authority" and a state council and this seemed to have
assured the people that the prestige and respect of their
indigenous institutions was not in danger. The people still
possessed their measure of control over their states' councils,
as provided for by custom, and could, if they saw fit, forbid
them to form themselves into "Native Authorities" under the
provisions of the Native Authorities Ordinance.
The checks and balances in the democratic indigenous
political system had survived the colonial Government's attempt
to make the chiefs its stooges or divorce them from their people.
In fact, the Paramount Chiefs, after the establishment of the
"Native Authorities" under the Native Authority Ordinance of 1944,
gradually divorced themselves from active participation in the
actual running of the treasuries, leaving this to the finance
committees, and became only interested advisers.
The degree of popular acceptance of paying an annual tax
should not, however, be exaggerated. Its collection was far from
being a complete success. In a number of states, there was no
regular procedure for the preparation of a roll of taxpayers and
the collection was haphazard. Even where rolls of taxpayers
were properly prepared, not all the people registered paid. In
1947, for example, in the Oguaa Native Authority only 19$ of the
persons on the nominal roll paid and only 23$ of the persons on the
•J
nominal roll of Ahanta paid. The figure for Asebu was 42$ that
"*G.N.A. ,Cape Coast, ADM.23/1136. letter of 11.12.1947 from Senior
D.C., Cape Coast, to "Native Authorities".
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for Esikuma was 53$ and that for Gomoa Asin was 54$. ^
One further difficulty occurred during the collection of
the annual rates, namely that of jurisdiction. Unlike the
Treasuries Ordinance of 1939, the Native Authority Ordinance
of 1944 provided that a "Native Authority" could not tax "subjects"
2
resident outside its area. This was, however, challenged by those
states many of whose "subjects" held cocoa farms in other states.
They claimed that members of their community who had land in the
areas of other stools were not thereby released from allegiance
to their own stools and hence should pay the annual rate to their
state of origin. This argument seemed to be supported by the
customary constitution since the allegiance of an individual to
3
his chief was a personal and not a territorial relationship.
On the other hand, the states in which these migrant
farmers resided insisted that the annual rate must be paid to
them and in this they were supported by the Native Authority
Ordinance. Inevitably, this led to various disputes between the
stools. In fact, the whole system of state taxes and state
treasuries tended to keep each state separate from its neighbours
and, thanks to the difference in the size and wealth of the states,




Lord Hailey, Native Administrations, Part III, 209.
3
For example, J.E. Casely-Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions,
• 51-52. ~ ' " ~ ~ ~ '
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We have attempted in this chapter to examine and describe
chronologically the Africans' protest and resistance to some
essential principles of the Indirect Rule system; namely, to
the establishment of stool treasuries and the collection of taxes
specifically for the maintenance of the different functions of the
"Native Administrations". We have suggested several factors
which frustrated and led to the failure of the colonial
administration's policy of imposing an annual regular tax and
establishing stool treasuries. These factors ranged from the
somewhat academic question of the definition and extension of
the British jurisdiction to the more practical ones of the people's
financial inability to pay a tax, their objection to any sort of
economic exploitation and their suspicion and resentment of any
interference by the colonial Government in the affairs of their
stools.
Thanks to these factors, the Africans' protest and
resistance to the colonial administration's attempt to impose
direct taxation and to establish stool treasuries was substantially
successful. In spite of the fact that beginning since the late
1920's the colonial Government vigorously attempted to impose a
regular annual tax and to establish stool treasuries, this was
not in fact achieved until the mid 1940's, and even then, the
people's acceptance to pay the tax and to establish stool
treasuries was made with the understanding that the colonial
administration would in exchange make some political concessions
to them. In practice the people's acceptance to pay a regular
annual rate and to establish stool treasuries proved to be very
limited and, in any case, came too late to save the Government's
Indirect Rule policy. Post-War nationalism in the Gold Coast moved
far more quickly than the British expected and in 1951 the whole




THE ASAFO ORGANISATIONS' OPPOSITION TO INDIRECT RULE
As Lord Hailey noted, at first sight it might appear that the
Gold Coast could have offered an unusually favourable field for the
development of a successful Indirect Rule system. ^ There were chiefs
who had a clearly recognised and well accepted status and powers in
the society. In addition, the Akan provided a predominant and appar¬
ently homogenous ethnic group. There were none of the complicated
issues which arise from the existence of a large community of European
settlers. Finally, the wealth of the country, thanks to the expansion
of the cocoa industry, could provide the necessary funds for developing
efficient and successful "Native Administrations".
But the situation was not so simple. As we have seen in preceding
chapters, there were several factors and obstacles which made it diffi¬
cult for the colonial Government to establish in the Gold Coast a
successful system of Indirect Rule. The aim of this chapter will be
to investigate and describe the nature and significance of the role
of the Asafo organisations in frustrating and eventually bringing
about the failure of the Government's attempt to establish a success¬
ful system of Indirect Rule in the Gold Coast.
The hypothesis put forward here is that the Asafo organisations
were an integral part of the indigenous political structure and had,
under the customary constitution, well recognised political and con-
^"Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development in
British Tropical Africa: A confidential report, 19^2".
2Ibid.
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stitutional rights and a measure of control over the chiefs. However,
the Indirect Rule system concerned itself solely with enhancing the
status and powers of the chiefs and as such not only failed to recog¬
nise the rights which the Asafo possessed under the indigenous
customary constitution but also deliberately tried to undermine these
rights. Furthermore, the Government, under its Indirect Rule policy,
gave the chiefs powers aimed at economically exploiting the Asafo.
Naturally, the Asafo protested against all this and staged a
determined struggle to restore their political, constitutional and
economic rights. Their struggle was twofold. Firstly, it took the
shape of opposing, sometimes through demonstrations and uprisings, the
Government's Indirect Rule policies. Secondly, it took the shape of
opposing those chiefs, particularly Paramount Chiefs, who appeared to
be too integrated into the machinery of government or tried to acquire
powers they were not entitled to under the customary constitution.
In the end, the Asafo struggle and political activity resulted in
frustrating specific colonial policies and provided the checks and
balances to the authoritianism of chiefs under the Indirect Rule
system.
The nature of the Akan ^ political system can be described as
^"In this chapter we are primarily concerned with the Asafo system among
the Akan. The Akan are the most predominant ethnic group in Ghana.
They constitute over 40of the entire population of the country.
Geographically they dominate about two thirds of the area of Ghana.
Culturally they were also the dominant group. See A. A. Boahen, "The
Origin of the Mean," in Ghana Notes and Queries, No.9. Nov.1966.
This does not, however, mean that we are neglecting the reactions of
the other ethnic groups to Indirect Rule. For example, in chapter
eight we shall be discussing in detail the reactions of the Ga people





2. the elders; and
3. the Asafo.
The two former were hereditary representatives of the third. The major
unit among the Akan was the state which was a hierarchy having as its
head an Omanhene (Paramount Chief). The Omanhene was the head of the
civil government of the state, the president of the Oman (State
Council), the highest tribunal in the state. ^ In the pre-colonial
days the Omanhene was also the highest military officer or commander-
in-chief of all fighting men in the state. Next to the Omanhene in
the hierarchy of chief ship of the state was the Ohene (divisional
chief) and next to him was the Qdilcro (village chief), both of whom
owed allegiance to the Omanhene. ^
The /Ucan political system involved a large measure of popular
control in selection of chiefs and in the guidance of their later con¬
duct in life. The chief, being either Omanhene, Ohene or Odikro, was
not an absolute ruler. He was guided, adivsed and directed in the
government of the state by the people's i-ipanyim^o, (elders), who were
the second part in the ^kan political system. ^
^J. B. Danquah, dkan Laws and Customs, London, 1928, 25; J. E. Casely-





The elders were either hereditary or nominated. The former were
the political heads of the different lineages and had been elected by
their lineages to be their representatives on the chief's council.
The lineage, composed of people tracing their descent through the female
line from a common ancestor, was the basic unit in the Akan indigenous
structure. As such, the hereditary, or rather the elected, elders
were the most important members ol any Akan chief's council. The
chief was bound by his oath to consult them on all matters and to
follow their advice. ^ The nominated elders Tv'ere those appointed by
the chief to his council. Their opinion, however, unanimous and great
it might be, could never outweigh the opinion of the hereditary elders,
2
the elected representatives of the people.
The democratic nature of the Akan political system becomes clearer
if we consider the way in which the chief was elected. The chief,
being either Omanhene, Ohene or Odikro, was elected to office by the
people who also had the right, under rules prescribed by custom, to
destool him. The election of an Akan chief can be described as follows:^
Upon the death of a chief the elders met and demanded the royal family
to present a successor. It is important to state that succession to
4
chieftainship was handed dowrn in the matrilineal line. Having received
the request of the elders, the Queen-Kother, the head of the royal
family, would discuss the matter with the royal lineage, apart from
^"K. A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System
of Ashanti, London 1968 (first edition 1951)» 1^5 also, R. S. Rattray,
Ashanti Law and Constitution, London 1956 (second impression), 82.
J. B. Danquah, op.cit., 58*
%'or a brief description of an Akan chief, see K. A. Busia, op.cit., 9.
4
For example, R. S. Rattray, Ashanti, Oxford, 1955 (first edition 1923). 77.
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the elders. Having decided on a candidate, the Queen-Mother informed
the elders and if the elders agreed on the candidate, they informed
the Queen-Mother of their approval. If the elders did not accept the
nominee, the Queen-Mother had to produce another one.
It is important to note that the elders, before agreeing on a
candidate, usually consulted their different lineages. * Once the
chief was elected he was then installed by being set upon the stool,
the symbol oi chieftainship among the Mean. He then took the customary
oath and received the homage and allegiance of his people. ^
The third recognised part of the Mian political system, which was
in fact usually referred to as "the third state", was the Asato
organisations, usually referred to in English as "companies". Though
more developed among the Fanti, the /1safo system was really to be
found among all the ethnic groups in the Gold Coast. ^
The Asafo organisations were in origin companies of warriors.
The word Asafo or Asafu is the plural form of say-nyi or say-nyimpa,
the Fanti-Mean compound meaning "war person" or "warrior". ^ /it the
head of each company there was a Supi (senior captain), who had under
him several Safohenes or y^safoatse (junior captains). ^ Some companies
*K. A. Busia, op.cit., 9*
^R. S. Rattray, op.cit., 82.
3
For example, G.N. .A. , Accra, ADM. 11/1136, No.0975iS«F.No.2, "Notes on the
Asafo system".
4
G.K.A.,Cape Coast,AGO.No.90/64, a typescript of a paper entitled "The
yisafu in Cape Coast", by W. S. Kwesi Johnson. This paper was read at
the University College of Cape Coast before the Historical Society
of Ghana, on December 14th, 1963.
~^A. Ffoulkes, "The Company System in Cape Coast Castle", in Journal of
the Royal African Society,7.no,XXV (Oct.1907)» 261-77.
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had more than one supi. The supi, usually a person of some competence,
was responsible for keeping the company's ammunition, flags, drums,
and other equipment. ^
The companies of a town or of a whole state were usually headed
by a Tufuhene, the Captain-General or Commander-in-chief. The appoint¬
ment of the Tufehene was usually by popular choice, but in some states
it was hereditary. ^ The Tufuhene often had a stool and was usually
a member of the state council.
Each company had its own flags, drums, gong-gong, songs and "posts".^
The flags, the symbol of honour of the company, were usually marked
with various designs and figures intended to commemorate some event in
the history of the company. Sometimes the design would represent an
insult to a rival company, the exhibition of which had always been the
cause of several inter-company fights.^
Another important feature of the Asafo system was that it followed
the patrilineal line in a society where kingship, inheritance of land
and property, collective responsibility, and chiefly succession were
reckoned through the maternal line. A son would always enter his
father's company. The reason for patrilineal membership in the Asafo
was due to the fact that a son was believed to inherit his military
prowess and bravery from his father. 5 In short, the matrilineal
*J. B. Christensen, Double Descent among the Fanti, New Haven, 195^»
2W. E. G. Sekyi, "A Comparison of English, Gold Coast and Akan-Fanti
laws relating to the Absolute Rights of Individuals", in C-.N.A. ,Cape
Coast,ACC.396/64 (Sekyi's Papers).
3
For example, G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1439.case No.11/1931. Notes of 17.1.1931
by the Ag.S.N.A., and entitled "fhe Company System in the Gold Coast".
4
Ibid.; also J. M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Law, London 1968 (3rd edition),
T>T4.
5
J. B. Christensen, op.cit.
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succession to property and chieftainship in the Akan society was counter¬
balanced by the Asafo system to Ttfhich every one in the society, except
the chiefs and the elders, belonged through his father.
The members of a company usually resided in one quarter or ward
of a town or a village. If having a procession, no company could
pass peacefully through another company's ward unless it paid a tri¬
bute. The failure to pay this tribute had been the cause of several
company fights. ^
Besides their military functions, which they lost with the advent
of the pax-Britannica, the Asafo had peace-time social functions.
They usually undertook such public works as road clearing, sanitation,
capturing a murderer or a highway robber or searching for would-be
suicides.
With regard to their political functions, with which we are here
concerned, the Asafo, which collectively represented the non-office
holders, the non-chiefs, the non-elders, or the commoner strata of the
community, were to approve of the election of chiefs, as well as to
generally exercise a popular control on decision-making. Before a
chief could be constitutionally enstooled, he must be paraded by the
Asafo, and if this was not done, his right to the stool could always be
contested. 3 jn short, the Asafo's strength lay in their power to
1
A. Ffoulkes, op.cit.
^For example, J. C. de Graft-Johnson, "The Fanti Asafu", in Africa,
vol.V,No.3»1932, 307-322.
3
J. B. Christensen, op.cit., 118.
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withhold support of a chief and thus make it impossible for him to
fulfil his obligations and duties.
Sarbah, Danquah and Busia have explained that the mmerante
(illiterate commoners) had a recognised and an effective way in which
they expressed their will, on all matters affecting the state. Sarbah
made it clear that the Tufehene and the captains of the companies took
part in the election and installation of chiefs. *
Danquah stated that the Asafomma, the companies of youngraen,
act primarily as a check on any tendency on the part of the
Executive towards any exercise of power not in harmony with the ^
true spirit of the customary constitution.
Busia described that when the elders met on the appointed day
3for the election of a chief, the commoners were also present. When
the spokesman announcedthe name of the candidate nominated by the Queen-
bother, demonstrations of approval or disapproval were unmistakably
Ll
given by applause, grunts, hisses, laughter or silence. The elders
would appear to deliberate over the matter and then ask the commoners
what they thought about it. The commoners would then approve or dis¬
approve of the elders1 decision. ^
Besides their role in election and enstoolment of chiefs, the
Asafo could also, under special circumstances which were well recog¬
nised under the customary constitution, initiate destoolment by placing
charges against the chief. Danquah, who was not very sympathetic with
the political role of the Asafo, admitted that the yjsafo's claim to
possess absolute power to enstool and destool a chief "seems in a sense
to be supported by facts of history and long-established customary
^J. M. Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, London 1968 (second edition),
27.
2
J. B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, 17.





By and large, the Asafo had a well-recognised political and con¬
stitutional status in the indigenous customary constitution. The
Asafo system represented, or rather was, the people's assembly within
which they expressed their views and by which they made known their
2
grievances to the chief and his council. In short, the Asafo re¬
presented public opinion, and as such, neither the chief nor his
elders could enforce decisions without their consent.
Although the Asafo anti-colonial activities did not seem to have
emerged clearly until the outbreak of the First World War, there is
reason to believe that the Asafo "fights" had increased following the
enactment of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance in 1883. The majority
of these "fights" were inter-corapany fights, but some of them, as
Terence J. Johnson explained, were direct attacks against the colonial
Government and the chiefs. ^
The Government reacted by passing the 1892 Native Customs Ordinance.
Section 6 of this Ordinance gave the District Commissioners legal
authority to prohibit company meetings which they had reason to believe
would result in a breach of peace. ^ Section 7 provided that no company
flag or emblem could be exhibited without the permission of the District
Commissioner, and that any person who exhibited or took part in the
exhibition of any company flag would be liable to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year, or to a fine not exceeding one hundred
pounds. ^ These two sections of the Native Customs Ordinance were, as
^"J. B. Danquah, op. cit., 119.
2
The Times of West Africa, 7.3*1932.
^Terence J. Johnson, "Protest: Tradition and Change: An Analysis of
Southern Gold Coast Riots, 1890-1920", in Economy and Society, vol.1,
1972, 164-193.
4
Section 6 of the Native Customs Ordinance; D. Kimble, A Political
History, 470; Leg.Co.Debates, 1945.
^Section 7 of the Native Customs Ordinance; also Leg.Co.Debates, 1923-24.
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we shall later see, widely used by the District Commissioners to
suppress the Asafo political activity against the colonial adminis¬
tration. The Ordinance itself was amended more than once with the
view of giving the District Commissioners more control over the Asafo.
The first organised and widespread risings by the Asafo against
specific colonial policies took place during the period 1913—1919-
The Asafo were particularly active in the two neighbouring states of
Akim Abualcwa and Kwahu, both in the Eastern Province. In Akim Abuakwa,
the Asafo system seemed to have made its first appearance in about
1800, during the reign of Ohema Do^lcua. * The internal organisation
of the companies was similar to that described at the beginning of
this chapter, but, unlike the case in the Fanti states, the Asafo of
Akim Abuakwa had no office comparable to the Fanti's Tufehene, the
2
overall leader representing the companies on the state council.
However, the members of the Asafo were under one or other of the
elders and to that extent were represented on the state council. They
could indirectly bring such pressure to bear on the various elders
that their will was bound to predominate. ^
The Asafo risings in Akim Abuakwa in 1913-1919 began by destooling
4
the chiefs of Begoro and Apinamang. The wave of destoolemnt then
spread over the whole state and threatened the Omanhene, Ofori Atta.
*G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/738.case No.ll/l919t Notes of 28.2.1922, by D. C.
and entitled "Akim Abuakwa: Asafo - Origin and the Power of".
2
Ibid.; also Jarle Simensen, "Rural Mass Action in the Context of
Anti-Colonial Protest: The Asafo Movement of Akim Abuakwa, Ghana",
in Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol.VIII,no. 1, 1974, 25-41.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.ll/738.case No.11/1919. op.cit.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.32/1/23, "Destoolments in Akim Abuakwa". Jarle
Simensen, op.cit.
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The rising, or the movement, culminated in a march on Kibi in 1918 by
the Amantoo-Kiensa Asafo, which could be termed the paramount Asafo of
the state. The marchers made an onslaught on the Omanhene himself. *
The Amantoo-Miensa was originally composed of the inhabitants
of the three villages of Apedwa, Apapam and Tete, all of which were
2situated outside Kibi, the capital town of Akim Abuakwa state.
Their original function was to provide the Omanhene with a powerful
bodyguard which could be called up on short notice in case of emer¬
gency. ^ They also had civil functions and wide but limited customary
rights over the Omanhene. Danquah explained that the Amantoo-Miensa
Council, essentially a body of the Asafo, was
a common mouthpiece of the people, that it has a marked influence
both over the Okyeman Council and the Kibi Council, and that it
has the right to criticise certain acts of executive officers,
are truths so abundantly proved by ancient and modern history .
that it would be futile to attempt a denial.
Nonetheless the Omanhene, Ofori Atta, denied that the Amantoo-
Miensa Asafo, and for that matter the whole Asafo of the state, had any
customary or constitutional rights over the chiefs. Ofori Atta was
strongly of the opinion that the Asafo were
exceeding their limits by taking the power off from the chiefs*
hands and investing some in themselves. One should think that
now there is no war, Asafo, as an instrument in the hands of the
chief, will only do what the chief tells them in the way of
cleaning roads and doing such other works of development that
our peaceful time demands. 5
"*"G.N. A. .Accra, ADM. 11/738, case No. 11/1919, op.cit.




^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.ll/l/721,case No.67/1918, enclosure No.l, in letter
of 29.7.1918 from Ag.D.C., Kibi, to the Provincial Commissioner of the
Eastern Province.
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He strongly objected to the Asafo being a "leading authority" in
destoolment and maintained that this was not in accordance with
custom. ^
V/. J. A. Jones, the District Commissioner (later the Secretary
for Native Affairs) at Kibi agreed with Ofori Atta that the Asafo had
"exceeded their powers" and that their rising was an example of "a
2
revolutionary spirit" threatening the government of the state.
Furthermore, he supported Ofori Atta in his contention that the Asafo
had but little real political power and they were certainly not able,
without the knowledge and sanction of the chiefs, to effect the de-
3
stoolment of any chief.
The Government did not fail to support Ofori Atta in his crisis.
Not only did the Government refuse to recognise the destoolments made
by the Asafo but it also inflicted severe punishments on the Asafo
4
and in particular on the Amantoo-Kiensa, forty of whom were imprisoned.
Furthermore, by a decree made by the state council, the Amantoo-Kiensa
were instructed that they should not in the future enter Kibi without
a special permit. 3
However, the Akirn Abuakwa Asafo rising or movement of 1913-1919
was not without some success. Ofori Atta had survived the crisis and
avoided destoolment, but not without some concessions. He and his
1Ibid.






state council agreed to allow representatives of the Asafo, generally
the Asafoatse themselves, to sit on the council of every divisional
chief in the state. ^ So although the state council did not acknow¬
ledge that the Asafo could act independently of the chief s arr1 elders
and initiate destoolment themselves, it admitted that the Asafo had
some say in the running of the state affairs and for the first time
in the history of Akim Abuakwa the Asafoatse were allowed to sit on
the chiefs* councils.
In Kwahu state, the Asafo formed themselves in 1915 into an
organised body and issued "New orders and Regulations" which drew up
a scale of fines for different offences and a list of prices for food
2
stuffs. The Kwahu Asafo's mevement, unlike that of Akim Abuakwa,
did not take the shape of staging destoolments: the Asafo simply took
the law into their own hands and refused to obey the judgements of the
native tribunals. By 1919• the District Commissioner reported that
the Asafo were becoming a "dangerous element" in the politics of Kwahu
and that they were undermining all established authority.
The Omanhene of Kwahu maintained that this new organised body of
the Asafo, usually referred to as Asafo Kyewicu (new Asafo), was
acquiring rights and powers that the Asafo never had before. He was
very alarmed by the growing power of the Asafo and thus wrote to the
District Commissioner asking that the Government should suppress this
h,
"New Asafo" who were "breaking the powers of the chiefs". The
1Ibid.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11738,case No.11/1919» "New Orders and Regulations
inaugurated by the whole Kwahu Asafo", enclosure *A* in letter of
6.4.1920 from the Commissioner of the Eastern Province to the S.N.A.
3
Report by D.C., Kwahu, for quarter ending 30«9»1919; Also D. Kimble,
A Political History, 471.
4
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/738,case No.11/1919» letter of 6.4.1920 from
Commissioner of the Eastern Province to the S.N.A.
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Government intervened to help the Omanhene and his chiefs. The
Commissioner of the Eastern Province met the Asafo leaders and told
them that the Government did not recognise the Asafo as having the
right to impose fines or to interfere with the judgements of the
native tribunals. *
Kimble suggested that,
the renewed importance of the Asafo fjL913-1919^ arose partly from
the lack of education among the chiefs, which emphasised their ^
isolation from the younger generation.
This could hardly be a sufficient explanation. The "lack of education"
was also characteristic of the Asafo and their leaders. Indeed some of
the chiefs, like Ofori Attn, against whom the attacks of the Asafo
were directed, were better educated than many of the Asafo.
The 1913-1919 Asafo risings were chiefly directed against specific
colonial policies. The Native Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883 had empowered
the chiefs to establish tribunals but did not provide for any measure of
inspection or control over their working. ^ And since it was the cus¬
tom that the members of a tribunal divided the fines and fees among
themselves, it was not surprising, as we have explained in chapter
five, that they deliberately imposed the maximum fines and fees. The
resentment to the corruption in the native tribunals, and hence to the
Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, was a major factor behind the Asafo
risings. For example, at Apinamang, in Akim Abuakwa, the Asafo had
long been in disagreement with the chief over the high cost of liti-
4
gation in his tribunal before they decided finally to destool him.
1Ibid.
2
D. Kimble, A Political History, 470.
%ee chapter two above.
4
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.1/721,case No.76/1918» "Enquiry into the alleged
destoolment of Kofi Boateng II, Ohene of Apinamang".
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In Kwahu, the Asafo agitation and protest against the corruption
in the native tribunals was even clearer. Here, the beginning of the
Asafo movement and their issue of "New Orders and Regulations" in 1915
took place immediately after the death of the Omanhene, Kwame Apeadu.
When he died, Kwame Apeadu was said to have left cash amounting to
only nine shillings. * The Asafo were extremely aggrieved by this
since they had been paying heavy fees and fines into the Omanhene's
tribunal. Accordingly, they organised themselves into a body, the aim
being,
to protest and resist against the imposition of heavy fines for
breach of oaths, because nothing worthy of significance or
reraemberance was left as a result of the heavy fines made by our ^
late Omanhene, Kwame Apeadu.
Another factor behind the 1913-1919 Asafo movements was the Asafo's
resentment of the Compulsory Labour Ordinance of 1895 which empowered
the chiefs to mobilise people for "communal labour". Under the guise
of "communal labour", the people xvere mobilised, or rather forced, to
do for the Government such work as the maintenance of roads and the
buildings of railways, without being paid. It is interesting that
the railway through Akim was built in 1912-1913> at the time when the
Asafo risings in Akim Abuakwa began. The Asafo must have been pressed
by the administrative officers and Ofori Atta into building the rail¬
way. At Begoro, the Asafo rising was certainly triggered by the chief's
3call for "communal labour".
The 1913-1919 Asafo risings should also be seen in the light of
the social and economic changes created by the process of modernisation.
For example, the Asafo, being mostly cocoa farmers, were anything but
happy about the policy adopted by the Department of Agriculture. Just
^G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/738,case No.76/1919. "New Orders and Regulations
inaugurated by the whole Kwahu Asafos".
2Ibid.
^G.N.A..Accra,ADM.32/1/23, "Destoolments in Akim Abuakwa"; also Jarle
Simensen, op.cit.
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when cocoa became in 1910 the country's main export product, the
Department of Agriculture, as G. B. Kay noted, started a campaign
against the cocoa industry contending that the methods of cultivation
employed by the farmers paid inadequate attention to disease control;
and that the cocoa brought to market was of poor quality. *
Kay went on to explain that the Department was wrong in both
contentions. First, the Department's solution of weeding and keeping
farms tidy, doubtless based on the vision of the well-ordered English
countryside, would have proved useless even if adopted by the farmers;
and when farms in the eastern region were severely struck by disease
in the late forties the Department had nothing to suggest but cutting
out infected trees. ^ Furthermore, the Department's solution was
technically inadequate and was economically inappropriate, as it would
have involved reducing acreages and increasing the use of scarce
labour. The Department's proposal would have restricted the growth
of the industry as existing techniques did not allow for substantial
increase in yields per acre, so that expanding output could only be
achieved by increasing the area under cultivation. 3
Secondly, on the question of quality the Department was similarity
incorrect both technically and economically. On technical grounds, it
was wrong because it mistook Ghanaian cocoa for a crop equivalent to
West Indian cocoa, whereas the two were in fact quite different, and
had separate uses in the confectionary industry. ^ Its economic error
followed logically from its technical ignorance, for, had it understood
^"G. 3. Kay, (ed.) The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana: A






more about the uses to which Ghanaian cocoa was put, it might not have
held to the groundless belief that improvements in quality would
necessarily lead to substantial increases in price. ^
In addition, the Government passed in 1917 "an ordinance to raise
duties on cocoa". The Ordinance empowered the Government (1) to impose
an export tax on cocoa at the rate of one farthing per pound; and
(2) to increase by 50/® the rates on cocoa railed between Kumasi and
2
Sekondi. Adding to all this the increase in railway rates and the
general economic hardships created by the outbreak of the War, it is
not surprising that the Asafo became convinced that the colonial admin¬
istration and its agents, the chiefs, were embarking on a deliberate
policy of economically exploiting them. The Asafo of Akim Abuakwa
made it clear that they were suspicious of Ofori Atta's commercial
dealings. They complained that Ofori Atta had mortgaged the land of
the Ofori stool (the paramount stool of Akim Abuakwa) to the Colonial
Bank and they asked him to account for that. 3 Ofori Atta explained
that when negotiating with the Colonial Bank to charter a steamer on
behalf of himself and other Paramount Chiefs, he guaranteed that should
the venture prove a failure he and his people would be responsible for
the debts due to the Colonial Bank. ^ This argument did not convince
the Asafo. Moveover, Ofori Atta, as we have explained in chapter three,
was very active in the war effort and imposed a tax for that purpose
on his people. This must have added to the Asafo's resentment of the




Quarterly Report, Sept.1918, Birim district.
^Ibid.
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By and large, the 1913-1919 Asafo risings are to be seen as forms
of protest against certain colonial policies which aimed at exploiting
the yisafo as well as undermining their political and constitutional
rights. It is thus not surprising that the risings coincided with
Clifford's term of office, As we have seen in chapter two, Clifford
was very sympathetic to the chiefs, particularly the Paramount chiefs,
and lost no time in making clear his attitude. He asserted that,
It is my earnest wish to see the authority of the chiefs supported
by all Government officers, and the chiefs and their principal
advisers taken into the confidence of the Government, and habitually
consulted when any matter affecting them and their people is under
consideration. 1
Such an attitude, which clearly favoured the chiefs and tried to stren-
then their power, was seen by the Asafo as a deliberate attempt to
upset the element of balance and harmony in the indigenous political
structure. The .Asafo felt that their political and constitutional
role in the indigenous political system was being undermined by the
colonial Government and that it was attempting to give the chiefs
powers they never possessed under custom.
Though a full-scale action by the Tisafo did not again take place
until after the passing of the Native /idministration Ordinance in 1927,
the vlsafo seemed to have continued to frustrate the Government's
Indirect Rule policies. Just at the time when the Government, under
Clifford and Guggisberg, began to seek ways of strengthening the power
of the chiefs and integrating them more and more into its machinery
of government, the number of destoolments began to increase steadily.
%eg.Co.Debates, 1913» also Kimble, A Political History, 469.
c
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Partly, the increase in destoolments is due to the Asafo's dis¬
satisfaction with the chiefs• abuse of their powers and with the
Government's gradual move towards a Lugardian type of Indirect Rule.
Guggisberg, who made no secret of his intention of strengthening the
authority of the chiefs, was very annoyed that the increase in destool¬
ments was threatening the stability of the government in the rural
2
areas. So to restrict the role of the Asaf'o in destoolments, he,
3in 1923. amended section 7 of the Native Customs Ordinance. This
amendment made the exhibition of company flags and emblems without
the permission of the District Commissioner an offence triable by the
of 4
District Commissioner instead/by the Court. In other words, the
amendment tried to give the District Commissioners more control over
the yisafo affairs. But in spite of this the dsafo naturally continued
their political activity against the chiefs and the Government. It
is interesting that a few months after the passing of the abovementioned
amendment, the Kwahu Asafo movement came to the surface again and resulted
in an attempt to destool the Nifahene of Obo. ^ Several of the Jisafo
members were arrested, convicted and fined. ^
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.663, Memo, entitled "Decay of Tribal Authority, 1926",
by the S.N.A.
2








The Asafo protest and agitation against the colonial Government
and the chiefs increased considerably after the passing of the Native
Administration Ordinance in 1927. This is not surprising. Not only
did the Ordinance give the Paramount Chiefs "new powers", but it failed
to give a statutory recognition to the Asafo system which, as we have
explained, was an integral part of the indigenous political structure.
Naturally, the Asafo saw the Ordinance as another attempt by the
colonial administration to undermine the democratic nature of the
indigenous customary constitution, and hence to ignore the political
and constitutional role they possessed under that constitution.
Not surprisingly, the Kwahu Asafo took the lead in the agitation
against the Native Administration Ordinance. When the Ordinance came
into force in Kwahu state, the Asafo demanded an explanation of its
provisions from the Oraanhene, Nana Akuamoa Boateu II. * The Omanhene
was unable to give a convincing explanation and as a result the Asafo
staged "demonstrations" and "riots" to stop the application of the
Ordinance to their state. The "demonstrations" were so serious that
the Omanhene wrote to his friend, Ofori Atta, who introduced the
Ordinance in the Legislative Council, to plead on his behalf to the
2
Government to suppress the "New Asafo" of Kwahu. He complained that
the "New Asafo" was
quite independent of the natural rulers, have their own oaths
known as Asafoho-bo and Asafo-dwoada and their object is mainly
to make laws for their chiefs and oppose the Native Jurisdiction
Ordinance of 1883 and the hew Native Administration Ordinance of
192?. J
*G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1^39.case No.11/1931. "Minute on the affairs in Kwahu".
2G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1439.case No.11/1831, letter of 30.12.1927 from




He concluded that the "New Asafo is in all but in name a Bolshevik or
Communist society seeking to pull down the Native Administration". *
Another place where the Asal'o were active against the Native
Administration Ordinance was Winneba, the capital town of the Effutu
state, in the Central Province. Winneba was once one of the principal
centres of Gold Coast political activities, and was the seat of King
Ghartey who was the President of the Fanti Confederation. Here, the
Omanhene, Nana Ayirebi Acquah III, turned on the A.R.P.S. and supported
2
the Provincial Councils system and the Native Administration Ordinance.
In fact, in 1926 the Council of the Central Province elected him as one
of its two provincial members to the Legislative Council. The two
Asafo companies objected to the Omanhene's stance. Their offensive
began in July 1927, when the Asafo drums were beaten for a meeting to
3discuss the Native Administration Ordinance. The District Commissioner
hurried to the meeting and asked the Asafo about their grievances.
They told him that "they heard things about the new Native Administration
Ordinance which were not good", and that they intended to call upon the
4
Omanhene to explain his reason for approving the Ordinance. In an
effort to prevent an action by the Asafo against the Omanhene, the
District Commissioner explained the Ordinance section by section with a
view to proving that the Ordinance was really for their benefit. At
the end, however, the Asafo told the District Commissioner that they
did not want to hear any more of the Ordinance as they had made up
their minds not to have it applied to their state. J
1Ibid.
^Report on the Native Affairs Dept., 1926-27.
3
G.N.A., Cape Coast,ADK.23/1/675, letter of 11.7«1927 from D.C. to the




The state council, under pressure from the Asafo, instructed
4yirebi Acquah III to resign his membership of both the Provincial
Council and the Legislative Council. ^ The Omanhene ignored, however,
the instructions of his state council. The 4safo reacted by declaring
him destooled. Predictably, the Government refused to recognise the
destoolment, knowing that recognition of Acquah Ill's destoolment would
2be a great blow to its Provincial Councils system. As we have seen,
4cquah III was a staunch supporter of the Provincial Councils and a
member of the Legislative Council.
The 4safo defied the Government's decision and elected a new
Qraanhene, one Reindorf. ^ They then asked the District Commissioner
for permission to parade their Omanhene. Naturally, the District
Commissioner refused to allowT the parade. In spite of his refusal,
however, the 4safo went on with the parade and as a result, two hundred
of them, including thei" Tufehene, Kwelcu Siripi, were arrested. ^
The naw Omanhene, Reindorf, was also arrested. 5
However, the 4safo were not deterred. Their opposition to the
Omanhene continued so strongly that his car was seized and burnt. ^
For its part, the Government continued to support the Omanhene. For
example, in February 1928, the District Commissioner interviewed him
and confirmed that the Government
^"G.N.A. ,Cape Coast,4DM.23/l/675» telegram of 19.7.1927 from the state
council of Winneba to the S.N.A.; also The Gold Coast Leader, 8.10.1927.
2
G.N.4. ,CapeCoast,4DM.23/1/675» letter of 22.8.1927 from the S.N. A. to
the 4g.Commissioner of the Central Province.
3
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,4DM.23/l/675» letter of 23.8.1927 from the D.C. to
the Commissioner of the Central Province.
Ibid.
-^Ibid.
6G,.N.4. .Cape, Coast, ADM.23/1/675. letter of 3.12.1927 from the D.C. to
Ag.Commissioner of the Central Province.
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would give him full support and would not acquiesce in his alleged
destoolment. Further that if he or his followers were subjected
to any hostile demonstrations they would be given necessary pro¬
tection. 1
Indeed, the Government did not fail to help Acquah III in his
crisis. The Tufehene complained that the Government was assisting
the Omanhene's messengers to execute warrants of arrests against Asafo
2
members. The District Commissioner told the Tufehene and other Asafo
leaders who came to his office that the Omanhene's tribunal was exer-
3
cising its legal powers. The Tufehene and his supporters left in a
very "truculent mood" ana told the District Commissioner that they did
not care il the Government "hanged them or brought a warship in",
4
they would never recognise Acquah III as their Omanhene.
By far the biggest action of protest by the Asafo against the
Native Administration Ordinance was what is usually referred to as the
"dispute of the Oguaa state", Cape Coast, which continued from 1928 to
1932. It involved the seven companies of Cape Coast and influenced the
politics of Cape Coast and its rural surroundings throughout the 1930's
and the early 1940s. This is not surprising as Cape Coast was the
headquarters of the A.R.P.S. which led the opposition against the
Provincial Councils and the Native Administration Ordinance. The
Society was able to win the Omanhene of Oguaa state, Nana libra III,
and his council to its cause. In protest against the Native Administra¬
tion Ordinance, the Omanhene and his council in fact ceased, in
January 1928, to function as a tribunal and confined themselves to
^"G.N.A.,Cape Coast,23/l/675» letter of 6.2.1928 from the B.C. to the
Commissioner of the Central Province.
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/l/675» letter of 20.2.1928 from the D.C. to




heavy cases which were brought before them for arbitration. 1 Indeed,
the Oguaa state continued to boycott the Native Administration Ordinance
and the Provincial Council until 1943.
There were in Cape Coast seven Asafo companies which were the most
ancient and active Asafo groups in the Gold Coast. ^ The first recorded
Asafo "fight" in Cape Coast took place in 1681. The "fight" originated
when some of the slaves escaped from the Castle to the town. The
Asafo refused to give them up to the Castle authorities when requested
to do so. As a result, the guns of the Castle were turned against the
to^n and in retaliation seven hundred armed Asafo members attacked the
Castle and killed several of its defenders. Other Asafo "fights" took
place in 1808, 1820, 1856, 1859 and 1879. 3
In 1909» the Cape Coast Companies voluntarily surrendered all the
4
objectionable flags and emblems. A meeting was held for the occasion
in which the companies were presented with new peace flags. Among
those who spoke on the occasion were the Provincial Commissioner, the
Tufuhene of the companies, J. M. Sarbah, and J. B. Brown. 3 Since
then, little was heard of Asafo "fights" in Cape Coast until the dispute
of 1928-32 took place.
The origin of the 1928-32 dispute could be traced to the 1928
election of a municipal member of Cape Coast to the Legislative Council
under the 1925 Constitution. The A.R.P.S. and the Omanhene, being
opposed to the 1925 Constitution, naturally strongly objected to the
^"Report on the Central Province, 1927-28.
2
W. S. Kwesi Johnson, op.clt.; also Ansu K. Datta and P. Porter, "The
Asafo System in Historical Perspective: An inquiry into the origin and
development of a Ghanaian institution", in J. A.H. ,XH,2,1971, 279-297.
3
W. S. Kwesi Johnson, op.ext.




election taking place. The Omanhene beat the gong-gong to the effect
that the people should not participate in the election. *
However, K. A. Korsah, who had resigned his office in the A.R.P.S.,
decided to stand for the election with the support of the newly formed
Ratepayers Association. The then Tufuhene, W. Z. Coker, with the
support of company No.l, his bodyguard, decided to support Korsah.
In fact, Coker was elected in July 1928, as the president of the Rate-
2
payers Association and was thus very active in the election campaign.
The other six companies were on the side of the A.R.P.S. and the
Omanhene in their opposition to the election. As a protest against the
role played by Coker in the election campaign, the Omanhene supported
3
by the six companies deposed him as Tufuhene. v Then the Omanhene and
4
the six companies appointed G. E. Moore, who had been very active in
opposition to the election, as Tufuhene.
Following the deposition of Coker as Tufuhene, Governor Slater
appointed H. W. Thomas, the Deputy of the Secretary for Native Affairs,
as a Commissioner to enquire into:
1. whether Coker had been deposed from the office of Tufuhene
in accordance with custom and if so whether Moore was the proper
person to succeed to the office;
2. what was the position of the Tufuhene as regards procedure
in the Oguaa state. ^
1
G.N.A., Accra,ADM. ll/925» letter of ^-.8.1928 from the Ag.S.N.A. to the
C.S.
^G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/364, "Cape Coast Native Affairs".
^Ibid.
h
G. E. Moore: Born in 1879. After leaving the Colonial, then Govern¬
ment School, at Cape Coast, in 1895» he worked in succession as a
Treasury clerk in Cape Coast, as a clerk of the Western African
Frontier Force in Nigeria and as chief storekeeper during the Ashanti
(288)
The Commissioner's findings were as follows:
1. that Coker was deposed from his office as Tufuhene with the
full approval of six companies out of seven constituting the Asafo of
Cape Coast;
2. that the office of Tufuhene in Cape Coast was hereditary in
the family of Kwamin Edu;
3. that Moore was not one of the descendants of Kwamin Edu and
therefore could not succeed to the office of Tufuhene. ^
Governor Slater refused to accept the Commissioner's finding as
affecting Coker. He argued that according to the relevant terms of
reference the Commissioner was to find out whether Coker was
constitutionally deposed and not whether he was unanimously deposed by
the Asafo. ^ However, Slater agreed with the Commissioner's finding
that Moore was not the rightful person to succeed to the office of the
Tufuhene. Accordingly, the Government continued to recognise Coker as
Tufuhene and forbade the Oraanhene and the six companies to complete
their ceremonies for the installation of Moore. 3 when the six
war of 1901. For the next twenty three years he worked in the mercan¬
tile field. From 1924 he devoted all his time to politics. He
worked on the Executive Committee of the A.R.P.S., led its delegation
to London in 1934 and from 1940 to 1950 he was the municipal member
for Cape Coast to the Legislative Council. See G.N.A.,Sc.18/15, G. E.
Moore's Papers; and Leg.Co.Debates, 1950»
^The Gold Coast Times, 18.1.1930.
^"G.N.A.,Cape Coast,23/1/364, letter of 15.4.1930, from the C.S. to the
Commissioner of the Central Province.
2Ibid.
•^P.R.O., C.0.96.706/7391. despatch of 14.10.1932 from the Ag.Governor to
Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister.
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companies threatened to install Moore in spite of the Government's
orders, the police force at Cape Coast was increased and the Asafo
had to abandon the installation ceremonies. ^ However, the six companies
continued to support Moore and he attended the meetings of the state
council in his capacity as Tufuhene. When Coker died in 1931» Moore
had no competitor for the post.
The findings of the Commissioner and Slater's reaction to them
were contributive to the riots and killings that occurred in 1932.
Slater's decision not to recognise the Asafo's deposition of Coker and
their choice of Moore as Tufuhene, seemed to be influenced by political
considerations, As we have seen in preceding chapters, Slater was
determined to substitute the A.R.P.S. with the Provincial Councils as
the medium of communication between the Government and the people.
Accordingly, Slater apparently viewed recognition of Moore, who was
a proiiiinent leader of the A.R.P.S. and a vigorous opponent of the
Provincial Councils system, as a victory for the A.R.P.S., which he
2
was trying to reduce to a "private society".
Slater was certaibly helped in his decision not to recognise
Moore as Tufuhene by the findings of the Commissioner. The Commissioner
had found out that the office of the Tufuhene in Cape Coast was here¬
ditary in a certain family to which Moore did not belong. But contrary
to what the Commissioner found out, the office of the Tufuhene in
Cape Coast was not, as J. C. Be Graft Johnson noted, hereditary. ^
1Ibid.
^For more detail on Slater's attitude to the A.R.P.S., see chapter four
above.
•a
G.H.A., Accra,ADM.11/l^39>case No. 11/1931» minutes on a report by J. C.
Be Graft Johnson.
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If the Commissioner was not influenced, as his Governor, by political
considerations, then this shows that the political officers, even
those working in the Secretariat of Native Affairs, lacked a thorough
knowledge of the indigenous customary institutions. The Commissioner,
H. W. Thomas, was in fact appointed in 1933 as Secretary for Native
Affairs, a position he kept for a decade.
The Government continued to maintain a hard attitude towards the
Omanhene and the six companies. For example, in May 1929» the Omanhene
met the Governor and complained about the attitude of political officers
towards him and the Asafo. * He also complained that the Commissioner
of Police on one occasion went out to the "post" of company Ho.5 as
the members of the company were sitting down at their "post" and tore
off a harmless flag which was being flown half mast according to custom
O
in honour of a dead leader. The Omanhene also complained that the
Commissioner of Police also met company Ho.2 who had gone outside
the town for some company business, scattered them, and got hold of
their flags. 3
Nonetheless, the Omanhene and the six companies continued to
challenge the Government's recognition of Coker as Tufuhene. In 1930»
an opportunity occurred for them to show their dissatisfaction with the
way the Government handled the dispute. In that year, the Acting
Governor decided to visit Cape Coast and to hold a durbar. An invitation
Xvras made to both the Omanhene and Coker, in his capacity as Tufuhene,
to attend the durbar. The Omanhene objected to the Government's
^G.N.A., Cape Coast,ADM.23/1/364, "Notes on Discussion between the




invitation for Ooker and accordingly, with the full approval of his
council and his Asafo supporters, he declined to attend the durbar.
This action of the Cmanhene aggrieved the Government and the Acting
Secretary for Native Affairs described it as an act of "petulant
stupidity" and "a gross uct of discourtesy". * He added angrily,
But I do not think that this is the first or second time when
a Governor has been affronted in Cape Coast. One Governor was
actually stoned during a visit to this "centre of education",
and the administration has always had difficulty in dealing
with a community which seems to make it their business never to
see eye to eye with Government policy.
The Acting Commissioner of the Central Province even suggested that
the law should be amended or supplemented so that the Government could
3have more control over the chiefs.
The dispute of the Oguaa state culminated in 1932 in a riot in
which five persons were killed and twenty eight were wounded. ^ The
immediate cause of the riot was that in 1932 company No.3 applied to the
Acting District Commissioner asking for a permit to install its new
captains. According to custom this ceremonial turn-out was usually
headed by the Tufuhene. As we have seen, company No.3 recognised no
other person as Tufuhene but Moore. On the other hand, Coker's family,
Coker being dead, supported by company No.l, were opposed to Moore
heading the procession.
The Acting District Commissioner issued company No.3 with a
permit after its captains agreed to confine the function to their
quarter. When the procession started it did not include Moore but he
subsequently joined the procession as its head. -5 The captains of
1G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1633,case No.37/1930, Minutes of 21.10.1930 by
the Ag.S.N.A.
2Ibid.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1633» letter of 14.10.1930 from the Ag.Commissioner
of the Central Province to the C.S.
4




company No.l warned the administrative and police officers that they
would have great difficulty in restraining their members if Moore remained
at the head of the procession while it passed through a certain street
known as Jackson Street. * although included in the permit, Jackson
Street ran through territory claimed by both companies. When the
procession entered Jackson Street, they were fired on by company No.
1 and the riot began. One shot just missed Moore and instead killed
2
his bodyguard.
The Government reacted by proclaiming Cape Coast under the Peace
Preservation Ordinance and a full company of the Gold Coast Regiment
was sent to help the administrative officers in the search for arms
and the arrest of the /Isafo. In all, 470 mambers of the Jlsafo were
3
arrested. Sentences ranging from fines of a few pounds to imprison¬
ment with hard labour for various terms up to two years were passed
on those arrested. Indeed, very few escaped conviction. Moore, the
central figure in the riot, was sentenced to twelve months imprison-
ment with hard labour.
The riot was a natural outcome of the Government's attitude towards
the deposition of Colcer, as Tufuhene. The members of company No.l,
as Kwesi Johnson noted, were encouraged in their decision to forbid
Moore to head the procession in his capacity as Tufuhene by the
Governor's ruling in favour of' Colcer against Moore. 3 The yisafo had
1Ibid.
**W. S. Kwesi Johnson, op.cit.
3Ibid.
^G.N.71. ,Cape Coast, ADM.23/1/883, notes of 15.6.1936 by the Commissioner
of the Central Province.
V S. Kwesi Johnson, op.cit.
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their own democratic way of choosing a Tufuhene and had the Govern¬
ment not interfered, siding with one company against the others, most
probably the issue would have been settled without much difficulty.
Indeed, the Asafo system in Cape Coast was very ancient and the
companies had never before found it difficult to agree on a Tufuhene.
Besides the Asafo of Cape Coast, the early 1930s witnessed a
large and widespread increase in the activities of the Asafo against
the colonial administration throughout the country. The anti-colonial
dimension of the 1930s Asafo risings was even more clear than in the
1913-1919 risings. The immediate cause of the 1930s risings was the
Government-proposed Native Administration Revenue Ordinance. This
Ordinance has been discussed in detail in chapter six and it is
sufficient here to state that its aim was to empower the chiefs to
establish stool treasuries and to levy a tax.
The Asafo of Akim Abuakwa led the protest against the Native
Administration Revenue measure. Initially, the Omanhene, Ofori Atta,
convinced his state council and the Provincial Council of the Eastern
Province, of which he was the president, to accept the measure. He
also spoke in favour of it at the meeting of the Joint Provincial
Council.* The Asafo strongly objected to the measure being introduced
in Akim Abuakwa and argued that the state council1s decision to support
it was taken without their consent; that their divisional chiefs had
failed to consult them or even to inform them of the state council's
2
decision. So in order to safeguard their political and constitutional
P.R.O. ,C.0.96.70V7260, "Notes of the proceedings and happenings in
connection with the united mass conference of Provincial Councils
held at Saltpond, from the 19th to the 23rd April, 1932", enclosure
'D' in conf.despatch of 20.8.1932 from the Ag.Governor to Sir P.
Cunliffe-Lister; for more details see chapter six, above.
2
The Times of West Africa, 30.8.1932.
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rights and to put pressure on the Omanhene and the state council to
withdraw their support of the measure, the Asafo destooled all the
five Wing (divisional) chiefs of the state. ^ The position of the
Omanhene himself was seriously threatened; the Asafo asked for his
removal after they submitted nineteen charges against him.
Understandably, the Government offered its help and support to
its great ally, Ofori Atta. A force of police was despatched to Kibi
when it was rumoured that the Asafo intended to march on the town.
Furthermore, in order to check "the disorderly meetings", the captains
and other members of the Asafo were arrested under the Native Customs
p
Ordinance and notices were served upon them.
However, the Government's aid and support could not alone have
saved Ofori Atta from destoolment. Atta was lucky in other respects.
First, unlike the case in the Fanti states, the Asafo of Akim Abuakwa
did not have a Tufuhene, the overall leader of companies. In other
words, the Asafo movement of Akim Abuakwa lacked the united leadership
which could have forced the destoolment of the Oraanhene. ^ Secondly,
the Asafo system in Akira Abuakwa was a purely a rural phenomenon.
There was no tradition of Asafo organisations in Kibi itself. ^ This
meant that the immediate action of the Asafo was usually directed
against their divisional and village chiefs and only indirectly against
the Omanhene and his council. Ey the time the rural Asafo had organ¬
ised themselves to stage a march on Kibi, the Omanhene and the Govern¬
ment would have plenty of time to stop it or to suppress it. It is
perhaps because of all these factors that Ofori Atta, in spite of the
continuous unrest in Alcim Abuakwa, survived as Omanhene from 1912 until
Report on the Eastern Province, 1933-34.
2G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.32/1/15. report on Birim district.
3G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/738, op.clt.; Jarle Simensen, op.cit.
4Ibid.
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his death in 19^3»
However, in spite of the Governments intervention, the Alcim
Abuakwa Asafo movement achieved its main objective. The Omanhene who
considered the Asato system "as nothing more than a nuisance" was
forced, under the strong protest and pressure of the Asafo, to
dissociate himself from the Native Administration Revenue measure;
and he sent a circular to this effect to his chiefs and he informed
the Government as well. ^
The Government-proposed Native Administration Revenue Ordinance
xvas also strongly opposed by the Asafo of Kwahu. Following their
tradition of 1913—1919» the Asafo movement in Kwahu in the early 1930s
also took the shape of constitutional demands. Their leader, Kwami
Mossi, was apparently a very strong and determined man. The
Provincial Commissioner, who was obviously annoyed by his activities,
described him as
a strong but not ideal leader. He is rather a stormy petrel and
his aim appears to be to take the ruling power from the chiefs and
place it in the hands of the Asafo. He has on more than one
occasion ... taken very drastic action to force the Asafo views
on the chiefs.
The Asafo movement in Kwahu began by submitting charges against
the Omanhene, Kofi Akuaomoa, accusing him of, among many other things,
misappropriating the stool revenues. The Asafo also passed resolutions
in which they decided that no member of them should enter a chief's
house; no chief and his wives should be allowed to sell or buy any
foodstuff, drink palm wine from the public market or ride on lorries
owned by a member of the Asafo. ^ The aim of these resolutions was to
^"The Times of V/est Africa, 25.10.1932.
2
Report on the Eastern Province, 1931-32.
3
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.Il/l439.case Ho.11/1931. letter of 5-1.1932 from Kofi
Akuamoa, Omanhene of Kwahu, to the D.C.
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isolate the chiefs from public life and thus put pressure on them to
withdraw their support of the Native Administration Revenue measure.
However, the Omanhene ignored the charges submitted against him.
Instead, five of his household assaulted a member of the Asafo. *
The Asafo made the most of the incident and cited it as a typical example
of the brutality of the Omanhene. Subsequently, the Asafo boycotted
the native tribunals in the state; no chiefs* oaths were sworn and no
cases were instituted. The Asafo elders dealt with whatever cases
2
arose by way of arbitration.
The Omanhene continued to refuse to answer the charges submitted
against him and one of his supporters even killed a member of the
Asafo. ^ The Asafo reacted by declaring him destooled. The state
council, under pressure from the Asafo, declared the destoolment con¬
stitutional and a new Omanhene was elected. The Government had no
choice but to recognise the destoolment of Kofi Akuaomoa. In re¬
commending to his seniors the recognition of the destoolment of Kofi
Akuaomoa and the enstoolment of the new Omanhene, the Acting Provincial
Commissioner explained that the divisional chiefs of Kwahu were in the
hands of the Asafo leaders and could do nothing contrary to their
wishes and thus any refusal by the Government to accept the enstoolment
of the new Omanhene would tend to diminish what little power the chief's
k
in Kwahu possessed.
Not only did the Asafo of Kwahu succeed in their fight with the
Oraanhene, but they also achieved a major success in their struggle for




G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.O.117V31» letter of 19.^.1933» from the Ag.Commissioner
of the Eastern Province to the S.N.A.
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their political and constitutional rights. The state council made the
following resolution:
(1) that we do recognise Kwahu Asafo;
(2) that all members of the Asafo are one;
(3) that all Kwahu Asafo have the undisputed right to meet,
consult and act at any time, at any place and under al1
lawful circumstances;
(4) that all the Asafoatses are direct representatives of
the people on the state council. 1
although the immediate cause of the early 1930s Asafo movement
was the Asafo's dissatisfaction with the Native Administration Revenue
measure, the movement, like that of 1913-1919» was directed against
other aspects of the Government's Indirect Rule policies. The Asafo's
resentment and dissatisfaction with the Native Administration Ordinance,
particularly its failure to eradicate the corruption in the native
tribunals, was very apparent. As we have seen the Asafo of Kwahu
boycotted the native tribunals in the state. In Akim Abuakwa, when
explaining the reasons for the Asafo rising, the District Commissioner
stated that apart from the Asafo's objection to the Native Adminis¬
tration Revenue measure, there could be no doubt that some, if not
all, of the divisional chiefs
with their autocratic methods, and their unnecessarily heavy
fines and fees in their tribunals have, ever since the intro¬
duction of the Native Administration Ordinance, been sowing the
seeds of the present state of discontent. 2
Again as during the 1913-1919 risings, the Asafo risings of the
early 1930s coincided with general economic hardships as a result of
the World trade depression and the cocoa hold-up of 1930-31- These
economic hardships created a feeling of dissatisfaction which seemed
to have helped to make the Asafo protest more vigorous and fierce.
^"G.N. A.,Accra,C.S.0.1174/31, "Declaration by Omanhene, Ahenfo and
Adikrofo of Kwahu, dated 17,Nov:,1931M*
G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.Il/l/l5» report on Birim district, 1932.
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The role of the Asafo was certainly very decisive in forcing the
Government to abandon its proposed Native Administration Revenue
Ordinance. The Ordinance was an essential aspect of the Government
scheme to introduce in the Gold Coast a Lugardian type of Indirect
Rule and thus the decision to abandon it was a serious setback to such
a scheme. The Governor himself, when commenting on the demonstrations
against his direct taxation scheme, admitted that
the real seat of political power is in the Asafo, the plebs, who
expect the sub-chiefs to advise the Head Chief according to their
wishes and the Head Chief to follow that advice. It follows that
the Head Chief who, let us say, supported an unpopular Govern¬
ment measure or who intervened to prevent a form of demonstration
which has the sanctity of custom, would be regarded as acting
unconstitutionally and would not improbably subsequently find i
himself destoolea.
The Government was very alarmed that the Asafo activities were
frustrating its Indirect Rule policies. Slater was very keen that
some legislation should be made with the view of restricting the powers
of the Asafo as, in his opinion, "the company system have been ... a
source of trouble and anxiety to Government". However Slater acknow¬
ledged that it would not be wise to suppress such an institution of
so ancient an origin as the Asufo without first fully satisfying him-
3
self as to the wisdom of such a step. Thus, following an inter¬
company "fight" in 1930 in Appam, in the Central Province, in which
forty-five persons died, Slater appointed the Assistant Secretary for
Native Affairs, J. C. De Graft Johnson, a Fanti with an intimate






knowledge of the Asafo system, to make
a comprehensive survey of the Asafo, its origin, history,
development and place in the social and political economy of
the people, and to submit recommendations for its proper control
in places where its activities had proved to be subversive of
peace and oraer. ^
De Graft Johnson submitted in 1932 "an extremely able, interesting
and informative report" in which he unhesitatingly deprecated any idea
of abolishing the Asafo system. He observed that the "New Asafo",
"the united voice of the people", was very much feared by the chiefs
and elders who believed that it would lead to a diminution of their
powers and perhaps to the disappearance of chiefly rule altogether. 3
He added that the popular movement of the "New Asafo", no matter what
the chief s said or aid, had come to stay and would grtrj/ in strength
as time passed. ^ Ee Graft Johnson suggested that the Asafo should
be represented on the state councils and on the Provincial Councils. ^
He also proposed that the Asafo should be given places on the native
tribunals. ^
By and large, Ee Graft Johnson made very useful and far-reaching
proposals. Unfortunately, the report was not published because some
of the Government's senior officials complained that it contained
"uncalled for criticism of actions taken by named Government officers". ?
*Ibid.
^Ibid. The report itself does not seem to have survived but there is
an adequate summary of it in G.N.A..Accra,AEK.11/1^39.case No.11/1931*
3
G.N.A., Accra,JDK.11/1439»case No.11/1931. Minutes of 7.12.1932 by the





?G.N. A,, Accra, /IDM. 11/1^39»case No. 11/1931* F°r example Notes of
7.12.1932 by the Ag.Commissioner of the Eastern Province and Notes of
30.3.1932 by the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti.
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The Secretary for Native Affairs, H. W. Thomas, and the Colonial
Secretary, G. A. S. Northcote, held diametrically opposed views with
regard to De Graft Johnson's proposals. The former rejected them
completely and strongly advised that legislation should be made to
provide for the abolition of the Asafo system. ^ On the other hand,
Northcote felt that, after reading De Graft Johnson's report, the
proposal to abolish the Asafo would be "an unwise one" and instead
suggested thut the Asafo companies should be directed into more peace-
2
ful channels. Northcote was convinced that if the report had been
written a few years earlier, it would have obviated many mistakes made
3
"in all good faith" by the administrative officers.
Slater agreed with his Colonial Secretary that De Graft Johnson
had presented a strong argument against the abolition of the Asafo
system. Slater was convinced, after reading the report, that any step
to abolish the Asafo system would certainly lead to the renewal of the
Asafo activities against the Government. Accordingly, Slater, whose
term of office was in any case drawing to an end, decided that no
legislation should be enacted to provide for the abolition of the
Asafo system. In fact, the question of abolishing the Asafo system
was not again raised until a decade later.
^G.N.A., Accra, ADM. 11/1136, Notes on U'inneba Native Affairs, by H. W.
Thomas, the S.N.A.
2




Though the Asalo never again organised a large scale movement
like that of the early 1930s, they sporadically continued to oppose
unpopular policies. The number of destoolments continued to increase.
It seems that as a result of the Asafo activities some of the states
began to follow the example of the Kwahu state in representing the
Asafo on the state council. For example, in 193^ i the state council of
New Juaben, in the Eastern Province, approved of the institution of the
Asafo and allowed them some representation on the state council. *
It is not without importance that New Juaben had witnessed political
unrest since the passing of the Native administration Ordinance in
1927. Indeed, in 1927 the Omanhene was deposed for supporting the
2
Ordinance and for attending the meetings of the Provincial Council.
In 1936, the Asafo, or the rural commoners, were again active in
"the protest against the colonial administration. In that year, the
Government passed the Levy Bill which empowered the chiefs to impose
annual levies on their people. 3 Naturally, the Asafo opposed the
measure and in several states they forced their chief's to pass resolu¬
tions against it. Borne of the chiefs who supported the measure were
in fact destooled by their Asafo. As a result of the Asafo action,
although the Levy Bill was passed into law, the majority of the Para¬
mount Chiefs did not usk to exercise the powers provided by it. With
the growing critical attitude of the Asafo to the chiefs, it became
difficult for the latter to impose levies even if approved by custom.
^"G.N. A., Accra, ADK. 11/1^-39»case No. 11/1931» letter of 2.5.193^ from the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province to the C.S.
2
Sessional Paper No.V of 1929-30. "Enquiry into the alleged deposition
ol Nana Kwaku Boateng, Omanhene of New Juaben."
3
For more detail on the Levy Bill see chapter six above.
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The Asafo not only wanted to know for what purposes the leives were
needed but also wanted to be shown that they had been used for the
purpose for which they were ostensibly collected. ^ Failure to do
so had been the cause of several destoolments.
In face of the Asafo activities, the Joint Provincial Council,
in an effort to stop, or at least decrease, destoolraents, resolved in
1936 that the leaders of the Asafo should be invited to attend the
2
meetings of the state councils. Some states immediately accepted
the resolution and in Asin Atandaso, for example, the attendance of
the Asafo representatives dated from that resolution. ^ The Asafo
xjere continuously, if gradually, winning success in their struggle
for their political and constitutional rights.
The only Asafo rising of major importance during the War period
was perhaps that which took place in August 19^1 at Winneba, the
capital town of the Effutu state, in the Central Province. There were
in Winneba two Asafo companies which, as we have explained, were very
active in the campaign against the Native Administration Ordinance.
The main cause of the 19^1 rising was the active role played by the
Omanhene, Nana Ayirebi Acquah III, in raising recruits, a measure to
which the two companies objected. ^ The Asafo successfully frustrated
a meeting convened to encourage recruiting and they refused to attend
as a body a meeting convened to explain Air Raid Precautions. $
Ironically, as J. W. De Graft Johnson noted, if it had not been for the
discouragement the Government hitherto showed to the Asafo, the Asafo
P.R.O.,C.O.96.662, Memo, of 31*2.1925 entitled "Decay of Tribal
Authority", by the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti.
2
Lord Hailey, "Native Administration and Political Development in
British Tropical Africa; conf.report, 19^2".
^Ibid.
^G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.ll/ll36,F.No.0975tS.F.No.6, "Report of the Enquiry
appointed to enquire into the Disturbance which occurred in the
Winneba (Effutu) state on the 19th and 20th April, 19^1".
5Ibid.
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companies, which were in origin military organisations, would have
provided the nucleus of a Defence Force. ^
With regard to the immediate events which led to the rising, no
definite grievances were ever put forward "yet there was the usual
o
undercurrent of ill-feeling by both companies against the Omanhene".
This "undercurrent of ill-feeling" had been increasing day by day and
what is referred to as "the Ghartey hat incident" only helped to em¬
bitter the feelings of the Asafo still further. ^ k. Ghartey, who
was described as "an educated man", was the supi of company No.2.
During May 1941, Ghartey decided to appear in public and to lead his
company on the occasion of the celebration of the annual deer hunting
custom wearing a brass helmet. The Omanhene strongly objected to
Ghartey's wearing the helmet and firmly instructed him to remove it.
Ghartey removed the helmet but decided "to make things unpleasant" for
the Omanhene. ^
The opportunity came in August 1941» when the Omanhene issued a
summons for one K. Ackotey, a member of company No.2, charging him
with usurping the powers of a "headman". Ackotey had styled himself
as "headman" in a letter to the Provincial Commissioner. $ Ghartey
and the members of his company attacked the Omanhene^ tribunal and
1G.N.A.,Accra,ADM.11/1840, letter of 4.3.1931 from J. W. De Graft







released Aclcotey. The Omanhene appealed to +he Government for help.
As a result, reinforcements of police were called for from Cape Coast
and Accra to take back Ackotey from the Asafo to the Omanhene's
tribunal. The Asafo, singing their war-songs, reacted by stoning the
police. In return, the police fired at them, killing six and injuring
many others. ^ Subsequently twenty-seven of the Asafo were arrested
and twenty-four of them were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging
2
from twelve months to two years.
Following the riot, the Asafo preferred twenty one charges against
the Omanhene with the view to destool him. Eight of the eleven chiefs
of the state signed these charges. However, the Government intervened
3
and transferred the matter to the Provincial Council. The Provincial
Council did not fail to come to the aid of its long-serving member.
Although Ayirebi Acquah III failed to appear before the Provincial
Council, the Council struck out the case and recommended that the
l±
Omanhene be reinstated. The Governor hurriedly confirmed the
Council's recommendation.
The Asafo of course resented the Governor's decision and refused
to recognise Acquah III as their Omanhene. jn 1944., their opposition
to the Omanhene came into the open. The occasion was the Empire Cay
parade in V/inneba which Acquah III proposed to attend in his capacity
as Omanhene, much to the annoyance of the Asafo who were of the opinion
that if it had not been for the Governor's intervention he would have
^Ibid.






been destooled. The police again came to the help of the Omanhene
and dispersed the demonstration.
Governor Alan Burns was disturbed by the instability in the
states caused by the Asafo. The riot at V/inneba in 1941 firmly convinced
him that action should be taken against the Asafo. So early in 1942
Alan Burns wrote to his administrative officers stating that he had
"noted with deep concern" the increasing number of riots and disturb¬
ances which had been caused by the Asafo. * He asserted to the
administrative officers that he was seriously considering the question
of disbanding the Asafo companies and was thus asking them for their
• 2
views on the issue.
Host of the administrative officers were, in principle, in favour
of disbanding the Asafo companies but feared that if the Government
ordered a general disbanding of the Asafo companies, this would result
in "considerable opposition" by the Asafo, a situation which the
3
Government should try to avoid especially at a time of World War. J
The Secretary for Native Affairs, H. W. Thomas, however, held to his
opinion which he made a decade earlier, namely, that the Asafo system
should be abolished. ^
/It the same time, Alan Burns asked the Provincial Councils and
the Joint Provincial Council for their views on the Asafo system.
The Council of the Central Province, although not suggesting the
abolition of the Asafo system, responded quickly by making proposals
with the view of bringing "the disruptive element" of the Asafo under
control.-5 These proposals could be summarised as follows:
G.N.A.,Cape Coast,ADK.23/1/1932, letter of 5*3.1942 from the Commissioner
of Central Province to D.C., Cape Coast.
2Ibid.
3lbid., 1-Iinutes on the Asafo company system.
4
Ibid.
5g.N.A.. Accra.API;.11/1136.F.No.0973.S.F.No.4. letter of 11.9.1942 from
the Secretary of the Provincial Council of the Central Province to the
S.N.A.
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1. company emblems should be registered;
2. the names of the captains of the Asafo should be registered;
3. company flags should be approved by the state councils;
4. no public or customary demonstration or festival by the
Asafo should be performed without the express permission of the
"Native Authorities" and the District Commissioner;
5. no meeting of the Asafo should be held without the express
permission of the "Native Authorities";
6. regulations governing the Asafo under the Native Administration
Ordinance should be made. ^
These proposals were adopted, almost in their entirety, by the
Joint Provincial Council. The Joint Provincial Council, like the
Council of the Central Province before it, emphasised that it was not
2
asking the Government to abolish the Asafo system. Although anxious
to restrict the powers of the Asafo, the Paramount Chiefs of the
Provincial Councils were aware of the role which the Asafo possessed
under the indigenous political structure. They recognised that if
they advocated the abolition of the Asafo system, the Asafo would
simply react by destooling them and thus bring the "Native Authorities"
to a complete standstill.
Although Alan Burns and his Secretary for Native Affairs were
anxious to abolish the Asafo system, they could not overlook the
administrative officers* advice, namely, that any attempt to abolish
the system would lead to a strong protest against the Government. The
Governor was not ready to risk such a protest during the War period.
Furthermore, the Paramount Chiefs, against whom the Asafo's protest
1Ibid.
^Ibid., letter of 27.11.1942 from Nana Ofori Atta, Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council,to the S.N.A.
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was partly directed, did not go so far as to suggest the complete
suppression of the Asafo activities. As a result, Alan Burns
decided to give up the idea of enacting legislation for the abolition
of the Asafo system. He instead, in 19^5» contented himself with
amending section 6 of the Native Customs Ordinance. ^ This amendment
gave the District Commissioners more effective and wider powers to
prohibit Asafo meetings which they had reason to believe would result
2
in "a breach of peace".
Perhaps the only Asafo offensive during the post-war period that
we have evidence about was that of the Asafo of Akira Abuakwa, partic¬
ularly the Amantoo-Miensa Asafo. The reason for this offensive could
be traced to the murder of Akyea Kensah, the Odikro of Apedwa, during
3
the funeral ceremonies of Ofori Atta in 19^3•
This murder was usually considered a ritual one; the Odikro was
killed so that his blood could be used to "wash" or "blaken" the stool
of Ofori Atta. It seemed however that there were other motives for
the murder, primarily political, which were seldom referred to. Apedwa,
as we have seen, was one of the three leading Amantoo-Miensa villages
which led the Asafo march against Kibi in 1918. The Odikro of Apedwa
himself was the second ranking chief in the Amantoo-Miensa. It thus
seems that in revenge for Ofori Atta, some of his supporters took the
chance to kill one of the leading chiefs of the Amantoo-Miensa. As
such the murder could be seen as a counter attack against the Amantoo-
Miensa Asafo for thier persistent agitation against Ofori Atta, rather
than being a case of human sacrifice. In any case, the practice of




For a brief account of this see Sir Alan Burns, Colonial Civil Servant,
London 19^9.
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The body of the Odilcro was never found but eight persons, who
were apparently strong supporters of the Ofori family, were accused
of the murder. They were tried, found guilty ana sentenced to death. *
Their guilt and punishment were based on information given by two eye¬
witnesses. The jury, eight Africans and one European, were unanimous
o
in their decision. But although the sentence was passed in 1944, the
Governor was obliged to postpone the execution more than once. In
fact, the executions, and then only of three of the accused, did not
take place until 1947. This delay in the executions was due to
"delaying tactics" adopted by the defence, which was led by J. B.
Lanquah, the half-brother of Ofori Atta. J Besides its delaying tac¬
tics, the defence sought the assistance of some members of the House
of Commons, who petitioned the Secretary of State asking him to inter¬
vene and stop the executions. The Secretary of State, Creech-Jones,
made a long statement in the House of Commons in which he narrated the
history of the case and explained the reasons for the delay in the
executions. ^
In the Gold Coast itself there was indignation and impatience
with the delays and the manner in which condemned persons had been
allowed to obstruct the course of justice. There was a feeling among
the people that there was one law for the rich and another for the
poor. ^ Popular demonstrations did in fact take place against the
delays in carrying out the sentences.
^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.783/31537» "The alleged murder of the Odilcro of Apedwa".
^Sir Alan Burns, op.cit., p.221; also Leg.Co.Debates, 1945.
"^Sir Alan Burns, op.cit., 219-239.
^Parliamentary Debates (fifth series), vol.434,1946-47, 484-491.
'Vor example, The Gold Coast Independent, 8.3.1946; also Leg.Co.Debates,
1947.
^The Gold Coast Independent, 8.3.19^6.
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On his part Alan Burns resented the fact that the tactics of the
defence had forced him to postpone for a long time the executions.
He resisted all pressure from Churchill, and mem¬
bers of Parliament because he felt that if the executions were not
carried out, it would in effect be "a surrender of the principles of
justice to the power of money and influence". ^ He held that the
administration of British justice in the Gold Coast had been seriously
discredited by the delays and that if the executions were not carried
out, the public would lose all faith in it.
Naturally, the Amantoo-Miensa Asafo were the most dissatisfied
with the delays. They petitioned the Governor asking for the cons¬
titutional rights of the Amantoo-Kiensa as a popular check on the
2
Omanhene to be finally restored. The protest of the Amantoo-Kiensa
continued even after the executions were carried out and in 1947 and
1948 they marched on Kibi and preferred charges against the Omanhene,
Ofori Atta II, with the view of destooling him. Subsequently, they
boycotted the state council and asked to be independent from it.
A reconciliation was made in 1949 but the long Asafo aissatisfaction
with the state council and the Omanhene was far from being completely
resolved. It was thus not surprising that when Kkruraah invaded Kibi
in 1957 with seven hundred police and removed Ofori Atta II, who was
a strong opponent of the C.P.P., and some of his chiefs, there was
4
little opposition, if any, to his action. The Asafo of Akim Abuakwa
had for long been dissatisfied with their chiefs and were thus appar¬
ently very pleased that Nkrumah had intervened.
^"Sir Alan Burns, op.cit., 230.
^G.N.A.,Accra, AETj. 32/4/100, "Akim Abuakwa Native Affairs".
3
Ibid.; see also Jarle Simensen, op.cit.
j. Atta^This invasion took place because Nkrumah alleged that Ofori^H, a
strong opponent of the C.P.P., had used his influence to have some
£10,000 deducted from the salaries of subordinate chiefs and moneys
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Although the historical evidence for the post-war period is not
substantially available, there is reason to believe that the Asafo
continued their protest against the colonial administration. The
Native Authority and the Native Courts Ordinances of 1944 had failed,
like the Native Administration Ordinance before them, to recognise the
political and constitutional role which the Asafo possessed under the
indigenous customary constitution. In particular, the Asafo must have
resented that clause of the Native Authority Ordinance which empowered
the District Commissioner to deport any person against whom a complaint
had been made by a chief. ^
Another factor behind the Asafo dissatisfaction during the post¬
war period was the policy adopted by the Government to combat the
swollen-shoot disease which spread widely in the 19^k)s. The Govern¬
ment's policy to stop the disease was to cut down the infected trees.
The Asafo, who were mostly cocoa-producers, were very suspicious of
this policy and saw it as another deliberate attempt to exploit them
economically. Their economic dissatisfaction was sharpened by post¬
war inflation and general economic hardships. Although the leadership
of the Asafo was not formally identical with that of the Farmers Unions,
the latter must have built on the Asafo institution, the permanent
body through which the rural commoners had always expressed their
opinions.
due to elders, linguists and stool dependants; and that this money
had been used to support a body of "Action Groupers" terrorists who
preyed on the C.P.P. and Government supporters. After the invasion
Nkruraah passed the Alcim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act which authorised
the Minister of Local Government to create a department within the
ministry of Local Government, headed by the Receiver of Stool Revenue
to whom was assigned the full responsibility for the collection of
moneys and the management of the stool lands of Akim Abuakwa. See
Report of a Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Affairs of Akim
Abuakwa State, Accra, Government Printing Dept., 1958.
^The Native Authority (Colony) Ordinance, No.21 of 1944.
2
For example, Tony Killick, in W. Birmingham, I. Neustalt and E.N.
Oraaboe (eds.), A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol.1, London 1966,
236-250. also B. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 59^
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The cocoa-producers blamed the educated elite and the chiefs for
not putting enough pressure on the colonial Government to stop cutting
down their cocoa trees. In other words, they were prepared to follow
any leader who could promise them economic prosperity and in this
Bkrumah and his C.P.P. were not lacking in words. As Maxwell Owusu
pointed out, what mattered for the ordinary man was economic freedom
and material well-being and Nkrumah presented self-government as the
only and unfailing means to economic bounty for the common man. ^
To sum up, it can be argued that the Asafo organisations provided
a permanent institution and an organisational basis through which the
rural commoners expressed their demands and organised their protest
and opposition to the colonial administration. In particular, the
Asafo political activities and agitation were directed against those
policies which aimed at strengthening the chiefs1 position, such as
the Native Administration Revenue measure, the Levy Bill, etc. In
this respect, the Asafo action was partly responsible for the failure
of the Indirect Rule system in its principal administrative objective,
that of ruling the people through their chiefs.
The Asafo persistently opposed and resisted the attempt of the
colonial Government and its agents, the chiefs, to exploit them
politically or economically. As such, the role of the Asafo was very
vital and decisive in the background to the post-war nationalist
movement. The C.P.P. could draw on a long tradition and an impressive
record of anti-colonial protest in the rural areas. Perhaps this is
one reason why Ghana achieved independence earlier than its fellow
ex-British Colonies in West Africa.
^Maxwell Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, Princeton, 1970, lh-6.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
INDIRECT RULE AM) EXAMPLES OF STOOL DISPUTES:
(1) THE ASAMANGKESE - AKIM ABUAKWA DISPUTE. 1920-1938.
(2) THE GA PARAMOUNT STOOL DISPUTE. 1918-1935.
Frequent reference has been made in this thesis to the
alarming increase in the number of destoolments and stool disputes
during the colonial era, particularly during the post 1927 Native
Administration Ordinance period., Reading the Gold Coast newspapers
during the 1930's and the 1940's one could hardly come across an
issue which did not contain a reference to a stool dispute. The
Gold Coast Spectator rightly noted in 1938 that if a census were
taken of those chiefs who had remained long on their stools, few
could be picked up. 1 The Gold Coast Independent also observed in
1942 that on looking around one could hardly find a spot in the
2
country where a stool dispute did not exist.
It has been argued that primarily these stool disputes
represented the reaction of the Africans to the attempt of the
colonial administration to make the chiefs its agents and an
integral part of its machinery of government and to give them
powers that did not belong to them under the country's customary
laws. Reference has also been made to specific causes of
destoolments such as the progress of western education, the
^The Gold Coast Spectator, 12.2.1938, "Destoolment of Chiefs; its
cause and how to prevent it."
^The Gold Coast independent, 26.9.1942,editorial entitled "Stool
Disputes, Part 1".
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increase in the material wealth of the country, the failure of the
chiefs to have "representative or progressive" councils, and the
cost of litigation which was itself the outcome of the introduction
of western laws. ^
In this Chapter we shall, as a case study, discuss in
some detail two examples of stool disputes, both from the Eastern
Province, which was usually considered by the colonial Government
as the stronghold of its Indirect Rule policies. The first was
that of Asamangkese-Akim Abuakwa, commonly known as the
Asamangkese case. In studying thisdispute our aim is to
attempt to demonstrate, firstly, how the Indirect Rule system was
responsible for creating serious strains between some Paramount
Chiefs and their subordinate chiefs, and secondly, how this
dispute became a battleground for the supporters and opponents
of Indirect Rule, and consequently, how it was unnecessarily
prolonged. The dispute involved, on the one hand, the colonial
administration and Nana Ofori Atta, the Omanhene (Paramount Chief)
of Akim Abuakwa and the staunch supporter of the Government's
Indirect Rule system, and, on the other hand, those lawyer^
politicians and nationalists such as Kobina Sekyi, Ko,jo Thompson
and Wallace-Johnson who vigorously opposed and were hostile to the
Colonial Government, in general, and to its Indirect Rule System,
in particular. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Hugh Thomas,
was convinced that "the pernicious influence of lawyers is the
^The Gold Coast Spectator, 12.2.1938.
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alpha and omega" of the dispute. ^ He thought that the dispute was
in particular begun by Sekyi and Kojo Thompson "two of the most
2
unscrupulous lawyers in the Country".
The second example was that of the Ga Paramount stool
dispute. Here our aim is to show that the overwhelming number of
disputes and troubles in the Ga state during the colonial period,
were mainly due to the Government's policy of imposing on the
Ga people a system based on the Akan institutions. The Gold
Coast Independent was certainly right in pointing out that the
main cause of the disputes in the Ga state was due to the Ga
people's adoption of laws and usages which were foreign to their
3
own history and custom. These adoptions, the Independent exaplained,
were dictated and forced on the Ga people by the Native Administration
Ordinance which established common laws and common ways of political
life - based on the Akan political system - for all the ethnic
4
groups in the Gold Coast. The Vox-Populi put it as thus:
"The native constitution is a very intricate thing and it
differs in each state. This vital point was, however,
forgotten by the votaries of Indirect Rule who sought to
establish a uniform system that brings the customs and
institution of all the states into line, only to aggravate
the position." 5
GN.A. .Accra.ADM. 1 l/l627. A Memorandum entitled "The History of
the Dispute between Asamangkese and the Paramount Stool of Akim
Abuakwa", by the S.N.A., Hugh Thomas, dated 9.5.1934.
2Ibid.
3




The Vox-Populi, 16.7. and 18.7. 1938, editorial entitled,
Indirect Rule in Practice."
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(1) THE ASAMAHGKESE - AKIM ABUAKVA DISPUTE. 1920-1938.
Originally the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia (the
latter being a sub-stool of the former) formed part of the Kingdom
of Akvamu. In about 1730, however, the Akirns who migrated from
Ashanti were able to defeat Akwamu and drove them from the banks
of the Densu and the Nyanewase valleys to the country situated on
the east side of the River Volta. ^ The victorious Akims transferred
what was formerly Akwamu territory into the Akim Abuakwa state, with
its capital at Kibi. The Asamangkese and Akwatia people, unlike
other Akwamu, chose to remain on their lands and accepted to serve
the paramount stool of Akim Abuakwa and to observe its laws and
customs. ^
Between 1907 and 1912, thanks to the introduction of cocoa,
the rich lands of Asamangkeseand Akwatia began to rise in value,
and in addition, in 1919 diamonds were discovered in the stool land
of Akwatia. The two chiefs, Kwaku Amoa, the Ohene (divisional
chief) of Asamangkese and Kwame Kuma, the Odikro (headman) of
Akwatia, feeling that they owed no allegiance to Ofori Atta, the
Omanhene (Paramount Chief) of Akim Abuakwa, began to sell lands
3
and to collect tribute without the authority of the latter.
G. N.A..Accra,ADM.11/1627. Ibid: Ivor Wilks, "The Rise of the
Akwamu Empire, 1650-1710", in T.H.S.G.,vol.Ill,part 2, 1957;
J.K.Fynn, Asante and its Neighbours, 1700-1807. London, 1971,
68-71.
G.N.A..Accra,ADM.1l/l627, op.cit. Danquah stated that the two
stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia were integrated into the state
of Akim Abuakwa. Akim Abuakwa, he explained, was comprised of
five wings, Adonten, Nifa, Benkum, Oseawuo and Jase which were
divided into thirteen divisions. The stool of Asamangkese, one
of the thirteen divisions, served the paramount stool through the
Oseawuohene. As Commander or General of the stool Guard, the
Oseawuohene was one of the five important wing chiefs whose
presence in the State Council was always necessary. The stool of
Akwatia served the paramount stool first through the stool of
Asamangkese and then through the Oseawuohene, J.B.Danquah, Akan
Laws and Customs, London, 1928, 30-33.-
rz
G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/1627. Ibid. Hereafter the two chiefs are
referred to as the Ohene and the Odikro.
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More importantly, in 1920 the Ohene and the Odikro granted, without
the consent of Atta, concessions to the minin^bompany, Consolidated
African Selection Trust, which paid them £60,000. \ They refused
to give Atta any share of it.
Atta argued that according to the customary law of Akim
Abuakwa he, as the Omanhene, was entitled to one third share of
the purchase price of the sale of any land or concessions in his
2
state. Hence Ofori Atta asked the Ohene of Asamangkese to appear
at Kibi to give an acoount of his proceedings - and that of his
subordinate the Odikro - before the state council. The Ohene
refused to attend the meeting of the state council and instead
informed Ofori Atta that he and his elders "did not wish to be
made parties to rules and by-laws passed by the State Council as
they did not form part of the Okyeman (the state Council of Akim
■z
Abuakwa)". Furthermore the Ohene maintained that he was justified
in refusing to pay the Paramount Chief the one third share as "it
4
was not the custom to do so in the time of his ancestors".
This,as one of the Colonial Office Officials noted, was in fact
5
the fons et origo of the whole dispute.
^Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.O.96.726/31039. "Affairs in the Asamangkese Division",





During the next year, 1921, the Ohene addressed a
petition to the Acting Governor. ^ He asked that the Government
should grant him permission to sever his connection with the
2
Paramount Stool. He also asserted that he was "the sole owner"
3of the Asamangkese stool lands. Finally, he complained, inter
4
alia, of Ofori Atta's '^autocratic ruling which had been intolerable."
It is to be remarked that at this time Ofori Atta was
engaged in his fierce attack against the intelligentsia of the
5
N.C.B.W.A. Understandably Guggisberg, who, in general,
encouraged strengthening the authority of the Paramount Chiefs
and, in particular, supported Ofori Atta in his fight against the
intelligentsia, refused to grant the Ohene his independence from
Atta. ^ The Government could not let down its close ally in favour
of a small chief. However, the Ohene of Asamangkese, and with
/(
him his subordinate, the Odikro of Akwatia, defied the authority
of the Government and continued to act independently from the
paramount stool.
The Government decided, however, to intervene in favour
of Atta. The Ohene was summoned to Accra in order that charges
P.R.O.,C.0.96.638, For a summary of this petition dated 7.10.1921,







For more details see chapter two above.
6P.R.O..C.0.96.726/31039.Ibid.
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might be preferred against him with view to his suspension. ^
The Ohene made excuses on the ground of health for not furnishing
answers to the charges. The Acting Secretary for Native Affairs
thought that the Ohene was deliberately defying the Government
and accordingly, without consulting the Governor, he wrote to the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province asking him to escort the Ohene
2
to Accra. This action of the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs
was, in the words of a Colonial Office Official, "not legal" and
that in previous cases of the kind the action was specifically
3
ordered by the Governor.
The Ohene's team of lawyers, which was led by Kobina
Sekyi and included Kojo-Thompson, A.J.E. Bucknor, Frans Dove and
T. Hutton-Hills, brought an action against Ofori Atta, the Acting
Secretary for Native Affairs and the other administrative officers
concerned in escorting the Ohene to Accra and claimed £5,000
4
damages for conspiracy. The Chief Justice, however, dismissed
the charges against the defendants.
In February, 1922, Guggisberg ordered an enquiry to be
held in the dispute at Kibi by the Commissioner of the Eastern
Province. The Ohene and the Odikro refused to attend and asked
that such enquiry should be held in a neutral place outside Akim
Abuakwa. Guggisberg refused this and reacted by deposing, in
5
March 1923, both the Ohene and the Odikro. In practice, however,




^P.R.O.,C.0.96.638, Conf. despatch of 31.3.1923 from Guggisberg to
the Duke of Devonshire.
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the people of Asamangkese and Akwatia continued to treat the
deposed Ohene and Odikro as their de facto chiefs„
Guggisberg could not tolerate this and hence he asked
the Colonial Office that power should be given enabling him to
deport a deposed chief from his division or village to another
place within the country. ^ This was effected by an amendment
2
of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance in 1924. It is interesting
to note that all the African members on the Legislative Council,
3
except Ofori Atta, opposed this amendment. Guggisberg was not,
however, immediately able to use the powers given to him by the
amendment as Sekyi, the principal solicitor of the Ohene and the
Odikro, appealed against it to the courts.
While Sekyi's appeal was still before the courts, the
Government established in 1925 the Provincial Councils of the
Paramount Chiefs and two years later passed the Native
Administration Ordinance. Both measures were aimed at
strengthening the power of the Paramount Chiefs at the expense
of the intelligentsia and the subordinate chiefs. Ofori Atta
was the father of the Provincial Councils and the introducer of
4
the Native Administration Ordinance in the Legislative Council.
1P.R.O.,C.0.96.658. Minute of 18.4.1925.
2





For more detail on the introduction of the Provincial and the
N.A.O. and the opposition of the intelligentsia to them see
chapter three, above.
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Naturally the intelligentsia opposed these measures and
Sekyi, in particular, saw in them a device by which the Government
was aiming to undermine the indeigenous institutions of the
country,, ^ Hence Sekyi became even more determined to pursue
with the Asamangkese case as he saw in it a means to discredit
Ofori Atta and other supporters of the Indirect Rule system.
He used the case as evidence that alien institutions were
incapable of solving local problems of the states. In fact,
the Asamangkese case looked more like a confrontation between
Sekyi and other lawyer-politicians who were opposed to the
colonial administration, on the one hand, and the colonial
administration and its collaborator Ofori Atta, on the other,
rather than a dispute between two subordinate chiefs and their
Omanhene. It was a political dispute of a very complicated
nature.
The 1927 Native Administration Ordinance itself provided
that political and constitutional disputes between a Paramount
Chief and a divisional Chief should be determined by the State
2
Council or before the Paramount Chief's tribunal. The
Ordinance also provided that no Divisional Chief or Chief-
should claim independence from a Paramount Stool to which his
3
stool was subordinate. This was clearly in favour of Ofori Atta.
^For more detail on Sekyi's attitutde towards the Provincial
Councils see chapter four above.




Armed, with these powers given to him under the Native Administration
Ordinance, Ofori Atta sought in 1928 to compel the attendance of
some of Asamangkese people before his tribunal at Kibi for
offences falling within the provisions of the Native Administration
Ordinance. ^ During their detention in Atta's prison at Kibi those
2
people received "revolting treatment".
The next year, May 1929, the Government strengthened
the position of Atta further by passing the Native Administration
(Amendment) Ordinance, No. 12 of 1929, which enabled the state
3
councils to defend their constitutions against "subversive acts".
Section seventeen of this amendment introduced provisions for the
punishment of persons who would instigate opposition to a Paramount
Chief and section twenty-nine enabled a Paramount Chief to detain
4
any person for nine months without trial. The Governor made it
clear that the primary object of the amendment was to make people
like the Ohene of Asamangkese and his supporters guilty of an
offence if they persisted to oppose the authority of their
5
Omanhene.
Immediately after the passage of this amendment, Atta




^P.R.O. ,C.0.96.689, Minute on the "Native Administration (Amendment)
Ordinance No.12 of 1929".
4Ibid.
5P.R.O..C.0.96.689/6456. despatch No. 717 of 27.9.1929 from
Guggisberg to Lord Passfield.
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and elders) and took them to Kibi. ^ Some of these people were
during the period of their imprisonment at Kibi subjected to the
2
most "inhuman treatment". The Ohene and the Odikro petitioned
the Secretary of State against the amendment and described it as
3
retrogressive. Their lawyer, Kojo-Thompson — Sekyi being on a
visit to London at the time — protested against the bad treatment
4
the people of Asamangkese were subjected to by Atta. He also
complained that the political officers, the soldiers, and the
police were terrorising the Ohene and his people to yield to
5
Ofori Atta.
During the next month, June, 1929, the two parties agreed
to submit their dispute to arbitration. The Government, anxious
that the arbitration should take place so that it could end this
already protracted dispute, restored the Ohene and the Odikro,
deposed by Guggisberg in 1923, to their former positions. ^
Mr. Justice R.E. Hall, a puisne judge of the Gold Coast
Supreme Court, who was appointed an arbitrator, gave his award in
September, 1929. It was as follows:
(l) That the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia were: sub-stools of
the paramount stool of Akim Abuakwa and that the said stools were
P.R.0.,C.0.96.691/6331, Minute on the "petition of Kwaku Amoah,
Ohene of Asamangkese and Kwamu Kuma, Odikro of Akwatia" dated 27.9.1929;
Report on the Eastern Province, 1929-1930.
2Ibid.
■^P.R.0. ,C.0.96.689/6436. the petition, dated 21 .6.1929, was
enclosed in despatch No. 717 of 17.9.1929 from Guggisberg to
Lord Passfield.
4
The Gold Coast Times. 4.11.1930.
5Ibid.
^The Gold Coast Gazette No. 4-7 of 1929. P. 121.
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subject to and owed allegiance to the said paramount stool;
(2) That the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia were members of
the state council of Akim Abuakwa and its decisions were binding
on them;
(3) That the consent of the Paramount Chief was not, according
to custom, necessary for the valid alienation of lands held by
the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia;
(4) That the Paramount Chief was, by the custom of Akim Abuakwa,
entitlted to receive one third of all rents and profits of lands
alienated by the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia, or either of
them;
(5) That the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia were subject to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal of the Paramount Chief of Akim Abuakwa,
and of the state council of Akim Abuakwa. ^
Clearly the award was, on the whole, in favour of Atta
as he was given one third of the profits of the Asamangkese and
Akwatia stools' lands, and this was the important issue of the
dispute. The two stools rejected the award and Sekyi, on their
behalf, appealed to the Supreme Court against it arguing that it
2
had no legal effect.
Ofori Atta seemed to have grown impatient because although
the award went in his favour, the two chiefs continued to defy his
Gold Coast Reports; Divisional Court 1926-29 and Award in
Asamangkese-Akim Abuakwa Arbitration, 1929.(Copy at the
British Musuem, London. C.S.C.451).
2
It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Sekyi, J.B.
Danquah defended the attitude of his half-brother, Atta, towards
the people of Asamangkese and welcomed the award as fair and
decisive. The Gold Coast Times, issue of 3-13.7.1930.
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authority. He seemed to have decided to resort to violence as a
final means of making the two stools yield to his authority. In
May, 1931, one Philip Afoakwa, a supporter of the Ohene, was shot
dead by Atta's supporters. ^ Two more people were killed in the
clash that followed. West Africa commented that,
if the occurrence shows nothing else, it proves that the
recent judgement by which the rights of the Omanhene of
Akim Abuakwa to the overlordship of Asamangkese were
allowed, are no nearer to being popularly accepted than
they were many years ago . 2
On its part the Government reacted by putting the Asamangkese area
under the "peace Preservation Ordinance" and a force of police was
3
stationed there.
During the next year, 1932, Sekyi's appeal against the
1929 award was dismissed by both the Supreme Court of the Gold
Coast and the West African Court of Appeal. He immediately
appealed to the Privy Council. While this appeal was before the
Privy Council, the Governor, at the instance of Atta, made, in
April 1932, a proclamation declaring that Atta was the owner of
all land in his state and that alienation of any of the land by
a divisional chief or other persons was not permissible without
4
his consent. The proclamation also provided that in the event
'of alienation, one third of the proceeds of the sale should be
handed over to the Omanhene.
^Report on the Eastern Province, 1931/32.
S/est Africa, 30.5.1931*
•Z
Report on the Eastern Province, 1931/32.
^P.R.0..C.0.96.705/7307, Notes by Bushe, legal Advisor at the
C.O.: West Africa, 2.7.1932.
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The making of such a proclamation was unprecedented and
indeed unwarranted. In addition, and as the Legal Advisor of the
Colonial Office, Mr. Bushe, pointed out, it was likely to prejudice
the case of the Asamangkese people who were having appeal before
the Privy Council concerning the question of land ownership. ^
The Colonial Office, which was obviously embarrassed by the
proclamation, managed, however, to convince the Governor to
revoke it by an Ordinance.
The next year, 1933, the Privy Council dismissed Sekyi's
appeal against the 1929 award. Sekyi did not give up. At his
instance the Ohene and the Odikro petitioned the Secretary of
State asking to be independent from Atta's jurisdiction and
2
control. The petitioners complained, inter alia, that some
of their people had been subjected to "gross and brutal treatment"
3
by Atta. Predictably, the Secretary of State rejected the
petition. It is to be remembered that at the time Atta was in
London as the President of the "Gold Coast and Ashanti delegation
of 1934". He took the opportunity to discuss the Asamangkese
4
dispute with the Colonial Office Officials.
The Government's intervention in favour of Atta reached
its climax in 1935. In that year the Government passed the
1P.R.O.,C.0.96.705/7307. Ibid.
p
P.R.O..C.0.96.713/21613» This petition was dated 20.1.1934 and
enclosed in conf. despatch of 8.6.1934 from G.A.S. Northcote to
Sir P. Cunliff-Lister.
3Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.719/21836, "Extract from a Note of an interview
with Sir Ofori Atta at the Colonial Office on 7.8.1934".
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Asamangkese Division Regulation Ordinance, "an Ordinance to make
provision for the control and regulation of the property, revenues
1
and expenditures of the stools in the Asamangkese Division".
The most important provisions of this ordinance were:
(1) That all incomes of the Asamangkese stool were to be paid to
a prescribed Government officer;
(2) That no alienation of the Asamangkese stool property should
take place without the consent of the prescribed officer;
(3) That the Governor was empowered to suspend or depose any
chief who appeared to him to have contravened any of the
provisions of the Ordinance;
(4) That the Governor was empowered to remove a suspended or
deposed chief from the Asamangkese division to prescribed area
within the Colony;
(5) That the Governor was empowered to remove persons other than
2
chiefs from certain areas in certain cases.
The argument against the harshness of this ordinance was
well expressed by Vest Africa:jn a leading article entitled,
3
"The Asamangkese Ordinance". It stated that:
By placing all the resources of the various stools under
a "prescribed officer", and by providing for the immediate
deposition and/or deportation of Rulers or persons who
impede its working inany way, the new ordinance does in a
"civilised" manner what even the presence of troops in the
^P.R.O.,0.0,96.721/31039. "The Asamangkese Division Regulation




area had been unable to do, it prevents Asamangkese from
seeking any legal remedies that might still have been open
to her, and — a point which is noted by all in the Gold
Coast with the utmost misgiving — it provides a precedent
for official coercion in almost any state that may prove
administratively "difficult" . 1
p
The Ohene and the Odikro petitioned against the Ordinance.
Sekyi took the issue to courts and sought a declaration that the
ordinance was ultra vires of the Legislative Council and repugnant
3to the laws of England and therefore of no legal effect.
This was, however, dismissed by the Divisional Court in July 1936
and Sekyi appealed against it.
In addition the A.R.P.S. seized on the Ordinance as an
object of further propaganda against the colonial administration.
G.E. Moore and S.R. Wood, the two delegates of the Society then in
London, cited the Ordinance as another example of the excessive
powers which were unjustifiably given to the Paramount Chiefs
4
under the Native Administration Ordinance. They asked for an
interview with the Under Secretary of State in-order to discuss
5this "far reaching measure". The Under Secretary having refused
to see them, they got in touch with R. Kidd, the Secretary of the
National Council for Civil Liberties, and asked him to raise the
question of the Ordinance with the Colonial Office officials. ^
1Ibid.
p
BR.O..0.0.96.721/31039, This petition was enclosed in conf.
despatch of 9.8.1935 from Ag.Governor to M. MacDonald.
•Z
G.N.A..Cape Coast,ACC.,No.331/64. (Sekyi's Papers) notes on the
Asamangkese-Kibi Dispute.
^P.R.O..C.0.96.718/21752. notes of 12.12.1934 on the petition of
the A.R.P.S. of 1934, by G.Creasy.
^P.R.O..0.0.96.721/31052/2, letter of 2.5.1935 from G.E.Moore and
S.R. Wood to the Earl of Plymouth, parliamentary Under Secretary.
^G.N.A..Cape Coast,ACC.No.75/64, letter of 4.6.1935 from G.E.Moore
and S.R. Wood to William Coleman, Ag.President of the A.R.P.S.
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Ro Kidd, at their instance, protested to the Colonial Office about
the "unreasonably short time" elapsed between the introduction of
bill and the actual passing into law of the Ordinance. ^ He also
protested against the Governor's refusal to receive the legal
representation of the Ohene and to hear his objections to the
2
terms of the Ordinance.
Meanwhile Wallace-Johnston, who had newly arrived in the
Gold Coast, got involved in the Asamangkese dispute. Wallace-
Johnson was, like Sekyi, vigorously opposed to the Indirect Rule
system and saw it as a means by which the colonial administration
3
consolidated its grip on the people. He also regarded Ofori Atta
as a collaborater with the colonial administration and the two men
became very hostile to each other. In fact, at the time of the
passage of the Asamangkese Ordinance in 1935, Ofori Atta was
involved in an attempt to get Wallace-Johnson expelled from the
4
Gold Coast. Hence Wallace-Johnson, like Sekyi before him, saw
the Asamangkese dispute as a means to discredit his foremost
enemies, namely, Ofori Atta and the colonial administration.
In its first meeting his W.A.Y.L. passed a resolution against the
Asamangkese Ordinance calling upon the Government to consider the
5
advisability of its unconditional repeal. Wallsce-Johnson
referred to this Ordinance in his famous article "Has The African
^G.N.A. .Cape Coast.ACC.76/64, letter of 7.9.1935 from R.Kidd to
Under Secretary of State.
2Ibid.
3
See chapter four above, 135.
4
See chapter four above, 138.
5
Wallace-Johnson's papers, at the Institute of African Studies,
University of Ghana.
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A God" as "an ordinance to grab hold of his African} money so
that he could not stand economically". ^
Wallace-Johnson's involvement reached a new climax in
1936o In August of that; year the Governor deported the Odikro
of Akwatia and four of his councillors from the Asamangkese division
to the New Juaben district, half way between Accra and Kibi.
Wallace-Johnson was quick to champion the cause of these exiled
persons and visited them at their "concentration camp", to use his
2
own words. There, he claimed, the Government subjected them to a
great deal of injustice and suffering and put pressure on them to
3
yield to the Omanhene.
The question of the deportation of the Odikro became more
complicated when G.E. Moore, one of the A.R.P.S.'s delegates then
in London, sent to the Colonial Office copies of two letters
alleged to have been written by Ofori Atta. The first letter
was dated 26.6.1936 from Atta to the Secretary for Native Affairs
in which Atta suggested to the Secretary for Native Affairs the
4
deportation of the Odikro and his councillors. The second
letter was dated 8.7.1936 from Ofori Atta to the Commissioner
of the Eastern Province in which Atta also suggested that "it is
^The African Morning Post, 15.5.1936.
*T.R.O.,C.0.96.726/51039/1. letter of 5.9.1936 from Wallace Johnson
to the Secretary of the L.A.I, enclosure in secret despatch of
22.9.1936 from A. Hodson to Sir C. Bottomley.
5Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.734/31039/1. A copy of this letter was enclosed as
Annexure 1 in "Memo, regarding two documents dated 26.6. and
8.7.1936 ".
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necessary and incumbent on Government that the Odikro and the four
others at Akwatia are deported at any rate Clearly, if
authentic, the two letters inferred that there existed a
conspiracy between Atta and the Government to act in concert
against some people of Asamangkese division and to pervert the
administration of justice.
2
Atta denied having written either of the two letters.
He thought that the whole thing was a trick by E.T. Ashirifie who
managed an establishment in Accra known as the "National Service
3
Bureau". Ashirifie was a close friend of E.B. Wuta-Ofei, the
editor of the Gold Coast Spectator, which had shown "great
hostility to Sir Ofori Atta, personally, and Government's action
in the political dispute between the stool of the Omanhene, Akim
4
Abuakwa, and the stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia".
Equally the Secretary for Native Affairs and the
Commissioner of the Eastern Province denied ever receiving the
original of the two letters in question. In the light of these
denials the Governor asserted that the letters were "impudent
5
forgeries". The police even went as far to suggest that the
letters were in fact written by Wallace-Johnson. ^
4
P.R.O.,C.0.96.734/31039/1♦ Annexure 2 in "Memo regarding two
documents dated 26.6. and 8.7.1936 "
p
P.R.O..C.0.726/31039. "Report on Police Investigation in two
letters alleged to have been written by Sir Ofori Atta",





^P.RO.C.0.96.726/31039. despatch (conf.) of 17.9.1936 from A.Hodson
to W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore.
r
P.R.O.,0.0.96.726/31039. "Report on the Police Investigation..."
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On their part Wallace-Johnson and the A.R.P.S. were,
however, convinced that the two letters were genuine and were
written by Atta and that the Government acted according to their
content. ^ Wallace-Johnson claimed that the originals were
destroyed by the Government as soon as it became known that the
Secretary of State had been informed of their existence. In any
case the Executive Committee of the W.A.Y.L. passed a resolution
condemning the action of Atta and the Government and asked for the
appointment of an "Independent Commission of Enquiry" to investigate
and determine the true state of affairs in the Gold Coast in so far
as the general administrative policy of the Government was concerned,
and, in particular, the judiciary
which side of the administration seems to be threatened with
a process of grave and serious corruption thereby placing
the system of the administration of justice all over the
country, in a very questionable position.... 2
Wallace-Johnson also wrote to anti-imperialist
organisations in Britain, such as the League Against Imperialism,
condemning the action of Atta and accusing the Government of
supporting him to the detriment of the interests of the people
3
of Asamangkese and Akwatia. The League Against Imperialism,
at Wallace-Johnson's instance, raised the question of the two
P.R.0.,C.O.96.726/31039/1. letter of 18.9.1936 from Wallace-Johnson
to the Secretary of the L.A.I, enclosure in secret despatch of
22.9.1936 from A. Hodson to Sir C. Bottomley.
2C.0.96/726/31039/1. "Resolutions passed at a special meeting of
the Executive Committee of the W.A.Y.L. held on 18.9.1936...",
sub enclosure in secret despatch of 22.9.1936 from A. Hodson to
Sir C. Bottomley.
^P.R.O^C.0.96.726/31039/1. Wallace-Johnson's letters of 5.9.,17.9
and 18.9.1936 to the Secretary of the L.A.I. The three letters
were enclosed in secret despatch of 22.9.1936 from A.Hodson to
Sir C. Bottomley.
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letters with the Colonial Office and made R. Sorensen, M.P., to ask
the Secretary of State, W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, at the House of Commons
about them. ^
In summing up it can be said that there was no conclusive
or decisive proof whether Atta wrote the two letters or not.
Equally there was no evidence to support the police's accusation
that Wallace-Johnson wrote them. But, whoever wrote them, the
public feeling in the Gold Coast seemed to be that as copies had
2
got to England, the originals must have existed. And in any case
Wallace-Johnson and the A.R.P.S. exploited the story of these two
letters to the maximum in discrediting Ofori Atta and embarrassing
the Government.
Meanwhile the expense of litigation had become overwhelming.
By 1931 the two stools of Asamangkese and Akwatia had spent about
3
£120,000 on law-suits. Then by the Asamangkese Ordinance of
1935, the Government took control of all the stools' revenues in
the Asamangkese division and thus made it even more difficult for
the two stools to find money to pay the lawyers. Furthermore the
Government continued to increase its pressure on the Ohene and the
Odikro. In 1937, for example, thirty-three supporters of the Ohene
4
were arrested for causing a riot and for unlawful assembly.
^Parliamentary Debates, vol. 315.1935-36, 1728.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.726/31039, "Report on Investigation by the Police.."
3p.R.Q.,C.0.96.721/31039. conf. despatch of 9.8.1935 from the Ag.
Governor to M. MacDonald.
^"In A.B. Holmes IV, "Economic and Political Organisations in the Gold
Coast, 1920-1945", A Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1972.
Holmes has briefly discussed the Asamangkese dispute in his
chapter on "Kobina Sekyi and/or the A.R.P.S.". He is, however,
more interested in explaining Sekyi's legal involvement in the
dispute than studying it within the wider context of the Indirect
Rule system.
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Finally seeing that the case had been dragging in courts since the
early 1920's without a single victory, the Ohene and the Odikro
seemed to become convinced that the courts were not after all the
right place to solve such a dispute.
Because of all this towards the end of 1937, the Ohene
of Asamangkese approached the Acting Commissioner of the Eastern
Province and expressed his desire that peace should be established
between him and Atta. T >e Omanhene of Akwapim offered to act as
an intermediary. Finally, in May 1938, the Ohene and the Odikro
proceeded to Kibi and took the oath of allegiance to the paramount
stool of Akim Abukwa ending eighteen years of bitterness and
hostility. ^
(2) THE GA PARAMOUNT STOOL DISPUTE. 1918-1935.
Primarily, the stool disputes and destoolments in the
Ga state, which were unknown during the pre colonial period but
became frequent during the colonial period, were due to the fact
that the architects of Indirect Rule tried to evolve a uniform
system, based on the Akan institutions, that would apply to all
2
the ethnic groups in the Gold Coast. The difficulty, however,
was that each of the various ethnic groups had its own unique
customs and laws. In particular, the institutions of the Ga-
speaking people, with which we are here concerned, were, as will
be soon explained, distinctly different from those of the Twi-
speaking people.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.744/31039. Conf. despatch of 28.6.1938 from G.E.
London to M. MacDonald.
2
For example, the Vox-Populi, 16.7.1938.
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The Ga-speaking people were not a single group either by-
tradition or in organisation. ^ Each of the Ga towns, Temma, Accra,
Osu, Labadi, Teshi and Nungwa was an independent political unit
2
with a constitution which had grown out of its unique history.
In contradistinction to the Akan political structure there had
never been any political association or confederation between
3these towns and they had never had a Paramount Chief. The Ga
people were originally farmers and lived as scattered extended-
family groups or settlements. They had no military organisation
or a centralised government. The head-priest (wulomo) of each
extended family or farming settlement was its only ruler and the
4head of its civil affairs. The idea of a secular chief was
v
alien to them.
Threatened with extermination by the increase of slave
raiding at the end of the Seventeenth century, these farming
settlements gathered together into "towns" for mutual protection
and set up military organisations which they adopted from their
5
neighbours, the Fanti and the Akwamu. Of particular importance
was their adoption of the office of the mantse (town-father) and
"'m.J. Field, Social Organisation of the Ga people, London 1940,
p. 72; and M. Manoukjjfe, Akan and Ga Aadangme Peoples, London
1 964 (first published 1950), Wf.
2 Ot
M. Manoukifn, op.cit. 81.
3
M.J. Field, op.cit. 72.
4
M.J. Field, Ibid? and Religion and Medicine of the Ga People.
Oxford, 1962.
5 ^
M. Manoukijn, op. cit. 67.
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its war stool. But this did not carry with it the grandeur and
influence concomitant with the Akan chieftainship. A mantse was
a man magically treated or "medicined" by placing him three times
on the stool so that its influence passed into him making him
supernaturally brave and invincible. 1 His presence among his
warriors therefore was held to confer upon them a kind of "induced
2
charge" so that they too become magically brave. But he was only
magically useful in the war; he was not a military leader, and
stood apart with his stool during the battle, protected by a special
3 4
bodyguard. In peace time he had no authority or importance.
The head-priests (wulomei) remained the heads of civil affairs.
It is also important to note that a mantse was made a
mantse by a magical process and that this process could not be
5
undone. In other words, he, unlike an Akan chief, could not be
6
"destooled" and replaced by another mantse. If a mantse
misbehaved in any serious way, he was either killed or simply
ignored. In short the Ga people had no custom of destoolment.
Since most of the early negotiations between the
Europeans and the Africans were concerned with warfare, it was








natural that they took place through the mantsemei (plural of
mantse). Motivated, however, by the mistaken belief that
Africans should "naturally" have a chief who ruled them, the
Europeans treated these mantsemei as secular chiefs possessing
executive and administrative powers on their people. ^ In other
words, the position of the mantse as a secular chief was, like
2
that of the "warrant chief" in Eastern Nigeria virtually
erected by the Europeans.
The British went a step further by assuming that the Ga
people, like the Akan, must have a "Paramount Chief" as the
overall or supreme head of their military and civil affairs.
Accordingly they chose one of the Accra mantsemei and made him
*Z
the Ga Mantse (Paramount Chief) of all the Ga people.
He was not even, as M.J. Field noted, the most senior mantse of
4
Accra. Accra, M.J. Field explained, was divided into seven
quarters or subdivisions, namely Asere, Gbese, Sempe, Akumandez,
5
Otublohu, Abola and Alata, each with a mantse. The senior of
these mantsemei was that of the Asere. It was, however, the
Abela mantse and not the Asere who was treated by the British as
^For example, J.B. Christensen, "African Political System: Indirect
Rule and Democratic Process", in Phylon.XV,1,1934. 69-83.
2
See chapter one above.
3





Ga Mantse. ^ In short, the office of the Ga Mantse, like that of
the mantse, was virtually a European creation.
Apparently when the British first created the position
of the Ga Mantse they were ignorant of the true nature of the Ga
institutions. But after the Department of Native Affairs was
established in 1902 some investigations were made by the
administrative officers in the history and institutions of the
2
Ga. From an enquiry made by the Acting Secretary for Native
Affairs in 1921, for example, it was clear that the Government had
a reasonably good idea about the Ga institutions and it was aware
3
that they were distinctly different from those of the Akan.
Nonetheless, evidently as an attempt to simplify administration
by issuing directives through one person, it kept the office of
the Ga Mantse. They even, as we shall explain later in this
chapter, formally recognised him in 1927 as the Paramount Chief
of the whole Ga people.
Naturally the Ga people objected to the Europeans' policy
of treating the mantsemei and the Ga Mantse, contrary to the Ga
customs and laws, as rulers having secular executive powers.
The Ga people realised, however, that with the advance of the
pax-Britannica, they could no longer kill their misbehaved mantsemei
and could not even simply ignore and desert them, as the colonial
4
administration'was recognising and supporting their powers.
11bid, p.151.
G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/l673. "Notes of Evidence of the Commission of
Enquiry into the Tribal Organisation of the Gas, 1907".
■7
G.N.A..Accra,ADM.11/1676, "Notes of Evidence at Enquiry into
alleged Destoolment of Tackie Yaoboi", by C.W. Welman, the S.N.A.
^G.N.A.,Accra,C.S.0.1246/31 . "The Ga People and N.A.O.", remarks of
26.8.1938 by M.J. Field, the Government Social Anthropologist.
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So to protest against the colonial administration's
policy of giving the mantsemei and the Ga Mantse powers that did
not belong to them under the Ga customs and laws, the Ga people
adopted the Akan practice of destoolment. ^ This was first applied
against mantsemei who associated themselves closely with the
2
Europeans. It was then applied against the Ga Mantse.
The first destoolment of a Ga Mantse in the history of
3the Ga took place in 1918. This was of Tackie Obili who committed
the offence of pledging the stool lands of his ancestors to
4
Europeans for a loan of money without consulting his people.
His destoolment was opposed by his Abola Kpatashie family which
continued to treat him as a Ga Mantse. The Otublohu quarter also
opposed his destoolment. The mother of Tackie Obili was related
5
to the mantse of Otublohu by marriage. The rest of Accra
mantsemei were, however, all in favour of the destoolment and the
Government had no choice but to confirm it. The destoolment of
Tackie Obili marked, as we shall soon see, the beginning of a long
dispute in the Ga state.
Tackie Obili's successsor as Ga Mantse was Tackie Yaoboi
who assumed office in 1919. Yaoboi was the President of A.R.P.S.
^P.R.0..C.O.96.654. memo, of 5.4.1925 on the Affairs in Accra, by
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section of the Eastern Province. He was also from the start, unlike
the majority of the Paramount Chiefs of the Eastern Province, a
staunch supporter of the N.C.B.W.A. ^ As a result, relations between
him and Ofori Atta, the leading critic of the Congress, became
strained, particularly after the latter was booed by supporters of
the former after a heated Legislative Council meeting on 24 April,
2
1921, during which Casely Hayford made his major attack on Atta.
Yaoboi's support for the Congress provided his opponents
with a convenient weapon they could use to undermine his
3
authority. In 1921, for example, the mantesemei of Otublohu,
4
Asere and Sempe claimed to have destooled him. The Government
made enquiry into their allegations but they failed to substantiate
5
their charges against him. They reluctantly renewed their
allegiance to him.
The first serious challenge to Yaoboi came, however, in
1924. The immediate cause of this was the passing of the
"Municipal Corporation Ordinance of 1924". This provided for,
among other things, the replacement of the official president of a
town council by an African mayor, and a graduated rating scheme. ^
^Sessional Paper No.X,1920-21. "Further Correspondence relating to
the N.C.B.W.A.".
2
J.A. Langley, Pan Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa. 1900-




^Kimble, A Political History, 446.
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The usual practice of publishing bills in the gazette was not
followed in the case of this Ordinance but, immediately after
its passage, a copy came into the hands of one J.D. Garshon, an
Accra auctioneer, who brought it to the notice of the Asafo and the
Manbii (townspeople). ^ The Asafo and the Manbii held a meeting
which concluded that Yaoboi, the Ga Mantse, knew about the
Ordinance, "a law affecting them", but failed to tell them about
it. Furthermore they accused him (mistakenly however) of the
unpopular transference of the old market' to a new one and an
3increase in the rents for market stalls and for other hardships.
The Asafo and the Manbii then drew a petition against the Ordinance
in which they complained that
it infringes upon the position of the Ga Mantse and Native
custom and they also became certain that the powers and
duties of the Mayor will greatly interfere with them and
apart from the burden of taxes which the Municipal
Corporation Ordinance, 1924, introduces, it also greatly
in any way, shape and form#infringes upon the right,
duties and privileges of the chiefs of the Colony and
Native Custom.... 4
It must be remarked that although the Ordinance itself
was unpopular, the Asafo and the Manbii were equally opposed to
5Yaoboi's attempt to act independently of them. They were
convinced that Yaoboi co-operated with the Government behind
^Sessional paper No.X,1929-26; Report of an enquiry held by C.W.
Welman, the S.N.A., into the destoolment of the Ga Mantse.
2Ibid.
^P.R.O.C.O.96.654, Ibid.
^P.R.O.,C.0.96.669/4528. "The petition of Asafo and mantsemei
Gbese, Asere, Sempe, Otublohu, and Akumaji, dated 9.5.1925,




their back, a thing they could not tolerate. They even became
more convinced of their opinion when Yaoboi refused to sign their
petition against the Ordinance and instead he brought a suit
against the prime movers in the agitation and claimed £5,000
damages. ^ As a result of this the mantse of Gbese and one
2
Nattey, a leader of the Asafo, were fined £20 and £30 respectively.
3
Nine other persons were fined £10 each and one person £15. The
Asafo and the Manbii reacted by declaring Yaoboi destooled. His
destoolment was positively approved by five of Accra's seven
4
quarters. Of the remaining, Alata was opposed to it while
5
Abola maintained to be neutral. The A.R.P.S. intervened to make
peace between Yaoboi and his opponents, but its attempt failed
because the Asafo and the Manbii objected to the Ordinance totally
g
while the A.R.F.S. objected to certain features in it.
The Governor decided to appoint C.W. Welman, the Secretary
for Native Affairs, as a commissioner to enquire into the question
whether Yaoboi had or had not been destooled according to the Ga
customary law. But, as has been already described, strictly
speaking, the Ga people had no prescribed rules for the destoolment









applied the procedure connected with destoolment among the Akan. ^
According to the Akan customary law before a chief was destooled
charges were framed against him and he was given opportunity to
2
reply to them. The Commissioner maintained that this was not
noticed in the destoolment of Yaoboi and accordingly concluded
that Yaoboi's destoolment was "irregular and not in accordance with
3
native law and custom". On the strength of this Governor
Guggisberg decided not to confirm Yaoboi's destoolment. Guggisberg
was not sympathetic with Yaoboi, who was closely associated with the
N.C.B.ir.A., but he was alarmed by the increasing number of
4
destoolments and was anxious to stop or at least lessen them.
The opponents of Yaoboi were disappointed with the
Governor's decision. They argued that although they had borrowed
the practice of destoolment from the Akan, they did not borrow all
the procedure connected with it. They held that the destoolment
of Yaoboi was approved by the majority of the mantsemei and their
5
people and this was enough reason for his destoolment. Finally
they proceeded to the Government House protesting against the
Governor's decision and proclaiming that whatever the Governor
said they could not serve Yaoboi as Ga Mantse. ^ The police
11bid.
2
For example see Casely-Hayford. Gold Coast Institutions,
London 1970. (first edition 1903) 36.
3
Sessional paper No. X of 1923-26. Ibid. Also Report of the
Native Affairs Dept. 1924-25.
4
See chapter three above.
5
P.R.O.,C.0.96655, "petition by J.C. Okai and four others protesting
against Governor's decision that the destoolment of Ga Mantse was
not in accordance with native law and custom", enclosure in
despatch No. 450 of 27.6.1925 from Guggisberg to L.S. Amery.
6P.R.O..C.O.96.654. Ibid.
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intervened and several people were beaten and others arrested and
charged before the police Magistrate and remanded. ^ Guggisberg
stood his ground, however, and kept Yaoboi as Ga Mantse in spite
of the overwhelming wish of his people to remove him.
During the next year, 1925, the Government created the
Provincial Councils of the Paramount Chiefs, which were largely
based on the tradition of the Akan chiefs to assemble and act in
collaboration. Two years later the Government enacted the Native
Administration Ordinance which was also thoroughly constructed on
the Akan political system with its most distinguished feature,
namely that of a traditional state with a Paramount Chief as its
supreme head.
The Native Administration Ordinance was, however, applied
to all the ethnic groups in the Gold Coast. With respect to the
Ga people it formally recognised the Ga Mantse as the Paramount
Chief of all the Ga speaking people and gave him specific executive,
2
judicial and fiscal powers. The Native Administration Ordinance
also brought the Ga people under one "state" and created the "Ga
state council" as the ultimate authority in dealing with all
3
political and constitutional disputes.
As we have already observed the Ga towns were originally
}
independent of one another and did not co-operate in political
matters. So the Ga state council as constructed by the Native
^Ibid.
'Tor definitions of a paramount chief see the N.A.0. No. 18 of
1221-
3
For definitions and functions of a state council see the G.C.
No. 18 of 1927.
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Administration Ordinance had no traditional basis and was entirely
a British creation. Some of the Ga chiefs, in fact, complained
that the Native Administration Office was introduced by Akan chiefs
and might be suited to Akan customs and institutions but it did
nothing but undermine the power of the mantsemei who had no such
an office as a Paramount Chief, but were all equally members of
the greater tribunal of the Ga nation. ^
Ironically, although the Native Administration Ordinance
recognised Tackie Yaoboi as the Paramount Chief of the Ga people
and gave him powers that did not belong to him under the Ga
customary law, still he declared himself against it. Yaoboi was
the President of the A.R.P.S. section of the Eastern Province and
since that society had strongly come out against that Ordinance,
he seemed to have little choice but to associate himself with its
2
stand. Another reason for Yaoboi's opposition to the Native
Administration Ordinance was apparently because it had been
introduced into the Legislative Council by his traditional rival,
Ofori Atta.
In any case Yaoboi's opposition to the Native Administration
Ordinance provided his opponents with a new weapon to destool him.
The Ga state council which owed its existence and powers to the
Native Administration Ordinance could not tolerate Yaoboi's
opposition to that Ordinance. Hence, in February 1929, the state
^West Africa, 4*8.1928.
*Tor more on Yaoboi's opposition to the N.A.O. see chapter three
above.
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council declared Yaoboi destooled and the mantse of Gbese, Ayi
Bonte, was selected to act as Ga Mantse. ^ The state council then
re-elected Tackie Obili, who was destooled in 1918, as Ga Mantse.
The supporters of Yaoboi refused to accept his destoolment
by the state council. As a result, the dispute was referred in
2
1932 to the Provincial Council of the Eastern Province. The
members of the Provincial Council, including its president, Ofori
Atta (and Yaoboi's opponent), were predominantly Akan. Naturally
the procedure adopted by the Provincial Council was based on Akan,
and not Ga, laws and customs. The Provincial Council approved of
Yaoboi's destoolment and recommended that the election and
installation of Tackie Obili as Ga Mantse should be recognised
3
by the Government. The Government approved of their
recommendations. But the supporters of Yaoboi refused to accept
this. In practice, from now until the end of the colonial period,
the Ga people became permanently divided into two groups or factions
each recognised a different Ga Mantse, and the destoolment by each
faction of the other Ga Mantse became an annual ceremony. By
forcing the Ga people to adopt the Akan practice of destoolment and
by trying to force on them Akan usuages and customs the colonial
administration was responsible for the protracted dispute in the
Ga paramount stool (i.e. that of the Ga Mantse).
^Report on the Eastern Province, 1929-30.
2
Report on the Eastern Province, 1931-32.
^Ibid. Also the Gold Coast Times, 23.2.1933.
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Finally, it would perhaps be important, and indeed
interesting, to briefly examine how the Ga paramount stool dispute
affected the Accra municipal elections to the Legislative Council.
The first such election under the 1925 Constitution took place in
1927. The men of the N.C.B.W.A. decided to cease their boycott
to the Legislative Council and formed the "Ratepayers Association"
as an organisational vehicle for winning the election. ^ They
chose J. Glover Addo as their candidate.
Kojo-Thompson formed the "Manbii Party" to secure his
own election. He claimed that his party, as its name indicated,
represented the mass of the people while the Ratepayers represented
2
only the educated elite. His claim was not completely unfounded.
He had always been active in Accra local politics and in 1924,
for example, he was prominent in the agitation against the Municipal
Corporation Ordinance. This Ordinance, as we have described, was
strongly opposed by the Asafo and Manbii of Accra. In 1926, however,
he accepted nomination to the Legislative Council and this gained
him much unpopularity. But his solitary and fierce opposition to
the Native Administration Ordinance when it came to discussion in
the Legislative Council in 1927 seemed to have regained him his
3
lost popularity. If anything distinguished Kojo-Thompson from
^Kimble, A Political History, 452.
2
For example, A.B. Holmes IV, op. cit.
3
S. Shaloff; "The Press and Politics in Accra: The Accra
Legislative Council Election of 1935", in Societies - A Review
of Social History, Vol.1.No.3. 1971.
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the majority of the intelligentsia, it was his ability and courage
to say strong words against the colonial administration.
Unfortunately for him, however, when the 1927 election took place,
the Ga Mantse was Tackie Yaoboi, who was a leading supporter of
the N.C.B.W.A. Naturally Yaoboi gave his support to the Rate¬
payer^ candidate. In fact Yaoboi beat the gong-gong asking the
people to vote for Addo„ ^ Several factors, which is not our
purpose to discuss here, had determined the victory of Addo, but
it seemed certain that Yaoboi's support for him was vital and
decisive.
Accra's second election for the Legislative Council took
2
place in 1931. The two principal candidates were Dr. Nanka-Bruce
of the Ratepayers, and Kojo-Thompson, the President of the Manbii
Party- Meanwhile Yaoboi was destooled in 1929 as Ga Mantse and the
Mantse of Gbese, Ayi Bonte, was acting as Ga Mantse. Unfortunately
for Kojo-Thompson, Bonte, like Yaoboi before him, was a strong
supporter of the Ratepayers. Hence he also beat the gong-gong
3
asking the people to vote for Nanka Bruce. Kojo AbabioIV, the
mantse of James Town, who was also a supporter of the Ratepayers,
4
even sat next to the clerk's table during the balloting.
^A.B.Holmes IV, op.cit.
2
This election was well covered by the Times of West Africa, see
e.g. the issues of 20.7., 20.8., 8.9., 15.9., and 16.9.1931.
5Ibid.
^The Times of West Africa, 17-18.9.1931.
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Nanka Bruce won the election. ^ Once again the internal politics
of the Ga state seemed to have played a decisive role in the
result of the election.
Accra's third election to the Legislative Council took
place in 1935o Once again the two principal candidates were
Dr. Nanka-Bruce and Kojo Thompson. But things were now different.
Not only did Kojo Thompson receive the support of Wallace Johnson
and Azikiwe, both newly arrived in the Gold Coast, but, and perhaps
most importantly, he received the crucial support of the Ga
2
Mantse. The Ga Mantse in 1935 was Tackie Obili who was a bitter
rival of the former Ga Kantse, Tackie Yaoboi, and was opposed to
the Ratepayers. Obili was in fact one of Kojo Thompson's
nominators. As Yaoboi and Bonte beat the gong-gong in 1927 and
1931 in support of the Ratepayers' candidates, so in 1935 Obili
3
beat the gong-gong in support of Kojo Thompson. Kojo Thompson
triumphed over Nanka Bruce. His victory seemed to be primarily
due to the change in the balance of power in the politics of the
Ga state rather than being a class or mass triumph over the
4
educated elite as Wallace Johnson wanted us to believe.
The result was as thus:
Dr. Nanka Bruce 806
Kojo Thompson 558






Kojo Thompson was removed from the Legislative Council after a
controversial bribes charge. (For a brief information on this see
West Africa, 22.7. and 29.7.44 and P.R.O.,C.0.96.777/31013: Kojo
Thompson's case). He was replaced by A. Sawyer, a prominent
member of the Ratepayers. And when Burns' Constitution of 1946
increased Accra's representatives to the Legislative Council to
two, the first two to be elected were A. Sawyer and Nanka Bruce,
both of the Ratepayers.
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CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this study has succeeded in adequately examining,
investigating and assessing the nature and significance of the anti-
colonial protest and resistance of both urban and rural Africans in
Southern Ghana to the British policy of Indirect Rule during the second
quarter of this century.
It has been argued that there were various factors or motives
which triggered the African protest against the Indirect Rule system.
Among these factors was the democratic nature of the indigenous insti¬
tutions. The A lean political system was characteristically democratic
in theory and practice and provided the people with a large measure
of control over their chiefs. An Akan chief was elected by the people
and could be destooled by them; he could not act independently of his
council and his people. By contrast, the Indirect Rule system was by
nature authoritarian and it aimed at giving the chiefs autocratic
powers over their people.
The story of the Indirect Rule system in .Southern Ghana was
essentially one of struggle between an autocratic colonial system and
a democratic indigenous one. Through the Indirect Rule system, the
colonial administration attempted, first, to impose overriding control
over the chiefs, and secondly, to integrate them completely into its
machinery of government. However, this was not possible, When the
people felt that their chief was defying their wishes by supporting
unpopular colonial policies, they simply destooled him. The destool-
ments which became very frequent during the colonial era,particularly
during the period covered by this study, represented the reaction of
African society to the tendency of the chiefs to accept or to try to
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enforce unpopular governmental measures. The weapon of destoolment
proved very effective in frustrating Indirect Rule policies. The
people jealously guarded their customary institutions and objected to
the colonial Government's involvement in the day-to-day affairs of
their stools. In short, due partly to the democratic nature of the
Akan political system and the traditional checks and balances provided
by it, it was not possible to establish in the Gold Coast colony an
orthodox or a Lugardian model of Indirect Rule.
Another factor involved in the anti-colonial protest and resis¬
tance by Africans was the question of the inherent rights of juris¬
diction of the chiefs. In their opposition to the Indirect Rule system,
the African spokesmen, including the chiefs, maintained that the
chiefs' rights of jurisdiction were inherent in them by virtue of the
position to which they had been elected by their people and denied
that they were derived from and exercisable at the will of the Crown.
The spokesmen argued that the Gold Coast was not conquered or ceded
and thus the British Crown could not claim sovereignty over the chiefs,
and it certainly could not appoint or dismiss them. This argument
was advanced against virtually every measure of the British to regulate
chieftaincy. Because this argument was frequently cited by the African
leaders, it became a unique feature of the Indirect Rule system in
the Gold Coast, if compared, for example, with that in Nigeria or
Tanganyika, that until 19^-. the legislation avoided any explicit
commitment to the absolute sovereignty of the Crown and consequently
the relationship between chiefs and Government officials was never
adequately defined.
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It was similarly a unique feature of the Indirect Rule system in
the Gold Coast that, due to African opposition, until the mid-1940s,
the colonial Government found it very difficult to establish treasuries
or to introduce direct taxation for the upkeep of the "Native Author¬
ities". Treasuries and a direct taxation scheme were essential attri¬
butes of any classical system of Indirect Rule.
Another factor behind African protest was that western education,
Christianity, economic growth and the activities of the press, all
tended to weaken the authority of' the chiefs and consequently contributed
to the failure of Indirect Rule. 3oth the intelligentsia and the semi-
educated "youngmen" came out strongly against the Indirect Rule policy,
because, in their opinion, it tended to turn the balance of political
power in favour of the chiefs. Because of their education and
economic resources, the intelligentsia^in particular,considered them¬
selves, and not the chiefs, destined to the political leadership of
the country. Equally the "youngmen" resented the fact that the Indirect
Rule system totally excluded them from both political and economic
benefits. Education itself, which since the 1920s came to be demanded
on a large scale, was looked upon as a means for a good job.
In short, as a result of western education and economic growth,
there was a complete new system of social stratification; the chiefs,
the intelligentsia and the "youngmen" were all in conflict with each
other over political power. In the final analysis, it can be said
that the chiefs lost in this struggle. When self-government was
achieved in 1951» political power was not inherited by the chiefs as
the colonial administration hoped and planned but was inherited by
completely new social forces.
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It must be stressed, however, that both the intelligentsia and
the "youngmen" were not against the concept of chieftaincy itself;
their respect for the position of the chief as a representative of the
stool was never in question. Indeed, contrary to the view held by
the colonial officials, it was very misleading to speak in the Gold
Coast of "detribalised" or denationalised" Africans. Amid all the
economic and social changes which took place during the colonial
period with gathering speed and intensity, the life of the people
continued to centre around their stools. The Gold Coast indigenous
customary politico-social system was designed to show the greatest
respect for the concept of chieftaincy. Perhfl^J s that is one reason
why chieftaincy survived.
Ironically, a second reason why chieftaincy survived was due to
the power to destool which the people possessed under the indigenous
customary institutions. Although this was resented by the chiefs as
it forbade them to acquire all the powers available to them under the
Indirect Rule system, the threat of destoolment prevented chiefs from
allowing themselves to be too closely identified with or integrated
into the colonial system.
Some credit must also be given to the chiefs themselves in pre¬
serving the dignity and prestige of chieftaincy. First, the chiefs
tried, even if on a small scale, to accommodate themselves to the on¬
going educational and social changes by seeking to educate themsleves
and their heir-apparents. Secondly, some of the chiefs, although a
minority, were very prominent in the leadership of the nationalist
movement. In spite of their rivalry over political power, the chiefs,
the intelligentsia and the "youngmen" found it possible to agree on
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issues of a national nature such as the demand for constitutional
reforms and the Africanisation of the civil service. Even Ofori Atta,
the staunch supporter of the colonial Government's Indirect Rule
policies, found it possible on various occasions to resist British
authority and to associate himself with the ccu*ses of his people.
Indeed, it can be said that the relationship of the chiefs with the
colonial Government was, in gener-'d, one of both cooperation and re¬
sistance. The colonial Government did not completely succeed in its
policy of dividing or divorcing the chiefs irom the rest of the
African community.
3y and large the chiefs in the Gold Coast emerged from the
colonial era with much of their political base irQ:act. This was why
even Nkrumah could not remove the chiefs, had he genuinely wanted to,
because their power base was such that while they could not challenge
the regime, any attempt to remove them would have caused a reaction
which Nkrumah could not politically afford.
The students of Ghanaian nationalism have largely concentrated
on and, as a result, have sometimes overemphasised the role of the
urban educated elite. The role of the illiterate rural people, who
constituted the majority of the country's people, has been very much
neglected. A primary objective of this study has been to focus more
attention on the political activities of the rural people and con¬
sequently to offer a better understanding of political development in
Ghana. It has been argued that, primarily through the Asafo system,
the rural people played a crucial role in the development of Ghanaian
nationalism. One can argue here against Austin who stated that:
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Only in the municipalities, among the small group of lawyers arxi
teachers, were there any obvious signs of discontent. Elsewhere
the dominant feature of the Gold Coast scene was a seemingly
universal attachment to local chiefdoms, lineages, and village
groups, and an absorption in local interests which was encouraged
by the decentralized nature of the colonial administration under
which Commissioners controlled their districts with a minimum of
interference from Accra. 1
Indeed, the discontent in the rural areas was no less, if not more,
than in the three municipalities of Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi. In
the Gold Coast, as we have explained in this study, the rural people
had a long and impressive record of anti-colonial protest. What
Nkurmah did was to exploit this discontent and dissatisfaction found
among the illiterate rural people and use it for his cause. Indeed,
it was mainly these rural people who gave the C.P.P. its election
successes. It is interesting to note that Klcrumah seemed to be aware
of the vital role played by the Asafo in the rise of the C.F.P. and
even suggested that, "The Asafo companies ... should be properly uni-
2
formed and perform their traditional role in a modern manner".
By and large it seems no exaggeration to suggest that the role of the
illiterate rural people and their long anti-colonial protest was
equally vital to achieving independence as that of the educated Africans.
Finally, this study has described and examined the different
forms of African anti-colonial protest which ranged from passive non-
cooperation to violent "disturbances" and "riots". This anti-colonial
protest was usually organised, forceful and above all successful.
Indirect Rule policies such as the Provincial Councils system, the
Native Administration Ordinance, direct taxation, the stool treasuries
system, etc., were seriously challenged and their application was frus-
^D. Austin, Politics in Ghana, 66-67.
^Quoted in K. Owusu, op.cit., 4l.
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trated. In short, because of African protest and resistance, the
classic application of Indirect Rule of the type developed by Lugard
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